Date: Tue, 5 Aug 1997 00:09:55 -0400 (EDT)
From: Treb Courie
Can someone please either give me the full TO&E strength for a Red Army infantry battalion in WWII or refer me to the proper source? Thanks in advance.
Treb Courie
Clemson University
Department of History
M.A. Student
acourie@clemson.edu
Date: Tue, 05 Aug 1997 18:07:01 -0400
From: Tom Downs
Dear Treb,
There is a series on Red Army TO&E's written by Charles Sharp and published by George Nafziger. The latter has a web site at www.infinet.com/~nafziger. My only connection with either gemtleman is that I own all the titles in the series and use them frequently.
Good luckTom Downs
Date: Tue, 5 Aug 1997 18:59:59 -0400 (EDT)
From: Rzhev@aol.com
Dear Mr. Courie,
The most authoritative unclassified source on the strength of a rifle
battalion is found in the series, Taktika v boevykh primerakh [Tactics in
Combat Examples] edited by A. I. Radzievsky. Books in this series covered
army, division, regiment, battalion, platoon, and company and included a
detailed account of the corresponding formation and unit establishments.
These were published by Voenizdat in the early and mid-1970s. The volume on
regiment [polk] was published in 1974 and, although I do not have it, the
volume on battalion appeared shortly thereafter. I suggest you contact LTC
Les Grau at the Army's Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth,
since I believe he does have a copy. He can be reached at (913) 684-5894.
Of course, the establishment of battalions changes throughout the war and only a thorough review of formerly classified literature will reveal the details of each of these transformation. I think the Radzievsky volumes should suffice.
Sincerely,
David M. Glantz
Date: Wed, 6 Aug 97 11:21:34 -0000
From: bevon
If it is not deemed too commercial, may I suggest you consult The Military Encyclopedia of Russia and Eurasia (formerly The Military-Naval Encyclopida of Russia and the Soviet Union), published by Academic Internaional Press, for which I toil.
The tables of contents for all volumes in print are online at our web
site.
Cheers.
Berndt von Wahlde
Academic International Press
PO Box 1111
Gulf Breeze, FL 32562-1111
850 932 5479 (fax)
bevon@gulf.net (e-mail)
Date: Wed, 6 Aug 1997 13:50:47 -0500 (CDT)
From: "Louis R. Coatney"
For those of you not that familiar with the military side of Soviet history, I think I should mention that COL Glantz is now considered by many to be the No. 1 authority in the West on the Red Army in World War II. Even the redoubtable John Erickson (in his "New Thinking about the Eastern Front in World War II" article, in the Apr 92 Journal of Military History, which was primarily addressed to the import of David's voluminous works) felt compelled to acknowledge "thanks to the encyclopedic work of Glantz (not to mention his major contribution with The Journal od Soviet Military Studies), no one can now remain either bemused or uninformed about the wartime evolution, organisation [sic], armament, leadership and performance at all levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) of this military machine."
As importantly, to all of us, David has done much to popularize/share interest in Russian/Soviet (military) history: e.g., serving with LTC Grau on the "War College" panel at the big, national "Origins" wargaming convention, held in Columbus OH, this year. (Author Tom Clancy is also becoming involved in wargaming activities, having drawn much of his books' technical knowledge from a wargame designer acquaintance and understanding wargaming's stimulation of naval/historical interest.)
Of course, David hasn't yet risked experiencing my own new WWII Russian Front game ... featuring unknown Jun 41 Soviet strength/composition ... including the "From the Stables of Marshal Budyenny" and "The Tukhachevsky Twist" strategic options ... but ... :-)
(I should mention to our non-military Russian/Soviet historians that Simulations Publications Incorporated (long gone, sadly) produced an excellent Russian Civil War strategic game, modeling the various political factions, as well as the resulting military conflict, generally.)
In any case, thanks for having joined our happy H-Russia crew, COL David M. Glantz, ... and for generously sharing your expertise. Now if we can just get John Erickson on, too, ... :-) ...
Lou Coatney
mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu
www.wiu.edu/users/mslrc/ (free game)
... whose 1987 boardgame "German Eagle vs. Russian Bear" was
published on ERIC (at ED 361 256) as a legitimate instruction aid.
From: "Dan Panshin"
Organization: Univ of Minnesota Extension Service
Date: Mon, 11 Aug 1997 13:29:28 -0600
The PBS catalog I just received lists:
A2612 Russia's War (10 hours on 5 videocassettes) $69.98
B2612 Russia's War -- hardback book 29.95
C2612 video and book 94.93
all plus shipping and handling
Besides the telephone number Charlotte Douglas provided (800/645-4727), you may also order by fax (703/739-8131), from PBS Online at http://www.pbs.org/shop, or by mail: PBS Home video, P.O. Box 751089, Charlotte, NC 28275-1089.
Dan Panshin, Urban Extension Specialist
dpanshin@mes.umn.edu)
Univ of MN Extension Service
612/624-1034, fax 612/626-9353
University of Minnesota
499 Wilson Library, 309 - 19th Ave. S.
Minneapolis, MN 55455
Date: Tue, 12 Aug 1997 15:59:52 -0400
From: Felix Kreisel
I watched the last episode of the new PBS series called "Russia's War" and Henry Kissinger's concluding remarks. Kissinger was the history consultant for this series. He stated that while the Nazi regime ended with Hitler's suicide, the murderous "Communist" regime lasted for over thirty years after Stalin's death. He continued that this war of the regime against its own people only ended with the collapse of "communism", presumably in 1991.
One must pose the following questions: 1) There is a contradiction between laying blame for the murders on Stalin personally and the observation that the inhuman regime lasted another 35 or 38 years.
One could dismiss this as just a manifestation of Kissinger's "pop-history" mentality. Fine, but ...
2) An even larger contradiction is between the concluding statement by the writers of this TV series that the Russian government's "war on its own people" ended six years ago and the observable reality today. The actual living conditions in Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union are experiencing a catastrophic decline in the spheres of both economy and culture, and this decline has now exceeded the wartime destruction of fifty years ago. Why this catastrophe if "Russia's war" has finally ended?
Personally, I hate such debasement of historical science. Why study history if it does not offer an understanding of contemporary developments? I would recommend to the interested reader a review of Trotsky's "The Revolution Betrayed" to find a truly scientific analysis of the Soviet regime.
- - - - - - - - - -
Iskra Research -- Historical research and publication of Russian language
Marxist classics. 3 paperbacks by Leon Trotsky published so far:
Predannaia revolutsiia; Permanentnaia revolutsiia; V zaschitu marksizma.
*** NEW item: Electronic "Russian Marxist Glossary" is on-line. ***
Address: PO Box 397142
Cambridge, MA 02139-7142
e-mail: fjk@mit.edu
http://www.mit.edu:8001/people/fjk/iskra.html
Date: Wed, 13 Aug 1997 22:58:31 -0400 (EDT)
From: Jeffrey M. Hornstein
Re Felix Kriesel's post:
I second Kriesel's recommendation of Trotsky's analysis of Stalinism, still the best and most sophisticated; I would also recommend Moshe Lewin's work. However, what would one expect from Henry Kissinger, who in a truly just and humane world would be considered a war criminal for his role in Southeast Asia as well as Indonesia/East Timor? Kissinger's actions as Secretary of State demonstrated little regard for the lives of civilian populations.
At the same time, however, I must take exception with the premise, unquestioned by Kreisel, that the Soviet regime after Stalin was "murderous." While it surely wasn't an an open society, it was surely a much better place to live - materially and politically - than the Stalinist USSR or Hitlerite Germany. Thus, I would also amend Kreisel's point about contemporary Russia: the "war against the people," on a material level at least, is really a much more recently-renewed phenomenon. The precipitous decline in living standards is unprecedented in "peacetime" Russia since the 1930s. In a just and humane world, Yeltsin and his cronies will be remembered for their economic crimes against humanity.
Jeff Hornstein
From: Paul Leicht
Date: Fri, 15 Aug 1997 09:23:55 -0600
I too watched the last episode of the PBS series entitled "Russia's War" as well as all of the preceding episodes. As with Mr. Kreisel, I was also somewhat disappointed with Mr. Kissinger's supplementary comments, but in doing my best to ignore them, I managed to appreciate the overall contribution to popular historical understanding that the series was attempting to make.
With a wider, and more "general" audience in mind, I believe that one of the film's main points was made rather well--namely, that the central causes for the Second World War in Europe were as much the product of Stalin as well as Hitler. Indeed, the savage nature of the German-Russo War of 1941-45 was also quite indicative of the terrorist regimes that were conducting it. In any event, I think that the film helped to show that in the context of human displacement and misery, the Second World War in Europe was indeed "Russia's War"--both in blame and so called victory.
Date: Fri, 15 Aug 1997 20:39:48 -0400 (EDT)
From: cmad8085@uriacc.uri.edu (Cheryl A. Madden)
Hi,
Regarding where to place the blame for WWII, Viktor Suvorov (pseud.) wrote a
fascinating book:
Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?
Hamish Hamilton Books, London, 1990, ISBN: 0-241-126223.
Cheryl A. Madden
cmad8085@uriacc.uri.edu
Date: Tue, 19 Aug 97 22:27:26 CDT
From: Hugh Ragsdale
On Suvorov again: the 1995 book Gotovil li Stalin nastupatel'nuiu voinu protiv Gitlera is nearly as teasing and unsatisfactory as Suvorov himself. Ditto Iu. A. Gor'kov, Kreml'. Stavka. Genshtab (1995). Most interesting work on the subject, though indirect, is Cynthia A. Roberts, "Planning for War" in Europe Asia Studies (1995).
Hugh Ragsdale
My attention has been drawn to the debate over Suvorov which seems to be raging in the list. As it happens I have been working on Soviet foreign policy in the period of 1939-1941 for the last decade. My book on Cripps's Mission to Moscow, 1939-1942 was published by Cambridge University Press some time ago. I have first crossed swords with Suvorov over his initial article in Russkaya Mysl' about 10 years ago and then on the pages of RUSI in England. When his book came out I was asked by Progress Publishing House to produce a rebuttal which came out two years ago under the title "Mif ledokola". I have been the only scholar so far to gain free access to the archives of Soviet foreign ministry, the military and the KGB. Unfortunately at the time of writing the Russian version I was in a very preliminary stage of the writing. I have now completed an English version based on those documents which will be printed by Yale University Press most probably in July next year.
My conclusions leave no doubt that Suvorov's work is indeed amateurish to say the least and is not corroborated by any of the 10,000 documents and more which I have consulted. The first chapter in "Mif Ledokola" exposes the distortion of the archival material by Suvorov (in fact he used very little if any at all) and real doctoring of the memoirs he used. For instance when Vasilevsky wrote: "we prepared for the counter offensive" the quote in Suvorov's book was "we prepared for the offensive", a rather meaningful omission. Suvorov has just published another book under the title Posledniaia respublica is which he misquotes in his typical way my own book. He makes a whole thing of a quote I had from Stalin in the wake of the winter war in which he reproached the army suggesting that they were "50% stupid, 30% incompetent and the rest nothing". He devotes two chapters to this quote suggesting this is actually my own views of the army and the book ends with the words: "my brothers, officers of the Russian army, I hope you will now know what to do with Gorodetsky". So this is the person we are dealing with. It is indeed a great pity that he had such a hold on the Russian readers but let us not forget that the period of 1939-1941 was an empty page in Soviet historiography.
The archival material does reveal a lot about Stalin's policies during that period which has not been covered so far by historians and I do hope my book will be able to feel the lacuna.
Gabriel Gorodetsky
Director, the Cummings Center
Tel Aviv University
Date: Wed, 20 Aug 1997 17:53:07 -0400
From: Boris Lvin
It seems that an impartial discussion of the Suvorov's books (there are already three books about the origins of the WW2, and not just "Icebreaker") is long overdue. What we have thus far is either outright rejection of his assertions on purely ideological ("he's a Stalinist, a Hitlerite, a spy, or something else") and stylistical ("no archival references") grounds or invariably failed attempts to refute him.
I would pass over N.Knight's point that Suvorov effectively serves a Stalinist cause - to say this one must simply ignore everything Suvorov writes, and also believe that the "negligence theory" is more damaging to Stalin's reputation than a charge that he consciously arranged and ignited the world war.
What is more striking is that while there is voluminous literature about the diplomatic and political origins of WWI, there is almost nothing of the sort about WW2. This point was made by A.J.P. Taylor in his 1961 book, and still remains valid. Incredibly vast literature is devoted to the every minor military aspects of WW2 as though the war itself was inevitable and the military developments were of decisive importance. In fact, the opposite is true: militarily the war was lost by Germany the day it was started, and it was far from being desired and really planned for by any participant but Stalin.
As for the Western participants, Taylor devastatingly proved that both sides (Germany/Italy and France/England) tried very much to avoid it. Indeed, it was WWI, and not WW2, which was enthusiastically greeted by the peoples and politicians alike, and the fate of which remained unclear till almost the end. Interestingly enough, it was regarded politically correct in the Twenties for the historians to blame their own country for the war (see for the Russian example the excellent book Imperialistskaia voina by Pokrovski)..
Taylor proves that Hitler really believed the Pact would save him from a European war (his demands to the Poles were quite limited, at least in view of what happened later on). And Stalin has just learned about Anglo-French war plans and their intention to fight for Poland!
But Taylor was characteristically ignorant about the Soviet realities as much as he was enlightened about the Western ones, and his assumptions about what Stalin thought and what the Red Army looked like were very naive, to put it mildly. Thus he presents the war as just a historical accident.
Suvorov proves that while the Red Army was definitely the strongest one by 1939, it is in August that Stalin decided to unleash the war and to start preparation for the total offensive battle over Europe. His evidence has never been disproved; all what his critics could do was to point to some alleged errors in the technical description of some weapons. But these were not primary evidence as presented by Suvorov; he bases his story on the development and logic of military units and their movements.
That there is very little substantiated response to
Suvorov in Russia (apart from the book Gotovil li
Stalin nastupatel'nuiu voinu protiv
Gitlera? cited by Peter Blitstein, I can note also
Voina 1939-1945. Dva podkhoda, Moscow, RGGU, 1995) is
understandable: there are too many vested interests to
be affected and too many reputations destroyed). The
lack of interest in the West where I believe
"Icebreaker"'s follow-ups have never been translated is
to be explained by a general belief that Stalin and his
policies were of only secondary importance during
WW2. And in Germany the Left tried hard to suppress the
book instead of coming to terms with the truth. This
story is well described by R.C.Raack's article
"Stalin's role in the coming of World War II: the
international debate goes on" (World Affairs, vol. 159,
Number 2, 1996).
Boris Lvin
blvin@imf.org
Date: Sun, 17 Aug 97 21:39:03 CDT
From: Hugh Ragsdale
In response to C. Madden's recommendation of V. Suvorov, Icebreaker: it is not only a very controversial book but is regarded by most qualified spec- ialists as unreliable. It has generated quite a lot of response from former Soviet now Russian specialists, esp. Gen. Gorkov, and all of the response is without sufficient documentary evidence to be very useful.
Hugh Ragsdale
Date: Sun, 17 Aug 1997 19:23:57 -0400 (EDT)
From:David M. Glantz
To whom it may concern:
Before reading Rezin's (Suvorov's) work and contemplating his inflammatory and politically dangerous conclusions, one should read his previous works and reviews of Ledokol' [Icebreaker]. While his first work, the memoir of a Soviet major, was quite convincing, his subsequent works (on the Soviet Army, the intelligence services, etc.) increasingly veered toward the absurd. His views, in particular the claim that Stalin was planning to attack the Germans in summer 1941 (and hence, that Hitler's war of 22 June was preventative in nature) have been embraced by revisionist Germans, for understandable reasons, and by many Russian reformers, whose hatred of Communism and everything Soviet, prompts then to accuse Stalin and the system of virtually every evil. Suvorov's inflammatory theses have been supported by fragmentary information taken out of context from Soviet memoir literature. The book is symptomatic of a new trend toward sensationalism. The pity is that this material is appearing at a time when genuine scholarship is exploiting new Soviet archival materials to surface entirely new aspects of the war, aspects which, while fresh and revealing, are at least anchored on fact. There is enough new to learn without being mesmerized by fable.
For additional materials on Suvorov, see review in a recent issue of the Journal of Military History.
Date: Mon, 18 Aug 1997 15:20:04 +0300 (IDT)
From: Mayzel Matitiahu
I was always under the impression that Mr. Suvorov wrote about the war between the USSR and Germany, not on WWII. In any event, the case he presents is, to put it mildly, problematic. He sold millions of copies in Russia, but this does not make him a good source neither good history.
M. Mayzel
Tel-Aviv U
I'm glad to see the discussion of "Ledokol'". A friend gave it to me in Russia a few years ago and I took it to read on a long train ride. I've always been curious what other people thought. I found it to be a rather ingenious mix of speculation, circumstantial evidence and patchy sources--typical conspiracy theory material, intriguing, disturbing and, to a believer, almost impossible to disprove. What struck me most, though, was Suvorov's image of Stalin. After reading the book, I had to conclude that in his heart of hearts, Suvorov remains a Stalinist to this day. The main purpose of the book was not to condemn Stalin, but rather to exonerate him of the accusation that is most damaging to the Stalin myth--that he was grossly negligent to the point of incompetence on the eve of the war. We may conclude after reading Icebreaker that Stalin was evil, but he was an evil *genius*. His apparent mistakes were all part of a brilliant plan, and if Hitler hadn't double-crossed him the hammer and sickle would be waving over the Eiffel Tower. What more could a Stalinist want?
Nathaniel Knight
Date: Thu, 21 Aug 1997 09:33:45 -0400 (EDT)
From: David M. Glantz
For an archival-based refutation of Suvorov's claims, see my forthcoming volume due to be published in spring 1998 by Kansas University Press, entitled The Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army in June 1941. It documents (on the basis of Soviet archival materials) the parlous condition of the Red Army on the eve of war, a condition clearly evident once war began.
David M. Glantz
Date: Sat, 23 Aug 1997 10:58:48 -0700 (PDT)
From: Gabriel Gorodetsky
Could anyone repeat to me the information about Glantz's new forthcoming book on Suvorov?
I have distributed to the list a week ago a word about the book I have published in Russia against Suvorov under the title Mif ledokola and which will appear in Yale next year under a less assuming title, covering Stalin's policieis in 1939-1941. It will be a comprehensive survey of Stalin's policy, examining under a single spotlight the military, international and intelligence aspects.
Geographically it will point out to the significance, somewhat overlooked by historians, of the fierce clash between Stalin and Hitler over the Balkans since the very outbreak of the war. The underlining thesis, proved beyond any doubt by the free access I had to the Soviet documents in the Foreign Office archives, the archives of the General Staff, the Presidential archives and a substantial collection of the KGB archives, is that there was no ideological consideration in Stalin's policies. He was in fact obsessed with issues such as the control of the Black Sea, the Turkish Straits and some control over Bulgaria, thinking of the Crimean War rather than Lenin's thesis on "imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism" (which he openly dismissed).
It is an intricate story but only a minute and thorough narrative of the complex period does lead to clear answers. I have used some 10,000 documents and none of them, none whatsoever, corroborates Suvorov's thesis. The sole exception is Zhukov's proposed plan for a preemptive strike on 15 May (of which Suvorov himself was not even familiar) but which is in a draft form and was rejected on the spot with Stalin who was at that particular moment engaged in an attempt, hitherto unknown, to meet Hitler personally and reach an extension of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact to defer the war. Zhukov was forced therefore to submit a defensive plan of deployment a couple of days later; this one is signed by him and Timoshenko and served as the standing order for the defense of the Soviet borders until the attack (reinforced on the 2nd of June and then on the 12th).
What rather upset me about the debate is that people tend to express their views freely according to their ideological or political beliefs without having the simplest clue as to what actually happened between 1939-1941. I do hope the book will rectify that.
Gabriel Gorodetsky
Cummings Center for
Russian Studies Tel Aviv University
Date: Tue, 26 Aug 1997 08:25:42 -0400 (EDT)
From: "David Stone (GD 1997)"
I'd actually like to turn this discussion temporarily away from Suvorov to the sources that Gabriel Gorodetsky has mentioned. My personal experience of the archives listed above is limited to the Foreign Office archives, but what I've heard from colleagues about the others suggests that, though specific conditions may differ, "free access" is hard to come by at any of them.
So two questions then--for Professor Gorodetsky, what exactly does free access mean? Use of all opisi and finding aids as well as free selection of documents themselves? Were all documents of all degrees of classification made available, or if not, what were the limits imposed? This may perhaps preempt a discussion included in Gorodetsky's forthcoming book, but I think it's still worthwhile to discuss it in this forum.
For the list members, what have your experiences been of working conditions at the most difficult Soviet archives: Foreign Ministry, Presidential Archive, Ministry of Defense, KGB? What avenues are most promising for scholars seeking access?
Dave Stone
------------------------------------------------------------------
David Stone
International Security Studies
Yale University
New Haven, CT 06520
(203) 789-1028
david.stone@yale.edu
stodavr@minerva.cis.yale.edu
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 1997 16:26:17 +0300 (IDT)
From: Prof. Gabriel Gorodetsky
Thanks for the very fair comment. Needless to say that there is nothing like free access to the Russian archives and there is no need really for a very intensive discussion of that. But the conclusion can be very simple: never try to access whatever is available using the above excuse and then write fiction based on theories and thoughts. The other is attempt to use all avenues one can to get through to the widest array of documents you can lay hands on. In my specific case I had unrestricted access to the documents of the Foreiegn Ministry, including the Opis and all that; a more limited access to the Military and Intelligence ones and obviously a restricted to the Security Services. I also had an unrestricted access to the Comintern archives and the archives of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. I still ended with a rather impressive collection of some 10,000 key documents in my data base which is by far more than any other historian has been exposed to either in Russia or in the West. Whether this is the ultimate way? Surely not but I think it is an important stride forward. And obviously my book will be out before long by Yale for you to examine the sources and pass your own judgment.
Needless to say that there are constraints in access to similar archives of the Security Forces also in the Western countries.
Gabriel
Date: Wed, 27 Aug 1997 10:00:04 -0700 (PDT)
From: Peter Blitstein
I've not worked in these archives; my experience is limited mainly to GARF and RTsKhIDNI, so what I have to say on this is based on what I've heard from others. There is no "free access" at the archives Gorodetsky listed. To me free access means the availability of finding aids to patrons, regardless of personal connections; it means that all "declassified" materials are available to historians equally. Naturally this is a relative concept. Access at RTsKhIDNI is "relatively free", but at the Presidential Archive? Hardly, unless your name is Volkogonov. Even if Gorodetsky was able to look at opisi at these archives, was able to choose what he saw (rather than submitting a broad topic and having the archival staff bring him materials, as seems to happen at the Foreign Ministry archives), unless others had such access it can hardly be considered "free" and it inevitably puts in question his research (not to mention that any categorical statement-- 'proves beyond doubt', etc.-- can hardly be accepted given our overall state of knowledge of the period).
It is high time historians of the Soviet period again consider the effect this sort of thing has on our field.
Peter Blitstein
Department of History
UC Berkeley
Date: Thu, 28 Aug 1997 16:59:18 -0500 (CDT)
From:Joseph Bradley, by way of Joan Neuberger
Those following the recent exchange about Ledokol will also be interested in this message from Brad Bradley, co-editor of Russian Studies in History. [Joan Neuberger, History, UTexas at Austin]
I am not currently a recipient of H-RUSSIA, but I understand that there has been some discussion of Suvorov's Ledokol. Recipients of H-RUSSIA might be interested to know that Russian Studies in History, one of the M.E. Sharpe translation journals, which I co-edit, is planning two issues on the topic of the Soviet entry into World War II. The Fall, 1997, issue, titled "Was the USSR Planning to Attack Germany in 1941?", features a discussion of the literature by M.I. Mel'tiukhov; the debate of the editorial board of Otechstvenaiia istoriia in 1994 about whether to publish Mel'tiukhov's article: and two other articles by Mel'tiukhov and V.A. Nevezhin on ideology and propaganda. The Winter, 1997-98, issue will be guest edited by Bruce Menning and will focus more directly on the question of military preparedness. Menning has selected articles by Gor'kov (including excerpts of the now oft-cited "Strategic Plan" of May, 1941), Bobylev, Kiselev, Pechenkin, and Dvoinykh & Tarkova.
These articles are only the tip of the iceberg, so to speak, and demonstrate that in the past few years there has been considerable response to Ledokol in post-Soviet historiography. Indeed, space limitations prevented me from using another article by Nevezhin, "Stalinskii vybor 1941g." which is a review/article prompted by Gorodetskii's Mif Ledokola. As I conclude in my editor's introduction to the Fall issue, whatever we may learn of Stalin's intentions by this exercise in retrospective kremlinology, the historians who take on Ledokol are acting as icebreakers for a wide range of other studies of politics, ideology, and culture on the eve of the war.
I would also like to organize a roundtable discussion of this subject at the 1998 AAASS meeting, partly, of course, to plug the two issues of Russian Studies in History, but also because this is such a hot topic. If anyone would be interested in participating, let me know.
Joseph Bradley
Co-Editor, Russian Studies in History
History Department
University of Tulsa
Tulsa, OK 74104
bradleyjc@centum.utulsa.edu
Date: Sat, 30 Aug 1997 11:38:53 -0700 (PDT)
From: Gabriel Gorodetsky
Bradley's comment was indeed most refreshing. But it is typical that the person to figure prominently on his list is Nevezhin, who, as is typical for post Soviet historiography, rather than do a serious encompassing research on the topic, chose to take a narrow aspect, the propaganda efforts on the eve of the war. The intricacy of ideology, propoganda, manipulation of public opinion should be examined against the military and political decisions. This calls for a tremendous effort, as I have found out in the last couple of years, and shooting wildly here and then is of no help. His attitude is the one I call in Russia historiography "the single document" solution. You find THE document and build around it a mountain of hypothesis and speculations. As we all know that right approach is to get to the largest array of documents and cross them with each other and try and see the complicity of it all. It is a pity that no work of that magnitude had as yet been attempted in Russia. Even worse is the inability to put it all in the context of the international arena at the time, mostly due to the poor knowledge of the western languages or lack of access to the Western literature and archives. Perhaps typical for it all is that the Russian Studies journal prefers to approach scholars commenting on my book rather than myself. I have full confidence though that Bruce Menning will do a good professional job on the second installment.
I would also to repeat the point I made before: Suvorov has side tracked us from the main debates which are not really whether Stalin planned an attack on Germany but rather a comprehensive understanding of German and Soviet policies during those two critical years, based on our knowledge of the events preceding the war and also as a key for understanding the post war world.
Gabriel Gorodetsky
This thread prepared for H-NET by Kyle W. Hafar
hafar@u.washington.edu