David Wetzel. A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001. xvi + 244 pp.
Jeffrey Wawro. The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. xvi + 327 pp. $35.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-521-58436-4.
David Wetzel. A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001. 244 S. $24.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-299-17490-3.
Reviewed by Anthony J. Steinhoff (Department of History, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga)
Published on H-German (July, 2004)
Of Men and War
Vergil commenced his epic story of Aeneas and the founding of Rome with the words: Arma virumque cano--"Of arms and man I sing." This line is also a fitting epigraph for David Wetzel's and Jeffrey Wawro's recent studies of the Franco-Prussian War. Armed conflict (or at least its threat) figures centrally in each book's narrative. Wetzel examines the war's origins, Wawro the deployment of arms on the battlefield and its consequences. But what distinguishes both of these fine volumes is the attention paid to the human dimension of these diplomatic and military struggles. Although mindful of the demographic, economic, military, and political factors that structured the Franco-Prussian rivalry after 1860, Wetzel and Wawro privilege the passions and decisions of the human actors, both great and small. It is this emphasis on personalities that enlivens both narratives and enables their authors to illuminate this momentous event in new and fascinating ways.
A Duel of Giants, David Wetzel's analysis of the Franco-Prussian war's origins, is a refreshing work in the oft-neglected genre of diplomatic history. The title itself betrays Wetzel's fundamental conviction about this conflict: it occurred not because of chance or forces beyond human control, but rather because of the decisions and actions of great men, above all those of the Prussian Minister-President, Otto von Bismarck, and the French Emperor, Napoleon III. Public opinion and national chauvinism also played important roles in pushing France and Germany towards the precipice of war, Wetzel notes. But they were not fully independent forces, for French and German leaders regularly manipulated such sentiments to their own advantage in the diplomatic chess game. One might object that the very focus of the study, European diplomacy, predisposes the author towards this conclusion. Nevertheless, Wetzel's case is compelling, grounded in an impressive mastery of the primary sources and the vast, if now rather dated, secondary literature (which are the focus of a lengthy bibliographic essay at the end of the book).
One of the main fruits of Wetzel's attention to the interplay of personalities is a robust appreciation of the crisis' origins and evolution. He dismisses the popular understanding of the war, according to which the wily Bismarck seized upon the Hohenzollern candidacy for the vacant Spanish throne to challenge France, duped France into declaring war, and then used the conflict to complete the unification of Germany. Wetzel certainly acknowledges Bismarck's skill as a diplomat and politician. He was the "giant" of Prussia, responsible both for German unification and the escalation of tensions between France and Germany. It was also Bismarck who championed Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen's bid for the Spanish throne, even in the face of King William I's opposition. And when the whole affair seemed to unravel, Bismarck cleverly doctored the Ems dispatch on July 13 to put the French on the defensive once more. But, Wetzel contends, Bismarck was not looking to force a war with France in 1870. He was in no hurry to complete the process of unification. Bismarck only wanted to weaken France, who now posed the primary obstacle to his German ambitions. Having a Hohenzollern as a Spanish king would accomplish this goal. Moreover, Wetzel shows that Bismarck's goading of France worked from the assumption that, in the end, Napoleon I would back down as he had in previous moments of international crisis.
Furthermore, Wetzel emphasizes that Bismarck was far from a free agent in the developing conflict. Bismarck's isolation from the Prussian parliament and court, for example, made him dependent on King William's confidence and trust. Indeed, William was the point man in the diplomatic negotiations in July that aimed to have Leopold rescind his acceptance of the Spanish crown. Moreover, several "minor" characters contributed significantly to the drama's development, including: William's wife Augusta; Leopold's father, Karl Anton of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen; and from July forward, the Prussian ministers of the army and war, Graf von Roon and Helmut von Moltke, respectively.
Another virtue of Wetzel's narrative is its repudiation of the notion that France was somehow an unwilling or unworthy participant in this "duel of giants." He describes Napoleon III as one of the leading (and competent) French political figures of the century. He was both more worldly and more secretive than his Prussian adversary, which, Wetzel suggests, undercut Napoleon's credibility as a negotiator. But France was a country in crisis by the late 1860s. Napoleon's efforts to restore French preeminence in Europe had a dear cost. Ties with Russia, Austria, Italy, and the papacy were strained. Prussia was establishing itself as a European power at French expense. At home, Napoleon had won an important plebiscite on May 8, 1870. The victory, however, was accompanied by the introduction of a liberal constitution and the appointment of Émile Ollivier, a long-time opponent of the Emperor, to lead the government. Finally, throughout much of late 1869 and 1870, Napoleon's ill-health enabled the imperial court, and the strong-willed and anti-Prussian Empress Eugénie in particular, to have greater influence over matters of state.
In short, Wetzel demonstrates that by the summer of 1870, the French political system was ill-prepared to accept a further assault on national pride. This is, however, precisely how the foreign minister, the Duke of Gramont, and Napoleon III interpreted the news of the Hohenzollern candidacy at the beginning of July. Gramont's interventions during the first two weeks of July, in particular, transformed the Hohenzollern candidacy into a causus belli. He made unreasonable (even insulting) demands of William I and also inflamed French public opinion to demand full satisfaction of Prussia as a matter of national honor. When the text of the doctored Ems dispatch was published, thus, even Ollivier recognized that only a strong response would now satisfy French politicians and the press. And after the military establishment argued that France would enjoy an early advantage should conflict break out, Napoleon's council of state decided on July 14 to commence plans for war, which was duly declared five days later.
A Duel of Giants shines as it probes the intricacies of high politics and diplomacy. The University of Wisconsin is to be commended for releasing this volume in a paperback version, for it deserves the attention of specialist and non-specialist alike. Although Wetzel admirably acquits himself of most of the goals stated in his preface, his analysis of the impact of public opinion and nationalist sentiment on the outbreak of war remains limited. Even in the French context, where Wetzel does the most with this subject, one gets the sense that there is much more to say on this important topic.
Geoffrey Wawro's book, The Franco-Prussian War of 1870: The German Conquest of France in 1870-71, picks up where Wetzel leaves off. Wawro in fact draws on Wetzel's study, which was first published in 2001, for his own discussion of why hostilities erupted in 1870. But Wawro does not share all of Wetzel's conclusions. For instance, Wawro holds that Bismarck's actions between 1868-1870 were indeed designed to provoke war with France. But he joins in Wetzel's criticism of Gramont, emphasizing that as war became reality the French foreign minister foolishly assumed the existence of alliances with states like Denmark and Austria-Hungary that had never been concluded.
Wawro's primary interest, however, lies in the war itself. it is in chapter 2, with its examination of Prussia's and France's militaries on the eve of battle, that Wawro begins to develop his main argument. Contemporaries believed that France would stand up well to the Prussian forces. Wawro demonstrates that, on the eve of battle, Prussia was actually the stronger party. Although the French would have an early advantage in terms of men, at full force the Prussian army was larger, fitter, and better disciplined. Moreover, the Prussians outclassed the French in terms of military planning, infrastructural support (telegraph lines, railways), and tactics. With respect to weaponry, however, each side had important strengths. The French, Wawro points out, had superior rifles (the chassepot and the mitrailleuse, the first machine gun), whereas the Prussians had better artillery (the Krupp canon).
Was the outcome of the war thus predetermined? Wawro's response is an emphatic "no." Despite Prussia's many advantages on paper, the only one that actually made a consistent difference, Wawro asserts, was the edge in artillery technology. Had Europeans understood this, Wawro contends, they might well have been spared the trauma of trench warfare on the Western Front in 1914. But, as in 1866, luck and the poor performance of the opposing forces made the Prussians look better than they actually had been. The early battles of August--Spicheren, Wissembourg, Froeschwiller--did not go off as planned, but rather by accident. Generals, notably Steinmetz, continued to act independently of the Supreme Command. Above all, Prussian efforts to attack chassepot-equipped French positions head-on were bloody failures. What really saved the day for the Prussians were the artillery units--and the French's surprising inability to capitalize on their advantages. At Froeschwiller, for instance, had General MacMahon's troops counter-attacked in the afternoon, Wawro argues they might well have defeated the Germans. The French were better situated and had a slight advantage in numbers. But MacMahon's decision to stay on the defensive allowed the German troops to reposition themselves and seize victory.
Poor leadership continued to plague the French after Froeschwiller. Napoleon III, for example, routinely undermined the position of General Bazaine, the nominal commander of the Army of the Rhine. And, perhaps out of resentment, Bazaine neglected to step fully into the role of commandant, squandering repeated opportunities to regroup and improve the French position. His refusal to take the offensive at Mars-le-Tours turned a likely French victory to a loss and opened the vital road to Verdun to the Germans. Bazaine's maddening indecisiveness also led to his army being pinned down at Metz, where it remained out of action until it surrendered at the end of October. French mistakes also laid the foundations for stunning defeat at Sedan. Not only was Napoleon III taken captive, but because Empress Eugénie had sent the troops defending Paris into battle, the road to Paris also lay clear.
Wawro devotes his two penultimate chapters to Prussia's efforts to end the war. He observes that the Prussian victory at Sedan actually got in the way of this goal. One the one hand, it prompted the Prussians to press for harsh peace terms: a heavy cash indemnity and the cession of Alsace and major portions of Lorraine. On the other hand, it led to the creation of a Government of National Defense in Paris, whose steadfast refusal to give up Alsace-Lorraine dashed Prussian hopes for a quick armistice. Indeed, forcing the French to capitulate proved to be difficult. Paris still possessed great defenses. The Germans were far from home. In fact, as the war dragged on, Wawro shows that Bismarck became increasingly agitated, fearing that foreign powers would intervene to settle the conflict. This anxiety fueled Bismarck and Moltke's intense feuds, with Bismarck wanting to bomb Paris into submission and Moltke preferring to continue the siege while the scattered military threats to the south of Paris were disarmed. Bismarck succeeded in getting additional pressure put on Paris and, as Moltke's forces put down the fledging French forces in December, resistance in Paris crumbled. By January, widespread hunger and destruction had set off riots, convincing Jules Favre to enter into negotiations with Bismarck on January 23, 1871. Three days later an armistice was signed and, for all practical purposes, the war was over.
Understandably enough, Wawro ends his study by commenting on the final peace agreement, signed at Frankfurt on May 10, 1871, and reflecting on the wider consequences of the war for Germany, France, and Europe. He contends that the real loser of the war was not France, but Germany. Following the lead of such scholars as Lothar Gall, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, and Volker Berghahn, Wawro argues that, long term, the peace provided neither foreign nor domestic security for the newly established German Empire. The treaty did not cripple France, as Bismarck intended. Instead, it set the stage for military reforms and a revival of French nationalism under the "radical" republicans, who were openly hostile to Germany. Nor did unification resolve Germany's internal political problems. Indeed, the insecurities born out of Bismarck's policies in the early 1870s, Wawro maintains, eventually put Germany back on the road to war in 1914, with disastrous consequences.
Wawro's book is an accomplished work of military history that enlightens and entertains the reader in equal measure. It is also blessed with a particularly fine set of maps that facilitate following the discussion of the major military engagements. Nonetheless, the final three chapters do not come off as well as they might. The problem in the two penultimate chapters is structural. As Wawro struggles to relate events that are happening in more than one place--in Metz, in Paris, and around Orléans--information is repeated, the narrative becomes more disjointed, and the overall sense of the drama suffers. The more serious shortcoming, though, is the final chapter. With his remarks on the consequences of the Franco-Prussian war for the German Empire, Wawro enters into a historiographical minefield that takes him well beyond the scope of his study. His points about the shortcomings of Bismarckian policy are valid, but it is far from evident how these related directly to either the Prussian-German victory or the terms of peace. But these quibbles do not lessen Wawro's accomplishment. One can only hope that Cambridge University Press will also release a paperback edition of what will likely be the new standard history of the Franco-Prussian War.
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Citation:
Anthony J. Steinhoff. Review of David Wetzel, A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War and
Wawro, Jeffrey, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871 and
Wetzel, David, A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War.
H-German, H-Net Reviews.
July, 2004.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=9631
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