

## Affective Dimensions in *Don Quijote*<sup>1</sup>

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My intention here is to sketch out an approach to studying emotion in *Don Quijote*. As it turns out, only the poorest critical language is available to us for talking about emotion in literature, and there is virtually no agreement as to what conceptual guidelines to use. But there does seem to be a growing awareness that this is a domain worth exploring.

Imagine for a moment what literature (of any genre or epoch) would be like if it were deprived of emotion. Lifeless might be one way to describe it: without emotion literature would simply not exist. Since Antiquity the vital importance of the affective dimension of literature and the other arts has most often been recognized, whether enthusiastically or begrudgingly. Plato, Aristotle, Horace, Quintilian, and Longinus all developed poetic or rhetorical theories very much oriented towards emotion. Most of the major Western philosophers have been deeply concerned

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with the affects or emotions or passions, and, after a brief lull, philosophy of the past few decades has again taken up this issue. Since about 1980, studies on emotion have burgeoned across the spectrum from the biological to the social sciences and humanities, with hundreds of books appearing on all aspects of the subject, as can be seen, for example, from the long lists of volumes on emotion published by the Cambridge and Oxford university presses.

It would seem all the more surprising, then, that literary theory and criticism over the past century, usually so willing to embrace anything within reach, have had so little to say about emotion, and have been so strangely inattentive to important developments in adjacent fields. Some critical approaches do lend themselves to developing an awareness of it, but these are relatively few compared to the primacy of interpretive models where texts are treated as information to be processed or codes to be deciphered according to discrete sets of criteria, and where meaning prevails in the form of thought devoid of affect, as though these were separable. Some valuable research has of course been undertaken on topics related to the emotions in literature. In the case of *Don Quijote*, for example, studies have been done of certain humors or passions, or of humor itself. Apart from an interest in humors and passions of Early Modern literature, English studies in particular have generated discussions gravitating around the question of how we can intelligibly feel emotions for nonexistent people or events, that is, the so-called paradox of fiction. Valid as this question may be, in my view it is badly formulated, depending as it does on the tenet of cognitive psychology that emotion depends on belief, so that a polemic has been stirred up as to whether the emotions we as readers feel are real ones or pseudo-emotions. To the extent that this sterile debate occupies the literary chapters of interdisciplinary volumes dedicated to emotions and the arts, it obfuscates the unique perspectives that literary studies could yield about emotion.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Especially lucid on the "paradox of fiction" is Jerrold Levinson's introductory essay to *Emotion and the Arts* (Chapter 1, 20–35). Note that the volume devotes its entire section on literature (Chapters 2–5, not to mention later chapters

One of the problems with emotion as an object of study, of course, is that it is so elusive and mercurial, so hard to systematize or theorize. What is it exactly that we would be trying to identify? How would we get hold of affects or determine moods, what emotions or passions would we focus on, and how would we demarcate the boundaries between all of these? Whether or not it has any measure of universality, affective experience no doubt varies in time and place, from person to person, from one language or culture to another, such that no scheme of criteria seems widely applicable. A cursory look at such notions as love, anger, guilt, or shame bears out how different they can be at different times and places, to the point that their identity may be called into question. What's more, talking about emotion presents the opposite danger of lapsing into platitudes and stating the obvious without leading to any further understanding of, say, the literary work in question. So even if emotion is recognized as important, it may be seen as irremediably problematic as an object of study. Whereas musicologists acknowledged that music was, in a special sense, the language of the emotions, they chose for decades to avoid all talk about emotion and focus rather on, say, indisputable formal and technical aspects, yet all of this formalism was unable to keep the inevitable theme of emotion from irrupting anew. Literary studies of nearly all banners opted for a similar avoidance.

I have found that disciplines other than literary studies provide far more insight into the nature of emotions as well as the workings of emotions in the arts. Psychology, philosophy, and ethnology figure among the more relevant of these disciplines for literary studies, while within the arts, musicology and film studies have taken the lead. The enormous resistance within literary criticism to regard literature as what it is, namely a temporal art (as Aristotle points out at the beginning of his *Poetics*), has no doubt obscured the affinities that literature has with its nearest of kin: music and film. Much of this, then, can be helpful in formulating how emotion deploys itself in literature, while at the same

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such as 10 and 16) to this issue about which numerous books have been published, among them those of Bijoy H. Boruah and E. M. Dadlez.

time literary texts should have at least as much to offer in return. My contention is that, by and large, the problematic of literature and emotion has yet to be thought out. Certain “places” are more privileged than others as vantage points, it seems to me, and Cervantes’ writings offer one such vantage point because they have so much to say about emotion. As we all know, *Don Quijote* in particular has spawned an impressive range of paradigms in modern thought, and, to cite just one recent anecdote, it is regarded as having anticipated by nearly four centuries the discovery of a condition known as R.B.D. or REM Behavior Disorder—in the battle of the wineskins in I, 35.<sup>3</sup>

So the problem remains as to how to go about investigating emotion in literature, or more specifically in Cervantes’ works. One could of course look into the discursive milieu of Early Modern Spain to see how, say, the passions or humors were talked about, and this might set up some coordinates for how Cervantes represents and induces emotion. But such an approach, useful as it might be in some instances, would fall short of what actually goes on in *Don Quijote*, much as the poetics of Cervantes’ greatest novel by no means fits within the straitjacket of Alonso López Pinciano’s *Filosofía antigua poética*. Contemporary treatises on laughing and crying, along with the erroneous association of Democritus with laughter and Heraclitus with weeping,<sup>4</sup> in my opinion do little to illuminate the laughter and tears represented or induced in *Don Quijote*. The intellectual poverty of works like these leaves us with no recourse but to look elsewhere.

My rather eclectic working assumptions about emotion are borrowed from all over, but are also the result of choices and reflections as to what might be most suitable to a study of emotion in literature, and most in sync with Cervantes’ own rendering of emotion. I will briefly explain a number of them. First of all, what terms should be used? As is already evident, I regard the term “emotion,” preferably in the singular so as not to evoke namable emotions, as the comprehensive term covering everything from

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<sup>3</sup> Brown 39. “REM,” an acronym for “Rapid Eye Movement,” refers to the state during sleep during which the subject experiences dreams.

<sup>4</sup> Aurora Egido provides a superb overview of such issues.

the most fleeting and undefinable affects to the most durable moods, and including feelings, sentiments, emotions (in the plural), and passions, all of which have their own semantic domain though with considerable overlapping. None of the other terms here defines so broad a scope as “emotion” (in Spanish *emotividad* and *afectividad* serve my purposes equally well). This initial choice of terminology already sets one approach apart from another: to focus, for example, on passions, or feelings, or emotions (plural), etc., as many studies do, already determines the object of study in very different ways. Passions are usually quite vehement, and exclude the calmer and more labile sorts of emotion; feelings suggest something more individual than social; emotions (plural) beg the question as to which particular emotions one is interested in finding out about. All of these terms typically exclude moods and other affective states with subtle changes.

As for the nature of emotion, the dominant current in philosophy since Plato has been that reason and emotion are antithetical. Seneca and the other stoics, Montaigne, and Descartes are among the many who in one way or another espouse this notion, which in any event seems to be supported by widespread proverbial wisdom that considers emotion to be irrational. My *American Heritage Dictionary* defines *affective* as “pertaining to or resulting from emotions or feelings *rather than from thought*,” as though thought had nothing to do with emotion. A contrary view would be that of Nietzsche, who time and again views thought itself as a product of the affects. One would of course have to go back to the second book of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* for a sustained analysis of all of those emotions somehow related to oratory practices: such emotions are inseparable from the rational thought that inhabits them. In certain circumstances, such as anger, far from being a deplorable emotion, the emotion is in fact the expected and most reasonable response. In this regard, philosophers such as Spinoza, Nietzsche, Sartre, and Heidegger<sup>5</sup> find themselves aligned with a more Aristotelian view, as is also the case with virtually all modern approaches to emotion, guided as most of them have

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<sup>5</sup> For Spinoza, see Cremaschi; for Sartre, see Solomon, “Politics” 4 and 6; for Heidegger, see Hyde and Smith.

been by cognitivism which insists that all emotion involves cognition at various key stages. To cite one example, film scholar Torben Grodal takes issue with the idea that comprehension and emotional response are separable by asking, "Is it possible to 'comprehend' the narrative in *Casablanca* or *Psycho* without any idea of the types of emotions cued in the films and their relative strength? The answer seems to be no" (1). The same question—with the same answer—could be applicable to any of the texts we deal with.

Many recent studies in fact focus on so-called "emotional intelligence," which I have no quarrel with as long as some allowance is made for emotional stupidity because, as Nietzsche again reminds us, emotions can sometimes be extremely stupid,<sup>6</sup> which does not mean that they have no thought in them, but rather that such thought is itself unintelligent. With regard to Cervantes, my impressions are that his representations of emotion generally reveal their own logical or psychological sense, that they are in fact full of thought even if that thought is sometimes stupid (as in the case of, say, Ortel Banedre's desire for revenge in *Persiles* III, 7), and that the reason/emotion antithesis is rarely if ever applicable. I would go so far as to say that in these works there is no meaning without emotion, and no emotion without meaning: to look for one without the other is a pointless exercise. Also worth bearing in mind here is Catherine Lutz's affirmation that emotion has value "as a way of orienting us toward things that matter rather than things that simply make sense" (cited in Planalp 38).

Other aspects of Cervantes' treatment of emotion include a full acknowledgment of the physiological aspects of emotion.

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<sup>6</sup> "All passions have a phase when they are merely disastrous, when they drag down their victim with the weight of stupidity—and a later, very much later phase when they wed the spirit, when they 'spiritualize' themselves. Formerly, in view of the element of stupidity in passion, war was declared on passion itself, its destruction was plotted; all the old moral monsters are agreed on this: *il faut tuer les passions*. ...*Destroying the passions and cravings, merely as a preventive measure against their stupidity and the unpleasant consequences of this stupidity—today this itself strikes us as merely another acute form of stupidity. We no longer admire dentists who 'pluck out' teeth so that they will not hurt any more*" (Nietzsche 487).

Think of all the bodily effects of Sancho Panza's laughter, fear, and sadness, or the bodily effects of Don Quijote's emotions, for that matter: there is obviously no alienation here of body from mind, of the kind that might be found in other writers. In this, too, Cervantes' portrayals accord both with Aristotle and modern research, as they also do in the way they regard emotion as both individual and social, in contrast, say, to William James, who would influentially define emotions as feelings and therefore as primarily individual in nature (see Calhoun and Solomon, 125–41). Contrary to the passivity implicit in the very etymologies of terms like "pathos," "passion," and "suffering," philosopher Robert Solomon contends that "emotions do not just 'happen' to us. ...They are...activities that we 'do,' stratagems that work for us, both individually and collectively" ("Politics" 5). It might be worth inquiring into whether, in Cervantes' case, characters' emotions sometimes have a tactical or strategic function, whether they are activities that characters "do." (Think of how Don Quijote "falls in love" in I, 1, or how the shepherds in the pastoral Arcadia of I, 51 simply pick an emotion and then "do" it.) The fully social nature of emotion in Cervantes' texts opens up an enormous range of social situations that produce emotion and transform it in every imaginable way. It is here that we can most clearly observe how emotion arises in one character or another, how it affects everyone else by such processes as sympathy, empathy, contagion, concern, or antagonism (to mention a few) and how it keeps fluctuating, changing in aspect and intensity as things move along. It is here that we can see how emotion rarely comes in a pure state, most often appearing in some hybrid or highly nuanced form, and how character and emotion interact, because, as we know, Don Quijote and Sancho may both experience fear, but their responses to this fear are diametrically opposed. It is here, finally, that we can notice the artistic techniques used to treat emotion, and that we can attach electrodes to ourselves and monitor how we respond to what we read.

The question remains as to where we locate emotion, especially when we are talking about, say, a novel such as *Don Quijote*. Whose emotion are we talking about, and what does it consist

of? As always, the most likely candidates here seem to be the writer, the text, or the readers, or some combination of these. The problem in the first case is that we can only speculate regarding the writer's emotion since we have little if any idea as to what was going through his mind when he composed his works. One of the reviewers of Edith Grossman's translation of *Don Quijote* quotes the moment of the knight's death, where Don Quijote, "surrounded by the sympathy and tears of those present, gave up the ghost, I mean to say, he died," and goes on to comment: "The poverty of the language here, its near-clumsiness and refusal to plume itself up into magnificence, is moving, as if Cervantes himself were overcome with grief at the passing of his creation" (Wood). A lot of interpretation is going on here, some of it entirely speculative. The fact is that the protagonist dies in the latter part of a sentence that began talking about something else. This tacked-on half-sentence in the novel might serve as an interesting Rorschach test for all of the novel's readers. Naïve as this commentary may be, I wonder whether any of us can or ought to avoid conjuring up some image of Cervantes as he wrote passages like the funniest or most heart-rending ones in the novel because, ultimately, we form part of the chain of magnetic rings in the conveyance of this novel, to borrow Plato's image from the *Ion*, and it is hard to imagine the writer of such sublime passages remotely detached from his work. The main problem in the case of Cervantes is that his artistic workshop seems to be as inaccessible as Don Quijote's walled-off library.

Emotion is no doubt configured in many ways within the text, the most obvious of these being the representation of emotion in the characters. Characters respond to each other, and we respond to them, but not always in predictable ways. As we see throughout Cervantes' texts, tears and laughter are among the most contagious of responses, but tears can also provoke laughter or nausea or numerous other reactions, and someone else's laughter isn't always funny. Such diversity of response was always anticipated, of course, as when the friend in the Prologue to Part I of *Don Quijote* takes into account a variety of different temperaments and advises the authorial figure: "Procurad también

que, leyendo vuestra historia, el melancólico se mueva a risa, el risueño la acreciente, el simple no se enfade, el discreto se admire de la invención, el grave no la desprecie, ni el prudente deje de alabarla" (I, Prólogo; 18). The emotions of characters, of course, are no more real emotions than the characters are real people, but they are modeled closely enough on the real to elicit our response to them as though the bearers of such emotion were real people. I would suggest that some characters, rather than being less than real persons, may be more than real persons, and their emotions may be more than those of real persons, but in any event they are still within the modalities of the human.

Fundamental as characters are in the novel, it would be a mistake to think that they embody all there is to emotion in the work. The writer's task, after all, is very similar to the musical composer's: both of them are script-writers whose task is to maintain the listener's or reader's interest from beginning to end, opening up imaginative space, introducing themes and complicating them, adding new voices or taking them away, creating tensions and resolving them, bringing things to a climax or to repose, thickening or thinning the tonal textures, brightening or dimming the light and color, varying the mood and tempo, all the while carrying the listener or reader along by means of emotional interest. That instrumental music can accomplish this without the use of words or characters suggests, by close analogy, that there might be much more going on in literary composition and reading than is generally recognized (and I am not referring to the arcane ciphering and code-breaking exercises often supposed to be at the core of writing and reading). Words mean, but they are also felt through and alongside their meanings, and as the ancients knew very well, there's hardly a sentence, no matter how banal, that doesn't have some emotional charge to it. When emotional interest wanes, we find ourselves in the position of Mark Twain when he remarked about a novel by Henry James, "Once you put it down, you simply can't pick it up," or when he praised Wagner by saying, "Wagner's music is better than it sounds" (121, 158). In sum, emotive configuration in texts involves every means and technique that writing has at its disposal.

Cervantes shows a keen awareness of this in nearly all of his writings, and particularly in such texts as “La fuerza de la sangre,” “La gitanilla,” the final chapters of *Persiles* and certain highly emotive passages of *Don Quijote*, to name a few.

It might be worthwhile to point out that Plato in the *Republic* and Aristotle in the *Poetics* fundamentally agree that poetic works are designed to stir up emotion; where they disagree is whether this is a good thing or not. Aristotle in particular is quite explicit about the way all of the temporal arts such as music, dance, and poetry are mimetic of emotion, and of course the final cause of both tragedy and comedy directly involves the emotions—of the spectators or readers.<sup>7</sup> Whatever else it might be intended for, art is made for the experience of emotion; the sorts of responses it tries to elicit are already inscribed in its composition. Speaking of cinematography in this way, Noël Carroll observes that “filmmakers have already done much of the work of emotionally organizing scenes and sequences for us through the ways in which the filmmakers have foregrounded what features of the events in the film are salient. In contrast to the way that emotions focus attention for us in everyday life, when it comes to film the relevant events have already generally been prefocused emotively for us by the filmmakers. The filmmakers have selected out the details of the scene or sequence that they think are emotively significant and thrust them, so to speak, in our faces” (29). The same principle of emotional prefocusing has prevailed in literature at least since Homer, and, needless to say, attains a high degree of resolution in *Don Quijote*.

Another possible insight coming out of film studies is the notion of “witness emotions,” as Ed Tan and Nico Frijda have dubbed them. They state that “the major affects in film viewing correspond to affects in daily life when we watch people to which we relate in one way or another, who are involved in an emotional situation, but under conditions in which we cannot act, be acted upon, or otherwise participate in the situation except as onlookers. ...The viewers of films are led to imagine

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<sup>7</sup> W. W. Fortenbaugh analyzes Aristotle’s formulation of emotion not only in tragedy but also in comedy, despite the lost second part of the *Poetics* (19–21).

themselves as invisible witnesses that are physically present in the fictional world" (52). Perhaps this needs to be nuanced, but it does almost unwittingly orient us as to what kinds of emotions readers experience vis-à-vis characters. At first sight it appears that readers have a much more limited scope of emotion than characters do. When a character is in love or jealous or afraid or troubled or pleased, readers rarely have any reason to share that emotion as such though to one degree or another they comprehend what it might feel like to be in such circumstances (either as themselves or as the character), and in all likelihood will have felt something similar in their own repertoire of experience. Readers tend to feel empathy or sympathy, on the one hand, or some form of antipathy, on the other, unless they find themselves in a state of apathy. In any event, they feel emotion *in relation to* and *by way of* another person, albeit a fictional person.<sup>8</sup> Readers are moved, they find the text moving (as the etymology of emotion suggests), but the particular valency and intensity of that emotion is often unpredictable except in the case of those highly contagious sympathetic or empathetic sorts of emotions—forms of happiness or sadness, laughing or crying, for example. Nonetheless, let's not forget how *Don Quijote* itself has at one time or another been called the funniest or the saddest of all books. As Susanne Langer comments in a different context, "some musical forms seem to bear a sad and happy interpretation equally well," a phenomenon that has led some musicologists to talk about emotionally unmarked "vitality affects" in the music (Sloboda and Juslin 79–81).

The much debated idea that what we as readers of fiction affectively experience are really pseudo-emotions is, in my opinion, so ludicrous as to warrant Quevedian if not Rabelaisian laughter. More arguable is the notion that we experience *aesthetic* emotions as long as these are understood as the kinds of emotion we tend to feel in response to art but not only art, because, to cite Ronald de Sousa, there can be "no systematic basis for making a difference between those of our emotions that are targeted to

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<sup>8</sup> For the social psychology of emotional communication and "contagion," see Planalp as well as Hatfield *et al.*

people and those that are targeted to art" (186). If we take "aesthetic" in its etymological sense of *aisthesis*, invoking the senses and feeling, then no dichotomy separates art from life. What does inevitably happen, however, is that art intensifies certain kinds of emotive experience, and seems to be meant to do so.

A recent article of mine focuses on the adventure of the *batañes* (I, 20), in which Sancho's character is so rounded out in body and soul. Consider, for example, the emotional language of the following passage, when the characters discover what made them so afraid all night:

Cuando don Quijote vio lo que era, enmudeció y pasmose de arriba abajo. Mirole Sancho y vio que tenía la cabeza inclinada sobre el pecho, con muestras de estar corrido. Miró también don Quijote a Sancho y vio que tenía los carrillos hinchados y la boca llena de risa, con evidentes señales de querer reventar con ella, y no pudo su melancolía tanto con él, que a la vista de Sancho pudiese dejar de reírse; y como vio Sancho que su amo había comenzado, soltó la presa de manera que tuvo necesidad de apretarse las ijadas con los puños, por no reventar riendo. Cuatro veces sosegó, y otras tantas volvió a su risa, con el mismo ímpetu que primero; de lo cual ya se daba al diablo don Quijote. (I, 20; 219)

This Olympian laughter, generated out of bodies, looks, perceptions, and awareness, banishes all the fear and melancholy of the night before. One thing that happens in this chapter is that the characters' emotion, highly dialogic in nature, orients their actions and conversations to such an extent that emotion itself becomes a central theme of reflection and debate for the characters, and actually redefines their relationship. And of course, here and elsewhere, we experience Cervantes' uncanny ability to bring us up close to the characters to see them, hear them, and witness the subtlest changes. This recalls those extensive passages where both Quintilian (*Institutio oratoria* VI.2, VIII.3) and Longinus (§10, 15, 26, 39) speak of the powerful effects of *fantasíai*, *visiones*, and *enargeia* by which the emotionally inspired orators or poets seem

to see what they narrate, and thereby induce the audience to imagine this in all its liveliness (see also Webb). We have the sense of being there—a *sine qua non* of affective involvement—and of participating in every moment of this scene as it moves from one emotion to another. Cide Hamete Benengeli is there too and draws an inference from Sancho's tears: "Destas lágrimas y determinación tan honrada de Sancho Panza saca el autor desta historia que debía de ser bien nacido y por lo menos cristiano viejo" (I, 20; 218).

Another study of mine explores emotion in Chapters 53–55 of Part II, from the troubled end of Sancho's governorship through his encounter with Ricote to his fall into the pit—climactic chapters in Sancho's protagonism of Part II. We are taken through a sublimely disturbing series of emotional intensities, especially in the departure from the *ínsula* and in the encounter with Ricote. If reversals of fortune and moments of anagnorisis or recognition tend to figure among the most emotive of events, as Aristotle points out, there are several of each over the course of these pages. One important narrative technique used here consists of presenting events not directly but rather by way of what Sancho sees, hears, feels, thinks and says. Narratological concepts such as "focalization," "point of view," "perspective," and so on obviously fall far short of being able to capture what's really going on with this literary technique, which situates us as readers practically in the place and being of Sancho Panza and grants us direct access to his perceptions, sensations, thoughts, and emotions, and indirect access to what his attention is focused on, such as the oddly different pilgrim who turns out to be Ricote. And in a larger sense, Ricote comes to us by way of his friendship with Sancho Panza, and Ricote himself finds out about the exodus of his wife and daughter from the village by way of Sancho, who tells him how he and everyone else wept.

Plato (*Republic* Book 10) observes that the emotions of people witnessing events may be even more intense than those felt by the very protagonists of those events. According to him—or Socrates if you will—we rarely succumb to self-pity but easily let ourselves be overwhelmed by compassion for other people, in-

cluding poetic characters, and similarly we laugh at things in the comic theater that we would be ashamed to say ourselves. Whether or not his examples apply, his argument may have valid implications for reading: as close observers or witnesses to what's going on, we may at times let ourselves be more easily swept up emotionally than if we were able to intervene in the events. Despite what Immanuel Kant, T. S. Eliot, or Thomas Mann might say,<sup>9</sup> emotion in art is often more intense than it is elsewhere.

I would like to look further into the question of "witness emotions" and its implications. To an extraordinary degree, our perceptions throughout *Don Quijote* are channeled to us by way of the consciousness of characters who themselves are witnesses of the action. This suggests that characters on the periphery already assume the tasks that we as readers would otherwise assume more directly, and that our reading is witness to their witnessing, depending on their hearing, seeing, thinking, and feeling. I would say that from about Chapter 15 until nearly the end of Part I—until, say, the pastoral Arcadia of Chapter 51—the narrative continually directs our attention to those who respond emotionally to something or someone else. I do not recall any literary text with such density of hearing and seeing others, or thinking and feeling about others, as we find in this long series of chap-

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<sup>9</sup> Carl Plantinga and Greg Smith tell how "Thomas Mann and a friend emerged from a movie theater 'weeping copiously.' Mann recounted this (probably apocryphal) incident to support his view that, whatever they are, movies are not art, since art is 'a cold sphere.'" Plantinga and Smith also discuss T. S. Eliot's view of how art expresses emotion by finding an "objective correlative," defined by Eliot as "a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events, which shall be the formula of that particular emotion." Yet Eliot's argument, as they point out, is that literature essentially dissolves emotion in its artistic formulations, or, as Eliot himself puts it, "Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion" (5).

Nicholas Cook and Nicola Dibben comment on how badly music fares in the eighteenth-century discipline of aesthetics, as in the case of Kant's *Critique of Judgment*: "music can arouse emotions, Kant admitted, but it amounts to no more than a 'play with aesthetic ideas...by which in the end nothing is thought.' (He added that the pleasure it creates 'is merely bodily, even though it is aroused by ideas of the mind, and...consists merely in the feeling of health that is produced by an intestinal agitation corresponding to such play')" (47). Robert Salomon discusses Kant's hostility towards "melting compassion" and moral sentimentality (associated with irrationality and women writers) ("In Defense" 227–28).

ters. Our only access to events is often by way of witnesses' perceptions and responses. To cite a simple example, observe the way that Don Luis appears in the narrative:

Sucedió, pues, que faltando poco para venir el alba, llegó a los oídos de las damas una voz tan entonada y tan buena, que les obligó a que todas le prestasen atento oído, especialmente Dorotea, que despierta estaba, a cuyo lado dormía doña Clara de Viedma, que así se llamaba la hija del oidor. Nadie podía imaginar quién era la persona que tan bien cantaba, y era una voz sola, sin que la acompañase instrumento alguno. Unas veces les parecía que cantaban en el patio; otras, que en la caballeriza, y estando en esta confusión muy atentas, llegó a la puerta del aposento Cardenio y dijo:

—Quien no duerme, escuche, que oirán una voz de un mozo de mulas que de tal manera canta, que encanta.

—Ya lo oímos, señor —respondió Dorotea.

Y con esto se fue Cardenio, y Dorotea, poniendo toda la atención posible, entendió que lo que se cantaba era esto... (I, 47; 500)

Think of how different this would be if the narrator had merely announced that a young muleteer started singing "Marinero soy de amor." Instead, everyone here is all ears, except the plaintive, initially disembodied voice that comes to those ears. Our only connection to that voice is by way of those characters who hear it and react to it in awe, thus giving form and color to our own heightened expectation before the lyrics of the song actually appear before our eyes in print. Much the same phenomenon occurs in other instances, such as when the priest and barber come upon Cardenio and later Dorotea. Examples could be multiplied of narrative close-ups of characters who are moved by other characters. If we recall narrative scenes such as the incognito Odysseus no longer able to hide his weeping as he hears the minstrel's tales on the island of the Phaiakians, it will be obvious that this phenomenon belongs to the powers of narrative of all times, yet it seems to me that Cervantes carries these capabilities to unheard-of extremes. Though it has gone under different critical ru-

bricks, I would call this phenomenon the interplay of sentient consciousnesses. It embraces diverse aspects of Cervantine narrative, such as the predominance of dialogue, the responsiveness between and among characters, the complex systems of citation, the invention of fictional authors and readers, and the affective involvement of readers with all of the above.

Let me clarify parenthetically that potential modes and intensities of affective involvement of course vary enormously not only from reader to reader but also from text to text and passage to passage. It goes without saying, I think, that one would be hard-pressed to find any gratuitous, gushy sentimentalism in Cervantes' writings (after *La Galatea*, that is). Emotional effects are justified, well-earned.<sup>10</sup> Some of his narratives, for all their complexity, are quite cool and detached, and do not invite too much emotion. I myself find it hard to feel a dog's pain or a glass man's fear, and what's more, I suspect that the tales of the "Coloquio" and the "Licenciado Vidriera" encourage us to regard nearly everything—including the protagonists—with estrangement. Let these examples suffice for now.

Yet I do think we can identify certain patterns and means by which Cervantes typically engages our emotion, no matter who we are. One such technique, comparable to the way it is used in Homer, Shakespeare, and perhaps no other writer, is anagnorisis, splendid examples of which can be found in many of the *Novelas ejemplares*, sometimes more than once, as well as in *Persiles* and *Don Quijote*. Anagnorisis is recognition, but much more than just recognition. Aristotle defines it generically as "a change from ignorance to knowledge, bringing about either a state of friendship or one of hostility on the part of those who have been marked out for good fortune or bad" (*Poetics*, section 11). And of course one major category of anagnorisis brings together characters who have long been separated, characters who sometimes do not even know they were in some way related.

Think of the reuniting of two Pérez de Viedma brothers, the

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<sup>10</sup> Compare how Oscar Wilde characterizes a sentimentalist as "one who desires to have the luxury of an emotion without paying for it" (cited in Solomon, "In Defense" 225).

ex-captive and the judge or *oidor* in I, 42. We all know how it happens. It is worth bearing in mind that Cervantes could have made this happen in so many other ways, or not made it happen at all. The way he chose optimizes our emotional involvement. We have just read or heard the captive's story with its fairy-tale beginning of three sons taking different paths into the remote workings of empire, and we have followed the captive, now freed and accompanied by Zoraida. A very excited Ruy Pérez confirms that the newcomer to the inn is his brother, but is assailed by doubts about whether this brother will receive him well. Hence the priest's intervention, and while the priest puts the *oidor* to the test, we sense the rushing intensity of the emotions of the captive who is watching and listening to every movement and sound, and we sense how the highly attentive *oidor*, "que ninguna vez había sido tan oidor como entonces" (I, 42; 497), is overwhelmed by what he hears. Then comes the climactic scene. Where are we in all of this? We're with the priest, for sure, and we watch and listen to the brother, whom we don't know, and we're moved by his emotion; but we're simultaneously out of sight with the observers, including Zoraida and the captive, and we're especially moved by *his* emotion. In this interplay of sentient consciousnesses, we are witnesses whose presence is simultaneously distributed in different places, according to what we know and feel about the characters. In anagnorisis, knowledge and emotion are absolutely integral, unthinkable one without the other, unthinkable also without the ethical components involved here. The lost is found, the incomplete is made whole, and this happens to characters who probably deserve a reversal to good fortune. Such instances of anagnorisis, where "a change from ignorance to knowledge" occurs, are among the most intensely emotive moments in all of Cervantes' writings, and they require much closer study than what I have been able to provide here.

A few final remarks. Perhaps it is time to put on the museum shelf once and for all the psychological models whereby thought and emotion are considered mutually exclusive categories, as well as the telegraphic model of artistic communication which characterizes writing as transmission and reading as reception.

The notion of the readers as quasi-witnesses engaged in the interplay of sentient consciousnesses suggests one alternative to such models. In his long and short novels, Cervantes deploys narrative technique about as effectively as can be imagined to intensify awareness and emotion on the part of readers. And to the extent that readers not only associate with the characters but also take in the whole literary artifact, perhaps a way of characterizing this would be the notion of hospitality, where we host the work, and where generosity and gratitude come into play, and where two-way conversations can turn into long-term friendships.

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