(originally published by H-German on 15 January 1996)
The volume of writing about the resurgence of extreme racist, far right, new right, radical nationalist, radical right populist, radical conservative, neo-nazi, or neo-fascist groups in western Europe over the past fifteen years has increased perhaps as much as the activity of the subjects themselves. As the above mentioned list suggests, the historian or social scientist has a smorgasbord of terms from which to choose in discussing his or her particular example. But far from enriching the discussion, this terminological pluralism has reflected a conceptual imprecision that obscures more than it reveals. Terms like "neo-nazism," after all, come loaded with very different historical baggage from that of, say, "radical-national."
The issue, however, involves more than an academic debate about appropriate terminology. As Diethelm Prowe points out in his valuable article, practical considerations flow from the choice of appellation. For the manner in which we identify right-wing political activity will determine what we think is its most effective antidote. Neo-nazis need to be handled differently than radical nationalists. And here the question is the nature of the relationship between contemporary right-wing groups and what Prowe calls the "classic" fascism of the inter-war period, because "classic" fascism "provides a basic paradigm through which contemporary rightist groups are defined or define themselves" (289).
We can be thankful, therefore, that the Prowe has made it his task to clarify the terms of analysis by systematically comparing current right-wing groups with "classic" fascism. The very term "fascism," however, he recognizes as itself requiring clarification, because it can be used in two ways. One way is to gather the characteristics of "classic" fascism, including its ideology, into a model or ideal type of timeless applicability. In this view, many of the current right-wing groups appear as neo-fascist, especially in their ideological profile. The other approach stresses that the inter-war context in which "classic" fascism gestated was such an important factor that the term "fascism" must be limited to this context, or, at least, contexts like it. Here great stress is placed on the specific programs and goals of fascist movements that are of necessity historically specific. Moreover, there is also a suggestion that fascist movements can only exist in fascist (i.e., crisis) circumstances. In this "primacy of context" view, the term cannot be applied to the situation in western Europe today where the circumstances are so different from the inter-war period.
Prowe opts for the latter perspective. His argument is that one must index the term "fascism" to context because rightist groups formulate their programs and strategies in response to the circumstances of the day. And as the contexts of modern and inter-war Europe differ so much, they have produced very different types of rightist phenomena. Social scientists who are committed to ideal typical, ideology-centered understandings of fascism may object that defining fascism in terms of the immediate goals of fascist parties arbitrarily restricts the term to historical contexts. But, ultimately, this may be a difference of opinion that is not resolvable by appeal to historical record. For the social scientists are interested in the trans-historical essence, while Prowe, the historian, fixes on its concrete, historical manifestations. Be that as it may, Prowe makes a strong case for his approach.
The middle section of his article tells the story of the gradual change in context after 1945. There was an initial, strong continuity of ideology and personnel in right-wing groups, when liberal democracies were still politically and economically fragile, and nationalist rivalries may have even re-sparked another conflict had it not been for the Cold War. After the mid-1960s, however, the transfer of leadership of radical right-wing groups to the younger generation and the consolidation of the social welfare consensus set the pattern for right-wing activity in the 1980s and 1990s. These groups now accepted the rules of the system, and sought to profit from it electorally by exploiting potential resentment caused by the presence of foreign workers or citizens from former colonies. Here one might have wished for greater differentiation between the ostensibly conformist Republikaner and the openly neo-Nazi groups whom one cannot describe as "electorally integrated" in the system. For the latter represent both anti-foreigner and anti-system hostility. The last part of the article comprises an excellent, six point discussion of the major differences between "classic" fascism and far right-wing groups today. Anti-communism was central for "classic" fascism, but is a non-factor today. The end of empire has meant that nationalist sentiment is defensive rather than expansionary. "Classic" fascism was born in the aftermath of a devastating world war and grew in conditions of class conflict, national rivalry, and economic depression. Since 1945, by contrast, western Europe has experienced almost uninterrupted peace and prosperity. "Blood and Soil" anti-modern rhetoric has been replaced by a general acceptance of urban life, where the radical right is concentrated. Right-wing extremism today, then, is the product of different factors, probably the decline of "the cohesive, integrative power of the successive common goals, fears and myths" (308).
These differences do not all tell in favor of post-war right-wing extremism. Today's groups are overtly racist, directing their scorn and/or violence not only against foreigners and asylum seekers, but anyone with a different skin color or culturally different form of dress. They have made it their mission to oppose multi-culturalism. Those commentators for whom the radical oppression of otherness lies at the heart of fascism will be tempted to see these groups as fascist. They may also point out that some of today's features of the radical right sound like functional equivalents for features of "classic" fascism (e.g., anti-foreigner sentiment for anti-communism/anti-semitism, Holocaust denial for anti-Enlightenment posture). Prowe denies none of this. His point, if I understand him correctly, is that there is no historical continuity between "classic" fascism and today's far right, who are fighting different battles.
Readers will profit from Prowe's precise separation of inter-war and contemporary right-wing extremism. But it may be that the readiness of scholars to use terms like "fascism," "nazi," or "radical-national" will be based more on theoretical, rather than historical, presumptions. The conceptual pluralism will continue.