SYLLABUS

Terry Nichols Clark
322 SS, 702-8686 office
Office Hours: after each class, or by appointment
Teaching Assistant:   Joseph Yi, 773-493-7531
josephyi@midway.uchicago.edu
Wed 4:00-5:50, Harper Memorial 103

Overview

Complex global and local forces are transforming politics in the U.S. and around the world. The course maps the elements of the new local-global politics:

- the crisis of the welfare state and transformation of older cleavages like class and race-based politics;
- the rise of alternative life-style and issue politics, new identities and cultures;
- restructured political parties and organized groups; new patterns for mobilizing individual citizens.

Using the best work to date, we analyze where, why and how such new patterns emerge: what is the role of education, income, mass communication, travel, migration, economic exchange and other forces. More normatively, how do these patterns relate to concerns about freedom and inequality in increasingly diverse and interactive societies? We consider these questions and arguments in the context of the politics and cultures of specific localities, such as Chicago.

The course will include active student discussion, building on key readings. Ideas for papers are discussed at the end of the Syllabus.

We encourage students to complete a paper if they wish a letter grade, but will offer a final exam if any student prefers it. Many writings on globalization are inchoate and isolated from the rest of social science. We seek to overcome these two problems by

(1) stating key ideas in each section as specific propositions, and
(2) linking globalization processes to related subfields in social science through propositions and readings.

A first effort in this direction is represented by this Syllabus. We encourage all course participants to help us codify these ideas further as we proceed. By the end of the course we hope to have further and sharper propositions.

READINGS

PART I.   MARKETS, GLOBAL LINKAGES, HIERARCHY, AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE

Proposition/Idea

1. Size.

As the “extent of the market” grows, it permits a more advanced division of labor, the prime moving force generating the wealth of nations.

Reading: Adam Smith.

1) Market size >>> Division of Labor >>> Wealth

This is the historically dominant economic proposition. But as Smith specified, limits are imposed by tariffs, government regulations and the technology of the time that limit the communication and delivery possibilities for many market goods, esp. those involving perishables or personal contacts. But recent decades have seen major changes: drops in tariffs since the end of the Cold War and better transportation and communication (air travel, fax, internet, etc.).

Globalizing Smith:

• 1a. Lower Tariffs and Government Restrictions >>> Larger Markets



• 1b. Higher Technology for Transportation and Communication >>> Larger Markets and Shared Media Access, i.e. Potential Globalization

2. Openness of Market or Linkage of domestic economy with global economy, generating international or global linkages.

Global linkage substitutes for size of national markets and allows persons in nearly any one country to participate in a global advanced division of labor. For example, persons in India or Bangladesh can do telecommunications or software work for American companies.

Readings: Friedman.

• 2a) Global Market Openness (Linkage) >>> Substitute for national market size >>> Wealth



• 2b) Global Linkage >>> More potentially shared cultural communications >>> More globally shared views.
  
  Clearly 2a and especially 2b are qualified by local and national tastes, values and traditions, which vary in the extent to which they enourage or resist global “commodification” in entertainment (Hollywood/Sony), consumption (McDonalds’ fast food), and deeper values (politics and religion). Each is partially distinct and differentially embraced by different social strata:



• 2c). Persons more educated in strong nationalist, hierarchical or anti-market traditions are more likely to resist the processes of global exchange.

3. Linkage between economic changes and political culture?

Global linkages diffuse global cultural elements throughout the world, including the ideals of democracy, freedom and equality (Northwest European or new political culture). Why and how do cultural changes occur? Some economic and technical determinists (see T. Friedman and J. Friedmann) see culture as derivative. Others specify economic, political and social factors generating cultural change (Clark and Hoffmann-Martinot, p. 37). Others see cultural institutions as having their own internal dynamics. In all three instances, integration into larger global frameworks often bring greater integration into a shared global political discourse and culture, broadly democratic, egalitarian, and individualistic.

4. With globalization, two sorts of challenges potentially undermine older forms of economic and social hierarchies.

First is competition in price, quality and efficiency. Overseas competition and new firms challenge older, less adaptable companies, such as GM and IBM. Second, egalitarian ideals and collegial models of work and personal relations undermine the legitimacy of traditional hierarchies in families, work places, and civic/religious institutions, especially weakening the allegiance of persons lower in status. Global cultural impacts thus spread egalitarian ideals among women, minorities and younger persons, esp. students and intellectuals, encouraging them to challenge social hierarchies.

• 4a) Market Openness/Linkage >>> Efficiency via innovation, competition >>> Economic development >>> Undermine traditional economic hierarchies.



• 4b) Egalitarian Ideals >>> New Political Culture >>> Undermine traditional political and social hierarchies.

5. Marxists argue that capitalist expansion (or economic development) is the prime force of history (or independent variable), which destroys traditional hierarchies.

What replaces them? Neo-Marxists (see J. Friedmann) argue that under “late capitalism” global forces generate monopolies that are world-wide in scope. But later under socialism, previously private functions are taken over by state agencies (basic economic functions, planning, production of many goods and services, plus expanding welfare-state services).

• 5a) Global Capitalism >>> Larger Markets >>> More Monopolistic Companies.



• 5b) State socialism >>> State control of economy

6. Non-Marxist observers (Sassen, Robert Reich) suggest that globalization increases demand for talented professionals and managers who can adapt to new technologies and have a global conceptual framework.

They are correspondingly rewarded more, compared to less skilled workers, especially those in sectors declining through global competition, whose salaries thus fall. Overall, this generates more inequality in income although ideally it would be measured by status level of the occupation and the sector, with each classified by degree of global interdependence. Sassen attempts this for the financial sector in New York but traditional census data do permit precise breakdowns. The impacts of such private sector dynamics on net income depends, however, on government policies, which often explicitly counter potential inequalities through taxes, welfare-state programs, and public goods available to all citizens. Classical socialist governments as well as corporatist and the “Asian economic model” sharply contrast with the free market model in mediating global forces.

• 6a) Global interdependence >>> More demand for talent >>> Shifts in Income



• 6b) But qualifying 6a, which operates largely in the private sector.


Income Inequalities and income and job changes by sector >>> Political pressures to respond to new violations of equality norms>>> Public goods policies and/or redistribution of income directly and via tariffs, subsidies, etc.

The amount and success of these political processes depends fundamentally on a) the global spread of egalitarian ideals and practices, such as social movement protests, linkages to international organizations (esp. NGOs) with similar concerns and b) the amount of political pressure that dissatisfied constituents mobilize. Clearly a) and b) shift with impacts from globalization. Further c) in more strong-state contexts, pressures toward income redistribution are more likely, which d) in weak-state, strong civic contexts, the NGOs (civic associations) are more key actors on specifics, or e) if individuals accept the inequalities as “fair,” political action may be unpopular f) a compromise by political leaders is to use public goods (broadly shared actions to counter the undesirable globalization processes, e.g. better schools, infrastructure investment, more R&D) rather than private goods of income redistribution.

Week 1.   Introduction and Overview of the Course

Week 2.   Globalization: Economics, Technology, Hierarchy.

*Adam Smith

The Wealth of Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, chs 1-3, pp. 1-26.

The classic statement of how the “extent of the market” permits a more advanced division of labor, the prime moving force generating the wealth of nations. Does he mention government? Or culture? How and where do they enter such an analysis?

**Thomas L. Friedman

The Lexus and The Olive Tree. NY: Farrar, Straus, Giroux. 1999. chaps 1-8 pp. ix-163.

NY Times bestseller that brought "globalization" to Main street. Great anecdotes, but look for internal contradictions. (Over)stresses technical and economic forces with metaphors like “the Golden Straitjacket” on politics. Interviews with author on web:  http://www.lexusandtheolivetree.com/.

*John Friedmann

“The World Cities Hypothesis,” in Paul L. Knox and Peter J. Taylor, eds., World Cities in a World System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 317-331.

Strong statement of largely Marxist ideas stressing hierarchy and inequality. Are the “hypotheses” as deterministic as he suggests? What propositions from other theories could lead to the same results?

***Saskia Sassen

The Global City. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. Overview, pp. 3-15.

Provocative statement with a nuance and subtlety that many others do not attain. Scan the rest of the book.

Handouts on:

1. proposition construction and

2. past student papers

Week 3.   Globalization: The Emergence and Diffusion of Distinct Democratic Cultures and Institutions.

**Daniel J. Elazar

World History Curriculum, MS, 130 pp. double-space. Draft 1999.

Ambitious and facile, yet remarkably coherent overview of the rise of Western Civilization from the small, volatile societies of the ancient Greeks and Jews to the present, including Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Stresses the interpenetrations among the cultures and civilizations of the world. Illustrates key concepts that recur: migration, frontier, claiming a new territory, covenants creating mutual obligations, democratic participation. How explain the lack of diffusion of these ideas across most of the globe, until very recently, and then more recent efforts toward rapid change? Elazar’s ideas are elaborated in far more detail and with scholarly specifics in his 70 plus books. See esp. The Great Frontier and the Matrix of Federal Democracies, Transaction Press, 1998. Vol. 3 of four volume series.

***Seymour Martin Lipset

American Exceptionalism, New York: WW Norton, 1997; Introduction, pp. 17-30 and ch 1 pp. 31-52.

As overview of core values of Americans historically. Useful for his own views as well as a synthesis of many past interpreters of America.

**Ronald Inglehart

Modernization and Post Modernization. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, read at least ch 3, pp. 67-108 and scan the rest; read more for later sections.

Clear overview of several propositions about value changes over time, then tests of these using the World Values Surveys. Inglehart’s theory of post-modern value change remains controversial but is one of the most influential in social science.

*Samuel P. Huntington

“The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, 1993.

A forceful but overly deterministic statement of global transformation since the end of the Cold War. Uses a strong military/strategic thrust. Elaborated in his book with the same title if you want more detail.

PART II.   STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY SECTORS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP

7. Tocqueville argued that egalitarian ideals and structure would be the driving force of history.

He offers two models of democracy and equality that replace traditional hierarchies. In propositional form:

7) Demands for social equality undermine old hierarchies and create

• 7a) American-style civil society (voluntary associations); or



• 7b) expansion of European-style central state.

8. Tocqueville proposes a trade-off in growth of state vs. civil society:

• 8a) state expansion fosters passive reliance of citizens on government and undermines individual initiative of citizens. By contrast:



• 8b) a vibrant civil society allows for limited government. If individual initiative is associated with economic entrepreneurship and competition, the growth of state should be associated with lower entrepreneurship and economic growth.

Proposition 9) Controlling for other variables, localities with higher growth on government spending in past decades should have lower economic growth and more decline in civil society (indicators: crime, church membership, etc.).

Assuming that proposition 9 is true, it implies

10) Economic competition (global linkage) influences growth-oriented leaders to foster individual initiative and entrepreneurship; and

• 10a) individual entrepreneurship, in turn, requires the development of social capital and civic associations, which reduce the role of the state.

While localities (cities) are paid little attention in theories which give primacy to the central state or capitalist market, they are more prominent in theories of entrepreneurship, social capital and civil society, which stress grassroots organizations. Numerous civic groups and local governments permit all citizens to participate and learn democratic values.

Week 4.   Demand for greater social equality has historically encouraged state growth and intervention throughout the world.

**Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1969.

Democracy in America (J.P. Mayer, ed). New York: Anchor Books. V2, Part II, Chs 1-5, pp. 503-517.

Classic discussion of American civic associations vs. European hierarchies.

**Robert Putnam

Making Democracy Work, ch 1 and conclusion.

Highlights the role of local leaders and organizations in the construction of a vibrant civil society, which spurs economic development.

*Francis Fukuyama

Trust, New York: The Free Press, 1995, Part V, pp. 325-362.

Critique of state expansion as leading to dependency and undermining individual initiative. Social capital is important for economic development, but can come from diverse sources. In the US, from Protestant asceticism; in Germany, from the guilds; in Italy and France where guilds were destroyed, there was less social capital. Generally: those countries that had strong national states destroyed intermediary organizations, and in the process, destroyed the civic basis of trust among citizens, as in Italy, France, former Soviet areas.

*Lipset

American Exceptionalism, ch.8 pp. 267-292 on civic participation, declining trust, and public morality, an on-going debate with Robert Putnam.

Appendix pp. 293-297 very short but powerful results on who joins groups and obligations felt (contrast to Putnam, etc.)

Extra: Olson, Mancur

The rise and decline of nations : economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press, c1982. Regenstein HD82.O5650 1982. Ch 1, 3.

Classic counterargument to Putnam's thesis. Argues that closely knit social, economic, and political organizations are prone to inefficient cartelization and social rigidity. A powerful state that destroys older forms of associations creates space for individual mobility, entrepreneurship and new forms of associations, which promote economic growth.

Week 5.   Entrepreneurial Urban Politics. New leaders stress individual initiative and private sector dynamics.

***Terry Nichols Clark and Vincent Hoffmann-Martinot, eds.

The New Political Culture. Boulder: Westview, 1998, chs 1-4, pp. 1-194.

Defines new rules of the game for politics, challenging two older traditions: class politics and clientelism. Advocates include Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and Francois Mitterand. They revolutionized the politics of their countries by embracing citizen democracy, environmentalism, gay rights, and abortion—generally consumption and lifestyle issues, with less emphasis on workplace and jobs than in the past. Leadership comes less from parties, unions, and ethnic groups; rather issue-specific leaders are more active, as are citizens and the media. Processes are specified in propositions and detailed using data from 7,000 mayors and their cities in 20 countries plus selected case studies.

*Terry Nichols Clark

Trees and Real Violins: Building Post-Industrial Chicago. Draft of book.

Shows how globalization helps redefine past rules of the game about Chicago politics, to focus less on clientelism, jobs, contracts, and patronage, and more on consumption, amenities, education, and public goods for the entire city. Similar processes are underway in many cites from Tokyo to Naples. Transformations are larger and harsher outside of the northwest European cultural region.

Extra: Terry Nichols Clark

“Old and New Paradigms for Urban Research”, Urban Affairs Review. September 2000.

Shows how globalization weakens some paradigms about cities, but strengthens others. Uses results from the Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation (FAUI) Project in 35 countries.

*James Norquist

The Wealth of Cities. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1998, chs. 1-2, pp. 1-45.

Strong and specific statement about “new politics,” featuring concrete local polices that mesh with global markets. Openly critical of traditional welfare-state approaches that make cities dependent on higher governments. Many examples from U.S. cities. Author is several-term Mayor of Milwaukee, the first major city to use school vouchers.

Extra: Alan Harding et. al.

European cities towards 2000: profiles, policies, and prospects. Manchester; New York: Manchester University Press; New York: St Martin's Press, 1994. Regenstein Stacks HT131.E920 1994.

A generally strong statement of global markets limiting local initiative. Contrast this with his paper on reserve, which looks into some concrete decisions more deeply and shows far more local initiative and variation in responding to global forces.

Extra: Norman Walzer, ed.

Local Economic Development. Boulder: Westview, 1995.

The first book on local development policies in countries around the world, esp. W. Europe, Russia, and the US. Contrasts traditional incentives by government that aid individual firms with public goods/amenities that seek to improve the overall climate of the locale (in chapters by Miranda, Rosdil, and Green).

Week 6.   Discussion of Student Projects: propositions, readings, class trip to explore data files.
(See comments at beginning and below week 9)

Resources related to readings include comparative analysis of cities, states and countries via FAUI survey, WVS (world values survey), census data, etc. Some variables to consider: Independent variables: Economic development (e.g. per capita income), External Linkages (e.g. foreign direct investment, trade, migration). Dependent variables: World Values Survey items on democracy, individualism, social attitudes; inequality indexes.

Analysis of FAUI, WVS and other data. For example, Proposition:

7a) Controlling for other variables, cities with higher growth on government spending in 1970s later have less lower economic growth and decline in civic society (indicators: crime, church membership, etc.);

7b) Cities with greater scope of civil society (e.g. church membership) in 1970s are linked to higher economic growth in 1980s and 1990s;

7c) Fiscally conservative mayors (1970s) are linked with higher economic growth and civil society (1980s and 1990s).

PART III.   ETHNICITY, COMMUNAL IDENTITY AND NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

9. Global impacts on ethnicity. More global communication and travel bring more information about different nations and ethnic groups, which combined with education encourages less parochial outlooks toward national and ethnic groups.

International agencies (UN, EU) and voluntary associations (humanitarian, religious and human rights groups) have grown more active globally in recent years. They use the media to feature international scandals, i.e. violations of classic Western values, such as quasi-genocidal policies in Bosnia or Kosovo. The globalizing process tends to extend the values of Western democracy to social and ethnic relations inside and across national boundaries around the world.

9) Globalization spreads an ethos of equality and applies it to ethnic and disadvantaged national groups. It undermines ascriptive hierarchies, and expands opportunity structures.

• 9a) Institutions of civil society, entrepreneurship and free market economy are associated with "cosmopolitan" ethnicity, or new forms of communal identity which cut across traditional social boundaries.



• 9b) Strong state intervention is more likely in contexts where past ethnic traditions have been particularly conflictual and weak state controls would provoke ethnic violence and conflict (Bosnia, Indonesia). Strong state intervention maintains static, closed, and politicized ethnicity. Welfare state resources are distributed along traditional social group boundaries.
  
  9a) Individual Mobility + Multiple Universal Cultures/Institutions >>> Cosmopolitanism
  vs.
  9b) Individual Mobility + Binary Cultures (e.g. mainstream vs. minority ethnic) >>> mainstream assimilation
  9c) State regulation and distribution based on group boundaries >>> Politicized and static ethnicity
  
  Within countries ethnicity and race effects vary by policy area. State distributive power shifts core processes.



• Proposition 9c): Ethnicity/race matters more in policy arenas, such as public education, where state distributive power is dominant, and less significant in arenas like business entrepreneurship and economic development in countries where the government plays a limited role in these areas. Racism can combine with state regulatory power.



• Proposition: 9d) Politically, ethnicity is salient in social arenas, in the US, like employment by government, construction unions or home ownership, where white racism was prevalent yet government policies in some localities have resolved the situation. If racism is prevalent in a certain locality, and state regulation cannot provide a viable solution, then minorities may abandon pressing for state regulation (voice) and exit to more minority-friendly environments. For example, discrimination is common in personal social networks (marriage, informal social relations). But rather than seek to regulate marriage markets, minorities often simply associate with persons more friendly to minorities, or move to locations which have a reputation that is less racist.



• This leads to Prop 9e) When "voice" (via such policies as social justice through state regulation, redistribution) is not a viable option, more individuals choose exit, i.e. they move to areas and networks with greater opportunities.

10. Globalization can create social chaos, by undermining traditional institutions. What can replace them?
Social chaos contributes to demands for strong state or (global) charismatic social movements, depending on which is more active.

10) Economic/social changes, such as mass immigration, contributes to social instability and conflict.

11) Social chaos and disorder (e.g. crime, failing schools) predispose persons to new authoritarian, hierarchical institutions which restore a sense of moral order. However, such a role can be played by:
1. charismatic movements and moral institutions, such as martial arts or evangelical churches; or
2. a strong state.
12) Limited government intervention during times of social change encourages popular participation in charismatic civil movements; conversely, an active, growing state discourages civic movements.

13) Participation in charismatic civic (non-political) movements is encouraged by global linkages with other cultures.

The introduction of martial arts, Buddhism and other self-help associations encourage more minorities and lower-income persons in American cities to participate in civic or civil movements, as opposed to civil rights and political movements. In Latin America and China, the introduction of Protestantism provides opportunities for more civic, self-help oriented participation, as opposed to reliance on state or traditional leftist movements.

14. Globalization undermines the powerful hierarchies of nation states and traditional institutions, and encourages individualism.

Anomie, crime, and illegitimacy are common in societies like the former Soviet states. What can prevent anarchy? Initially common are groups like organized crime or gangs that discipline individualized violence, and protect their members and friends. The classic business of the Mafia is selling protection. Strong political parties are common, lobbying the state for new policies. But beyond such groups, are emerging a wide range of global civic movements (churches, martial arts) which focus on personal improvement, mutual aid and disciplined participation in the market economy, broadly consistent with Max Weber’s Protestant ethic view of life. This behavior is economically rational if:

14) Duty-oriented, universalistic organizations and cultures (which instill sense of duty and obligation among fellow members) foster social capital (trust); and

15) controlling for human capital, persons with more social capital generate entrepreneurship and wealth. In addition, we shall look at universalistic movements which includes persons from diverse social (ethnic) backgrounds, and test the proposition that

16) Cosmopolitan social capital provides access to multiple social networks and therefore contributes to economic innovation and greater socioeconomic mobility than more parochial forms of social capital.

Week 7.   Ethnicity and Race.

*Dahl, Robert Alan

Who Governs?

New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961. JA36.Y22 v.4. Ch 4, pp. 32-51.

A classic statement on assimilation and multiple, diffused identities as immigrants achieve socioeconomic mobility. Immigrant leaders support general assimilation into the mainstream and do not call for group-based categories.

* Lipset

American Exceptionalism, Ch 4.

"Two Americas, Two Value Systems: Blacks and Whites", pp. 113-150.
Stresses the often conflictual value frameworks for interpreting similar events.

Ch 6, Intellectuals and Political Correctness.
How major programs for social change, like affirmative action, are struggled over by intellectuals in particular.

**Clark, Terry Nichols (Ed).

Urban Innovation. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994. "Class vs. Race vs. The New Political Culture," pp. 21-78.
Post-redistributive politics in American cities. Uses Hierarchy Leveling Principle (p. 29ff.) to interpret ethnic conflict. Note that this subsumes the concept of “political opportunity structure” in the social movement literature.

** Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, eds.

Racial Politics in American Cities, Second Ed. White Plains, NY: Addison-Wesley-Longman, 1997, E185.615 .R214. Ch. 1, pp. 15-39 by the editors on 10 Bay Area cities.

And ch 2 pp. 41-64 by Raphael J. Sonenshein, "Post Incorporation Politics in Los Angeles."

Good contrast: general success of minorities in Bay area, but much resistance, punctuated by riots and election of Republican Mayor Riordan in LA. Local diversity and specific tactics of political activism have clearly differentiated impacts. Other chapters discuss ethnic incorporation in other cities.

*W. Lance Bennett

"The Uncivic Culture: Communications, Identity, and the Rise of Lifestyle Politics," PS December 1998, p. 741-758/761.

Among the causes of the new local, issue politics is the public reluctance to endorse substantial class or race-based redistributive programs.

*Bobo, Larry & Howard Schumann

Racial attitudes in America: trends and interpretations. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988. Regenstein Stacks E185.615.S293.

Comprehensive overview of survey results on race in America.

Extra: Jesse Jackson, Mary Gotschall (Contributor), Jesse Jackson Sr., Jesse Jackson Jr.

It's About the Money: How You Can Get Out of Debt, Build Wealth, and Achieve Your Financial Dreams, 256 pages (January 2000).

Dramatic change of tone from past civil rights activism. How widespread is this change of view?

Extra: Handouts on FAUI results on changing impacts of race in US cities (Wong, Jain, Clark); results from Clarence Stone surveys, L. Quillian? Other recent data.

Week 8.   New Social and Charismatic Movements.

***Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, eds.

Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966. Introduction and ch. 1, pp. 1-40.
Introduces three key concepts for interpreting social Movements: opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. The “political opportunity structure” idea links with the concepts above of “global linkage” and “Hierarchy Leveling” in that they stress how contexts drastically shift processes: radical protest can rapidly change to party politics if the “opportunity structure” opens. The German Greens’ entry to the Bundestag is the classic instance.

***Putnam, Robert

"Bowling Alone." Journal of Democracy 6.1 (1995) 65-78.
Classic civic decline thesis. See also his book-length version with the same title published in 2000.

*June Nash

Re-Envisioning Mayas: Contesting Strategies of Globalization in Chiapas, Mexico. Scan esp. chs. 1 and 5.
A book draft by a seasoned anthropologist reporting on the separatist resistance movement in Mexico. Shows with nuanced specifics how the presence of international human rights workers, and the national government's fear of negative media coverage, shifted the process away from classic repression.

Extra: Hanspeter Kriesi

“The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements: Its Impact on their Mobilization,” in J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans, eds., The Politics of Social Protest. Social Movements, Protest, and Confrontations 3, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995. Chap 7, Pp. 167-198.

Extra: Martin, David

Tongues of fire: the explosion of Protestantism in Latin America. Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass., USA: B. Blackwell, 1990.
Please read chapters in Introduction and either the Brazilian or Mexican case study. Martin interprets and provides extensive data on spread of evangelical Protestantism (Pentecostalism) in Latin America.

Joseph Yi interprets the global spread of evangelical Protestantism and other movements in his Ph.D. thesis which he will summarize. Unfortunately little past writing directly illustrates key points for the course. Some works that provide background are listed below.

Extra: Max Weber

Protestant Ethic, Ch 1.

Extra: Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby

The glory and the power: the fundamentalist challenge to the modern world. Boston: Beacon Press, 1992.
Short book that introduces the global fundamentalist phenomena.

Extra: Hammond, Phillip E. and David W. Machacek

1999. Soka Gakkai in America: Accommodation and Conversion. Oxford: Oxford U Press. Ch 1.
A Buddhist self-help, mutual aid movement, albeit more individualist than evangelical Christians.

Extra: Biggart, Nicole W.

1989. Charismatic Capitalism: Direct Selling Organizations in America. Chicago: The U of C Press. Ch 1. and Appendix on growth of DSOs in other countries.

Weeks 9 and 10.   Discussion of Student projects.

1. Review the propositions we have started here in the Syllabus, and will elaborate through the course, as hypotheses to test. How might they be tested? Often ideal is a mix of in-depth qualitative field work, combined with the relativising discipline of a comparative survey, as the commentaries below on the data sources suggest.



2. How conceptualize and measure different dimensions of globalization? What propositions and data lead to different strategies?



3. Globalization at the urban level can mean more local autonomy for local officials to pursue policies without the interferences of the national government. This can be measured with FAUI data on the importance of each type of official in up to 7,000 cities in 20 countries.



4. Consider measures of global linkages with data on TV, internet use, video rental patterns, movies, theater, college/university presence, etc. How much do cultural indicators overlap/correlate with economic and political indicators; which change first? Putnam presents data that, he suggests, shows that voluntary associations drove economic development in Italy in the nineteenth century, reversing the common economic determinism. How explore this with existing data?



5. Code and analyze the content of websites that cities around the world have created. What themes do they promote? How explain/correlate these themes with the socio-economic makeup of the locality? Correlate with foreign direct investment, post-industrial sector, or other economic measures. This was initiated by one student British cities.



6. Look at definition/formation of ethnicity in civil rights organizations vs. martial arts, evangelical and Buddhist churches, etc. Civil rights activists generally argue for permanence of racism and deep white-black gap vs. civic association leaders stress post-ethnic identities. Jesse Jackson's new book on entrepreneurship. Visit one of Joseph Yi’s dissertation field sites.



7. How conceptualize and measure economic growth? It has many components, such as in an individualistic model: a) desire for individual self advancement b) personal abilities c) social capital d) financial resources. Or advancement may be more collective, involving a town or organization or economic sector (like computers) that advances with a new product or better form of technology, and carries its members economically forward. For the individual model, we can use data from the World Values Survey for 80,000 persons (check on specific items). For collective advancement measurement is more difficult. Some could be estimated from the makeup of the labor force of local governments. It can be traced back to individuals who change their economic sector, such as leaving automobile production for computer software. These could be measured with individual data in WVS.



8. Controlling for initial fiscal base, entrepreneurial, fiscally conservative mayors would be associated with a) economic growth and b) cosmopolitan, post-race politics. IV = fiscons 1970 (FAUI). DV = 1970-80 Fiscal base growth, Grpact for civil rights groups.



9. Controlling for education, persons with more multiethnic (cosmo) social networks (intermarriage, friendships) achieve more socio-economic mobility (e.g. income, occupation).