![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
![]() Jiang Zemin: Unlikely Defender of Truth
By Victor Fic, Seoul
Jiang Zemin is obviously angry at Japan for not forthrightly
apologizing to China over the war, but inwardly he should thank his
taciturn host: it makes the dull, unelected president of a Communist
dictatorship look like a passionate exponent of honesty and candor.
Until the failed Tokyo summit, Jiang could never play such a role
because this former engineer has a mechanical style, and especially
because of his defense of the bloody rampage in Tiananmen Square.
However, Japan's engergetic conservatives and apathetic public almost
make the voluble and unrelenting Jiang look like a Bobby Kennedy with
chopsticks.
He is correct, of course, in insisting that the insincere and redundant
words Tokyo profers are not enough. They fall far short of what is
required, and the many years that the Chinese have waited for a proper
apology only highlights Japanese instransigence.
Overall, the anti-apology crowd is faultable on an dismayingly large
number of issues:
Humanistically, they display an inept understanding of Chinese
sensibilities. The Japanese army killed millions of Chinese and raped
countless women; since then, pseudo-apologies inflame opinion.
According to the Japan Times, July 16, 1995, 96.8% of the young Chinese
polled by the China Youth News said that they were "angry" about the
war, and 90% insisted that they felt "very angry" over Japan's denials.
Could those who oppose a proper apology think that all or most of these
Chinese are masochists, or pretenders, or dupes of the Communist Party?
It appears that the Japanese panjandrums who so understand export
strategy cannot understand their neighbours -- or even human nature.
On the moral plane, Japanese conservatives prove that a hard line often
begins with a hard heart. During their war of resistance, Mao's soldiers
were instructed to treat captured enemy troops well. Few Japanese
prisoners were tortured, most were rehabilitated (albeit they were made
into Maoists), and they were fed decent meals. Surely Japan could match
this kindness shown in the midst of savagery with decency in times of
peace? It appears that the Japanese moral code does not truly include
the principle of reciprocity.
When the Communists came to power, moreover, they decided not to press
Japan for war reparations. This must have been an emotionally painful
policy for them. If the Chinese leaders who saw their people brutalized
could swallow so much of their pride, then why can't Japanese leaders
swallow so little of their ego? It appears that their ego is supreme.
In addition, Japanese hard-liners show that they are diplomatic
bumblers. Didn't Kim Dae Jung's allegedly succesful trip to Tokyo double
the expectation that Jiang would get at least what Kim did, maybe more?
It appears that Japanese diplomats fail to heed the very message they
send to China.
On culturalal awareness, the anti-apology faction falls short. How can
the Chinese father be denied his apology from the Japanese middle
brother when the Korean youngest brother is propitiated? It appears that
Japan's guardians of Confucian orthodoxy are forgotting some basic verities.
And what about foreign policy expertise? Japanese hard liners may have
ensured that Chinese leaders seeking legitimacy must put rice in the
bowl, arm the military, retain ownership of Taiwan, and stand up to
Japan. How does Japan gain by becoming a card that Chinese leaders can
play in the power-based poker which is Chinese politics? It appears that
Japanese leaders, mostly graduates of prestigious schools, get a failing
grade in political science.
Intellectually, the history deniers contradict themselves. Tokyo argued
that it does not have to apologize fully to Jiang because the Emperor
did so when he visited China in 1992. But didn't Tokyo argue then that
Akihito could not apologize because he is above politics? Additionally,
Japanese spokesmen said during the summit that Japan showed greater
contrition to Korea because it was colonized, whereas China was not. But
didn't the militarists use their samurai swords to carve the puppet
state of Manchukuo out of the wood of China? It appears that Japan hopes
that soft loans can replace logic and facts in its China policy.
Turning to pyschology, Japanese policy makers do not realize that one
reason China is so assertive on the apology is because the Chinese find
themselves economically and militarily stronger. How ironic. In the
1980's and 1990's, the Japanese establishment was willing to rebuff the
US's trade demands, and attack America's social failings, because the
Japanese felt richer and stronger. It appears that Tokyo not only
forgets the Chinese experience, even more strangely, it even forgets its
own experience.
Finally, the Japanese public fails itself socially. Most of the public
either cannot see, or refuses to act upon, the possibility that when
Japanese tourists, students and businessmen -- some of them progressive
and decent people one on one -- visit China, they will meet the very
Chinese cited in the poll above. It appears that a people expert at
reaping harmony at home are intent on sowing discord abroad.
What can be said more narrowly about Jiang and the Chinese?
To start, Jiang's stature in China will surely grow. Hardliners in the
military and party will give him the praise that patriots ladle upon the
stymied redeemer of national dignity. The public might be divided on
regional, clan, generational, economic, linguistic and ideological
grounds, but their resentment at Japan binds them closely.
Also, the Chinese president will win support among Chinese people
broadly speaking, meaning the millions of han ren who live outside
China. Surely, Taiwanese, Singaporeans, Hong Kongers and
Chinese-Americans will hail Jiang's stand on a moral issue that causes
over a billion Chinese hearts, otherwise eurythmic, to beat as one.
Looking to the future, Japan would be foolish to expect that China will
soon settle for a diluted apology. By so publicly and consistently
rejecting casual words in favor of concrete terms on paper, the Chinese
leader has established a Jiang Zemin line. Any Chinese statesman who
backs away from that line will be charged with appeasement.
In addition, Jiang himself cannot easily compromise with Tokyo in the
future in the way that, say, former red-baiter Nixon could make peace
with China. After all, Jiang said that he learned firsthand what Japan
did to China, and this is one reason he was adamant in Tokyo. The
boy-wittness must remain the man-zealot -- or risk looking like a
weakling who abandoned his own crusade.
Sino-Japanese relations will remain unsteady for the forseeable future
as the summit, which was supposed to produce a major new accomodation,
instead failed. One wonders if the penalty of defiant pride that Jiang
slapped upon arrogant Japanese hard liners will moderate or radicalize
Japanese elite and mass opinion.
The blame for this imbroglio lies mainly with Japan. It promised that
the summit would be a grand opera; instead, it provided old karaoke,
sung off key.
XXX
|
|||||