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CAUDILLOS DISCUSSION (18 Nov.-14 Dec. 1995)


H-LatAm
Item number 1746
Sat, 18 Nov 1995 14:24:54 -0600 (CST)
QUERY: Mariano Malgarejo

Neteras/os:

The other day in my Latin American survey class I mentioned Mariano Melgarejo. Then, in one of those suspensions of thought processes that occur when one is in front of a class, I recounted the following tidbit, gleaned from one of my graduate classes. According to the instructor, one of Melgarejo's favorite pastimes was to engage his officers in a debate over who was the greater military strategist: Napoleon or Bonaparte. The point was made and the instructor went on. Unfortunately, my students want to know which strategist Melgarejo preferred. Has anyone else heard this anecdote, and can anyone answer my students question?

Thanks,

Sue Rodriguez
University of Southern Mississippi
srodrigz@whale.st.usm.edu


H-LatAm
Item number 1750
Sat, 18 Nov 1995 22:29:12 -0600 (CST)
REPLY: Mariano Malgarejo

Dear Sue,

While I am a little confused as to the true nature of your inquiry as to who was better "Napoleon or Bonaparte" - I can add a little bit more to that anecdote. i think it must have been Napoleon III as when Malgarejo was President of Bolivia, it is said he set out at the head of the Bolivian army to come to the French monarch's aid. Seemss, he thought he could just march his troops right over to France. Fortunately for his troops, it started to rain heavily and their progress overland to France was impeded almost immediately. Mother Nature and the fact Malgarejo was a BIG drinker prevented what would have been one of history's most interesting if not impossible mutual aid pacts ever!!!

Got to love those 19th century Latin American leaders!!

Ciao,

Heather Thiessen
Tulane University
hthiess@mailhost.tcs.tulane.edu


H-LatAm
Item number 1764
Mon, 20 Nov 1995 09:26:30 -0600 (CST)
REPLY: Mariano Melgarejo

Sue,

Alcides Arguedes, Los Caudillos Barbaros tells a lot of stories about Melgarejo, who has gotten a lot of bad publicity in Bolivian history. Arguedes tells other similar stories about Melgarejo as well.

Robert Jackson (AAS_JACKSON@TIGER.TSU.EDU)


H-LatAm
Item number 1767
Mon, 20 Nov 1995 09:55:55 -0600 (CST)
REPLY: Mariano Melgarejo

Sue,

The bad rap that Melgarejo has received was written in the early twentieth century by an individual who decried Bolivia's caudillo past and was in favor of civilian government. Melgarejo symbolically became the image of the debauched and ignorant caudillo, and Los Caudillos Barbaros is full of these kinds of studies. Melgarejo also was not accepted socially in elite circles in Bolivia because of his lowly status and, if I am not mistaken, his illegitimate birth. The interesting thing is that a number of Melgarejo's policies, particularly his anti-community legislation, was later implemented, although in a somewhat modified form, by other politicians. I am not saying that Melgarejo was a saint, but he was not the ignorant buffoon that he has been identified as since the early 20th century.

Dr. Robert Jackson (AAS_JACKSON@TIGER.TSU.EDU)


H-LatAm
Item number 1769
Mon, 20 Nov 1995 11:41:17 -0600 (CST)
REPLY: Caudillos (was Mariano Melgarejo)

The thread about Melgarejo raises the whole issue of our historical view of the caudillos, as both Arreola and Jackson point out. The revision of the caudillos has begun in some specific instances--Burns's book is a general example, and some of the work done on Argentina's Rosas is too. I have been working (indirectly) on Mexican caudillos.

We have not properly understood the roles of the caudillos for three main reasons, I think.

1. Historiography clumps them all together, refusing to distinguish between the good, the bad, and the merely ugly.

2. The historiography has not yet fully absorbed the significance of territoriality in Latin American 19th century history--the role of the state or province as the base of nationhood, and the role of the caudillo as the legitimate voice/leader of the states/provinces.

3. The fundamental problem is the influence of European 19th century historical formulations of "nation," which continues to lead us to write and speak in terms of "Mexico" or "Argentina" or whatever as a whole, unable to see that until a certain point in their respective histories they were not yet nations but, rather, aggregations of subnational units (provinces), highly heterogenous in terms of region, ethnicity, language, even history.

Until we start seeing some legitimacy in the caudillo, we will not understand 19th century Latin American history. And as long as we continue to base our historical formulations and agendas on those of the 19th century "masters" (the Alamans, Bustamantes, Tornels, etc.) we will not cut through it, because those observers despised the caudillo phenomenon with every ounce of their being. So did the 19th century Victorian traveler from Europe. Those two main pillars of 19th century historiography told us the caudillo was the devil incarnate, and we continue to believe them without once inquiring as to their motives for telling us that.

19th century historiography is still characterized by a bias for the center, and a belief that Latin American history was, as Alaman phrased it, an eternal war between order and anarchy. These are both absurdities that we have not yet broken.

For Mexico, read anything by Luis Gonzalez, particularly his latest articles, and anything by the younger scholars located in the provincial universities (Jalisco, Michoacan, BC Norte) and you will see ways to unencode the Positivist world view that still holds us in thrall. In Mexico, and in Canada for that matter, the provinces are mad as hell and they are not going to take it anymore.

Timothy E. Anna
History Department
University of Manitoba
(anna@cc.UManitoba.CA)


H-LatAm
Item number 1777
Tue, 21 Nov 1995 09:45:37 -0500 (EST)
REPLY: Caudillos

I found your discussion of cuadilllos very enlightening. I have a couple of questions: Is not also true that much of 19th Century writing in Latin American (e ssays, and novels) also focus in on the theme of chaos versus order? What do yo u think of Enrique Krause's book, Caudillos? It seems to me that Latin American literature up to the present also portrays the caudillo as the source of much evil? Where does a novel such as The Autumn of the Patriarch fit into your anal ysis of Latin American historiography?

Mil gracias,

Tom Morin (MORIN@URIACC.URI.EDU)


H-LatAm
Item number 1778
Tue, 21 Nov 1995 10:44:36 +0500
REPLY: Caudillos

While I'm quite sympathetic to Pablo Arreola's call for replacing the the comic-operatic version of 19th century caudillos and caudillismo with more nuanced and contextualized assessments, I would caution that just putting popular pluses where liberal historians have long placed elitist minuses is not likely to be the most fruitful way to go about it. Scholarship on the Rosas epoch in Argentina has moved beyond the dead end of liberal condemnation vs. revisionist hagiography, starting perhaps with John Lynch's _Argentine Dictator_ (Oxford, 1981) and continuing in the work of younger scholars such as Ricardo Salvatore and Pilar Gonzalez Bernaldo (see their essays and others in Brown and Szuchman, _Revolution and Restoration_, U.Nebraska, 1994). A more general starting point would be John Lynch's _Caudillos in Latin America_ (Oxford, 1992), along with other recent country-specific work by John Chasteen on Uruguay and Charles Walker on Peru.

As for Melgarejo, of whom I confess vast ignorance, Bradford Burns mentions him only once in _Poverty of Progress_, and not at all favorably: "When the Huaichu Indians of Lake Titicaca rebelled in 1869 to regain communal lands ... President Mariano Melgarejo dispatched the army to massacre them" (p.110). Perhaps Pablo has confused Melgarejo with his predecessor Manuel Belzu, to whom Burns devotes considerable favorable attention in the preceding five pages. Perhaps Heather Thiess can enlighten us further on these Bolivian caudillos.

Fred Murphy
Center for Studies of Social Change
New School for Social Research
(murphy@cssc.newschool.edu)


H-LatAm
Item number 1780
Tue, 21 Nov 1995 10:05:44 -0600 (CST)
REPLY: Caudillos

In Mexico, the great dichotomy that characterized the 19th century (and I believe, the 20th too), the issue that Emilio Rabassa called the "problem of problems," was centralism vs. federalism. This had become the dominant theme by 1830, and it was rooted in a power struggle between the central elites vs the provincial elites. As the federal republic failed to take root, which happened by about 1828, the states fell back on caudillos to protect their autonomy in the face of a resurgent conservative elite in Mexico City (headed by Alaman and Nicolas Bravo) who were intent on destroying federalism.

Once this issue had taken hold, the conservative (and many moderate) authors argued that federalism is what had sparked the rise of the masses, and they always associated populist political mobilization with anarchy. Conservatives thus created the "order versus anarchy" syndrome to explain the failure of Mexican national governments and lots of other things as well. By the 1830s both liberals and conservatives strongly believed this; it became a matter of belief even if it was never a valid historical fact. Since the caudillos represented the mobilization of the masses on the provincial level, the struggle for state and municipal autonomy against a grasping central government, writers easily came to equate caudillism with anarchy, because they had already equated the masses with anarchy. It became the most powerful historical myth of the 19th century, and one that historians today have rarely been able to see through.

So beginning with Carlos Maria Bustamante, Madame Calderon de la Barca, and a host of others, there are generations of writers who mistakenly convert poverty into evil, that is, they see the poor as more than an inconvenience, but as the root of everything harmful. The Positivists easily take this up (since by then theories of race provide powerful substantiation). Hence,the caudillo becomes the image of this evil, the root of it.

Skipping over a few rather vital phases, we arrive at the 20th century, by which time this tradition is so deep set that it is a major motif of literary production. Enrique Krauze's Siglo de Caudillos, of course, is a pretty good popularized history, rather insightful on my points, but he falls back on the literary motif of the caudillo in a way that I ish he had avoided. He makes every 19th century leader a caudillo, which is overdoing it quite a bit. It is "great man theory of history" applied to a whole century. Garcia Marquez, in Autumn of the Patriarch, was, in my view, using this motif more as a way to enter the introspective world of one man in order to explore how great power can also bring great misery and isolation (real literature, rather than history with an artsy embellishment).

So powerful is this motif that Glen Dealey makes "the great man syndrome" the explanatory key for all of Hispanic-American culture, which is really absurd.

My argument, then, is that we have made the caudillo into the fetish--the independent force that we assume operates on its own with scarcely any support structure, autonomous and independent--and have failed to ask where the caudillo came from, what systems supported caudillism, what value it had. If we believe human beings really do live by making choices, we need to investigate what early 19th century people saw in the caudillo, why they supported them, and what they got from them. And my answer, caudillos provided autonomous local government, permitting the state and municipality to function as they were generally intended to do within a federal system. By focusing only on what was happening at the level of the nation (Mexico City), historians miss the real history of Mexico.

Thus, I would argue that the "order versus chaos" thesis that dominates 19th century historical work is false because it focuses on national governments and ignores the states, provinces, municipalities, and people who were actually the nation. When viewed from their perspective, Mexican 19th century political chaos disappears almost completely. Whose order are we talking about? That is the issue. If we continue to let Alaman or CM Bustamante set the agenda for us, we will never understand 19th century Mexico.

Cheers,

Tim Anna (anna@cc.UManitoba.CA)


H-LatAm
Item number 1781
Tue, 21 Nov 1995 13:33:29 -0600 (CST)
REPLY: Caudillos

Neteros,

To add to what Prof. Anna has just said in the Bolivian context with Melgarejo, positivism and also social darwinism were both influential at about the time that Alcides Arguedas was writing such works as _Pueblo Enfermo_ and _Caudillos Barbaros_. In 1899, a civil war in Bolivia led to the mobilization of thousands of community members from the Altiplano. At the end of the civil war the mobilized indigenous peasants refused to lay down their arms, and fought against the victorious faction in the war until they were defeated. Leaders of the uprising were photographed and studied, in conformity with the pseudo-scientific racial theory that was prevalent at the time. At the end of the nineteenth century Bolivian leaders decried the fact that Bolivia had such a large indigenous population that was retarding development. A good source for this is: Marie Demelas, "Darwinismo a la criolla: el darwinismo social en Bolivia, 1880-1910," Historia Boliviana 1:2 (1981). Also see Marie Demelas, "El sentido de la historia a contrapelo: El darwinismo de G. Rene Moreno (1836-1908)," Historia Boliviana 4:1 (1984). Arguedas wrote his interpretations of Bolivian historical development at the time when social darwinism was still influential.

Dr. Robert H. (AAS_JACKSON@TIGER.TSU.EDU)


H-Latam
Item number 1785
Tue, 21 Nov 1995 15:40:29 -0600 (CST)
REPLY: Caudillos

Tim Anna recently wrote in passing of the caudillo:

So powerful is this motif that Glen Dealey makes "the great man syndrome" the explanatory key for all of Hispanic-American culture, which is really absurd.

My argument, then, is that we have made the caudillo into the fetish--the independent force that we assume operates on its own with scarcely any support structure, autonomous and independent--and have failed to ask where the caudillo came from, what systems supported caudillism, what value it had.

Here, I think Tim Anna dismisses the very answers he is looking for by misrepresenting Glen Dealy and dismissing his ideas out of hand. Dealy offers a cultural structural (or cultural materialist) explanation for the caudillo proposing that Latin American rationality is political not economic. This is rather different than attributing all of Latin American history and culture to great men. Dealy makes a clear and usefulstatement of the "distinct tradition" thesis which almost always enocunters hostility. Mention of Dealy in some circles causes audible gasps and mutterings of racist, reductionist, deterministic and blah blah. The concept of a basis for rational choice other than economic seems to be hard for some to accept; the idea that this so-called (by cultural materialist) mental and behavioral superstructure can affect the social and economic infrastructure meets with more resistance still.

A culture of political rationality for Latin America (and Iberia, and I would add the Philippines) has been convincingly described by Richrard Morse, Charles Anderson, Howard Wiarda and recently (again) by Claudio Veliz in __The New World of the Gothic Fox: Culture and Economy in English and Spanish America__, and by Jorge Castaneda "Ferocious Differences" __The Atlantic__ (July, 1995). The latter two are particularly interesting because they show that the economic effect of the "distinct tradition" is to produce a form of tributary capitalism dependent upon the presence of what I call "integral outsiders" in order to function.

Culture should be seen as an agent as well as an artifact of history (see Marvin Harris, __Cultural Materialism: the Struggle for a Science of Culture__ [Vintage Books, 1979]; Frank Elwell, __The Evloution of the Future__ [Prager, 1991]; and John Noonan, __Bribes: The Intellectual History of a Moral Idea__ [Berkeley, 1984]. I do want to say that I really enjoyed Tim Anna's post.

Bill Schell
History Dept
Murray State University
EMAIL: A28443F@MSUMUSIK.MURSUKY.EDU


H-LatAm
Item number 1788
Wed, 22 Nov 1995 09:50 -0500 (EST)
REPLY: Caudillos

I just want to second Tim Anna's analysis of 19th century caudillismo and the "order versus chaos" thesis. Some twenty years ago, John Coatesworth published an article, I believe in _Foro Internacional_, in which he took Anna's argument one step further: as I recall, Coatesworth argued that the seeming "chaos" of the 19th century was, from the perspective of subaltern classes in Mexico, a century of liberation struggle that created political spaces for a species of democratic self-government. John Tutino makes similar arguments in his _From Insurrection to Revolution in Mexico_. Rather than "chaos," he documents the "emergence of the peripheries" which created conditions favorable to "an entrenched agrarian population that was actually increasing its control over rural production." (243) As for the "distinct tradition," in Latin America, I would be far more convinced if its scholarly sponsors had not chosen to table the very questions to which Anna refers and which might have revealed that this tradition was not so "distinctively" Iberic, Catholic, corporatist, etc.

Keith Haynes (haynesk@rosnet.strose.edu)


H-LatAm
Item number 1793
Wed, 22 Nov 1995 13:01:09 -0600 (CST)
REPLY: Caudillos

Keith Haynes wrote: "As for the "distinct tradition," in Latin America, I would be far more convinced if its scholarly sponsors had not chosen to table the very questions to which Anna refers and which might have revealed that this tradition was not so "distinctively" Iberic, Catholic, corporatist, etc.

Keith, would you mind elaborating on this criticism a little more?

Thank you,

Bill Schell
History Dept
Murray State University
EMAIL: A28443F@MSUMUSIK.MURSUKY.EDU


H-LatAm
Item number 1796
Wed, 22 Nov 1995 22:55:35 -0500 (EST)
REPLY: Caudillos

Keith makes sense. The Dealy argument is too Eurocentric. If it works, it must be in the context of specific Latin American historical experience. Much is known concerning the cacical structures of caudillaje. The 19th century in sierra zones of Mexico experienced reassertion of the peasantry that culminated in the Revolution of 1910-1920. Caciques cum caudillos formed from both popular and elite sectors, and between them, and functioned both as popular and populist. Perhaps Schell can bend these ideas about a unique political culture into a more clear representation by bringing to bear the pueblos and their resistances into the discussion of the rational (or lack thereof) of caudillo leaders? Bill?

Victor O. Story (story@kutztown.edu)


H-LatAm
Item number 1805
Fri, 24 Nov 1995 11:30:07 -0600 (CST)
REPLY: Caudillos

Before the great thunderbird feast (an example of cultural structure by which we are seemingly compelled to eat far too much of particular foods in preparation for a month-long shopping frenzy to participate in a cargo-cult ritual that will generate at least 1/4 of the year's retail sales, thus driving the US and a good bit of the rest of the world's industrial economy) Victor wrote:

Keith makes sense. The Dealy argument is too Eurocentric. If it works, it must be in the context of specific Latin American historical experience.

Perhaps it's because I spend so much of my time teaching world civ., but I don't have much patience with Baconian criticisms. I don't believe that all of the infinite number of particular situations/regions m ust be investigated before making generalizations. Dealy argues that there exists a basis for rational choice other than economic, and that Latin American and other syncretic cultures created by Iberian colonization are chararcterized by political rationality. In fact, it is clear that politically-based rational choice is far more common to so-called non-western nations (defining them in the negative)/third world nations (defining them in out-moded Cold War terminology)/LDC's (defining them in terms of GDP) than is economically-based rational choice. In other words, it is not Dealy et al who are Eurocentric, but those who presuppose economic rationality (marxist/post-structuralist class analysis included). There are also many (like my friend Victor who has often debated this with me) who completely reject the idea that culture/mentality (superstructure) can affect infrastructue (or as with Victor,reject structure altogether) -- hence my thunderbird opening to these remarks.

Much is known concerning the cacical structures of caudillaje. The 19th century in sierra zones of Mexico experienced reassertion of the peasantry that culminated in the Revolution of 1910-1920.

Ok, come on Victor! Are you seriously resurrecting Frank Tannenbaum/John Wommack's peasant revolution? The inevitable peasant/worker revolution? The revolution was systemic political failure, pure and simple, allowing popular discontent spaces to emerge. Moreover, the "distinct tradition theory" goes a long way toward explaining that systemic failure(you already know my views).

Caciques cum caudillos formed from both popular and elite sectors, and between them, and functioned both as popular and populist.

The process you describe is precisely what the "distinct tradition" model describes -- cross-class, cross-cutting alliances that combine paternalism, authority, and populism. That caudillos and caciques emerge from all classes/groups/levels of society demonstrates the broad base of politically based rationality.

You turn.

a more clear representation by bringing to bear the pueblos and their resistances into the discussion of the rational (or lack thereof) of caudillo leaders? Bill?

Bill Schell
History Dept
Murray State University
EMAIL: A28443F@MSUMUSIK.MURSUKY.EDU


H-LatAm
Item number 1810
Sat, 25 Nov 1995 16:01:16 -0500 (EST)
REPLY: Caudillos

I assent to some of Bill's remarks. Must there be a political rationality or an economic rationality that defines a culture? I suspect that Mexicans, elite and peasant and worker, in extended communities and local pueblos, practice economic rationality in times of economic growth accompanied by adequate access to resources, and that people fall back on political rationality in times of war, political breakdown, periodic struggles for survival. That Spain provides the language hardly suffices to render it claim for the entire mentality of a world culture, Latin America. Structures are our abstractions.

Victor O. Story (story@kutztown.edu)


H-LatAm
Item number 1814
Sat, 25 Nov 1995 16:51:48 -0600 (CST)
REPLY: Caudillos

I assent to some of Bill's remarks. Must there be a political rationality or an economic rationality that defines a culture? I suspect America. Structures are our abstractions.

Victor,

And abstractions create structure. Did you consume turkey this Thanksgiving? I venture to say 2/3 of all US households replicated the feast in some fashion. For a great many (of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds) this is a prelude to a great buying generating 40% of the years retail sales, and a great redistribution of wealth at once religious, now secular, holiday. E=MC_2 is an abstract description of universal structures that exist yet the formula has not been proven in all its particulars. Your turn. got to go man the band-boosters concession stand.

Bill Schell
History Dept
Murray State University
EMAIL: A28443F@MSUMUSIK.MURSUKY.EDU


H-LatAm
Item number 1818
Mon, 27 Nov 1995 09:23 -0500 (EST)
REPLY: Caudillos

My view of the "distinct tradition" is more fully explained in an article in Latin American Perspectives 15:3 (Su 1988), but I would say very briefly that the emphasis on European ideas and sources (Thomism, Macchiavellianism, etc.) to explain Latin America's allegedly "distinct tradition," without examining the specific nature of local relationships of power, property, and labor makes this thesis problematic. It also tends to ignore the rather substantial "corporatist" history of those areas of the western world outside the Iberic- American tradition (e.g., France, Germany, the United States) whose development allegedly conforms more closely to what the authors regard as the "normative standards." Thus, the very questions which Tim Anna posed (and to which I originally responded) are largely ignored.

Keith Haynes (haynesk@rosnet.strose.edu)


H-LatAm
Item number 1819
Mon, 27 Nov 1995 10:37:04 -0600
REPLY: Melgarejo/Caudillos

Tom,

La diferencia con Pablo es que en su respuesta desconoce la utilidad de las imagenes -verdaderas o falsas, divertidas o serias- sobre los dictadores latinoamericanos y no las considera un problema historiografico.

Lo que yo pienso es que en el estudio de la cultura politica - entendida no solo como el conjunto de nociones y practicas que las clases dominantes tienen sobre el poder sino tambien como Cultura, con mayuscula y en el sentido de C. Geerz- estas anecdotas divertidas tienen mucha importancia. Ellas nos hablan de las imagenes que el pueblo o las otras fracciones de clase dominante construyen sobre el dictador. En el primer caso hacen parte de la definicion de lo popular, la risa de la Bajtin nos habla, y de la manera como estos sectores enfrenta, deformando, ridiculizando o santificando un gobernante. En el segundo caso nos permite ver como una fraccion de clase construye una imagen del opositor para legitimizar su proyecto politico.

Una segunda diferencia con Pablo es que caracteriza las anecdotas o ideas que sobre Melgarejo existen como mitos y simples historias o leyendas. La diferencia esta en que no comparto su nocion de mito. Creo, por el contrario, que el mito es otra cosa distinta y de un enorme potencial para el analisis historico.

En terminos de la polemica pienso en dos nociones estrategicas para el analisis de la historia politica latinoamericana: 1) cultura politica, la cual habre el debate sobre la nocion de cultura y las relaciones entre economia y politica, tal como lo han planteado otros historiadores que participan en esta polemica. 2) Orden, sobre la cual pregunta tambien Timothy E. Anna.

La no solucion del conflicto entre liberales y conservadores en la mayor parte del continente se expreso en la constitucion de un Estado sin nacion, del surgimiento, al mismo tiempo, de sentimientos nacionalistas y regionalistas y de Estados nacionales sin ciudadanos. La dictadura hace parte, entonces, de una alternativa politica de orden para paises con procesos parciales de constitucion del Estado nacional.

La pregunta sobre quien construye las imagenes de los dictadores y con que propositos es legitima para un historiador. Si para resolverla es posibile partir de un anecdota o de un chiste por que no hacerlo?. Si alguien esta interesado en anecdotas sobre otros dictadores puede leer Bestiario Tropical de Alfredo Iriarte -no es un libro de Historia, con mayuscula- o por email le enviare a su direccion personal una breve sintesis.

Migue-Angel Urrego (mangel@estud.colmex.mx)


H-LatAm
Item number 1822
Mon, 27 Nov 1995 13:08:36 -0600 (CST)
REPLY: Caudillos

To follow up on what Keith Haynes said: Caudillism is intrinsic to provincialism/regionalism. If we could concentrate on the role of regions and provinces in early national history, we would see that the caudillos were often, as Bradford Burns argued, the legitimate and perhaps even natural leaders, the voices, of their home provinces, whether we like it or whether the leaders of central governments of the day liked it. In the Mexican case at least, they were normally sustained by a variety of informal (but real) links to elections, to local institutions such as the municipio and the civic militia, as well as personal and business links to people at every social level. They were political bosses whose position depended on performance in meeting their constituents' needs, not unlike a Tammany Hall boss or a ward healer in Chicago.

We also need to be specific about which country and period we are discussing. I have only been discussing 19th century Mexico, and the linkage between caudillism and the demand for autonomy in a federalist institutional context. It is very different from, say, 19th century Venezuela, where federalism is often interpreted as merely a ploy to guarantee caudillos and local landowners their power, a political structure to uphold neofeudalism. Or from Colombia, where federalism is sometimes seen as a system that granted power to the states in order to deny power to the municipal level. (I have no idea if these are correct interpretations; I only take them from other authors).

In Mexico, state autonomy and municipal autonomy went hand in hand. The linkage among local people that occurred in the ayuntamientos, militias, and state legislatures meant that there was significant similarity of purpose at the subnational and local levels. Indigenous communities had their own approach to federalism and caudillism, finding in it and in municipal autonomism a primary instrument for the defense of their land and water rights. Even the much despised (in the historiography, that is), pronunciamiento can be seen as the way people made their voices heard on issues of political and constitutional legitimacy.

The traditional historiography sees this as a century of "disorder" because the Positivists invented the "disorder thesis" in order to justify their achievement of "order and progress."

It was, in fact, the process of the creation of a Mexican form of nationhood in the context of provincial self-determinism; the construction of political institutions and definitions that would be more in accord with the existing characteristics of the country and its people than the imposed order of colonialism had been. If rejecting the rule of the center and of its traditional elites constituted disorder, then disorder, by its nature, was the route to social, economic, and political progress. If democracy or self-government is measured by people voting on their feet, then a long tradition of following the caudillo was closer to democracy than rule by the frock coats in Mexico City. The frock coats, of course, wish us to understand differently.

Thus caudillism becomes intrinsically involved in the history of federalism and the impulse to self-government. Pres. Zedillo, in his first state of the nation address Sept. 1, 1995 showed that the task is still incomplete: "The organization of the Republic as a federation inspired heroic acts and demanded the finest talents of great Mexicans. We must recognize that a century and a half later, the reality of our federalism is not yet in harmony with that ideal, with those deeds, with those Mexicans. To a great extent, the states and municipalities, and the men and women who live in them, continue suffering the consequences of centralism." And to a great extent, they continue to have their caudillos.

Thus, I believe getting caudillism straight in the historiography would be a contribution historians could make to the clarification of current issues. John Coatsworth wrote: "One of the reasons for the lack of interest in the subnational political life of independent Mexico is the mistaken conception about the caudillo that permeates the literature of political history in Latin America."

All of this has little to do with "dictators," or with the struggle between European philosophies, or with the dark side of the Hispanic cultural inheritance. It has to do with forging systems for the exercise of political and economic power in a nation which is a plural society in all senses--regionally, ethnically, historically, linguistically, and therefore a nation in which union is the desirable objective, not uniformity. The historiography tends to seek uniformity and, not finding it, pronounces it to be chaos.

Timothy E. Anna
History Department
University of Manitoba
anna@cc.UManitoba.CA


H-LatAm
Item number 1825
Mon, 27 Nov 1995 22:39:02 -0400 (EDT)
REPLY: Melgarejo/Caudillos

Miguel Angel, Gracias por tu respuesta que ahora si comprendo. Me parece valido. Y si no es mucha molestia me interesa mucho la informacion que ofreces. Manejo en mi catedra la novela mexicana y hispanoamericana en general, particularmente todo lo que tiene que ver con la autoridad y el abuso del poder y como se manifesta en la creacion de una novela. Puede que me sirva mucho. Tom(tomas ) Morin. Hispanic Studies, URI, Kingston, R.I. E-Mail morin(arroba, no me sale el signo por el teclado) uriacc.uri.edu.

MORIN@URIACC.URI.EDU (TOMAS MORIN)


H-LatAm
Item number 1843
Wed, 29 Nov 1995 15:08:04 -0800 (PST)
REPLY: Caudillos

I been following the writings about caudillos. I know you are writing about Mexico and Venezuela. Well, I want to share what I have found in my research about Costa Rica 1820-1824. Caudillos were those people of respect or that had a strong following by a certain group of individuals. For example, el comandante de pardos de La Puebla de Nuestra Se~ora de los Angeles de Cartago, had a lot of respect by his ethnic group, he was chosen to be in the ayuntamiento in 1824, and was involved in economic activities of the elite, as well as, economic activities in town. However, all this recognition came from the military institution that he belonged, the civic militia. Furthermore, as part of the civic militia he enjoyed the "fuero militar". Moreover, more of the caudillos that I found in Costa Rica came from the elite. However, caudillos had something in common their military affiliation either to the civic or discipline militia. Almost any regional or even "national" caudillo had belonged sometime to the militia.

For me, it is clear that caudillos occupied the main ranks in the militia, either civic or discipline, in Costa RIca. Yet, military institution was used as a path to enter into political life. Support came from people under their jurisdiction. Indeed, military official ranks provided a lot of power that in return was exploited by such group in obtaining political power and positions.

Caudillos usually came from the same social stratum. However, after independence another lower groups with its caudillos became active. Such groups were allowed to be part of the ayuntamientos. So, caudillos depended of their unity and theur power, at least in Costa Rica during 1820-1824.

Hoping I can help in something

Aaron Arguedas (psu00014@odin.cc.pdx.edu)


H-LatAm
Item number 1844
Thu, 30 Nov 1995 12:58:07 -0400
REPLY: Caudillos

Re: Aaron Aguedas' post on Costa Rica in the 1820s.

How different were things in the USA?

There must have been very few politicians outside of East Coast cities in the pre-Civil War period who had not served in the militia or the army. Even so "unmilitary" seeming a president as Lincoln fought in the Black Hawk War. And of course, in the post-Civil War period, the halls of Congress were choked with Generals and Colonels. This might be a topic worth exploring.

Steve Muhlberger
Nipissing University
(STEVEM@EINSTEIN.UNIPISSING.CA)


H-LatAm
Item number 1846
Thu, 30 Nov 1995 16:51:55 +0100 (MET)
REPLY: Caudillos

I am enjoying the current thread on Caudillos//Melgarejo a great deal. Downloaded all of it and showed it to one of my students who just spent 8 months in Bolivia working on his thesis on the Busch and Toro years.

Marten Brienen is not yet subscribed to H-LATAM, anxious to do so, however, but he would like to submit a contribution to the thread already, pending is association. Hope this is OK with the moderators.

Un cordial saludo
Hans Vogel
e-mail: VOGEL@RULLET.LeidenUniv.nl

here you go:

[Post in English follows]

30 Nov. 1995
Subj: Melgarejo

Geachte heer Vogel,

Helaas heb ik geen toegang (via mijn server) tot H-LatAm. Twee vragen (verzoeken) dus:

Bericht staat hieronder

Bij voorbaat dank,

Marten Brienen

[English Translation]:

Dear everyone,

I have some small comments to add to the ongoing discussion of Melgarejo and the subsequent discussion of caudillismo in LatAm. First of all, I think the prime reason for his unpopularity in most existing historical writings would be the fact that he actually sold off large tracts of national territory to Brazil. Anyone who has ever visited Bolivia will know that the massive loss of territory is certainly the greatest of national traumas, and Melgarejo's part in this is generally seen as the most shameful.

Certainly, his treatment of peasant rebellions and such is not why he is depicted in so unpleasant a manner; during the nineteenth century, and also during very large parts of this century, the entire role of the military and of the government (As the two should generally be seen as different players) was to preserve social order. During Malgarejo's presidency, the silver industry had still not fully recovered and the landed elite were still the only national force of importance (although this was rapidly changing): Melgarejo, as did the caudillos before him, was responsible for keeping the landowners happy. In this light too, it is interesting how caudillismo disappeared overnight when the silver-industry, followed by the tin-industry, became the dominant economic (and thus political) force during the between 1875 and 1885. Even apart from this, the fact that M was a heavy drinker, a womanizer and so on makes him no different from any other Bolivian colleague. If he hadn't sold half of the country, historians would probably not have treated him any differently than other caudillos.

The other point I would like to make concerns the discussion on caudillismo and regionalism; in this aspect too, Bolivia has some interesting traits, in that, during quite a large portion of the 19th century, Bolivia had at least two caudillos: one in the East and one on the highlands, although the first of the two is hardly ever mentioned. The Suarez family actually ruled supreme during the last few decades of the past century, without hindrance or interference from the Altiplano, and controlled most of what is now Beni and Acre (Brasil). At the same time civil and not so very civil governments ruled 'Bolivia' i.e. the Altiplano. So the title of President of Bolivia should be seen as regionalism to the extreme of not counting any part other than the Altiplano region itself. It has only been in the last few decades that Bolivian governments are interested at all in the goings-on of the Oriente.

Marten Brienen


H-LatAm
Item number 1854
Thu, 30 Nov 1995 19:57:41 -0800 (PST)
REPLY: Caudillos

There are some similarities concerning military officials in political posts before 1850's between Latin America and United States. As well as Steve, I think it is worth to investigate this period. The influence of military officials in politics and their outcome should be research.

Aaron Arguedas (psu00014@odin.cc.pdx.edu)


H-LatAm
Item number 1859
Fri, 01 Dec 1995 09:33:38 -0600 (CST)
REPLY: Caudillos

Neteros,

Until after the 1952 agrarian reform in Bolivia, the eastern part of the country (Beni, Acre, and Santa Cruz) were sparsely settled regions. A contrast can be seen in the definition of land rights. Land rights and boundaries in Cochabamba, for example, were very precisely recorded. In the east, especially Beni and even the Yungas regions of Bolivia, you get descriptions of huge blocks of poorly defined land. In some lowland regions the cadastral (land) survey lists land values, and not extensions. Dating back to the colonial period, efforts were made to colonize the eastern region.

I somewhat disagree with the characterization of Melgarejo having sold off most of the east to Brazil. He was responsible for the loss of a small section of territory. Acre, a rubber rich zone settled primarily by Brazilians, was lost in 1903 when a separatist "revolt" was staged, and Brazil compensated Bolivia for the lost territory: the money was used to start building railroads in the Altiplano. Bolivia certainly has been traumatized in a narrowly defined nationalistic sense by losses of territory, but Melgarejo's really negative rap regarding the land sale to Brazil came after the fact at the end of the 19th century when Bolivian politicians realized they could divert attention from pressing internal issues by emphasizing territorial disputes (this happened in 1986 and 1987, when I was in Bolivia). The really big and important losses, from the nationalistic perspective, were Antofogasta in 1879-1880 and Chaco in the 1930s. In the 1860s few politicians really cared about land in the Amazon Basin, but after the loss of Acre in 1903, a territory that provided badly needed tax revenues, Melgarejo's earlier action took on a new light. It was easier for Arguedas to bash Melgarejo in the aftermath of the loss of Acre.

During most of the nineteenth century most of the regional competition in Bolivia was between La Paz, the Sucre-Potosi region, and Cochabamba. The eastern territories were not all that important, except for Santa Cruz.

The whole debate about caudillismo over the last several weeks has be very interesting and fascinating. A rather obscure Bolivian caudillo has sparked valuable scholarly exchange.

Robert H. Jackson
Texas Southern University
AAS_JACKSON@TIGER.TSU.EDU


H-LatAm
Item number 1860
Fri, 01 Dec 1995 09:44:27 -0800 (PST)
QUERY: Caudillos and Military

The recent exchange on caudillos and their military/militia origins raises for me a number of issues. Following Alain Rouquie's observations in _The Military and the State in Latin America_, I'm quite suspicious of the identification of caudillos as having military origins. If military institutions are defined by things like bureaucracy, hierarchy, some sort of professionalism, and obedience to (or association with) a state, then caudillos are their antithesis.

More important than this somewhat semantic question of how one defines a military institution is the matter of how late-colonial militia commissions were awarded. In the case of Brazil (which I know best) and elsewhere, militia commissions went to men who enjoyed a certain amount of wealth and social standing, and the prestige needed to organize these forces. If the militia thus institutionalizes existing social hierarchies and patron-client ties, then looking at the "military" origins of caudillos misses the more important sources of these men's leadership.

Which brings me to the most intriguing part of Arguedas's posting: the activities of the "comandante de pardos" in 1824. The officers in the segregated black and pardo militias, it seems to me, are important leaders of their communities (regardless of their military rank) but they are a group about whose actions in the independence era we know very little. Studies of the militia (based on the administrative documentation of the colonial bureaucracies) tend to stop at independence, precisely when the breakdown of the colonial state and military afforded these men the opportunity to play a far greater role in society. I have been working on the post-independence activities of the black officers of Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, and I find among them an interesting mix of liberal ideas tempered by a defense of corporate identity and a strong desire to participate in the new political system. Their story ends tragically with the death of many of them in the Sabinada rebellion of 1837-38.

I'd be interested to know if there are others out there who have been looking at these officers' independence-era and post-independence political roles elsewhere.

Hendrik Kraay
Department of History
University of British Columbia
hkraay@unixg.ubc.ca


H-LatAm
Item number 1863
Fri, 01 Dec 1995 14:47:33 -0500 (EST)
REPLY: Caudillos

I don't think it's so much a question of how many men served in the army, as the position that society accords military men. The most obvious icons to describe this situation are the pictures of Bolivar and San Martin (always in uniform) and the pictures of Washington, Lincoln, etc (always in civvies) except for Davey Crockett, always in coonskin cap.

Judith Laikin Elkin
Latin American Jewish Studies Association
2104 Georgetown Blvd.
Ann Arbor MI 48105
313/996-2880
elkinjl@umich.edu


H-LatAm
Item number 1874
Mon, 04 Dec 1995 17:44:58 -0500 (EST)
REPLY: Caudillos

Dear Neteros,

I read Aaron Arguedas' comments about caudillos of Costa Rica in 1820 and I think it would be very interesting to follow the discussion. As Costa Rica, in Colombia, caudillos were military and rich men. In Bolivar's last years we can mention Obando in Cauca, southeastern zone of Colombia next to Ecuator. But the greatest caudillo of nineteenth century in Colombia was General Tomas Cipriano De Mosquera, from Cauca as Obando; they had a personal and political fight that comes Colombia to four civil wars during 1850-1868.

That is the point I want to bring to this discussion : civil wars in XIX century produced by personal conflicts among caudillos.Not only these two generals were caudillos in Colombia, every zone or departament had its caudillo that was ready to come into civil war and tried to kill the other caudillo in his zone.

The end of the military caudillos era in Colombia was the end of The Mil Dias war in the beginning of XX century. These military men had great extensions of land and their peasants formed their armies in the civil wars.

Francisco Miranda
Universidad de los Andes
f-mirand@uniandes.edu.co


H-LatAm
Item number 1875
Mon, 04 Dec 1995 20:13:57 -0800 (PST)
REPLY: Caudillos

Regarding to the posting of professor Henrick Kraay, I want to add some points about caudillos and military.

The example I brought about el comandante de pardos in Cartago, Costa Rica is very important to me. He was a leader of this ethnic group,the pardos. Leonardo Zavaleta was a leader of the pardo community la Puebla de Cartago, the ancient capital city of Costa Rica. He appeared in several documentation of 1810s and 1820s. Why was he a caudillo? He had prestige among his people and among the other castes, whites and mestizos. He appered taking money to the soldiers in Matina, close to the Atlantic coast,because only pardos guarded that area. Then, he appeared fixing the Church of Cartago after a big earthquake in 1822. Certainly, his main job was commander of pardos in 1820s. Pardos made 5 civic companies in Cartago out of 11, in 1821. Moreover, they enjoyed the fuero when active or in service, he served as a link between men who committed crimes and the judge( the military commander). In these years, there was political inestability, caudillos and their power over people, in case of war were really important for the political elite.

Actually, some information about pardos can be rescued after independence in Costa Rica. Leonardo Zavaleta is one. He became elected to the Cabildo in 1824, not before. Probably because they followed the Cadiz Constitution which forbidden anyone having African blood to be elected. He became elected after the liberals won in Costa Rica.

Other documents from this period that are very interesting. For example: In 1825, el comandante de las Armas, asked to the government that payment to morenos should be equal than the others. So, the white and mestizo soldiers earned more than the pardos and morenos. Even when the constitution claimed that all men were equal. There is other, in 1825, the military, protested for the abolition of their privileges. The fuero was abolished by the government. Eliminating in this way any further privilege to the military and the soldier.

I found two cases very interesting for me. The first, when Francisco and Antonio Soto refused to served in the pardos company, saying that they were mestizos. This in the city of Alajuela, 1813. In the social hierachy was better to be mestizo than a white. What else? Second, this was the first time I found a pardo cavalry. In Villa Vieja(HEREDIA) June 14, 1777, there were 9 companies, 1 made by Spaniards,5 by Mestizos (Infantery), then, 2 companies of cavalry made by mestizos and 1 and a half made by pardos. My question is, was it common that pardos had cavalry in the Colonial Times in Central America? Returning to the topic of caudillos. I share that military came from wealthy men, social standing and prestige. However, they belonged to the bureaucracy and some were professional soldiers. There was a case where a man was chosen to be an official of a infantery company in the town of Escazu in 1820s. He was rejected because he did not know how to read and write, and because he had "escaza fortuna". This example proves the above mentioned about wealth. Caudillos were also regional. Costa Rica in 1820s did not develop a national caudillo, but had many local caudillos. These local caudillos generally were military and occupied the towncouncil posts. They had a large following of people. However, after independence in 1821, they divided towns according to belong to the Mexican Empire or became a republic.

Hoping I will get some ideas,

Aharon Arguedas
Portland State University
psu00014@odin.cc.pdx.edu


H-LatAm
Item number 1880
Tue, 05 Dec 1995 11:36:36 -0600
REPLY: Caudillos

La historia de los militares en la colombia del siglo XIX esta determinada por la historia de los partidos. Sin detenernos en la polemica relacion entre Bolivar y el conservatismo y Santander y el liberalismo hay que senalar que efectivamente los militares de la independencia fueron la base sobre la cual se constituyeron las primeras redes politicas. Una guerra civil, como la de los supremos a finales de la decada de los 30, fue el instrumento para redefinir el espacio politico tras la muerte de Bolivar y Santander. Luego de esta guerra los caudillos militares o fueron derrotados o fueron incorporados a las redes politicas y de clientela. Salvo contados casos los mestizos quedaron al margen del poder politico y militar - Padilla, uno de los pocos militares negros de alto rango habia sido fusilado por orden de Bolivar en los anos 20- Quiza el mas destacado fue Jose Maria Obando, quien tras soportar la acusacion de asesinato del general Sucre llega al presidencia, aunque al poco tiempo debe dejar el poder debido a un golpe militar. Luego de una pequena guerra, en la cual resulta victoriosa la alianza liberal-conservadora, el general desaparece del escenario politico.

Los militares que se destacaron en el siglo XIX o tenian grandes propiedades o muy pronto se vincularon a los partidos olvidandose de sus intereses personales, razon por la cual pudieron supervivir politicamente. Es decir, el ejercito no fue una via para los sectores populares para ascender politicamente y aunque contaron en las primeras decadas con el privilegio del voto poco influyeron en los resultados de las elecciones. En las distintas guerras civiles luego de pactarse la paz los politicos marginan a los militares, al menos asi sucedio en la guerras de 1976-77, 1884-85 y la guerra de los mil dias. La hipotesis es que los sectores dominantes colombianos tradicionalmente, incluso en el siglo XX, no han permitido que el ejercito sea un trampolin politico, especialmente para los sectores populares, y han preferido pactar soluciones en los periodos de crisis social.

En cuanto a la vinculacion de caudillos militares con el pensamiento liberal el caso mas interesante es el del general Tomas Cipriano de Mosquera, quien impulso reformas liberales (estado laico, desamortizacion de bienes de manos muertas, reforma educativa, etc) y una constitucion radical (1863). Sin embargo, fue sepultado politicamente por los propios liberales.

Hay que senalar, finalmente, que un ejercito "nacional" solo aparece en el presente siglo.

Miguel-Angel Urrego
Centro de Estudios Historicos
El Colegio de Mexico
mangel@estud.colmex.mx


H-LatAm
Item number 1906
Thu, 7 Dec 1995 22:20:12 CST
REPLY: Caudillos

Regarding to the posting of professor Francisco de Miranda, I can tell you from my experience in Costa Rica about caudillos. However, Costa Rica and Colombia are quite different.

Nevertheless, there are several elements we share. First, there was a civil battle 5 April 1823 in Ochomogo, between Cartago and San Jose towns. This battle is very important in Costarican history. Why the battle happened? there are many reasons. Among them, I could find that such battle happended because of personal conflicts among caudillos. The commander of San Jose, Gregorio Jose Ramirez and the Commander of Cartago, Joaquin Oreamuno have had previous encounters and discussions, in business and politics.

The first, was a republican, and the second, was for the Mexican Empire. Ramirez case is very interesting. He was from Alajuela, a 16 km away from San Jose. He was the chief of the republican party in his town. He was 27 years old when he was chosen jefe de las armas in Alajuela and later chosen as Chief of the Republicans in San Jose. His family was not from Alajuela, actually, his family belonged to San Jose. There, in San Jose, he had ties with the elite and priests. He was not a military, he was a merchant. However, he hold the title of Capitan del Destacamento del Sur in 1820 and first caporal in 1819.

Oreamuno was a military officer, he had a military carrer. He was a wealthy man, he had an hacienda and some servants. His profession, as he declared, Capitan de los Ejercitos Nacionales, Compania de Granaderos del Batallon Disciplinado de Costa Rica. He was a man of respect in his hometown, Cartago, he had great following, like veteran soldiers, people of respect, priests, and common people. He belonged to Costa Rica's elite. By 1823, he declared to have 63 years old, and was a true follower of the option to become part of the Mexican Empire.

I share this with the idea to find a common ground, which is, that caudillos existed in each town and region. In Costa Rica, the caudillos had land, however, they did not have many workers in their haciendas. Militias (civic militias)were under the express command of the highest official in town, the towncouncil or the military commander of the town. Battles in Costa Rica happened because of many reasons, among them: localism or regionalism, caudillos conflicts, rilvaries of towns, and the placemnet of the capital town. For me the use of the political power, the towncouncil, permitted to caudillos control over civil population. Many of them became part of the towncouncil, the main institution of political power in town. As a result, they could control the population. The Cabildo, towncouncil, became the vehicule to increase rilvaries among towns, localism, division of the elite and division of political power. According to my idea they resolved this situation thru war, where the winner won all the pol;itical power.

Aharon Arguedas
Portland State University
psu00014@odin.cc.pdx.edu


H-LatAm
Item number 1946
Thu, 14 Dec 1995 09:47:24 CST

REPLY: Caudillos

Date: Mon, 04 Dec 1995 17:44:58 -0500 (EST)
From: Francisco Miranda Hamburger

"Dear Neteros,

I read Aaron Arguedas' comments about caudillos of Costa Rica in 1820 and I think it would be very interesting to follow the discussion. As Costa Rica, in Colombia, caudillos were military and rich men. In Bolivar's last years we can mention Obando in Cauca, southeastern zone of Colombia next to Ecuator. But the greatest caudillo of nineteenth century in Colombia was General Tomas Cipriano De Mosquera, from Cauca as Obando; they had a personal and political fight that comes Colombia to four civil wars during 1850-1868.

That is the point I want to bring to this discussion : civil wars in XIX century produced by personal conflicts among caudillos.Not only these two generals were caudillos in Colombia, every zone or departament had its caudillo that was ready to come into civil war and tried to kill the other caudillo in his zone.

The end of the military caudillos era in Colombia was the end of The Mil Dias war in the beginning of XX century. These military men had great extensions of land and their peasants formed their armies in the civil wars.

Francisco Miranda
Universidad de los Andes"

Estimados Neteros [reply to Francisco Miranda],

Naturalmente solo conozco la historia de Colombia de manera muy superficial. (Pero talvez estamos entendiendo el concepto caudillos desde diversoso puntos de vista).

Yo trabajo la segunda mitad del siglo XIX mexicano desde esta perspectiva creo que el enfrentamiento entre caudillos debe estudiarse no como fricciones personalistas sino a partir de los intereses que sostienen o representan estos caudillos. En el caso de la historia mexicana entre 1867 y 1910 los caudillos me parecen reperesentar intereses regionales frente a la consolidaci=F3n de el Estado\Nacion y de la reformulacion del pacto federalista en el que se observa un claro y creciente fortalecimiento de la administracion central y, en particular, del poder ejecutuvo aun sobre la soberania de los estados. En este marco es frecuente que los caudillos regionales en ocasiones se alien al poder ejecutivo federal de manera momentanea y para defender sus bases clientelares frente a otros caudillos.

El origen social suele ser muy diverso, junto a un Luis Terrazas heroe regional de Chihuahua frente a la intervencion francesa que despues seria conocido como el mayor terrateniente del periodo porfiriano 1876\1910 esta el gran caudillo del periodo : Porfirio Diaz, de origen campesino pobre que se convertiria en Presidente de la Republica por 30 a=F1os. Paradojicamente=, Diaz se levanto en armas en 1876 en contra de la centralizacion del poder que ejercia su predecesor, triunfante en esta revuelta llega por primera vez a la presidencia en 1877 y desde 1884 se convierte en el gran arquitecto del presidencialismo que logra someter como fuerza politica dominante a los caudillos regionales.

Por ello creo que las acciones de los caudillos deben estudiarse primero si son parte de la oposicion o de los poderes constituidos, su fuerza politica no solo a traves de sus bases (frecuentemente milicias) sino tambien con base en los cargos de eleccion que desempenaron (diputaciones, senadurias, alcaldias, etc.) y teniendo en cuenta los intereses politicos (en ocasiones autonomistas, a veces gobiernistas) y sus vinculos economicos con las oligarquias regionales. Asi el personalismo termina siendo secundario.

Maria Luna
El Colegio de Mexico
fnl@servidor.unam.mx


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