Joerg Haider in historical perspective
From: Victor Hugo Lane hlane@duke.poly.edu
Author's Subject: Re: Query: Joerg Haider in historical perspective
Date Posted: Thu, 17 Feb 2000 17:10:14 -0600
The current discussion of Haider continues to raise some important points. I think the caution urged in drawing parallels between Hitler and Haider, based in large measure on some of Haider's comments regarding the Nazi legacy, is wise. Yet, as Steven Beller's continued skepticism about the socio-economic thesis for the rise of the FPOe suggests, something more seems to be going on and I wonder if we have been avoiding more abstract issues. In particular, while one can draw some links between economic anxiety and the appeal of the FPOe's anti-emigrant rhetoric, I am decreasingly satisfied with such a mechanical explanation. It has even been suggested to me off-list that Austrians themselves did not necessarily draw that link, and it is concern about being overwhelmed by foreigners as an independent issue, which lies at the center of the FPOe's growing popularity. In short, it appears to be a product of a growing fear of "an other", and that would indicate that what is really at stake here is what it means to be Austrian at the turn of the twenty-first century. It has been ages since I have been in Austria, and I have never been there for long enough to explore the subtleties of Austrian identity, but isn't the apparent new concern about Austrian identity a reflection of two integral aspects of Austrian identity over the past 50 years, the Proporz system and the end of Austrian neutrality and its entry into the EU? Even if much of the xenophobia seems aimed at peoples on the East, doesn't the real tension in Austrian identity lie in Austrians' relationship with Germany and more broadly the EU? Times have changed, however, and whereas once upon a time it was Austrians who doubted their distinctiveness, the issue now is the preservation of a widely accepted Austrian national identity in the proximity of the much larger and politically and culturally more influential German Federal Republic. Indeed, I would argue that support for Haider and the FPOe is the mirror image of the resurgent nationalism seen among Welsh and the Scots, which incidentally is led in both cases by nationalist parties with very left of center political agendas. Those phenomena are widely perceived as offspring of the political and economic climate created by the E.U. economic climate of the E.U and the notion of a "Europe of regions." By contrast, as citizens of a nation-state, it should not be surprising that a significant proportion of Austrians have some regret about the transformation of their national identity to a regional identity. The possession of a state has been seen as the ultimate expression of an identities distinctiveness for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and even if a revision of that view is recognized as necessary, a feeling of loss is going to accompany that shift. That Austria should be one of the first places this should affect on politics is not surprising, given Austrians' close linguistic and cultural ties to the German nation. As a result their relationship with Germany bears some similarities with that of English-speaking Canadians' position vis-a-vis the United States, i.e. that Austrian identity's distinctiveness is generally accepted, but that does not entirely alleviate the fear of being overwhelmed from a much larger and more powerful nation. Under those conditions, the pending loss of a significant symbol of statehood like the Austrian Schilling is is somewhat analoguous to that that losing a symbol of statehood like the Austrian Schilling is not going to be viewed with equanimity. Here, apart from the lack of any bands of armed thugs officially, or to my knowledge unofficially, linked to the FPOe represents a key difference between Haider and the Austrian Nazis with whom he is often linked. Whether or not you like the conception of Austrian national identity, the stand taken by the Haider and the FPOe regarding expansion of the E.U. and Brussels make them the protector's of Austrian national sovereignty, not its executioners. Such an interpretation of why a sizable number of Austrians are bothered by this begs at least two questions. First, if Austrians are so protective about their national identity, why did they only begin to show their support for the FPOe now? Some of that undoubtedly has to do with internal factors like collapse of the Proporz system described elsewhere, but I think it is important to recognize the context in which Austrians chose to join the EU. That occurred as the prospect of Austria's exclusion from the benefits of greater European integration loomed over a decade ago. Thus, it was arguably a question first of economic survival which allowed for relatively little sentimentality about Austrian identity, at least on the surface. Moreover, at that time the prospect of Poland, the Czech Republic (then its former guise as Czechoslovakia), and Hungary joining the E.U. seemed very distant prospect. Besides, as I implied above, Austrians' sense of national identity was sufficiently developed to withstand the preparatory phases for European integration, when even the introduction of the Euro was not an entirely certain event. The other question raised by a thesis based on dwindling Austrian sovereignty is why do Austrian supporters of the FPOe express so much anxiety about the threat posed by foreigners, who are not yet members of the E.U., and may not become members for some time? One factor is projection. Austria's relations with the E.U. are simply too important for the threat the E.U. poses Austrian national identity to be completely admitted. Another, and the one I suspect is more important, is how just the possibility of EU expansion eastward reveals Austria's lack of independence in the EU system. Given the very different international political climate in Europe when Austria began to shift away its policy of neutrality, there was little need to worry about throngs of foreigners with no grasp of Austria's distinctive heritage coming to live in Austria. Now, even if likelihood of EU expansion to inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in the near future remains debatable, that threat is more real. What is more, the transformation of Austrian identity from one linked to a well-defined independent state to a regional identity within the EU arguably makes concern about the preservation of identity more pronounced. But here I think the real issue has to do with the sense that Austria's ability to influence when and how EU expansion occurs is probably the best argument for the significant increase in support for the FPOe. Even with the opt-out clauses that are available within the EU structure, only a few countries involved in the decision on eastward expansion of the EU are immediately exposed as Austria is. Moreover, Germany is the one other country as exposed, if not more so given Poland's much larger population than either Hungary or the Czech Republic. But even if violent xenophobia is more common there, Germany's population is so much larger than Austria's that the threat is not likely to belt as acutely, or by such a large proportion of the population there. Apart from that, Germany's central position within the emerging EU economic infrastructure means that it will play a key role in setting the timetable for EU expansion immigration in a way that Austria will not. On this last point, I would like to draw a parallel with conditions in Austria a century ago. If the Austrian Republic's political system derives from the three blocs in what is currently Austria, Austrian politics derives from the four-bloc system that existed in Cisleithania. The fourth bloc consisted of the Old Conservative elites, including those in other crownlands, and while it did not survive intact in the Austrian Repubic its importance in shaping the three-bloc system of the first and second Austrian Republic. In particular, Karl Lueger's populism was a reaction to the continuing power of that conservative bloc, and its increasing reliance on people with little link to the German-speaking Austrians. Herein lies the parallel with the situation described above. Polish and the Transleithenian Hungarian elite were able to wield considerable power, at the expense of the Austro-German liberals, which created the space for Lueger's social radicalism. Now European integration has begun to renew that external factor in Austrian politics, and the sense by a significant minority of Austrians that their interests will not be heard has opened the door for politicians ready and willing to stick up for Austrians' right to be Austrians. Hugo Lane Polytechnic University