NATO's so-called Double-Track Decision famously placed Germany on the front lines of the arms race of the 1980s, and in so doing catalyzed the Federal Republic's burgeoning peace movement. In *The Nuclear Crisis*, an edited volume of nineteen chapters, German historians offer wide-ranging views of Cold War security policy, the German peace movement, and their influence upon the Federal Republic's postwar history.

The editors distill four key areas of debate from the chapters that follow. In the first place, they contrast arguments that domestic debate over NATO's Double-Track Decision reinforced Germany's postwar democratic culture with the Federal Republic's seeming powerlessness to exercise any real control over the decision to emplace Pershing II missiles on the country's territory. Second, the editors question whether the “Euro-missiles” debate fostered nationalist and anti-American sentiment which called into question the Federal Republic's place within the Western order, or conversely whether the peace movement's transnational and transatlantic contacts in fact reinforced Germany's place within that order. Third, they note the historical debate as to the peace movement's broader sociopolitical legacy, given the contrast between its failure to stop the Double-Track Decision and the Green Party's mainstreaming of the peace movement's culture. Finally, the editors note the vigorous debate among scholars as to the respective contributions of the peace movement and the Double-Track Decision to the relaxation of East-West relations in the latter half of the 1980s, and consequently to the Cold War's peaceful conclusion.

The chapters which follow offer diverse perspectives regarding these and other themes. With respect to the tension between security policy and the peace movement and its influence upon the Federal Republic's postwar democratization, several chapters illustrate the extent of ongoing historical debate. For example, Tim Geiger contends that although West Germany had played an active role in shaping the Double-Track Decision, from the commencement of START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) in 1982 it lost any major influence
over the trajectory of transatlantic nuclear policy; thereafter the Federal Republic was relegated to granting its concurrence to decisions taken by its larger American ally in the interest of demonstrating Germany's commitment to the alliance. Jan Hansen, examining the influence of transatlantic security policy upon the Federal Republic's multiparty system, likewise demonstrates that the controversy surrounding the Euromissiles crisis forced West Germany's political parties to take public position on the matter, with the country's democratic culture implicitly benefiting from such debate. The editors justifiably conclude that the peace movement ultimately served to cement the Federal Republic's identity as both a responsible member of the Western alliance and a liberal democratic state.

Conversely, few chapters deal directly with the question of whether the Euromissile debate led to rupture with, or reinforcement of, Germany's place within the Western order. Marianne Zepp, notably, discerns a nationalist element within the peace movement that implicitly prioritized German reunification above Western collective security. Yet while her chapter is a compelling contribution to the debate which she and her fellow editors broach in the introduction, ultimately it stands in isolation from the rest of the volume.

As to the question of the nuclear crisis's domestic political legacy within the Federal Republic, the contributing scholars depict a multiparty system in which, notwithstanding the fractious debate over nuclear weapons, West German political parties remained largely united on most issues. Silke Mende and Birgit Metzger examine the common roots of environmental and antinuclear activism, while demonstrating that the two movements were sufficiently distinct as to limit the scope of any shared political influence. In another chapter, Jan Hansen contends that one of the more enduring consequences of the peace movement was the integration and mainstreaming of the Green Party into West German political life. The editors therefore reasonably conclude that the nuclear crisis did not drive a radical realignment among parties but instead fostered a consolidation of the postwar domestic political consensus.

Last, as to the bearing of the Euromissile crisis upon the Cold War's conclusion, the authors prudently decline to attribute the Cold War's conclusion to the Double-Track Decision and its implementation; instead, they find more solid grounds to conclude that the peace movement, which grew in reaction to the nuclear crisis, helped to pave the way for Europe's political and cultural reunification. Oliver Bange, for example, traces the influence of the 1970s military-technological revolution upon shared German perceptions of vulnerability, noting East Germany's consequent fostering of opposition to intermediate-range nuclear weapons among the Federal Republic's political Left. Hermann Wentker contributes a particularly illuminating analysis of how East and West Germany each balanced the necessity of backing decisions taken by their respective alliances against the desire to pursue inter-German interests where possible. And while Florian Pressler concedes that the peace movement did pressure Western governments to open talks with the Soviet Union, in assigning credit for the Cold War's peaceful denouement he accords much greater weight to Mikhail Gorbachev's unprecedented openness to détente. In the interpretations offered by this volume's contributing scholars, the peace movement's greater significance lies not in any significant influence upon the two superpowers' strategic calculus but in its fostering of closer ties between the two Germanies.

If this volume possesses a key deficiency, it is its breadth of focus. Although the editors attempt to draw common threads among the nineteen chapters, in truth many of them speak to very different facets of Germany's 1980s nuclear debates; in consequence, _The Nuclear Crisis_ is in some respects less than the sum of its parts. Yet this thematic inconsistency is more than compensated for
by the unique contributions that many of the contributors have made. For example, Rainer Eckert’s chapter on East Germany’s independent peace movement offers meaningful insight into an oft-overlooked facet of the nuclear crisis, as well as bringing balance to a volume principally focused upon West Germany. Likewise, Susanne Schregel contributes a fascinating analysis of the spatial element inherent in the peace movement’s activism, while Kathrin Fahlenbach and Laura Stapan add an insightful analysis of the visual and media strategies employed by activists. Such chapters do not materially address the themes outlined by the editors, yet confidently stand on their own.

Ultimately, this volume’s greater contribution lies in its dissection of the peace movement’s diverse constituencies. Sebastian Kalden and Jan Ole Wiechman highlight the integral roles played by the Protestant and Roman Catholic churches in domestic debate and protest, while Dietmar Süss illustrates the convergence of West German trade unions’ interests with those of the peace movement, despite the two social movements’ very different roots. Another chapter, by Reinhold Kreis, examines the women’s peace movement, which was at once part of, and distinct from, the broader peace movement in West Germany. Many readers may well be familiar with the international context of the Euromissile crisis, but chapters such as these bring greater clarity to the domestic sociopolitical upheaval it wrought within the Federal Republic. The Nuclear Crisis therefore stands as a useful reference for historians and students of contemporary Germany and, more broadly, of the Cold War.

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