Most histories on Richard Nixon’s foreign policy focus on three main issues: the war in Vietnam, the establishment of relations with China, and détente with the Soviet Union. Transatlantic relations between the United States and Europe tend to receive little attention. Given the magnitude of Vietnam, China, and détente, it is understandable they receive the bulk of historians’ focus; however, this leaves a void in understanding how some of the United States’ most important diplomatic relationships evolved during the administration. Luke A. Nichter’s *Richard Nixon and Europe: The Reshaping of the Postwar Atlantic World* ably fills this gap in the historiography. Nichter identifies four primary objectives of Nixon in Europe: reinvigoration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the US departure from Bretton Woods, engagement during the “Year of Europe,” and advocacy for Britain’s membership in the European Community. These four initiatives proceed largely in chronological order, and Nichter’s account proceeds linearly, using the events to trace the waxing and waning of transatlantic relations. Overall, *Richard Nixon in Europe* views the administration’s efforts as successful, in spite of numerous unforced errors by Nixon and his advisors.

As NATO neared its twentieth anniversary in 1969, it appeared imperiled. The 1966 decision of Charles de Gaulle to remove France from the alliance’s unified command and the expulsion of US forces from France suggested deep rifts in the alliance and an uncertain future. Nichter shows how revitalizing the alliance became an early priority of Nixon. The decision by the administration to use NATO resources to better understand how the “social problems facing advanced societies were self-inflicted” and to identify fixes helped foster cooperation (p. 17). *Richard Nixon in Europe* argues that initiatives like the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society helped shift the focus of NATO from collective defense to collective security, breathing new life into the body. The book raises interesting questions about Nixon’s approach but could have done more to define “social problems” and to provide greater context to how the alliance viewed and reacted to the global societal upheavals of 1968. In particular, a deeper examination of whether Nixon explicitly viewed the unrest of 1968 as a negotiating point to advocate for greater transatlantic unity would have been useful.

Nichter’s previous books (*The Nixon Tapes: 1971-1972* [2014] and *The Nixon Tapes: 1973* [2015], both with Douglas Brinkley) provide transcriptions of Nixon’s White House recordings, and he maintains a website (nixon-tapes.org) that makes transcripts of the tapes publicly available. These tapes play an essential role in Nichter’s narrative in *Richard Nixon in Europe*, particularly in chapters devoted to the decision to end the Bretton Woods economic order. The presentation of meetings between Nixon and his closest economic advisors are invaluable to understanding the pressures facing the administration and the acrimony between the US and European allies resulting from the closing of the gold window. Nichter praises the decision as “bold” but argues that the protectionist decisions afterward were needlessly antagonistic and counterproductive. He demonstrates that domestic concerns overrode foreign policy priorities and economic judgment as Nixon focused on his 1972 reelection cam-

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campaign. As the negotiations following the exit unfolded, Nixon advisor John Connally even ominously asked in his diary if “there was anything [Nixon] would not do to further his reelection” (p. 87). The use of the tapes provides excellent insight, but they are often introduced with minimal context as to the participants involved and issues under discussion. Readers will need significant familiarity with the personalities around Nixon and the intricacies of the Bretton Woods system to get full utility from these chapters.

Chapters centered on the “Year of Europe” depict the challenges the Nixon administration faced in repairing transatlantic relations following the economic upheaval of 1971. Nichter shows how miscommunication, outside events like the Christmas bombings in Vietnam and the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and domestic European changes that saw new heads of state in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany all undermined Nixon’s efforts and left transatlantic relations at a low ebb. The look at European domestic politics is valuable as it shows the complexity of balancing domestic and foreign concerns for both parties. However, Nichter could have provided greater context for how events external to the continent shaped transatlantic relations. While Nichter briefly mentions Nixon’s intent to use the “Year of Europe” as a way to reassure European governments over the détente fueled cooperation between the US and the USSR, the superpowered thaw receives only a cursory mention. A greater examination of European fears and responses to major changes in US policy toward both the USSR and China would have provided greater context for how they responded to Nixon’s overtures. While the focus and intent of the book is on US-European relations, it occasionally treats the relationship as existing in a vacuum.

The two chapters concerning the membership of the United Kingdom in the European Community have significant contemporary relevance. Though published before the Brexit referendum of 2016, Richard Nixon in Europe’s focus on the 1970s campaigns over the continued participation of the United Kingdom in the European Community bears a strong resemblance to the current debate. Nichter shows that the question of “who governs Britain?” was central to the campaign and led to the significant turmoil within both the Labor and Conservative parties (p. 167). The echoes between the debates in the early 1970s and the present-day make for interesting reading.

Nichter’s research is extensive. In addition to the Nixon tapes, he draws on numerous foreign archives and personal accounts. The book is also extensively footnoted, making it an exceptional tool for future researchers to expand on his conclusions. While the relatively narrow focus will limit its readership, Richard Nixon in Europe is an excellent reference for historians of transatlantic relations, the European Community, and macroeconomics in the twentieth century. It also adds greater nuance to the understanding of Nixon, showing both the boldness of his foreign policy and the deep insecurity of his character. The unique geographic focus of the book makes it a good read for those wanting to further investigate Nixon and his administration.

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