(originally published by H-German on 6 September 1996)
Kleßmann begins with the statement that resistance (Widerstand) might be defined as "intentional, risk-conscious political opposition against the whole system or essential parts of National-Socialist rule," and that this definition might be expanded to include "refusal, intransigence, withstanding [Resistenz], deviant behaviour, dissidence, non-conformism and dissent." Kleßmann finds that the two separate sets of notions (Begriffe) make it difficult to formulate a clear, scientifically verifiable, normative definition, and proposes to include the aims of resistance (Widerstand) in the criteria. This would permit a differentiation between "politically-active combatting the regime" aiming at the "overthrow of the system," and forms of refusal, non-compliance and mere intractability. Notions (Begriffe) are intended, according to Kleßmann, for "putting into order and interpreting historical reality, although they can in fact only selectively approximate it." He concludes this introduction by disclaiming any intent to contribute to a definition, and by stating the insight that the two key notions of opposition and withstanding ("Opposition und Resistenz") identified two approaches to a central problem of modern dictatorships, that these two approaches referred to related subjects, and that these two approaches were clearly distinguishable.
Next, Kleßmann examines the distinctions made by rulers made between opposition and refusal ("Opposition und Verweigerung"; it is not clear whether Kleßmann considers "Verweigerung" and "Resistenz" synonymous). He includes in his discussion the dictatorship of the German Democratic Republic, beginning with a description of the "totalitarian claim" of the National Socialist and the Communist dictatorships on the basis of which they defined opposition and refusal. The SED defined the "norm" as the classless, harmonious, progressive developing socialist society; the NSDAP defined it as the unity of the national community and the charismatic leader. Cases of deviation from the set standard, and cases of counter-action and opposition needed to be contained and, if necessary, prosecuted, not merely because they were not permitted, but because they might gain wide support and thus tendentially endanger the regime if they were tolerated.
Kleßmann then returns to the differentiation between opposition (Opposition) and withstanding (Resistenz). He claims that this distinction was drawn "only late in the West German historiography on National Socialism" and proposes to demonstrate this by referring to a work by Hans Rothfels and an essay by Martin Broszat, "passing over the critical historiography of the 60s." In fact, Rothfels' and Broszat's work emphasized different aspects of resistance but did not, as Kleßmann claims, fail to distinguish between forms of resistance. Rothfels pursued forms of resistance which consciously aimed at bringing down the regime, whereas Broszat sought to document the "broad spectrum of resistance from temporary or prolonged resistant non-conformism to illegal underground work," postulating a limiting effect of the resistance encompassed within his frame of reference upon the dictatorship. Kleßmann then cites criticisms of Broszat's "broad spectrum" which, according to critics, placed non-conformism and intractability too near to active, risk-conscious opposition, thus tending to level the substantial differences, and which suggested such a widespread resistance that - in the case of the National Socialist regime - the reality of the massive support for the regime became obscured. Critics also pointed out that the limiting effect of non-conformism and intractability upon a dictatorship could hardly be demonstrated. They suggest that a terminology be developed which would include the combination of partial support of the dictatorial regime and resistance to it.
Eventually, after demonstrations of cases of resistance in which the aim was not, or was not clearly, the overthrow of the regime, Kleßmann differentiates acts of resistance by the regime's claims to control on the one hand, and by the motivation of those engaging in acts of resistance on the other.
Kleßmann finally uses the Schola Thomana at Leipzig (founded in 1212) as an example for what was evidently withstanding ("Resistenz") in both the National Socialist and the Communist dictatorship in Germany. The National Socialists attempted to force the school into conformity, and at the same time to exploit its prestige for their propaganda. The Communists continued these efforts for their own purposes from 1945. Neither succeeded beyond superficial effects.
The movement of dissidence in the Communist German Democratic Republic had very little in the way of parallels in National Socialist Germany. Here Kleßmann sees "a new type of intentional opposition": the dissent's attempt not to overthrow but to change and reform the "system." But such an attitude was possible only because of "quite different political frame-of-reference conditions" than those of the National Socialist era. Circumstances are the differentiating criterion here. The phenomenon itself, however, was not unknown to the National Socialist era, although Kleßmann does not mention it: a number of the resisters who attempted to overthrow Hitler on 20 July 1944 aimed at putting in place a "true" national socialism to replace Hitler's perversion of it.
Kleßmann does not deal at any length with the resistance of those who unequivocally aimed at overthrowing the regime. It is obviously unnecessary to define their intentions, and their moral convictions as motivating factors are given little more than passing attention.
Kleßmann does not question the meaning or usefulness of notions, words and concepts in the description of "historical reality." The conclusions of his scholastic disquisition are relatively trivial. As intent, method and circumstances define other actions in human society (homicide in murder, manslaughter, negligence, accident, execution, war), so they define the manifestations of opposition.
Kleßmann further concludes that "opposition in dictatorships is a category sui generis," and that its motives are strongly founded in individual ethics. Opposition and withstanding ("Resistenz") "can hardly be sharply demarcated generally from one another because they frequently overlap." Both forms of resistance must be recognized as belonging to the historical reality of a dictatorship. "This finding remains a dilemma for the historian which he can hardly resolve."
Thus Kleßmann succeeds in his intention not to contribute to the definition of resistance.