The Third District does not appear, at first blush, a likely venue for a highly competitive congressional race. Composed of four politically distinct counties, its core (60 percent of the population) lies in the suburban affluence of Johnson County, whose schools and amenities could match those of the wealthiest areas bounding Atlanta, Minneapolis, or Phoenix. In addition, the district includes the Democratic bastion of Wyandotte County (Kansas City, Kansas), the university community of Lawrence (Douglas County), and small, rural Miami County. The district's population is overwhelmingly white (87 percent), although a third of the residents of Kansas City, Kansas, are either Hispanic or African-American.¹ The district is home to myriad corporations and major businesses, many of which compete in national and international markets and help fund some of the nation's best public schools in Johnson County.

Among American electoral politicians few are as secure as incumbent Representatives, who win reelection at a rate of well over 90 percent. The dearth of "quality candidates" to mount a challenge tends to make the lack of competition a self-fulfilling prophecy.² Nevertheless, in most congressional districts there exists a handful of individuals who could make a strong run; only infrequently, however, does one of these individuals decide to make the sacrifices required to construct a credible effort.³

In the Kansas Third, no prospective challenger was stronger than Dennis Moore, a moderate Democrat who had three times won election as Johnson County district attorney and who had narrowly lost a race for state attorney general in 1986. After Democratic challenger Judy Hancock's disappointing defeat in 1996, Democrats in both Kansas and Washington made a series of attempts to interest Moore in running. Becoming a candidate would not only cut into his income as a criminal defense attorney, but it would also open him up to attacks on his defense of some truly despicable characters--including the defendant in a high-profile murder case. Still, he retained some substantial ambitions that had been side-tracked more than a decade earlier.

In September 1997, the Kansas Democratic party commissioned a poll to demonstrate to Moore that the seat was winnable. The September numbers demonstrated, remarkably enough, that "Dennis Moore enjoys greater raw popularity than Vince Snowbarger" and that in a head-to-head trial heat "Moore holds Snowbarger far below 50% and . . . ties Snowbarger at 39% (22% undecided)."⁴ Moore responded by hiring Larry Jacob to begin raising funds for a potential Moore-for-Congress effort. Jacob got to work and Moore's December 31, 1997, FEC report showed $68,837 cash on hand. Snowbarger reported about a thousand dollars less ($67,757) in current accounts Remarkably, the Snowbarger campaign seemed not to view these finance figures with much alarm. As of mid-April 1998, Moore had $184,538 on hand--to Snowbarger's $73,250. By then, Washington political handicappers had taken note of the funding disparity; Dennis Moore and his fund-raising operation had put the Kansas Third in play.

By February, Moore had hired Chris Esposito as campaign manager; like Jacob, Esposito was under thirty and had worked on a 1996 near-miss Democratic race in New Hampshire. The campaign then proceeded to hire pollsters (Cooper and Secrest), media consultants (Seder, Legens, and Hamburger), and other consultants on direct mail and opposition research.

An April baseline survey provided a road map--on messages and target groups--and also confirmed that the Third District electorate was evenly divided. This was by the most extensive survey of the campaign (which did not poll again until early October), and it helped set Moore's issue agenda: to save Social Security, to provide more support for (public) education, and to emphasize public safety, including a strong opposition to concealed carry laws for handguns.

As for campaign strategy, Esposito offered the basic mantra: "There is a proven, tested historical formula for winning elections. It's a strong candidate, . . . it's good fund-raising, it's good polling, and it's strong organization, . . . and it's a message." All the pros, Esposito, Jacob, and later, press secretary Mark Nevins, saw Dennis Moore as a strong candidate--the raw material that could support the "scientific" campaign they sought to run. Fleshing out the generic strategy was an emphasis on getting the Moore candidacy to the last six weeks of the campaign in a position to win. That meant raising enough money for adequate mass-market television and establishing a thorough "get out the vote" (GOTV) effort.

Between April and August, the campaign experienced a sporadic series of struggles for control. The candidate never completely gave in, but Esposito did manage to keep him and the campaign reasonably well focused. Fund-raising, above all, dominated campaign activity. After all, the pros' strategy required $700,000 for media--and an overall budget of at least $900,000. One of the first things a visitor noticed in the Moore headquarters was a large sheet of white paper with a daily tally of total funds.

Between April 15 and July 15, the Moore campaign raised $166,725--almost $2000 per day. Individuals still gave the majority of the money ($91,320), but interest groups--and especially labor--were climbing on board with substantial contributions--almost $75,000. A few blocks away, the Snowbarger camp was finally starting to raise some serious money. Still, if fund-raising in American politics represents the "Wealth Primary," challenger Moore stood $100,000 ahead of incumbent Snowbarger as of July 15--with less than four months until election day.

By September 1, the rough footage for the campaign commercials was in the can, and on September 14, Cooper and Secrest conducted two focus groups in Overland Park to assess the mood of the electorate (including attitudes toward Clinton in the wake of his August 17 admission of "improper relations" with Monica Lewinsky), reactions to Moore's core messages, and the impact of ten television ads.

The focus group research accomplished several things for the Moore campaign. The two groups of participants (one all men, the other all women) generally confirmed why Moore--with his experience and low levels of partisanship--was a strong candidate, and why he could defeat Snowbarger, even though the overall mood of the participants was generally positive.

On one key issue--social security--the focus groups demonstrated both the continuing importance of the issue, and the need for Moore, or any candidate, not just to say that he would "save" it, but to inspire confidence that social security indeed could be saved. Here, the campaign's opposition research paid off, as it came up with a key Snowbarger quote, that he might consider a "phase out" of social security. Far more than any other single Snowbarger statement, this one came back to haunt the incumbent--even though he tried to counter the Moore attacks with a counter-advertisement.

This stage of the race ended on an upbeat, but cautionary note. First, Cooper and Secrest conducted its initial tracking poll (October 6-7), and the head-to-head results continued to show the two candidates in a dead heat. Snowbarger remained extraordinarily weak for an incumbent one month from the general election. In many ways, Moore's efforts had kept the race about where it had been in April--although the national political landscape had changed considerably since then. The Clinton scandal produced few first-order effects in the Third District, but it had caused the voters to view the race in more partisan terms, and that was bad news for any Democrat, even an attractive candidate with plenty of money for television exposure.

Into the highly competitive, increasingly Republican context came the first pro-Snowbarger ads, from the Republican National Committee, the first of a series of its extensive media buys that would run through the general election. Moore's paid media and his free (or earned) media strategies coalesced around the Social Security issues, which featured advertisements that continually mentioned "saving" Social Security, and Moore used the "phase out" quote in almost every stump speech and debate, as well as in his paid advertising. By mid-October, the Moore-Snowbarger air wars had escalated to the point that each campaign was spending approximately $100,000 per week on Kansas City television.

To leaven the comparative/negative ads, Martin Hamburger, Dawn Legens, and the Moore staff produced a purely positive, even "corny" commercial that stood distinct from the contrast ads that dominated the campaign's repertoire. This piece, entitled "Guitar Lessons," drew upon Moore's genuine talents as an amateur guitarist/singer.⁵ Although the focus group participants and many viewers considered "Guitar Lessons" to be hokey, it served as a valuable counterpoint to the other Moore commercials, especially a tough gun advertisement, in the last few days of the campaign. Indeed, in a post-campaign survey, the guitar ad was mentioned spontaneously by ten percent of the respondents as a reason that they voted for Moore.

Overall, the air wars were being conducted according to the campaign plan, but this only softened up the district for the ground war of the final days--where the election outcome was likely to be determined.

The Moore campaign's professionals, its consultants, and its DCCC field operatives all understood the importance of GOTV in any close race, and especially in a district where the natural Republican constituencies--most notably pro-life forces and evangelical churches--effectively turned out their own, with only modest help from individual candidates.

If there was a secret to Dennis Moore's ultimate success, it was the coordinated GOTV efforts of the Democrats, labor (and to an extent, the environmentalists), and the Moore campaign. Chris Esposito and Moore staff helped raise well over $100, 000 for the Democratic coordinated campaign (with a total budget of $400,000), and labor acted upon its best chance to win the seat in forty years.

When the votes were counted, the tally came to 102,299 for Moore and 92,801 for Representative Snowbarger. With an almost 10,000-vote margin (52 to 48 percent), Dennis Moore had won the Third District race--one of just six challengers (five of them Democrats) to gain a seat in the 106th Congress.

Representative Snowbarger opened the door by not raising enough funds to keep Dennis Moore out of the race. Once in, Moore put together an effective, professional campaign. As the pros acknowledged, it was Dennis Moore's name on the ballot. He was the one who suspended his lucrative law practice and placed his family in the spotlight. More importantly, he was the one to hire the pros who came to Kansas and demonstrated how Democrats could run a marginal-seat campaign in a hostile environment.

Three days after the election, Mark Nevins and Chris Esposito have driven off, to well-deserved rest and new career opportunities. Larry Jacob has moved his computer into Dennis Moore's basement. He has agreed to stay on for a while, and his whiteboard registers a new goal: $100,000 by February 1, 1999. A new cycle has begun.

Notes

1. Philip D. Duncan and Christine C. Lawrence, Politics in America (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1998), 571.

2. Gary Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections (New York: Longman, 1997), 34ff.

3. Linda L. Fowler and Robert D. McClure, Political Ambition (New Haven: Yale, 1989).

4. Cooper and Secrest polling advisory, 26 February 1998, p. 1, emphasis in original.

1996         Judy Hancock (D)             126,848         (45%)

                 Vince Snowbarger (R)      139,169         (50%)

                 Others                                 13,296         ( 5%)

1998         Dennis Moore (D)             102,299         (52%)

                 Vince Snowbarger (R)         92,801         (48%)