Gate-Crashers of Modernity: Catholics and Jesuits in the Liberal Imagination

When, on those rare occasions, cocktail party conversation turns to the subject of papal infallibility, invariably people are surprised to learn that this seemingly central aspect of Catholicism is of rather recent vintage. While to most Catholics and non-Catholics today, the primacy of the pope’s position within that church seems self-evident, infallibility was only officially adopted in the Roman Catholic church in 1870 during the first Vatican Council, and only after considerable resistance even among its own bishops. As bishops cast the final vote in Rome on July 18, 1870—the day before the beginning of the Franco-Prussian war—its opponents abroad, both Catholic and Protestant, began a zealous campaign. Papal infallibility, they argued, made Catholicism incompatible with the ideals of individual freedom, with the principles of liberalism, and, indeed, with the modern nation-state.

The Catholic Church and its pontiff, Pius IX, had been the subject of liberal disdain for some time prior to the Council. Pope Pius’s 1864 Syllabus Errorum declared that “progress, liberalism and modern civilization” were incompatible with Catholicism, and his 1868 decree Non Expedit forbade Catholics from participating in republican elections. In a democratic, modern and multi-confessional polity, liberals argued, the (progressive) state was the institution that could best steer society away from the trappings of an outdated feudal order. A Catholic Church that actively worked against these efforts and expected the same of its followers could not be tolerated. Within the context of German nationalism and nation-building, this critique of infallibility and with it ultramontane Catholicism became intimately linked with how liberal Protestants imagined themselves and “their” nation. The Jesuit order, whose members swore absolute obedience to the pope, were often placed at the center of this inverted vision. Anti-Catholicism and anti-Jesuitism were mainstays of liberal ideology. Anti-Catholic and anti-Jesuit petitions routinely outnumbered anti-Semitic ones, both in the number of petitions and the signatures these petitions collected.

Two new books, Michael Gross’s The War against Catholicism: Liberalism and the Anti-Catholic Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Germany and Roisin Healy’s The Jesuit Specter in Imperial Germany focus on the complex relationship between anti-Catholicism/anti-Jesuitism and liberalism. Both began their lives as dissertations—Healy’s at Georgetown under Roger Chickering and Gross’s at Brown under Volker Berghahn—and focus on very different aspects of this relationship within the broader liberal movement. Both studies examine confessional conflict and religious boundaries—and the transgression of those boundaries—in the process of liberal state building, and focus on the role that religion played in establishing (protestant) bourgeois cultural hegemony.
within imperial German society. [1]

Of the two, Gross’s study makes for more exciting reading. As Margaret Anderson notes in her blurb on the dust jacket, “Michael Gross has put culture back into the Kulturkampf!” and she is certainly right. Gross argues that the Kulturkampf was not a liberal fluke, a temporary abandonment of ideals of universal rights or a brief moment of acquiescence to Bismarckian Realpolitik in the process of state- and nation-building. Rather, it was a natural extension of liberal ideology and thus represented a liberal response to the dramatic resurgence in popular Catholic piety taking place throughout the German states. In this manner, liberals developed “new anticlerical and anti-Catholic rhetorical metaphors and practices that by means of differentiation and contrast proved powerful ways to define and assert the bourgeois claim to social hegemony” (p. 22). Gross relates the powerful set of antipodes that governed liberal thinking: while Catholics were continually coded as “Jesuits, priests, monks, and Catholics as stupid, medieval, superstitious, feminine, and un-German,” liberals embodied “modern rationalism, bourgeois individualism, high industrialization, free-market capitalism, the unified nation-state and gender-specific public and private spheres” (p. 22). The idea of exploring the function that the Kulturkampf played within the liberal movement and its ideology is perhaps not quite as new as Gross would have us believe—here it is worth pointing out Karl Vocelka’s study of the Kulturkampf in Austria, and Healy certainly veers in this direction as well—but his arguments are much more refined than Vocelka’s, both in their theory and in their prose, and profit from twenty years of methodological advances. [2]

Gross begins his study by examining the Catholic revival that began in the 1850s, which he sees as a Catholic reaction to the short-lived liberal victory of 1848. For conservative Catholics, the events of 1848-49 demonstrated the need to clamp down on pluralist dissent and reinvigorate an all too indifferent population descending into moral anarchy. To this end, Gross focuses on the religious missions held by Jesuits, Redemptorists, Franciscans, and of other congregations between 1850 and 1870. The missions, public spectacles that “descended” on a community, usually lasted around two weeks and mixed sermons (usually three a day, each up to two hours long) with local pilgrimages and, above all, visits to the confessional, especially so-called “life confessions,” which could take upwards of twenty minutes per person. In contrast to other historians who have worked on the Catholic revival, especially Jonathan Sperber, Gross argues that rather than peaking in the 1850s, the activity of missions actually increased in the 1860s, though on closer examination these differences undoubtedly stem from the sources each used in compiling his statistics. [3] The missions, Gross continues, were profound in their methods of reawakening popular religiosity among the laity. Even the parish priest, often angered by the blow these missions represented to his ecclesiastical authority, did admit that they seemed to do much good.

But it was not just Catholics who were affected by the missions. As Gross discovers, the missions were “remarkable intraconfessional zones” to which not just Catholics but also Protestants and even Jews flocked en masse (p. 25). In these encounters, Gross sees a hunger for religious experience on all sides: students attended to learn about Catholicism and to “feel” religion first hand; regular lay Protestants came to experience a little fire and brimstone in their otherwise ordinary (Protestant) religious lives; and voyeurs of all confessions and persuasions were enthralled by the spectacle. While Protestant priests were generally horrified, especially when the missions came to overwhelmingly Protestant cities such as Hamburg, they also admitted that the missions invigorated “their” flock as well. Lay Protestants thrived on the Auseinandersetzung with their own faith that the missions provoked. Indeed, conversion rates remained low among attendees and, Gross argues, they provided a sort of “Protestant religious revival” that went hand in hand with its Catholic counterpart.

While some Protestants felt their faith renewed by missions, for many others the missions touched a nerve: such a Jesuitenpest could only spell a Catholic attempt to subvert the true German nation, they reasoned. Jesuits and Catholics, it was argued, represented a backward, feudal, irrational order that was incompatible with the German nation and its liberal ideals. After the failures of 1848, Gross argues, liberals turned to anti-Catholicism to reinvigorate the words “light, reason, freedom, and enlightenment” with new meaning by placing them in opposition to Catholicism. In doing so, anti-Catholicism became more than just a mortar that held various liberal factions together; it “reshaped German liberalism from a pre-industrial, pre-capitalist movement into an ideology consonant with middle-class industrial development, capitalist expansion, and modern social order after 1848” (p. 98).

How this ideology functioned in practice is the focus of a chapter on the image of the monastery in the liberal imagination. Like Catholicism in general, monas-
teries experienced a revival in the decades after 1848 as the number of orders and their members increased by almost half. The monastery was a powerful sign in liberal semiotics: a closed-off, secretive space, separated from the public sphere and outside of the legal grasp of the state—a “hotbed of superstition, sloth, and fornication,” as one liberal petition to the parliament speculated (p. 180). Moreover, it harbored monks of dubious loyalty to the state as many were foreigners. Gross begins with an analysis of the popular liberal periodical, Die Gartenlaube, which juxtaposed caricatures of drunk priests and backward Catholics with pictures of modern factories and portrayals of rational economic life. Indeed, the only good monastery was seemingly one in ruins, which, in the proper setting—in the woods, preferably with a disheveled cemetery attached—could provide a “momentary flight from the modern age of bureaucratic sobriety” (p. 153), the perfect destination for a bourgeois outing. Next, Gross turns to two further examples of antimonicism. The first involves a nun in Cracow, Barbara Ubryk, who was accused by her superiors of reneging on her vows of chastity—in some accounts she was a nymphomaniac and repeat offender—and had remained imprisoned for years in her own monastery, since 1848 in some accounts. After hearing of her plight, liberalburgers rioted at the gates, smashing property until the gendarmerie came to investigate. A second incident, the storming of a religious house in the working-class district of Moabit in Berlin, took place after some monks had informally opened a house in the district to care for working poor. Liberals considered this an “insult to industrialization” (p. 172), arguing that since monasteries were models of wasted labor they had no place in a great industrial metropolis like Berlin. In both cases, the incidents serve to bring to the forefront liberal anxieties about ultramontanism, authoritarianism, sexuality, and industrialism, and thus brought together the disparate strands of the liberal movement in an elaborate ritual.

The central chapter of the book is perhaps chapter 4, “The Women’s Question, Anti-Catholicism, and the Kulturkampf.” Here Gross uses the notion of spheres, one coded male and public, the other female and private, to explore the interaction of gender and religion during the Kulturkampf. The Catholic Church, he argues, was coded female in the liberal discourse and the state male. Moreover, the Church was personified by an old, meddling woman while the state appeared as a young man, “assertive and in the prime of life” (p. 202). Gross begins by tracing the rise of the women’s movement after 1848, which he sees intimately linked with the development of religious pluralism since many of the later leaders of the Allgemeiner Deutscher Frauenverein began their “public” lives in the Deutschkatholiken movement. “For German liberals the women’s question and the ‘Catholic problem’ were one and the same” (pp. 196-197), Gross argues, and although such a statement may at first seem a bit far-fetched, he brings forth a mountain of evidence to show how the liberal anti-narratives on Catholicism and the woman question began to merge in the mid-1860s. Catholic missions “flooded the public with irrationalism” (p. 216), while Jesuits and priests recruited women to do their bidding in the public sphere. Meanwhile, the confessional represented an unnatural intrusion of the Church into the private sphere, which threatened to destroy the liberal, middle-class family “from the inside out” (p. 204). Finally, the increasing number of female converts produced a liberal counter-narrative of dangerous emancipation: “Why wouldn’t many girls prefer being a nun to enduring a life full of pain and misery as a maid, seamstress, washer, the wife of a petty bureaucrat, artisan or worker?” asked the well-known liberal and Old Catholic theologian Friedrich von Schulte (p. 213). In this manner, the narrative structure of the liberal critique of the woman question and Catholicism thus began to merge, making the Kulturkampf a “complex attempt” to preserve “an entire political, social, and sexual order that rested ultimately on the distinction between public and private life” (p. 239).

In the final chapter, Gross examines two political debates surrounding the passage of the anti-clerical May Laws in the 1870s. First, he discusses the Kirchenfrage (the question of the church’s relationship to the state and the state’s role in religious life), arguing that the justification liberals provided for the Kulturkampf in no way ran antithetical to their liberal ideals. In the aftermath of national unification, it was necessary to create a national public that was not subject to the oppressive mores of any one religion, for that would give that religion “a far-reaching, perhaps even irresistible, influence on the state,” in the words of Eduard Zeller, a Berlin philosophy professor and prominent liberal thinker (p. 248). Indeed, time and again it was the ideals of freedom and progress, of national and state autonomy that were reiterated as the central factors in the Kirchenfrage. Liberals had no problem sacrificing the separation of church and state on the altar of freedom and progress; indeed, they found it wholly consonant with their own ideals. Next, Gross turns to the anti-Jesuit law of 1872, which, he argues, marked a decisive turning point in the trajectory of liberalism as the anti-Catholic consensus began to crack.
for the first time. Prominent liberal Kulturkämpfer, such as Eduard Windthorst, lost their seats in the 1874 elections; Jewish groups, which until then had more or less supported the first set of May Laws as necessary preconditions for their own emancipation, began to turn against what they saw as “excessive state coercion in the spheres of society and religion” (p. 265); and the democratic left also grew weary of the efforts for the same reasons. And thus, just as the Kulturkampf was beginning in earnest, the anti-Catholic consensus on which it was based began to falter.

The book does have a few problems. First, when it comes to picking evidence, Gross tends to focus on Prussia and northern Germany; Bavaria and other predominantly Catholic states are almost wholly missing from his narrative. How did liberalism develop there? Was it posited in the same manner? Indeed, Gross seems to take the existence of a “national” (read Protestant and middle-class) liberal culture for granted, never exploring regional idiosyncrasies—an especially problematic move, since he bases much of his argument on local examples. When Gross does leave the comfortable confines of Prussia, as with his “Nun in a Dungeon” example in chapter 3, which takes place in Cracow in Habsburg Galicia, he wholly avoids the local setting. While he would undoubtedly argue that his interest there was how liberals in soon-to-be-unified imperial Germany interpreted the event, the treatment is at odds with the Moabiternostersturm incident covered later in the chapter, where he uses the local setting to great effect in bolstering his argument. Also missing from his account is a sense of the Catholic middle classes. Although Gross devotes the last pages of chapter 2 to their plight, these seem mostly like an afterthought. The missing Catholic middle class and the failure to look outside Prussia and northern Germany then brings up perhaps the most glaring problem: why anti-Catholicism and not anti-clericalism? In Gross’s account, the Kulturkampf is above all marked by confessional difference as Protestant and Old Catholic liberals take on the Roman Catholic church, seeking to banish its influence in the modern polity. Yet the Kulturkampf was by no means the exclusive domain of Protestant Germany, even if one of its leading liberals, Rudolf Virchow, did coin the phrase. Liberal governments in almost all predominantly Catholic states in Europe waged a type of war against the Catholic church in the second half of the nineteenth century, and a comparative perspective that isolated the “uniqueness” of the German Kulturkampf while also comparing it with larger European trends would have been a welcome addition.[4] Nevertheless, the book is, on the whole, immensely readable and a more than welcome addition to the historiography of liberalism, nationalism, and religion in nineteenth-century Germany. Moreover, its overall thesis—of liberalism as shaped above all by its war against Catholicism between 1848 and 1880—is presented in a convincing fashion.

Healy’s monograph picks up right where Gross left off. Her study, not quite as forceful as Gross’s in its argument, really comprises two studies in one. The first, consisting of two chapters at the beginning of the book and a final chapter at the end, traces the passage, implementation and ultimate revocation of the anti-Jesuit Law from 1872 to 1917. In the second study, Healy constructs a psychological profile of the anti-Jesuit, analyzing his historical, moral, and intellectual dimensions. Anti-Jesuits, she argues, tended to be bourgeois Protestants (and, occasionally angry Catholics or dissenting Old Catholics), liberal in their theology and their politics. Indeed, as quickly becomes evident, religion mattered a great deal to these anti-Jesuits, many of whom were also active in Protestant theological circles, while socialists played no role at all in the movement. Furthermore, nationalism was an important component, especially the “desire for a unified cultural ethos” (p. 2). The image of the Jesuit, Healy argues, was a “specter” that hung over the collective heads of liberals in nineteenth-century Germany, and her study sets out to explore the make-up and function of this specter in anti-Jesuit (read liberal) politics and society.

Similarly to Gross, Healy argues that the Jesuit Feindbild functioned as a rhetorical antipode for liberal ideology: nationalism was juxtaposed with the international allegiance all Jesuits owed the pope; personal autonomy with dependence on a Catholic hierarchy; and sincere religiosity with the Jesuit emphasis on dogma and tradition. She also focuses on the chronological and political limits of this consensus as the government, the Catholic Center party, and the Protestant League all remained at odds with one another; and also as conservative Protestants began to reach out to Catholics in their fight against atheism and radical liberal Protestants. Nevertheless, through their imagery, Anti-Jesuits constructed a powerful integrative tool. “Anti-Jesuitism provided the Bildungsbergertum with the most effective means of both expressing their repudiation of absolute obedience and leaving vague the level of authority they would put in its place, at least in the public sphere” (p. 229). Healy identifies three chronological phases: in the first, prior to 1872, anti-Jesuitism represented “a punishment of Catholics
who endorsed infallibility and hankered after Austrian hegemony and, to its critics, a violation of the rights of Catholics and individual states" (p. 85). During the second phase, at the height of the *Kulturkampf* in the 1870s, anti-Jesuitism actually retreated in importance as it became one of many aspects of a broader struggle against Catholicism. Finally, after the end of *Kulturkampf*, it once again became a central aspect of confessional relations, the "last bastion of imperiled Protestantism or the last hurdle in the struggle for Catholic parity" (p. 85).

After an initial chapter on anti-Jesuitism in Germany before 1870, the second chapter turns to the passage of the anti-Jesuit law in 1872, covering the rhetoric that accompanied its passage as well as its initial implementation. Jesuits were branded *Reichsfeinde* because they seemingly "challenged the state’s claim to authority" and "rejected its geographical boundaries" (p. 51). During the 1870 war, Jesuits were continually branded as traitors and in the wake of the First Vatican Council, liberals argued that Jesuitism, synonymous with ultramontanism, was "incompatib[le] with the German nation and state" (p. 55). The next chapter explores the complex political maneuvering that accompanied political discussion of the Jesuit Law after the end of the *Kulturkampf*. By 1890, the government was divided against itself; while Tripitz, Blow and other proponents of *Sammlungspolitik* actively worked toward repealing the law as a means of assuring the government’s continued support by the Catholic Center Party in its policies, the emperor and other members of the government refused to even consider the possibility. These respective positions each found an echo in the *Kaisereich*’s two representative bodies: beginning in 1894, the Reichstag repeatedly voted (and with ever-increasing margins) to recommend repealing the anti-Jesuit laws; the Bundesrat, however, refused to consider the measure. Only in 1904 did Blow secure the necessary votes there to repeal at least Article 2 of the law, which pertained to individual Jesuits. The order as a whole remained banned until 1917.

These divisions also mirrored larger debates among conservative and liberal Protestants in which anti-Jesuitism continually served act as a lightning rod. Liberal Protestants began to argue that individual congregations should be free to either accept or reject the official Lutheran creed. In such a setting, conservatives increasingly saw Catholics as allies in a more general struggle against atheism and immorality. After 1904, efforts within parts of the government to repeal the law continued, especially when local governments became increasingly inconsistent in their handling of the law. In 1913, the Reichstag once again called on the government to repeal the law, but the government, fearful of rousing up radical protestant resentment, chose not to act. It was the First World War that finally created the necessary conditions for a repeal of the remaining legislation. On the one hand, many Jesuits served in the war and received medals for their service; on the other, the liberal press was increasingly focused on other matters. As the war dragged on, Healy argues, the anti-Jesuit law increasingly seemed irrelevant. Yet when the last of the legislation was finally repealed in 1917, it still did not please the various factions. The Catholic Center Party remained antagonistic to the governments advances; liberal protests, though not as vocal as before, continued to bear a grudge as well; and even the general of the Jesuit order in Rome, Ledochowski, incensed at Germany’s unrestricted submarine policy, did not suddenly warm to the government.

The second half of the book then consists of three thematic chapters, each one profiling as aspect of the anti-Jesuit critique. The first, on the historical dimensions, focuses on Jesuits’ role in the relationship between the pope and the state. Anti-Jesuits argued that “Jesuits had consistently advanced the interests of the Catholic church at the expense of those of the state, in pursuit of complete papal domination of the temporal as well as spiritual spheres” (p. 117). Historians here played a central role in constructing a specifically borussian narrative of German history in which “the repudiation of Jesuitism [became] an essential characteristic of the German nation and the Jesuit Law a logical corollary” (p. 118). The general contours went as follows: Protestantism was responsible for Germany’s greatness and represented the core of national awakening; Jesuits had always been the enemy of these developments, standing in the way of a “solution” to the confessional question. In this narrative, as Healy argues, Jesuits became separated from the greater mass of “Catholics”: while Catholicism still embodied within it the possibility of change, “Jesuitism was a constant, existing outside time and space” (p. 123). Indeed, in the struggle for the nation and for national identity, Jesuits, as one Old Catholic decried, embodied its de-nationalized antithesis. (They were entnationalisier[ten].) Moreover, the Jesuit general in Rome was a “black pope,” steering the Catholic Church ever closer to an irreversible (and thus with nationalism incompatible) extreme version of ultramontanism. This narrative, Healy argues, reflected the anxieties and insecurities of a Protestant *Bildungsbürger* more generally, especially that its values might somehow fail to become the foundation of the German nationalism. They were “both em-
barrassed that it took so long for the nation to unify and fearful that the nation was not yet ready for unity” (p. 121).

The next chapter focuses on the moral critique of Jesuitism, above all on what anti-Jesuits perceived as the Jesuit intrusion into the private sphere of the home and family. Healy here uses the contrast between Martin Luther, who argued for the necessity of faith, and St. Ignatius of Loyola, who demanded blind obedience to the Church. Luther identified three natural hierarchies which, anti-Jesuits claimed, Jesuits refused to distinguish between: “divine hierarchies ... namely the Christian churches; worldly rule, or the police; and the chaste, bourgeois household” (p. 145). The last item was especially important to liberals because it separated the family from other power structures and emphasized the authority of the father over his wife and children. Jesuits’ insistence on instructing all members of the family challenged the authority of the father. In this sense, the Jesuit was androgynous, existing outside of the normal gender roles; his absolute obedience to his superiors coded him as passive and female while his demand of that same obedience from his flock coded him active and male. Even within such a structure, however, liberals argued that Jesuits ingrained a dangerous moral relativism into Catholics since, in the complex matrix that was Catholic theology, an exception could be found to everything and the end always seemed to justify the means—any sin seemed permissible under the “right” circumstances. Liberal anger especially focused on the confessional, a place that stood in contradistinction to any attempt to classify it in the categories of public/private or male/female. Here Jesuits infiltrated the private sphere, becoming privy to every family’s secrets and thus exerting immense control over them. By the same token, anti-Jesuits complained that Jesuits were unsuited for participation in the public sphere because they did not play by its rules and, moreover, corrupted those Catholics who did participate. Catholics, less rational and less educated, were steeped in mysticism. For anti-Jesuits, “reason, not revelation, was the operating principle of the public sphere” (p. 178). When Catholics did participate in the public sphere, it took the form of popular processions based on medieval mysticism and rituals, not true piety based on self-reflection. This would not do.

The structure of the book—half chronological political history, half thematic intellectual history—while it does serve its purpose, is a bit maddening. The strict separation of themes leads to a good deal of repetition, as individual episodes are repeatedly analyzed in successive chapters. The juxtaposition of Luther as the Protestant/progressive/gebildet figurehead of anti-Jesuitism, opposite a Catholic/medieval/mystical/irrational Loyola comes up in every chapter. If the juxtaposition of the two figures played such a central role—which Healy’s evidence suggests that it certainly seemed to—it might have made more sense to draw the example out only once at length and merely allude to it the rest of the time. Also missing is a sense of what a study of anti-Jesuitism contributes to our understanding of German history. Comparing the Franco-Prussian War and the First World War, for example, raises the question of why Jesuit participation in the respective war efforts was perceived so differently. Had the confessionally divided nation come together by 1917? Nevertheless, the book is an important contribution to the existing literature on liberal and religion in imperial Germany, especially in its study of the continuities of anti-Catholicism between the Kulturkampf and the conflicts over confessional parity after the turn of the century.

On the whole, Healy and Gross differ considerably in the their focus and in their argument. To begin where the two books agree, both see the Kulturkampf as a process of liberal consolidation in which liberals sought to find common ground for themselves and for their nation, a process most easily accomplished by setting these ideals in opposition to Catholic backwardness. The authors disagree, however, on the whens and hows of this process. For Gross, the anti-Catholic consensus was crafted within a wider liberal public in the course of numerous incidents of confessional conflicts on the local level, and reinforced by the press and in pamphlets on the national level. This consensus developed in the late-1850s and early-1860s and began to fall apart after the 1872 passage of the Jesuit law. For Healy, in contrast, it is the political consensus reached during the Kulturkampf and, especially, the consensus that emerges around anti-Jesuitism long after the “proper” Kulturkampf has receded, that are the basis for her argument. Indeed, she is most interested in exploring the political shifts and alliances that began to develop from the 1890s onward over the question of repealing the anti-Jesuit law. Here she ably takes the reader through the political intricacies of late-imperial politics—from the government and the political factions all the way down to the state level—always keeping her main issue, the anti-Jesuit law, in view. While it is often a cliché to end by saying that two books complement each other well, that is exactly what these two books under review do. Gross provides a genuinely novel account of the development of liberal ideology in the 1850s and
1860s, with excellent chapters on the cultural development of anti-Catholicism before the Kulturkampf. Healy has wonderful feel for the anti-Catholic and anti-Jesuit politics in the decades after the Kulturkampf, especially from 1890 to 1917.

Notes

[1]. The best known example is undoubtedly Helmut Walser Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); see H-German review by John Conway at http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.cgi? path=11281079054877. A number of recently completed dissertations also focus on confessional relations in this manner, albeit in very different contexts: James Edward Bjork, “Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Ambivalence in Upper Silesia, 1890-1914” (Ph.D. Diss., University of Chicago, 1999); Kevin Cramer, “The Lamentations of Germany: The Historiography of the Thirty Years’ War, 1815-1890” (Ph.D. Diss., Harvard University, 1998); Michael O’Neill Printy, “Perfect Societies: German States and the Roman Catholic Revolution, 1648-1806” (Ph.D. Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2002); and Lisa Swartout, “Dueling Identities: Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish Students in the German Empire, 1890-1914” (Ph.D. Diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2002). Finally, there are also three excellent collected volumes to recommend on the subject: Michael Geyer and Hartmut Lehmann, eds., Religion und Nation, Nation und Religion. Beiträge zu einer Unbewältigten Geschichte (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2004); Dieter Langewiesche and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, eds., Nation und Religion in der Deutschen Geschichte (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2001); and Helmut Walser Smith, ed., Protestants, Catholics, and Jews in Germany, 1800-1914 (Oxford and New York: Berg, 2001); see H-German review by John Conway at http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.cgi? path=11281079054877.

[2]. For similar arguments, see, for example, Karl Vocelka, Verfassung Oder Konkordat? Der Publizistische und Politische Kampf der sterreichischen Liberalen um die Religionsgesetze des Jahres 1868 (Vienna: Verlag der sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1978).

[3] For his Popular Catholicism in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), Sperber did his archival research and bases his statistics on developments in the Rhineland; Gross also did the bulk of his archival research in that region, but bases his mission statistics on a much broader geographical area.


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