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**Published on** H-War (July, 2023)

**Commissioned by** Margaret Sankey (Air University)

Philip C. Shackelford's first book, *Rise of the Mavericks*, articulates the evolution of the United States Air Force and Security Service and their roles during the Cold War. The beauty of Shackelford's book is that its foundation came from childhood tales his grandfather, Thomas W. Shackelford Jr., Airman First Class, told of his time in Kirknewton, Scotland, serving in the US Air Force Security Service (USAFSS). As a young boy, he became engrossed in his grandfather's stories, which set him on a path toward academia, focusing on the rise of the United States Air Force and the creation of the USAFSS. This reviewer can relate to this approach as my own academic interests came from military kinship from a great-grandfather, Roy Foust, and grandfather, Ted Foust, who served in the Army Air Force during World War II and the Air Force during the Vietnam War, respectively.

*Rise of the Mavericks* has six chapters, an introduction, and an epilogue. Shackelford presents his purpose thus: "This study will explore how both the Air Force and the Security Service evolved, the beliefs and motivations that inspired their development, and why the Air Force was motivated to create its own independent communications-intelligence organization" (p. 6). The introduction lays the groundwork for how his argument is supported. A poignant aspect of the book is the dedication to his grandfather in each chapter's opening or conclusion. Throughout the book, Shackelford recalls his grandfather's time in the USAFSS and how he got to Kirknewton, Scotland—a pleasant way for readers to gain a personal sense of the author and those who served in the USAFSS.

Chapter 1 begins with World War I and how it shaped strategic thinking in the interwar period. The chapter continues by exploring the Great Depression, World War II, and the misconception of Pearl Harbor as an intelligence failure. Shack-
elford depicts Pearl Harbor as a strategic success for the Japanese rather than an intelligence failure for the United States. As he puts it, "there simply was not much information to collect" (p. 25). Despite the tragedy on December 7, 1941, World War II represented an intelligence triumph. Going into the postwar period, Army and Navy leaders wanted to build upon this success. Air Force leaders want to use their success to create an independent military unit. This moment is where chapter 1 transitions into chapter 2.

The second chapter examines US air intelligence’s origins during World War II. Initially, the Army Air Force (AAF) centered around reconnaissance missions that observed enemy activity to plan operations against. By 1944, the role of the AAF had changed to conducting strategic bombing raids. These raids targeted Japanese and German industrial nodes to weaken their wartime economies. The AAF relied on ULTRA, secret intelligence, and information to pinpoint industrial targets. Due to multiple complications, from language barriers to communication failures, the AAF’s reliance on ULTRA brought its own problems. By the war’s end, AAF officers had a firm grasp on the importance of aviation. This recognition of significance led to the movement for an independent air force. Gaining autonomy is the focal point of chapter 3, arguably the most vital chapter of the book. Creating an independent air force spurred reorganization debates in the War Department. The Navy’s view posed the biggest hurdle for any reorganization. The Army supported a new structure and advocated for "a unified defense establishment, one that brought the services together into a single department with a single head" (p. 62). The Navy opposed this approach and argued for "a structure acknowledging that each service required autonomous control over the forces and capabilities necessary to its missions" (p. 63). The outcome was the formation of three independent military branches, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Shackelford accurately summarizes the evolution of the air force as it developed "from a tiny reconnaissance element of the Army into a full-fledged military department of the American defense establishment" (p. 70). The other excellent aspect of this chapter is the critical definition of SIGINT (signals intelligence) compared to COMINT (communications intelligence) on page 70. These definitions are vital for the impending chapters.

Following the birth of an independent American air force came the creation of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) (the precursor to the National Security Agency). The apparatus of the AFSA brought unification to military communications and COMINT. However, each branch managed its COMINT and brought it to the AFSA if necessary. This process ensured that military cryptology never became fragmented and uncoordinated. Each branch had its cryptography unit, and that of the newly independent air force was the USAFSS, established in 1948. The creator of the USAFSS was Lt. Gen. Richard Klocko. The latter half of this chapter focuses on his role in integrating the USAFSS into the AFSA in 1948. Chapter 5 demonstrates the failure of COMINT coordination in the Korean War. The breakdown stemmed from ill-prepared readiness from the AFSA, lack of importance placed on Korea, inability to decipher transmissions from North Korea, and code-stealing accusations blamed on the Air Force Security Service. This chapter also dives into the transition of the AFSA to the National Security Agency (NSA) in 1952 and the importance of COMINT ground stations scattered across the globe to listen to Soviet transmission. The final chapter looks at the role and failures of Flexible Response, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and America’s involvement in Southeast Asia, including the Vietnam War. The importance of this chapter is to demonstrate how the NSA and Air Force Security Service launched numerous emergency reaction units (ERU) across the globe to counter Cold War flares. A succinct epilogue rounds out Shackelford’s book and takes the Air Force Security Service to the present day.
Shackelford's book has a plethora of positive attributes that scholars can benefit from. The first is the quality of the prose. The introduction lays the foundation for the entire book. Shackelford directly explains the argument and importance of the six chapters. Each chapter is divided into multiple subheadings that make the book's structure easy to comprehend. The uniqueness of the book is its timeline, which is both a strength and a weakness. The strength comes from how the book starts in World War I and concludes in the twenty-first century. Throughout Shackelford's analysis of the twentieth century, he provides adequate details on World War I, the Great Depression, World War II, the Korean War, and multiple incidents during the Cold War such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War. Because of this, the book would make an excellent addition to scholars looking at America in the twentieth century. Any course focusing on post-Civil War America should include this book in the required readings. It will benefit graduate students but is accessible to undergraduate students, too.

However, while Shackelford's book has some strengths, there are also a few weaknesses. The first is the timeline. The subtitle lists the years 1948-79, which is the framework for the USAFSS. Yet the first three chapters focus mainly on America's involvement in World War II. The Cold War portion does not become prevalent until the book's latter half. The years in the subtitle should be altered to accurately fit the book's timeline. The other flaw is the treatment of the Korean War. Shackelford devotes three pages to it and then moves away from the subject. More insight into how the USAFSS and the US Air Force handled its first war as an independent unit is warranted in this section. The final drawback is grasping the numerous acronyms and organizations. Fortunately, the front of the book lists an acronyms guide. However, when a page contains organizations that vary by a single letter in acronyms, it makes for an arduous read. Despite these issues, the book is strong and highly recommended.

Scholars in military, modern US, Cold War, and airpower history will benefit from Shackelford's book. He used excellent primary sources ranging from declassified documents to command histories and historical studies issued by the NSA. For secondary sources, Shackelford used literature from prominent Cold War historians such as Douglas Stuart, Odd Arne Westad, and John Lewis Gaddis. Shackelford aimed to fill a gap in Cold War historiography by bringing attention to the USAFSS and their evolution in America's military cryptography. This book achieves that goal. Philip Shackelford and the Naval Institute Press have created an excellent book on the US Air Force and USAFSS, one that I am sure Shackelford's grandfather thoroughly enjoyed and was proud to read.
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