Nancy Johnson's 1998 campaign for a ninth term in the House of Representatives was in many ways an outgrowth of the unexpected trauma of the 1996 race. The key to victory would be to repair the damage reflected in the 1996 results and to bring Johnson's standing with her constituents back into line with the pre-1996 norm. Koskoff, energized by her unexpectedly strong showing, would certainly be the Democratic challenger again in 1998.

Breaking from her normal practice, Johnson set up a fledgling campaign immediately following the 1996 election, installing her field director in a basement office in her home and commissioning a post-election survey by her long-time pollster, Linda DiVall of American Viewpoint. The results confirmed her closest supporters' analysis that her close shave was derived from (1) her role as chairwoman of the House ethics committee where she presided over the proceedings on the ethics charges against Speaker Newt Gingrich in the 104th Congress; (2) the perception that she was out of touch with the district--her constituents felt that she was not around enough; and (3) the perception, for the first time, that she was more conservative than most of her constituents, which allowed her opponent to paint her as more conservative than she actually was, thus moving the district's perception of her to the right.

The major flaw of Johnson's 1996 campaign was the failure to respond in kind to her challenger's attacks. She felt that her position as chair of the ethics committee enjoined her from responding to criticisms of her handling of the proceedings against Gingrich while they were in process, and she resisted simplifying complex policy issues for campaign purposes. Finally, Johnson simply did not like to campaign in a hard-hitting way. Following her natural inclination to campaign in a genteel, civilized way had always worked before, and she evidently could not shift gears in 1996. Indeed, it took the near-defeat of that year to shock her into making the changes she thought necessary to insulate herself from similar damage in 1998.

Johnson's reaction to the near-disaster was swift. She hired a new Administrative Assistant (A.A.) for her Washington office. A former Associated Press reporter, David Karvelas had worked on Representative Dick Zimmer's unsuccessful 1996 campaign against Robert Torricelli for New Jersey's open Senate seat, a race that was described as "one of the nastiest campaigns in New Jersey history."¹ Karvelas brought with him experience with the kind of campaign she had just endured and the skills to operate in that kind of environment. He soon hired David White, who also had worked for Zimmer and for Jamestown Associates of Princeton, New Jersey, which had been Zimmer's media consultants.

In a key shift from the 1996 race, Jamestown Associates, creators of Zimmer's 1996 ads, was hired to do Nancy Johnson's media for the new election cycle, replacing the firm that previously had served as her media consultants. Thus, she hired a team that was experienced in the trench warfare of modern campaigns. Another key actor was Cheryl Lounsbury, a trusted long-time friend and manager of all of her campaigns except for her first in 1982 and the near-fatal 1996 campaign. In addition, Lounsbury had long been on the "kitchen cabinet" and played a key role not only in the 1996 campaign, but also in the strategy sessions for the 1998 campaign prior to becoming campaign manager.

Early on, Johnson's team decided to wage a nearly year-long campaign, giving her a head start that would allow her to set the agenda from the beginning, something that she had not been able to do in 1996. The first salvo in the campaign was a television ad that began running on December 22, 1997; the ad was an advocacy piece in which Johnson advertised her role in writing successful legislation to fund health care for uninsured children. A number of other ads were run in the months before Koskoff's first ad in early October forced them to turn their attention to responding to her charges.

By any measure, Johnson's 1998 campaign was a resounding success. Although she fell short of her usual victories of more than 60 percent of the vote, she nonetheless far exceeded her narrow 1996 margin against the same challenger. Her spectacular recovery was due in part to the changed political context: her release from the Gingrich ethics probe and a strong Republican candidate at the top of the ticket rather than one who had given up on Connecticut as Dole had in 1996, taking his money with him. Nevertheless, the strategy of immediately increasing her presence in the district as well as highlighting her moderation laid the groundwork for a year-long campaign that allowed Johnson to set the agenda. Although Koskoff raised more money than she did in 1996, enabling her to run television ads (which she had not done in 1996), she evidently did not have enough money to advertise for more than a month. Even though Johnson had to respond to Koskoff's charges, she nevertheless had nine months of advocacy ads on a variety of major issues under her belt before she ever had to publicly turn her attention to Koskoff.

The consultants fit neatly into the new dynamic, working collaboratively with Johnson and her staff. The pollster, Linda DiVall, had a long, trusting relationship with Johnson; new kids on the block were the media consultants, Jamestown Associates. Yet they were integrated into the campaign a little faster than they otherwise might have been by the fact that David White, Johnson's new press secretary, had worked for Jamestown prior to joining Johnson's staff. Jamestown was thus the natural choice for this race, given not only their experience with Karvelas and White, but also their work on Dick Zimmer's New Jersey race, which had been far more rough-and-tumble than the usual Connecticut campaign. In view of what Johnson saw as a highly negative Koskoff campaign in 1996, she concluded that she needed consultants and staff who had the skills to function in the modern world of campaigning. In April 1998, four months into Johnson's year-long campaign, DiVall did another survey. The results showed that the early ads as well as Johnson's other efforts had moved her numbers in a more positive direction. The campaign team judged that the strategy was on track.

DiVall conducted another survey of 400 voters in September, which showed Johnson at a 35 point lead (58 percent supported Johnson, 23 percent favored Koskoff). DiVall described the results as showing that Johnson was strong with her Republican base and seniors, with a significant number of Democrats. In another encouraging sign for Johnson, the poll showed that 64 percent of voters in union households approved of Johnson, according to a newspaper report of the poll, with an overall 70 percent job approval rating.²

In mid October, six days after Johnson's response to Koskoff's first TV ad had initially run, DiVall did a tracking poll to determine the effect of Koskoff's attack ad and Johnson's response to it. The results showed that Koskoff's ad was not working for her; in fact, Koskoff's negatives had increased and her positives had not moved; meanwhile, Johnson's positives had increased and her negatives had gone down. Lounsbury marveled, "Koskoff must not have polled! She should have seen her ad wasn't working and pulled it." Instead, she continued to run on the same message in that and subsequent ads.

The last tracking poll, conducted two weeks before the election, showed that union members were "coming home strongly to the Democrats," in four key towns, according to DiVall. Although earlier polls showed that jobs were not an issue in the district, Koskoff's attacks had been on that issue. DiVall therefore advised that the message and target be tightened by focusing mailings on the federal benefits that Johnson gained for those four towns. This strategy was implemented during the last two weeks of the campaign.

Over the course of the campaign, DiVall participated in assessing strategy, message development, and tactical shifts. She played a broader role as well She noted in an interview that this campaign was different from Johnson's prior ones. In the past, Johnson had always driven things herself. Because of her scare in 1996, she recognized that she had to give up some of that control, but she was unaccustomed to having others "tell her what to do." DiVall's role was to help "nudge Nancy toward what her team had come up with," using her seniority and their long relationship to reinforce the wisdom of the team's recommendations.

Still, there was never any question about the fact that Johnson was in charge. Her years of experience and strong policy orientation had defined her in a way that would have constrained the maneuverings of any campaign team even if she had been willing to be molded by them, which she was not. Within that context, the campaign staff played a dual role. While they worked to induce Johnson to respond more aggressively to her opponent, they also both mediated and moderated the suggestions of the consultants. As Lounsbury said, "the staff knows Nancy...the consultants will recommend something and you say 'no, that won't work.'" Nevertheless, the staff also argued with her on many media pieces, urging her to be tougher.

Johnson's own ethical standards provided the governing standards. She was willing to attack her opponent on her statements about Johnson, but was unwilling to make personal attacks. As Lounsbury said, "There were things we could have gone after her on, but it's not her style." That statement as much as anything summarizes the limits of the consultants' influence on this strong-willed, long-established incumbent.

Notes

1. Philip D. Duncan and Christine C. Lawrence, Politics in America, 1998 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997), 901.

2. David A. Smith, "Foes in 6^th spar over poll, filming," Republican-American, September 17, 1998, p. 3A.