

2010

H-Diplo

H-Diplo Roundtable Review

www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables

Volume XI, No. 35 (2010)

20 July 2010

Roundtable Editors: Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse

Roundtable Web/Production Editor: George Fujii

David Ekbladh. *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010. 404 pp. ISBN: 978-0-691-13330-0 (cloth, \$35.00); 978-0-691-13330-0 (£24.95).

Stable URL: <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XI-35.pdf>

Contents

Introduction by Thomas Maddux, California State University, Northridge.....	2
Review by Nils Gilman, Independent Historian	6
Review by Brad Simpson, Princeton University.....	13
Review by Daniel Speich, ETH Zurich.....	20
Review by Corinna R. Unger, German Historical Institute Washington, DC.....	24
Author's Response by David Ekbladh, Tufts University	28

Copyright © 2010 H-Net: Humanities and Social Sciences Online.

H-Net permits the redistribution and reprinting of this work for non-profit, educational purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the author(s), web location, date of publication, H-Diplo, and H-Net: Humanities & Social Sciences Online. For other uses, contact the H-Diplo editorial staff at h-diplo@h-net.msu.edu.

Introduction by Thomas Maddux, California State University, Northridge

In his review of David Ekbladh's *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order*, Brad Simpson notes the expanding scholarship on this subject from a number of scholarly perspectives as well as from practitioners in the field around the world. Another reviewer, Corinna Unger has also contributed to an assessment of the state of the field in the history of modernization.¹ Ekbladh's study focuses on the origins and nature of the United States' contribution to this subject with an in-depth analysis of the pre-1945 origins of American ideas and practices for promoting development, most notably through the New Deal's response to the Great Depression and the ensuing liberal perspective and experts who remained active in the postwar Cold War period. As the reviewers emphasize, Ekbladh challenges some of the existing interpretations that emphasize modernization as a distinct Cold War phenomena with President Harry S. Truman's Point Four program as the opening American offensive in an expanding global competition with the Soviet Union over which power had the best model for modernization. Ekbladh also broadens the participants that play significant roles in shaping the development of U.S. ideas on development and their implementation around the world. In developing a liberal consensus on how to promote modernization, Ekbladh emphasizes the role of the Tennessee Valley Authority in shaping the perspective of American experts on what could be accomplished through an exportable American model.

The reviewers are impressed with several of Ekbladh's contributions, most notably his significant expansion of the focus on American participants beyond the most familiar figures such as Walt Rostow to David Lilienthal and Eugene Stayley. As Unger and Daniel Speich note, Ekbladh gives extensive attention to the contributions from outside the government and scholarly specialists including non-governmental institutions, private foundations, business interests, and religious groups. Nils Gilman welcomes this broadening of development discourse through the author's extensive archival research as it "promises to broaden the range of sources that historians can use for trying to understand the history of development and modernization." (1)

Ekbladh's emphasis on the pre-1945 origins of American views on development and the New Deal's TVA as a liberal model is also approved by the reviewers. Simpson and Speich welcome Ekbladh's analysis of the origins of American engagement with development extending back to America's sense of mission to serve as a model. "Ingredients of an American vision of developmentalism had emerged," Simpson points out, with "emphasis on the mastery of technology and nature; the perceived need to tutor others in their proper use; a veneration of expertise; racial and cultural chauvinism; and a predilection for grand schemes of postwar reconstruction or societal transformation, whether in the American South after the Civil War, the Philippines after 1898, China in the early 1900s or Europe after the first World War." (2) Speich also notes the specific context of the 1930s as an

¹ See David Engerman and Corinna Unger, "Towards a Global History of Modernization," *Diplomatic History* 33:3 (2009): 375-385.

important catalyst in which the U.S. faced pre-Cold War competition with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union on not only the best approach to dealing with the depression but also as a model of future development. Joseph Stalin's "Soviet Experiment" certainly attracted significant liberal attention in the 1930s until it ran aground on Stalin's "Moscow Show Trials" and general purge. Unger agrees, noting that a "consensus evolved in the 1930s that the United States had to offer an attractive alternative to the 'totalitarian' methods of overall modernization practiced in Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union." (1)

Significantly more disagreement emerges over whether Ekbladh successfully demonstrates a continuity in American modernization ideas from the 1930s through the Cold War into the 1970s with the TVA as the preferred liberal model. Unger suggests that Ekbladh has achieved some success in challenging the widely shared view that "modernization was a by-product, or an innovation, of the Cold War." (1) Speich agrees that Ekbladh has demonstrated some continuity from the New Deal period to the Cold War in Truman's Point Four program. Simpson and Gilman, however, challenge the author's emphasis on consensus between the two periods. Simpson, for example, finds more disagreement than consensus in American views about modernization in the cross-currents of the postwar period as the Cold War gave a priority to strategic considerations over technological and humanitarian concerns. Although Ekbladh devotes significant attention to South Korea as a model for U.S. officials on development, Simpson questions why the U.S. never pursued "TVA-style infrastructure projects as the centerpiece of its foreign aid program in the south, instead providing a combination of technical, economic and military assistance." (4) Gilman also emphasizes that South Korea rejected U.S. modernization ideas for an authoritarian model: "the Korean case shows how conflicted the idea of development was during the postwar years (perhaps especially) among the United States's staunchest Cold War allies." (8-9)² Simpson also points to the increasing reliance on a military-led modernization in the Third World as a more viable Cold War strategy than a New Deal TVA model.³ Gilman agrees that continuities before and after WWII existed in institutions and personnel but the "conceptual basis of development was dramatically altered after the war." (2) Although Gilman notes the continuing appeal of the "TVA vision" to development planners, he concludes that there was a significant gap between "TVA-inspired rhetoric of 'modernization as democratic inspired pluralism' and the brutal realities of actually existing development as a process of depoliticization and bureaucratic enclosure." Gilman also disputes the suggestion that a continuity existed among all of the different American participants on a "shared vision of a globalized New Deal." (4)

² See the H-Diplo roundtable on Gregg Brazinsky's *Nation-Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans and the Making of a Democracy* (2007) at <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/NationBuildingSouthKorea-Roundtable.pdf>

³ For a discussion of military modernization, see the H-Diplo roundtable on Brad Simpson's *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968* (2008) at <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-IX-21.pdf>

The reviewers would have welcomed more discussion on the impact of Ekbladh's development of U.S. ideas on modernization in comparison with different approaches in different areas and the reactions of people on the ground to U.S. policies. Unger and Speich, for example, note the importance of a comparison with European ideas, both European colonial practices on development in the 1920s-1930s as well as, more recently, the European community. "The construction of an American world order seems to have taken place within a much larger context of globalized modernization efforts," Speich suggests, "that included strong beliefs in the feasibility of social improvements by scientific and technological means." Consequently, "Ekbladh sketches a picture of the 'American mission' which was American only to the extent that the institutions and persons who carried this mission were American. But it was not an American mission in terms of its very contents." (3) Unger also notes the value of more analysis on the role of business and gender in modernization. Since Ekbladh focuses on ideas about development and the conceptualization of policy approaches, Simpson and Unger would like more discussion of "what happened when those ideas hit the ground" in South Korea, in Vietnam, and in Iran. (2) How did South Koreans react when Americans reformed their children's school education? How did Vietnamese react to American reform campaigns?

As Ekbladh and several reviewers note, September 11, 2001 brought a revival of some of the core assumptions of modernization theory including connections between representative government and development. The U.S. has pursued aspects of this mixed with a variety of military forces at great expense with mixed results in Iraq and Afghanistan. TVA has faded, as Simpson notes, but counterinsurgency mixed with development is alive at the military level in Afghanistan but over nine years of development programs appear to have accomplished little.

Participants:

David Ekbladh is assistant professor of history at Tufts University and a Research Fellow with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University. Princeton University Press has just published his first book, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order*. He is currently working on a second, tentatively entitled *Look at the World: The Birth of an American Globalism in the 1930s*.

Nils Gilman is a senior practitioner at Monitor 360, the author of *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Johns Hopkins, 2003), coeditor of *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (University of Massachusetts, 2004), and *Deviant Globalization* (Continuum, forthcoming 2010), as well as *Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development*.

Brad Simpson (PhD, Northwestern 2003) is assistant professor of history and international affairs at Princeton University and the author of *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations* (2008), now out in paperback. His next book will explore the history of U.S.-Indonesian-international relations during the era

of Suharto (1966-1998), and he has begun preliminary research on a global history of the idea of self-determination in the twentieth century.

Daniel Speich, PhD, is research associate at the centre for the history and philosophy of knowledge at ETH Zurich and lecturer at the University of Lucerne. He was fellow at the Max-Planck-Institute for the History of Science in Berlin and fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Nantes, France. He has published widely on technical modernization and political liberalism in Swiss history. Recent publications include: *Transforming the Future. ETH Zurich and the construction of modern Switzerland 1855-2005* (with David Gugerli and Patrick Kupper, in print); "Travelling with the GDP through early development economics' history". Working papers on the nature of evidence 33/08. Department of Economic History, LSE London. He also edited an essay collection on the global history of development: *Entwicklungswelten. Globalgeschichte der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit*, Frankfurt a. M., Campus 2009 (with Hubertus Büschel). He is currently working on a cultural history of development economical knowledge.

Corinna R. Unger is a Research Fellow at the German Historical Institute Washington, DC. She received her PhD in history from the University of Freiburg, Germany, in 2005; her dissertation was published in 2007. She is currently working on a project that compares and contrasts West German, American, and Indian modernization concepts and practices between 1947 and 1980. Corinna Unger has published on modernization, decolonization and the Cold War, on development aid and philanthropy, and on the history of science and exile. She is co-editor of a special issue of *Diplomatic History* (33:3, June 2009) on "Modernization as a Global Project" (with David Engerman) and, with Andreas Eckert and Stephan Malinowski, of a *Journal of Modern European History* issue entitled "Modernizing Missions: Approaches to 'Developing' the Non-Western World after 1945" scheduled for spring 2010.

Review by Nils Gilman, Independent Historian

Published with the imprimatur of Princeton University Press, and arriving on wings of pre-publication praise from many of the leading American historians of development and modernization, David Ekbladh's *The Great American Mission* is a book of large ambition. It seeks no less than to recast the periodization and interpretation of one of the most important episodes in twentieth century international history, namely the United States's programmatic outreach to the parts of the world that at one time or another have found themselves grouped together under rubrics such as "backward areas" or the "Third World"; as "underdeveloped" or "developing" nations; or, in the current fashion, as "postcolonial" regions of the "Global South." The aim of *The Great American Mission* is to provide a synthetic global history of this American effort, ranging from the pre-WWII preliminaries to twenty-first century manifestations, from the intellectual hothouses of the metropole to the actual lived experience of development in various locales around the globe.

This book makes a number of notable contributions to the existing historiography on modernization and development, but from a methodological perspective, two stand out. First, *The Great American Mission* makes a concerted effort to broaden the range of actors that "count" in the narrative of postwar U.S. developmental practices. For example, some of the strongest work in the book are the sketches of David Lilienthal and Eugene Staley, whose contributions to development discourse have been underappreciated as compared to those of, say, Walt Rostow, Max Milliken, Robert McNamara, Lucien Pye, or Samuel Huntington. More generally, *The Great American Mission* emphasizes that development discourse was not the exclusive domain of scholars and government policymakers, and in fact cannot be fully understood without examining the work of foundations, activists, missionaries, and businessmen – an excellent point that we can only hope will be broadly extended by future investigations, not least because (as the book's list of consulted archives shows), it promises to broaden the range of sources that historians can use for trying to understand the history of development and modernization.

Second, *The Great American Mission* challenges the current historiographical consensus that the nature of modernization and development efforts changed fundamentally after World War II, with the onset of decolonization and the Cold War. Specifically, *The Great American Mission* argues that postwar American development discourse and practices were born in the crucible of the Great Depression, and postwar development efforts represent the unfolding of a New Deal-inspired liberal consensus about the proper balance of state action, volunteerism, and private enterprise in promoting economic growth. Particularly notable is *The Great American Mission's* account of the Tennessee Valley Authority's sainted place in the postwar development thinking, a kind of eternally returning ideal of what development assistance could achieve. Generalizing from this account of the TVA's immaculate conception among postwar American developmentalists, *The Great American Mission* argues for the continuity of both American developmental practices and developmental ideas from the 1930s through the 1970s.

Rather than focus on specific cases in *The Great American Mission*, what I'd like to do in this review is to interrogate these key methodological claims. I have fundamental doubts about *The Great American Mission's* effort to bridge the inter-war/Cold War divide by claiming that postwar American development efforts are best seen as a continuation of interwar trends, rather than as something new that emerged as a result of decolonization in the context of the Cold War. Likewise, I would strongly question the notion that there existed an unbroken and monolithic consensus about development from the 1930s to the 1970s among any group, much less among the diverse set of actors that *The Great American Mission* rightly insists we must acknowledge as key players in actual developmental practice.

Read as a whole, *The Great American Mission* argues that the underlying New-Deal-style liberalism that motivated postwar American development efforts sprang into being more or less whole in the 1930s, and remained largely unchanged thereafter until the 1970s. More specifically, the book argues that the TVA would serve as the lodestar of an overwhelming consensus in favor of a single "American model" of development that would be executed consistently across the globe. "The TVA was a grand synecdoche," Ekbladh writes, "standing for a wider liberal approach to economic development both domestically and internationally" (9). *The Great American Mission* is right to note that Lilienthal's *TVA: Democracy on the March* (1944) was an important programmatic expression of how the American experience of development could serve as a general model for development in other parts of the world. Officials at the Rockefeller Foundation, in particular, saw the TVA "as a template for economic and social development they could actively export across the globe" (71).

This case is convincing regarding the ambitions and hopes that some Americans invested in the TVA in the 1930s and 1940s, and would continue to give lip service to for decades to come. But the argument that all (or even most) postwar development programs were modeled after the TVA, to my mind, is simply unsustainable. It is one thing to argue that the roots of postwar "high modernist" developmentalism can be traced to various specific pre-war "developmental" practices, including the TVA; it is altogether another to suggest that these practices, as well as the ideas underpinning them, did not undergo radical changes during the postwar period.

While it is true that many of the specific developmental programs of the postwar period showed continuities with prewar programs in terms of institutions and personnel, the conceptual basis of development was dramatically altered after the war. What before the war had been a congeries of disparate "developmental" programs, justified on divergent principles – moral and religious uplift (in the case of missionaries), humanitarian intervention (foundations), mutually beneficial profit (corporations), and national empowerment (states) – came under the postwar discourse of modernization to be seen as part of a single program. To use Alden Young's phrase, the typical colonial vision of development as "an archipelago of schemes" was in the postwar, post-colonial period replaced by an integrated and monolithic vision of "development" as a singular process

destined to unify and integrate a world of liberal welfare-capitalist nation-states.¹ In contrast to the fragmentary view of development in the prewar period, the postwar period's vision of development was integrationist and committed to the notion that "all good things go together" – implicitly, if not explicitly. Grandiose conceptions of comprehensive state-led liberal development were for the most part alien to the prewar period; Lilienthal's vision of development as a single integrated process was the exception not the rule of the interwar period.²

In his effort to broaden his cast of characters, moreover, Ekbladh's *The Great American Mission* ends up undervaluing the role of the postwar modernization theorists, which was to systematize – in other words, to *theorize* – how the particular practices of the interwar period could be brought together into an intellectually coherent whole. Moreover, the desire to create (and receptivity toward) such a grand unified theory of liberal development is incomprehensible outside the Cold War frame. The challenge to global liberalism posed by an integrated and ideologically committed Communist developmental alternative demanded an equally integrated and committed vision of liberal developmentalism. The postwar discourse of modernization, in contrast to prewar developmental discourse, was explicitly designed by its authors (not only Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, Gabriel Almond, Lucien Pye, Daniel Lerner and so on, but also as Ekbladh rightly observes in the programmatic statements of the Foundations that largely funded their work) to serve this integrating function. Modernization theory, in other words, framed development in terms of a metahistorical theory that could serve as a tool in the Cold War struggle. This social theory of modernization reached a crescendo around 1959, and thereafter began almost immediately to decay, as some modernization theorists went into government and began to promote the military as a vehicle for modernization – something that seems awfully hard to square with the idea that there existed some unbroken commitment to "the TVA creed" (8).

From this reader's perspective, the idea that the United States – both the government, as well as myriad developmental actors – remained committed throughout the middle third of the twentieth century to a largely unchanging "TVA vision" obscures more than it reveals. While *The Great American Mission* is right that the "TVA vision" has animated many a development planner (down to the present day), this continuity of lip service masks a great deal of variation in the practical reception of "the" TVA idea. In fact, there were a lot more developmental contradictions inherent in the TVA than one would gather from reading *The Great American Mission*. Even *The Great American Mission's* own examples of this supposed continuity give pause. Yes, the original TVA program foreshadowed the postwar liberal vision of an integrated approach to development based on massive infrastructure

¹ Email correspondence with Alden Young, 30 September 2009.

² Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); see also Cooper's "The Dialectics of Decolonization," in Cooper and Ann Stoler, eds., *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). In the same vein, see also James Ferguson, "Decomposing Modernity: History and Hierarchy after Development," in Ferguson, *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006).

investment – investments that in principle would promote “progressive” social change and democratic governance. But abroad, this TVA idea would be applied selectively (to put it mildly). For example, both on the Mekong in SE Asia and on the Dez in Iran, as *The Great American Mission* notes, the democratizing and socially progressive aspects of the TVA vision were quietly dropped. What was left, in essence, were big dam-building projects, designed to help local dictators pursue their particular local political agendas.³ Was this really “the TVA vision” in action? The gap between the TVA-inspired rhetoric of “modernization as democratic pluralism” and the brutal realities of actually existing development as a process of depoliticization and bureaucratic enclosure cannot be treated as merely incidental to the history of postwar development practice; on the contrary, *this disjuncture is the main, central story of capitalist development in the postcolonial world since 1945*.⁴ Alas, *The Great American Mission* never brings this disjuncture into clear focus.

Part and parcel with *The Great American Mission*’s claim that the American vision of development was continuous from the 1930s to the 1970s is its argument that during this period there existed an intellectual and ideological “consensus” concerning that vision. *The Great American Mission* goes to great lengths to assert that there existed an ongoing, abiding “liberal consensus” on development and modernization that spanned not just the decades, and not just a broad congeries of different groups and institutions, but also across the globe. The idea of modernization was “heavily influenced by ideas and groups emerging from the United States, which embraced a consensus on development. This consensus, prevailing from roughly the 1930s through the 1970s, was adopted and cultivated by private and governmental organizations to implement a mission overseas.... Nonstate groups become powerful advocates and saw to it that consensus ideas remained in mainstream foreign policy” (7, 9). Here is the strongest claim of *The Great American Mission*; indeed, the word “consensus” appears in the book at least 86 times.

Strong, yes, but unfortunate too, since it undermines – indeed, is fundamentally at odds with – the main strength of the book, which is to broaden the cast of characters seen as central to the narrative of development. Are we really to believe that the American missionaries, businesspeople, NGOs, international bureaucrats, policy intellectuals, government policymakers, and military officials – who, as *The Great American Mission* points out, all came to the idea of modernization with very different backgrounds and underlying motives – were in fact all animated by a shared vision of a globalized New Deal? Extending the claim to the world as a whole only makes the thesis less tenable. On what level could it possibly be true that evangelical missionaries teaching English in China in the 1930s, labor activists at the ILO in the 1940s, and Park Chung-hee’s South Korean military

³ Ultimately, it is a mistake to see every dam-building-cum-social-transformation scheme as being the conceptual child of TVA. Yes, the TVA proved that big government planning for development could work, but this does not mean that every integrated dam-building scheme down to today’s Three Gorges Dam in China is the conceptual child of David Lilienthal.

⁴ James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993); James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

junta in the 1960s all shared a “consensus” concerning the economic, social, and political “transformation” that modernization was supposed to bring about?⁵ Looking at on-the-ground development practices in fact reveals how diverse and complicated actually existing development programs were, in contrast to the monolithic claims of many theoretical or programmatic statements.⁶

Even within the postwar United States, there existed a variety of different models of development and modernization. Although these different styles of development shared elective affinities, particularly at the level of ideology, there were marked divergences and disagreements about how best to pursue modernization – for example, over how much aid was appropriate, over the precise role of the state, over light versus heavy industry, and most of all over the place and timing of democracy in the process of development. *The Great American Mission* rightly points out that the idea of modernization was central to many critical U.S. geopolitical engagements, but it fails to engage with the matter of how differently the dream of modernity crystallized in different places, not just for Americans, but even more for the locals. To be fair, Ekbladh admits a variety of exceptions to his claimed “liberal consensus” on development. However, the exceptions become so numerous (and in fact, because of his focus on Asia, he ignores many of the most serious ones) that they overwhelm the underlying thesis. By the end of the book, I was left wondering how *The Great American Mission* could both claim that “development is an amorphous concept and has no single agreed upon definition” (12) and still insist that there existed a thirty or forty year global “consensus” on development. How can there be a consensus on something for which there is no agreed definition?

The claim of an abiding liberal consensus on modernization might just work if it is limited to talking about the narrow group of policy intellectuals that gathered around MIT,

⁵ Even ignoring the wider global matters, the argument in favor of an overwhelming American consensus in favor of a liberal version of development as embodied by the TVA ignores a host of tensions within the United States concerning New Deal liberalism. Specifically, *The Great American Mission* ignores the domestic backlash against New Deal liberalism that took place in the late 1940s, symbolized by the passage of Taft-Hartley anti-labor legislation. What needs explaining is how a domestic liberalism that was largely exhausted by the 1940s, but for one final burst of energy in the mid-1960s, managed to gain the upper hand over much of American foreign policy toward the Global South from the 1940s (NOT the 1930s) through the early 1970s, and then was further resuscitated not by New Deal-style liberals but by avowedly anti-statist, anti-planning conservatives and neoconservatives after 2001. The Owl of Minerva may not yet have flown on this latest episode, but one can at least hazard several (competing) hypotheses – that the lip service to development was pure balderdash by the Republican administration, designed to win over liberals to its militarist cause; that it reveals the abiding underlying liberalism of American life (a neo-Hartzian theory); or that the promulgators of the theory were simply postmodern idiots, recycling the internationalist-developmental clichés of the past into an incoherent pastiche.

⁶ Uncovering this diversity of transnational development initiatives has been at the center of much recent historiography on modernization and development. Initiating this effort was David Engerman, Nils Gilman, Michael Latham, and Mark Haefele, eds., *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2004), and followed up most recently in a special issue of *Diplomatic History* (33:3 [2009]), edited by David Engerman and Corinna Unger, devoted to development in a variety of geographic locales during the early Cold War.

Harvard, Yale, and the University of Chicago in the 1950s, and can perhaps even be extended to the Kennedy and Johnson White Houses in the 1960s. But the broadening of *The Great American Mission's* scope to include NGOs, business people, international institutions, and military officials should, in my opinion, have led to precisely the opposite conclusion, namely that there was NO broad consensus on what to do about development. When policy intellectuals and policymakers claimed there existed such a consensus, what these statements really entailed were efforts to sideline objections to their vision. In other words, these pronouncements of consensus were not factual descriptions of reality, but rather normative claims – bids for paradigm consolidation in the case of the social scientists, and bids for hegemony on the part of the politicians.⁷ In the end, what made it impossible to uphold the fiction that there existed any such consensus on development were the calamities in the field during the 1960s – from the misbegotten Alliance for Progress in Latin America, to famines in Africa and South Asia, to the political, military and moral disaster in Vietnam.

The reference to these developmental calamities brings us to the last major problematic aspect of *The Great American Mission*, namely its discussion of Korea. On the one hand, Ekbladh should be lauded for spotlighting South Korea, a country whose economic growth not only constitutes perhaps the most spectacular developmental success story of the twentieth century, but also has been largely ignored in most recent historiographical efforts to understand early postwar developmentalism at a global level.⁸ However, in the context of the other methodological and topical choices in the book, the focus on Korea is odd. Although it is true that Korea served as a critical discursive site for the imagining of “development,” *The Great American Mission* inexplicably fails to note that the TVA model was not at all the model of development that was used in South Korea, even during the heyday of the supposed consensus he claims existed.

⁷ Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), ch 6-7.

⁸ Although the Korean War has received extensive treatment from international historians, the postwar Korean economy (and development more broadly) is mentioned only in passing by works that take a larger comparative perspective such as Odd Arne Westad, op cit., or Michael Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). The Korean development model in comparative perspective is discussed in Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., *The Developmental State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999) and Mark T. Berger, *The Battle for Asia: From Decolonization to Globalization* (London: Routledge, 2003), and given single-focus coverage by Meredith Woo-Cumings, *Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Eun Mee Kim, *Big Business, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South Korean Development, 1960-1990* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000). Almost all of the literature on the South Korean developmental model begins in 1961, with Park's accession, ignoring development programs in the South during the 1950s. A partial exception is Tae-Gyun Park, “Different Roads, Common Destination: Economic Discourses in South Korea during the 1950s,” *Modern Asian Studies* 39 (2005), but this essay again focuses on the level of ideas rather than actual implemented programs.

The Great American Mission claims that the TVA analogy is relevant because South Korea focused on electrical production and social transformation as the basis for economic growth; but the first is a property of physics, and the second was first and foremost predicated on an extensive land reform in 1950, an idea that was based more on “lessons” from Japanese rather than on anything from the American historical experience. Although I welcome *The Great American Mission’s* point that during the 1950s it was unclear whether South Korea had a better developmental model than the North – in general Cold War Studies cannot overemphasize how, until as late as the 1980s, the jury remained out about whether capitalism or communism offered a better model of development – you’d never know from reading this chapter that the developmental model that Park promoted starting in the 1960s was based on state-directed cultivation of export-led industrialization, an approach that had exactly nothing to do with the TVA model.

The real story of liberal, U.S.-styled modernization ideas in South Korea in the 1950s is that they were stillborn – or perhaps more accurately, strangled in the crib – rejected in favor of a completely different developmental model (much to the initial ire of the United States). As Francis Fukuyama recently observed of Korean and Taiwanese postwar development, “In both, the initial decades of accelerated development were under authoritarian rule – but in both ‘fairness’ provided a basis of legitimacy. Land reforms assured rural equity; growth was oriented toward labor-intensive exports and so employment creating; high public investment in education provided opportunity for all. And in both, inclusive growth set in motion profound social transformation – facilitating the emergence of a middle class, and an eventual transition to democracy.”⁹ Not only did this model have nothing to do with the TVA, the idea that anyone might describe South Korea under Park or his predecessor Syngman Rhee as a model for democracy-friendly development is absurd. If a liberal American consensus on development using the TVA as a model existed at all, it certainly could not (and in fact did not) celebrate the postwar Korean case.¹⁰ Rather, the Korean case shows just how conflicted the idea of development was during the postwar years, even (perhaps especially) among the United States’s staunchest Cold War allies.

The Great American Missions wants to be a “big book” that provides a global history of development as both an idea and a set of practices. And it indeed provides some good set-pieces on the TVA, Truman’s Point Four address, the debates over the South Korean economy in the 1950s, and the harebrained developmental schemes cooked up by David Lilienthal for South Vietnam. But the larger thesis and methods of the book, as outlined above, strike me as not just unconvincing, but internally contradictory.

⁹ Brian Levy and Francis Fukuyama, “Development Strategies: Integrating Governance and Growth,” World Bank Working Paper 5196 (January 2010).

¹⁰ Gregg Brazinsky, *Nation-Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans and the Making of a Democracy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

Ten years ago Michael Latham helped to inaugurate a turn towards modernization among foreign relations historians with *Modernization as Ideology*, building on a wider literature aiming to historicize development theory and practice as a force in international relations. Since then a minor flood of books and articles have explored modernization theory from the vantage point of intellectual history; the sociology of knowledge; political economy; and its adherents, practitioners and critics in the post-colonial and socialist world.¹ Despite the profusion of scholarship, however, we lack synthetic accounts that advance broad, interpretive arguments about the role of modernization theory and the older development ideas from which it springs in shaping U.S. foreign relations.

David Ekbladh aims to provide such a synthesis in this wide-ranging and ambitious book (though he focuses on Asia), arguing that modernization was part of “a broader liberal vision of development” that “emerged and was utilized by the United States to confront threats internationally” over the course of the twentieth century (12). To make his case he advances three broad claims: that post-1945 ideas about ‘modernization’ descend from pre-war practices and practitioners; that many of these ideas emerged from the work in Asia of foundations, voluntary groups, missionaries, advocacy groups, universities and businesses before being appropriated by the state; and that one idea in particular, comprehensive hydroelectric projects as exemplified by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), became a lodestar for U.S. development policy and ideology in the Cold War and after.

By taking a long view, Ekbladh enables us to see developmentalism as a constitutive element of American hegemony. He is especially effective at tracing the influence of the ‘TVA idea’ and its New Deal planners and advocates across the mid to late twentieth century, and highlighting the persistence of public-private cooperation between state and non-state actors, particularly religious organizations (175-177). But by conflating virtually all twentieth century developmental projects, ideas and organizations with modernization Ekbladh obscures the intellectual and policy significance of modernization as a peculiarly Cold War project. And by reifying a ‘liberal consensus’ on development that never really existed he overemphasizes the dominance and continuity of a particular scheme – the TVA-style plan – vis-à-vis other noncommunist visions and programs of modernization, their myriad manifestations abroad and concurrent critiques.

The first third of Ekbladh’s book traces development’s pre-1945 “heritage in international life and in an American self-concept that embraced a mission to serve as an example for the world.” (13) Already by the early 20th century the ingredients of an American vision of

¹ For the state of the field see David Engerman and Corinna Unger, "Towards a Global History of Modernization," *Diplomatic History* 33. 3 (2009): 375-385, passim.

developmentalism had emerged: emphasis on the mastery of technology and nature; the perceived need to tutor others in their proper use; a veneration of expertise; racial and cultural chauvinism; and a predilection for grand schemes of postwar reconstruction or societal transformation, whether in the American South after the Civil War, the Philippines after 1898, China in the early 1900s or Europe after the first World War. In other words, developmentalism was a variant of progressive internationalism (29). Early initiatives included many of what would become the standard repertoire of postwar development policies: public health initiatives, road-building, public education and technical training; large-scale infrastructure projects; and agricultural modernization involving extension programs and capitalization. Ekbladh is particularly effective in his use of Rockefeller Foundation records to discuss Peking University Medical College and the broad-scale social transformation which such projects hoped to catalyze.

Though others have made these claims before, Ekbladh goes further in arguing that from the start American developmentalism was marked by voluntarism and public-private partnerships, with non-governmental organizations - in particular missionary societies and international relief agencies - often leading the way and colonial administrators and military authorities trailing in their wake (23). This notion of 'developmental corporatism' (my phrase, not his) is a novel and important argument. But Ekbladh overreaches when he argues that colonial developmentalism in the Philippines was distinctive because it was conceptualized as a "grand public works project," in contrast to European and Japanese models. American distinctiveness was mostly a function of historical lateness, and Washington's imperial allies pushed variants of the same projects in the late colonial period with similar self-congratulatory rhetoric, if not with the same political goals of independence.

The myriad development idea and practices circulating internationally before the 1930s, Ekbladh suggests, lacked strategic significance insofar as they represented largely piecemeal responses to national problems rather than a coherent doctrine wedded to state power and resources. The Great Depression and the rise of both Fascism and Communism as alternative models of development, however, threatened liberalism and capitalism more directly as responses to the challenges of modernity - a development for which Ekbladh ably synthesizes a wide range of existing literature. As such they concentrated the minds of American planners in both the public and private sphere, who needed proof that "broadly conceived development based on planning could effectively be implemented in a liberal, democratic society." (48) One response of the Roosevelt Administration - the Tennessee Valley Authority - combined hydroelectric power, rural electrification, agricultural modernization and education under the guise of a government-sponsored public corporation. As Ekbladh ably describes, the TVA rapidly "became nearly synonymous with liberal development itself," attracting thousands of foreign visitors who marveled at its scope, transformative impact on the regional environment, and possible applicability as a model for similar schemes from Iran to Indonesia. This period also marks a turn towards a greater role for the state in development assistance and for state planning more generally, though NGOs would continue to play a crucial role in the postwar period, supplemented by international agencies centered on the United Nations.

This is the argumentative heart of the book and it is persuasive. Ekbladh traces more thoroughly and effectively than anyone before the singular lure of the TVA as symbol across the post-1945 landscape, even for those (such as Richard Holbrooke) who have no connection to or expertise with the type of planning it represents. TVA planners, boosters and contractors, David Lilienthal in particular, continually rear their heads from the 1940s to the 1960s, invariably asserting that the adoption of TVA-style regional plans will vault one place or another into democratic modernity.

Surprisingly, however, given its centrality to his analysis Ekbladh gives inadequate attention to the question of whether or not the TVA actually measured up to the fluttering rhetoric of its many admirers. In short, could state-led planning on such a scale truly be democratic, much less participatory for its subjects, as opposed to its planners (56-57), and what would the challenges be of applying all or parts of this model to postcolonial Asia? The forced displacement and resettlement of vulnerable populations that accompanied the TVA, to take but one example, was hardly an “unintended consequence” of such development schemes (57, 240) but was in fact integral to their conception, another measure of the state’s ability to reconfigure both the natural and human environment. Outside of an admiring Europe, as Ekbladh illustrates with a brief but telling discussion of the Shah of Iran’s White Revolution (233-234), Lilienthal’s model of “grass-roots development” was usually imposed on unwitting and usually unwilling populations by governments neither participatory nor particularly democratic, and in countries lacking the vigorous civil institutions that might dissipate the impact of more highly concentrated state power. If the history of hydroelectric power projects in the post-colonial world (most especially in India and China, two of the countries that most admired the TVA as a model and build hundreds of large dams) teaches us one thing it is this: dams are not democratic.²

In Ekbladh’s rendering, before modernization theory came to dominate the academy, its principle assumptions and prescriptions were already inscribed in the work of various UN agencies (UNRRA, FAO, WHO), the World Bank (IBRD) and the Truman Administration’s Point Four Program. Nongovernmental organizations, including religious groups continued to play a crucial role, as sources both of expertise for new agencies and as initiators of small-scale projects under the rubric of the Technical Cooperation Administration (106). But they faced an increasingly complex political and ideological landscape, as the emergent Cold War gave their work a strategic, rather than simply technocratic or humanitarian cast, and as state-funding and proliferating international institutions shifted the balance of political power.

The United States’ two Asian wars, of course, served as high-stakes proving grounds for successive administrations, university and think-tank based social scientists, NGOs and international agencies to work out their plans among populations uprooted and traumatized by conflict. Ekbladh ably demonstrates that U.S. officials and a wider circle of participant-observers viewed South Korea as a crucial demonstration of U.S. determination

² James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Cambridge, England, 1990).

and ability to foster rapid development in a postcolonial state (143-144). He also notes that a wide range of NGOs continued to play an important role in U.S. strategy during the 1950s, serving as conduits for millions of dollars in official aid money and spending tens of millions more of their own on a vast array of “community development” projects (145, 175-177). But the Korean example sits uncomfortably in a book about the centrality of the TVA to U.S. developmentalism. The U.S. never pursued TVA-style infrastructure projects as the centerpiece of its foreign aid program in the south, instead providing a combination of technical, economic and military assistance (the latter almost wholly ignored here), and South Korea began its Big Push for heavy industry in the 1960s not in accord with but in defiance of U.S. plans. Ekbladh’s argument would be more persuasive if he gave us a better sense of the TVA’s *relative* importance over time within the overall foreign aid apparatus and vis-à-vis military assistance and other schemes such as population control and agricultural modernization. If, as this reader suspects, TVA-style infrastructure projects represented a relatively small proportion of U.S. foreign assistance, how do we explain its outsized symbolic importance, especially in the face of weak evidence of the actual success abroad of such projects?

On Vietnam Ekbladh has surprisingly little new to add to an already voluminous literature on wartime nation-building schemes, the influence of modernization ideology and ideologues on specific initiatives such as the strategic hamlet program. Plans for a TVA on the Mekong never really got off the ground and received little funding in any case, and probably obscure an even more important development – the U.S. effort to subcontract out the construction of a state in South Vietnam to a wide array of social scientists, think tanks, for-profit construction companies and other firms.³ Lilienthal’s Research and Development, Brown and Root and other for-profit development contractors were pioneers in the privatization of the U.S. foreign aid apparatus, a dimension of Ekbladh’s story with clear contemporary relevance that deserves to be explored at greater length. As the prospects of new TVA-style projects dimmed overseas, David Lilienthal turned D&R’s attention to domestic ‘markets,’ for a time cashing in on Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and VISTA contracts and framing domestic poverty issues in modernization idioms.

By the late 1960s western modernization discourses were coming under sustained criticism from all sides of the political spectrum. Congress slashed foreign aid budgets, while conservative political scientists such as Samuel Huntington, a generation of Latin American economists, western feminists, environmentalists, and a widened constellation of development NGOs picked apart the assumptions underpinning variants of modernization theory and the policies it inspired. This is a familiar story, and Ekbladh is probably right to place this story in the larger context of contemporary malaise with modern industrial society and its environmental and social consequences, as well as in more specific critiques of western developmental ideology and planning. It is unclear, however, where agency lies

³ James Carter, *Inventing Vietnam, The United States and State Building, 1954–1968* (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

here, who is exercising it, and where the institutional, financial and political nodes are where power and discourse are being reconfigured. The term Modernization in the end simply “fell into disuse,” an unsatisfying conclusion for all of us who know from personal experience and research how fiercely academics, among many others, cling to ideas upon which their intellectual identities and livelihoods depend.

Part of the problem here is that the decline of modernization theory *cum* policy was uneven, and critiques laid out in best-selling books and popular analyses moved at different speeds compared to the academy, much less the bureaucracies and practices of states and multilateral institutions. Even as proliferating international institutions and NGOs reframed the goals of development around poverty reduction and sustainability, modernization discourses persisted in the Nixon and Ford Administrations. The World Bank, for its part, hardly abandoned large-scale, state-led development projects carried out in the name of modernization, despite much argument to the contrary. The early 1970s represented the high tide of its commitment to state-guided population control and green revolution programs, and through the 1980s the Bank funded the largest transmigration program in history in Indonesia, led by the military modernizing regime of Suharto. Indonesia was no outlier – but the site of the Bank’s first and largest country mission, one of the largest recipients of Bank loans and a crucial source of legitimacy for the Bank’s increasingly central role in international development.

It’s difficult in a short review to do justice to Ekbladh’s range and ambition, weaving in an incredible range of events and sources and producing a challenging and at times stimulating book. But for this author the book raised a number of concerns. One is the continual slippage in terminology between relief, reconstruction, development and modernization, especially in early chapters. At times Ekbladh seems to be tracing the evolution of development ideas broadly construed, at others the descent of a particular manifestation of liberal developmentalism typified by large infrastructure projects, at still others postwar modernization theory writ large. Some of this is surely stylistic, and Ekbladh notes that he refers to modernization as a subset of development and traces the growing sense in the period that reconstruction, among other terms was inadequate to the task of explaining goals and policies. But he routinely lumps together all manner of technical aid, relief and reconstruction and humanitarian assistance (105-106, 133-134, 175) by both state and non-state actors, including religious organizations, and calls it modernization, though his subjects (at least as cited) did not. Though chapter four, to give one example, continually refers to modernization policies, ideas, programs, etc. as guiding lights of U.S. strategy towards China and South Korea from 1945 to 1960, only one of the sources cited (136) refers explicitly to modernization as such.

At times Ekbladh seems unsure whether to emphasize consensus or discord in U.S. and international thinking on development (155, 157, 178). Although he argues that TVA-style development represented both a domestic and international consensus in the postwar period, he never makes clear precisely when or how the boundaries of consensus were established and by whom, who its adherents were, and how its borders were policed within or without the state (since the contours of consensus changed over time). As a result Ekbladh reifies a ‘liberal consensus’ on development and an “American style of

modernization” as relatively static constructs, to the point where a seemingly flesh and blood “consensus went to war” in the 1960s. Although modernization discourses may have dominated both academic and policy debates from the late 1950s through the next decade, no consensus ever existed in Congress and among executive branch agencies - who instead reached a series of uneasy bureaucratic compromises, sometimes country by country, reflecting temporary balances of political power.

The author is on much firmer and more interesting ground when he notes conservative opposition to the TVA in particular and liberal modernization schemes more broadly, beginning in the 1930s and continuing throughout the period (100-101, 109-111, 138, 155, 163). This is an important and often overlooked dynamic in the literature on development. Ekbladh portrays conservative opposition to U.S. development assistance in the 1950s, however, primarily as a question of whether the state or the private sector should serve as the engine of capital accumulation for development (“trade not aid,” etc.), and whether the U.S. should work bilaterally or multilaterally. But conservatives were not opposed to modernization thinking as such or all forms of state planning, merely those that sought to erect an ‘external state,’ to use Robert Latham’s phrase, along the lines of the New Deal. They were quite comfortable with modernizing visions which emphasized military assistance and counterinsurgency doctrines which encouraged military forces in the Third World to take a larger role in politics and the economy (178, 199-200). Modernization did not get “lost in the government’s emphasis on military aid;” rather social scientists and policymakers began constructing a theoretical framework for ‘military modernization,’ even as they also tilted back in favor of multilateral assistance.

Ekbladh consulted widely in presidential archives, personal papers and foundation archives, and makes especially effective use of UN records in his discussion of U.S. policy towards South Korea. Elsewhere his approach seems scattershot – particularly with regards to records of the World Bank, the institution that arguably did the most after 1960 to promote the type of comprehensive infrastructure projects that he emphasizes and where the boundaries of international consensus might be probed more effectively. The project files of the World Bank are ignored, as are the embassy files on Korea and Vietnam at the National Archives. Most glaring, no foreign archives are used, which leaves the reader reliant on U.S. sources to evaluate claims that the rest of the world largely accepted the U.S.-established parameters of debate on international development. This may be an unfair criticism, given his enormous archival efforts elsewhere, but it speaks to the slightly distorting narrative and analytical effects of his avowedly U.S.-centric approach, with its emphasis on what myriad commentators, foundation officers and American officials proposed and said, rather than with the impact of their policies on the ground.

Lost in this rendering is any sense of agency on the part of state officials, intellectuals, activists and the ordinary objects/subjects of development in other countries (as opposed to in Congress or the rural South), and the ways that they viewed, responded to and reshaped development programs in a dialectical fashion (for an exception see the discussion on India and Pakistan, 163). While noting that “power was at the core of planning,” he gives us little sense of the contests over power between U.S. officials, NGOs and multilateral agencies and those on the receiving end of their attention and largesse.

Ekbladh will surely object that this was not his intention, but the relative absence of non-American voices is striking, especially in lengthy chapters on Korea and Vietnam.

The end of the Cold War, Ekbladh notes, produced shelves full of triumphalist American nonsense that claimed vindication for modernization theory despite its intellectual discrediting in the 1970s. Though most academics writing about development and the development community more generally had long rejected modernization discourses, some of its core ideas refused to die, ready to be dusted off and hauled back into service after September 11, 2001. As if by intellectual gag reflex, policymakers and popular commentators revived core assumptions of modernization theory as an intellectual framework for apprehending places like Iraq and especially Afghanistan, with militant Islamic revivalism standing in for the basket of cultural atavisms that animated the literature in the 1950s and 1960s.

The “first time as tragedy, second time as farce” quality of U.S. ‘nation-building’ efforts in both countries would be comical if not for their often ghastly human impact. But the TVA seems to have faded as a pivot point of discussion about development in either place.⁴ Perhaps the crumbling of America’s infrastructure and the epic failure of Hurricane Katrina has tempered U.S. hubris about exporting its developmental technology elsewhere. In any case the name of the game in Washington now is counterinsurgency (COIN), embraced on both left and right – as in the early 1960s - as the indispensable partner of development, with both carried out as a public-private partnership dominated by the Pentagon and its gushing spigot of militarized aid dollars.⁵

As a history of the “TVA idea” *America’s Mission* succeeds. But the measure of a work of attempted synthesis (and while not a global synthesis Ekbladh certainly makes synthetic claims) is the degree to which it holds together as an interpretive framework and gives us a new way of apprehending its subject. In this Ekbladh is only partially successful, mostly because of the extraordinary broad claims he makes for the TVA and “the plan” more generally as *the* exemplar of liberal development and modernization, rather than as one ‘doctrine’ among several competing for resources, political power and intellectual dominance in the U.S. and globally over the course of the twentieth century.

⁴ Nick Cullather notes the partial revival of interest in such schemes in Afghanistan. See Cullather, “Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State,” *Journal of American History* 89 (Sept. 2002), 512–37.

⁵ Michael Crowley, “COIN Toss: The New Cult of Counterinsurgency,” *The New Republic*, January 4, 2010, (<http://www.tnr.com/article/world/coin-toss>, last viewed on January 20, 2010); George Withers, Adam Isacson, Lisa Haugaard, Joy Olson, and Joel Fyke, “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy. How the Pentagon’s role in foreign policy is growing, and why Congress—and the American public—should be worried,” Latin American Working Group, March 2008, 1-15.

Profiling the Modernizers

David Ekbladh powerfully analyzes a “Great American Mission” that closely linked U.S. foreign policy post-1945 to an overall aim at reshaping the world in the American image. His book touches one key topic of recent world history, namely the quest to level global economic inequality. With the decline of the European colonial empires and in the context of the Cold War, the big concepts of reconstruction, modernization, and development unfolded a structuring force upon diplomatic discourse and international political practice. Recent scholarship has established the fact that both American modernization theory and the global development endeavor form constellations that were historically specific to the second half of the 20th century. These phenomena need explanation and can be explained. Ekbladh contributes substantially to their historical understanding. He presents a range of unpublished sources that profile the experiences, aims and expectations of key American modernizers. He also confronts U.S. governmental action with more general international currents and he ties leading voices of public discourse into an emerging network of non-governmental organizations. Most noteworthy is the fact that he also convincingly readjusts the relevant time-frame for the study of American modernization impact upon the world.

This is an important book, first, because it shifts attention away from the usual suspects, i.e. the dominant figures in public discourse of the 1950s and 1960s, by taking a close look at their discursive fore-runners. Walt W. Rostow, for example, appears in a telling photograph (p. 186) as a strongly motivated player in the modernization game – but not as one of the inventors of the sport. The same holds true for Harry Truman whose inaugural speech of 1949 finds a masterly contextualization. Development historiography largely took Truman’s Point Four to be the very beginning of a globalized American modernization impetus. Several critics of such a view have referred to the practice of colonial development (mainly by the British) and have argued that these late colonial experiences also shaped the American endeavors.¹ Ekbladh adds important facets by taking a look at the U.S. experience as a colonial power in the Philippines; by tracking core elements of the inaugural speech back into the economic crisis of the 1930s and by recounting all relevant detail of the composition of Truman’s secular policy announcement. One would wish that his specific interpretation of the Point Four Program could become a new standard reading. It makes quite clear how close liberal stances have always been connected to a vision of progress in general wealth creation, and how broad a basis Truman could build upon in order to sharpen his country’s ideological weapons in the Cold War. Truman pronounced a “bold new program” that marked global history by its scale and scope but that was in essence not so new and not so bold in the view of the American experiences of the interwar period and of the Second World War.

¹ See for example Frederick Cooper, “Writing the History of Development,” in: *Journal of Modern European History* 8 (2010) 1, in print.

This is an important book, second, because it suggests a new time-frame for the study of “The Great American Mission”. In 1960 the British Prime Minister Harold McMillan famously recorded “a wind of change” in African politics. The United Nations declared the 1960s to be a first “development decade” and John F. Kennedy announced his “Alliance for Progress” in 1961. In Ekbladh’s account such initiatives appear not as new beginnings but as the consolidation of a specific approach to leveling global inequality that is rooted in the interwar period. Looking at the USA, he finds no genuine contributions to the resolution of global problems in the 1960s but considers the American fiasco in Vietnam to be the closing phase of a discursive formation that had emerged out of the Great Depression. Such a time-frame convincingly opens up new perspectives for historical research. The year of 1945 is not necessarily a corner stone of world history. Rather, Ekbladh brings to evidence important continuities that powered the initial phase of American global ascendancy. His argument boils down to this: In order to reconcile U.S. domestic tension the New Deal brought large government interventions into infrastructural development that proved helpful as ideological tools to counter Soviet and Nazi totalitarianism. This war on the social engineering front did not end with the victory over Germany, Italy, and Japan, but was waged right into Cold War confrontations in what was to become the Third World. Before and after World War Two the “Great American Mission” was largely about how to fuse centralized planning into the liberal political project.

According to Ekbladh, one development scheme – the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) – provided the template for such a discursive masterpiece. And he presents the economist Eugene Staley as a chief authority in binding liberalism to global planning exercises. One can read his book as a finely crafted double essay on these two topics: the life and times of Eugene Staley, one largely forgotten scholarly figure of development history; and the global marketing of the TVA post-1945. Both topics are important and Ekbladh presents them in a highly differentiated style. The reconstruction of several (mainly futile) American modernization efforts in Asia provides the material to substantiate his claims. Of special interest is his finding that American modernizers critically debated the quality of the European Recovery Program (ERP) as a global template. The Marshall Plan has in the last seven decades repeatedly been referred to as one successful reconstruction project turning a massive influx of money into wealth creation and social stability. But early protagonists seem to have preferred the TVA as a blueprint for other regions of the planet, because this scheme was not only designed to build up large industrial capacities, but also to change the attitudes of a “target population” towards modernization and progress in general. In war-torn Europe the organizational skills and the attitudes of “modern men” still prevailed and the ERP did not need to deal prominently with culture and education.

Despite the overall positive impression, a peculiar contradiction runs through Ekbladh’s book. He argues that social engineering formed a cornerstone of the post war American global impact. But from the perspective of this reviewer, a European historian of science and technology, Ekbladh’s book offers ample evidence for the fact that the “American Mission” was not specifically American at all. Rather, the construction of the American world order seems to have taken place within a much larger context of globalized modernization efforts that included strong beliefs in the feasibility of social improvement

by scientific and technological means.² Ekbladh repeatedly qualifies some statements by his protagonists, or some social practice by one of the bodies under scrutiny as not in any way specifically American. In a kind of *ceterum censeo* the reader is informed that fusing planned government intervention with liberal values was something that kept intellectuals busy in many industrialized states.³ But these references to the European experience are not substantiated with concrete examples. No hints are given as to what could have been a major difference between these many national discourses and the American material. By omission, thus, Ekbladh sketches a picture of the “American Mission” which was American only to the extent that the institutions and persons who carried this mission were American. But it was not an American mission in terms of its very contents. This seems to be a rather strong argument that would need further substantiation in a comparative perspective – such as a comparison of U.S. programs with, say, the post-1945 global development efforts by Scandinavian countries or UN activities.⁴ It is strange, also, that the International Labour Office connection of Eugene Staley, who is presented as a chief architect of the American Mission, is largely absent from Ekbladh’s book. After all, Staley’s most important study on “World Economic Development”⁵ was published in 1944 by the ILO. One wonders how and why this international body could so strongly influence American discourse.

Every historian’s account needs to posit a set of stable categories against which social change can be described. Ekbladh chooses to take American liberalism as a basic entity. He reconstructs the way in which this centre piece of US-American self-conception structured domestic public discourse on foreign policy in the second half of the 20th century. In this, he strongly builds upon a second categorical notion: the theme of development, i.e. the planned intervention into social change. The resulting history of social engineering, American style, convincingly shows the symbolic importance of steered wealth creation in the stabilization of an American world order. But the book can not show why the construction of an American world order rested so strongly upon modernization theory.

One way to more clearly stress the specificity of the American approach would have been to reconstruct with greater care the inherent contradictions of the TVA story. Ekbladh’s

² For a comparative assessment of the promises of modern science and technology in all industrialized states see: Mikael Hard and Andrew Jamison, *Hubris and Hybrids: A Cultural History of Technology and Science* (New York: Routledge, 2005). For the Swiss case see: David Gugerli, Patrick Kupper and Daniel Speich, *Transforming the Future. The ETH Zurich and the construction of modern Switzerland 1855-2005* (Zurich: Chronos (in print)).

³ Indeed, forty years ago Charles Maier published a still very informative paper on the spread of technocracy in interwar Europe: Charles S. Maier, ‘Between Taylorism and Technocracy. European ideologies and the vision of industrial productivity in the 1920s,’ *Journal of Contemporary History* 5:2 (1970): 27-61.

⁴ Olav Stokke, *The UN and Development. From Aid to Cooperation* (United Nations Intellectual History Project, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).

⁵ Eugene Staley, *World economic development. Effects on advanced industrial countries* (Montreal: International Labour Office, 1994).

focus lies completely on the Tennessee Valley Authority as a discursive export success. While this scheme beyond doubt worked as a globalized development template in the American aim at spreading its liberal values, the TVA still also was the object of fierce domestic contestation. The electricity generated by the state sponsored TVA power stations brought the U.S. power market into disorder.⁶ Ekbladh mentions this violation of liberal free market ideology, but does not convincingly argue how it was erased from the TVA as a globalized developmental blue print. The construction of an American world order would not have been possible without resolving such inherent contradictions – or without at least spiriting them away from the centre of global ideological confrontations in the postwar period.

Also, science is depicted as a stable resource against which social change gains contours. Ekbladh writes much about the impact of scientific knowledge, and mainly of social scientific expertise but the production of this knowledge seems to stand outside the realm of history. The book thus leaves a series of questions unaddressed: What were the repercussions of American developmental activities on U.S. social scientists' academic work? Why did certain knowledge claims concerning social change prove so convincing for American modernizers, while others did not? Did the obvious contradiction of concurrently exporting free-market-ideology and government intervention evoke changes in the concept of American liberalism? What mutations can be observed in the history of the very idea of development? And to what extent was the American experience merely a local expression of a more global trend? Research in these directions would beyond doubt further profile the "American Mission" and help to critically assess its "greatness".

⁶ David E. Nye, *Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880–1940* (Cambridge Mass.: London: MIT Press, 1990).

“Ideas matter”, David Ekbladh writes in his remarkable book on the idea of modernization in 20th century American thought and politics, and goes on to demonstrate how true that statement is. By emphasizing the continuity of ideas about development and modernization from the time of World War I to the “war on terror” in the first decade of the 21st century, he successfully challenges the notion that modernization was a by-product, or an innovation, of the Cold War, as a recent boom in studies on modernization in the post-1945 era (intentionally or unintentionally) has come to suggest. Although most historians of the Cold War era are aware of the fact that ideas about modernization were rooted in much older debates about development, and although repeated reference has been made to the importance of the New Deal, the historiography lacked a systematic analysis of the history of the concept of modernization. David Ekbladh’s excellent study fills that void. He shows how a consensus evolved in the 1930s that the United States had to offer an attractive alternative to the “totalitarian” methods of overall modernization practiced in Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union at the time. The Tennessee Valley Authority with its emphasis on the sociopolitical potential of social and technical engineering, large-scale planning, integrated regional and local development, and on the importance of enabling individuals and social groups to overcome poverty and social immobility through self-help and concerted action came to embody the liberal American approach to changing the world. The war only strengthened the belief in the possibilities that arose from the coordinated cooperation between experts, science, politics, technology, and education. Institutional and personal continuities did their part to keep the belief in modernization *à l’Américaine* alive – most visibly in the figure of David Lilienthal, “Mr. TVA”, who defended the idea of establishing TVA-like structures in other parts of the world until the 1980s, although the plan to do so in the Mekong delta in order to “pacify” Vietnam and Southeast Asia had failed badly. It is very refreshing to read about a different set of persons than the usual suspects, Walt Rostow and Max Millikan (although they receive the attention they deserve, of course) and to realize that “the best and the brightest” of the Kennedy era owed a lot of their ideas about changing the world with the help of science, technology, and technical assistance to their older cousins, the New Dealers.

The diachronic and geographically diverse perspective (from 1914 to the first decade of the 21st century, from the United States to China, Korea, Vietnam, Iran, and Europe) that Ekbladh employs is what makes his book so fascinating and important. At the same time, it is exactly this broad view that leads to a number of thematic and conceptual limitations. These do not at all limit the value of the study; without them, we would still be waiting for the book, which would be a severe handicap to scholarship on modernization and development. Therefore, by pointing at what seems to be missing, I intend not so much to criticize the book than to suggest fields of research that could be studied in greater detail in the future.

Ekbladh deserves praise, among other things, for paying attention to the role of non-governmental institutions and organizations: volunteer groups, private foundations, and

international organizations, which had long promoted “development” abroad.¹ Ekbladh argues that those institutions were decisive in establishing a consensus about the alleged need for an international “modernizing mission”, and that the government relied on them to realize its program; he shows how this cooperation resulted in the development of a complex network of modernization agents and agencies whose personnel and agendas often overlapped. One could wish for a more detailed analysis of how that cooperation worked in practice: How did private and religious interests influence government policies, and what impact did government decisions have on programs of organizations like the United Nations? We learn that Catholic institutions were heavily involved in community development projects in Vietnam, for example, but we do not learn what exactly they did, how their projects differed from those of Quaker organizations, etc. This is tied to a general methodological challenge: Since the book focuses on the importance of ideas, it largely remains on the level of discourse and the conceptualization of policy approaches. Ekbladh is very successful in convincing readers that ideas matter, but we do not receive much information on what happened when those ideas hit the ground. Did South Korean parents support the ways in which their childrens’ school education was reformed by the American administration after 1945? How did individuals and social groups react to attempts to change their diet, as was tried in Vietnam and South Korea as part of the effort to “modernize” agriculture, or to “rationalize” their languages to make them conform to “modern” standards? How did those who were resettled by force as part of the Iranian Khuzestan scheme protest against their new living conditions, and did they frame their resistance in anti-modern terms?

These are not just questions born out of curiosity; they also have implications for the general interpretation of the role the idea of modernization played in the “American century”. If we focus on the “modernizers” and the sources they produced, we run the danger of reproducing the one-sided perspective that characterized those who considered themselves in charge of “uplifting” other societies; from there it is but a small step to observe the establishment of an “American world order”. If we were to include the perspectives of those who actually experienced modernization projects, we might find that the path toward global American hegemony was more complicated. “Agency” should not be reduced to organized opposition to building a dam. It can also be observed in everyday behavior of individuals who might embrace some elements of modernization and reject others. As James Ferguson and other anthropologists have taught us, individuals and groups react to processes of modernization in different manners, often in ways unexpected by those responsible for the design of the projects, and thus transform the original projects. It is this process of transformation, or the creation of alternative modernities, that deserves more attention from historians, I believe.

Also, it would be worthwhile to learn more about the transnational transfer of ideas. There are good reasons, of course, to focus on the United States and on American ideas, but it would be useful to try to define what was genuinely “American” about specific ideas about

¹ See, for example, Margherita Zanasi, “Exporting Development: The League of Nations and Republican China”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49:1 (2007): 143-169.

modernization and to what degree they belonged to a transnational stock of ideas. Daniel Rodgers and others have shown how closely individuals observed what was happening on the other side of the Atlantic with regard to social reform efforts in the first half of the 20th century.² It seems safe to assume that those interested in “improving” living conditions at home and abroad followed the debates about health care, educational reform, and the role of public institutions in the European colonies in the 1920s and 1930s, a time when the harsh colonial regimes came under pressure from progressive reformers, notably in England and France. The establishment of institutions that grew out of that criticism and the “benevolent colonialism” they came to be associated with have been studied in detail; we also know that the motives behind laws like the British Colonial Development Act of 1929 or similar initiatives by the French in the early 1930s were not purely altruistic but aimed at making the colonies more profitable (*mise en valeur*) and increasing control over the colonial subjects.³ It has also been shown that the approaches that characterized that “enlightened” version of colonial development continued to be influential beyond 1945, both with regard to methods and personnel. European colonial experiences provided the basis on which postcolonial development aid was conceptualized and practiced by national governments and supranational organizations like the European Community at least until the late 1960s, when a new generation of development experts and bureaucrats entered the scene and the global political situation was undergoing important changes.⁴ I believe it would be worthwhile to investigate the ties, or at least the similarities, between European colonial and postcolonial and American development and modernization policies and politics more closely. It might well be that American experts did not think much of the work of their European colleagues, and/or that they considered it “tainted” by colonialism and therefore did not want to be associated with it. At the same time, many Europeans involved in development work were skeptical of American approaches to modernization and considered themselves superior due to their individual or national experience in the field. And, lastly, Europeans, like their American colleagues, linked modernization at home with modernization abroad. The Mezzogiorno in Italy provided a classic point of reference to those interested in “developing” a “backward” rural region, and American observers were well aware of its existence. In sum, there are obvious connections between American and European development and modernization approaches that provide an excellent basis for comparative research.

² Daniel Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1998).

³ Frederick Cooper, “Writing the History of Development”, *Journal of Modern European History* 8:1 (2010): 5-23, 9-12; Niels P. Petersson, “‘Großer Sprung nach vorn’ oder ‘natürliche Entwicklung’? Zeitkonzepte der Entwicklungspolitik im 20. Jahrhundert,” in *Entwicklungswelten: Globalgeschichte der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit*, ed. Hubertus Büschel and Daniel Speich (Frankfurt, New York: Campus, 2009), 89-111, 91-96.

⁴ Véronique Dimier, “Bringing the Neo-Patrimonial State back to Europe: French Decolonization and the Making of the European Development Aid Policy”, *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 48 (2008): 433-457; Joseph M. Hodge, “British Colonial Expertise, Post-Colonial Careerism and the Early History of International Development”, *Journal of Modern European History* 8:1 (2010): 24-46.

I would like to point to two more issues that would deserve more detailed analysis: The role of business and the role of gender. Ekbladh does mention gender, but he does not consider the general gendered-ness of American thinking on modernization – which, of course, is a huge field that would deserve several studies of its own. We have learned from Laura Belmonte and others that American modernization in its many facets was heavily gendered. Recent interest in the history of population issues has directed scholarly attention to the role of women in development planning, and there is growing awareness of the fact that modernizers (American and international) did not disregard women in formulating their development concepts but actually considered them important subjects of the modernization process. All of this encourages research on the gender dimension of modernization, both in discourses and in practice. The same is true of the role of private business interests and of companies in establishing an “American world order”. A picture of a Bechtel engineer supervising South Korean workers is one of the few cases where Ekbladh hints at the existence of the capitalist entanglement with modernization; apart from that, David Lilienthal’s consultancy company D&R serves as a lone example of private economic interests in exporting modernization. Yet who would have built the dams around the globe if not private companies? What would the Green Revolution have been without the international fertilizer industry? Clearly business and economic interests played a huge role in American foreign policy in the 20th century and should be given appropriate attention.

Finally, one last point: It seems remarkable that Ekbladh uses the term “technocracy” only once, if I counted correctly. Would not the belief in the power of technology and the powerful role of experts to steer social and political processes, which was so characteristic of the idea of modernization as Ekbladh describes it, suggest a more systematic look at the concept? The same is true of the criticism modernization experienced in the late 1960s and 1970s: The growing distrust in technology, the fear of “alienation” in an increasingly “rationalized” society, the condemnation of experts as a “ruling class” lacking democratic legitimacy – all of those issues had been discussed by cultural critics in the 1920s and were taken up again in the 1950s and 1960s by conservative philosophers as well as by their colleagues in the realm of the Frankfurt School. Obviously, David Ekbladh’s book provides us not only with an impressive foundation but also with numerous inspirations for future research.

Author's Response by David Ekbladh, Tufts University

An author can only be flattered by the attention of other serious, thoughtful, and engaged scholars. Such is the case with the reviews offered by Bradley Simpson, Daniel Speich, Nils Gilman, and Corinna Unger. If nothing else, they have already provided what any historian could hope for, which is a substantive discussion of their work. More than that, the reviews offer a reminder that the scope of the book's topic makes dialogue a necessity. Modernization, as discussed in *The Great American Mission* is just one historical segment of a vast global history of development. Because of this I will take up the generous spirit guiding Unger's contribution and respond to those comments by the reviewers in a manner that hopefully segues into further inquiry on this fertile, sprawling, and vitally important topic.¹

The reviewers are right that the book is an attempt at synthesis although Simpson and Gilman do a disservice when they describe it as a global history of development and then fault it for not utilizing particular sources or perspectives. As is made clear in the introduction (and the title), *The Great American Mission* is not an attempt to exhaust the possibly inexhaustible global story of development but an exploration of a historically located approach to modernization. The book is written from a U.S. perspective although it certainly acknowledges the global nature of the question. This is particularly true since a basic theme of the book is how such modernization was used to enhance the legitimacy of an American variant of liberalism in a worldwide competition with other ideological systems.

To understand how such modernization was actually applied there are a literal host of constituencies that must be considered. Modernization, with its emphasis on extensive, large-scale projects was grounded in planning privileged the state. Nevertheless, states still required the support of missionaries, businesses, international organizations, voluntary groups, foundations, universities, and a collection of other non-state actors. This point is raised and carried through the book. I will candidly admit that there were a large number of organizations that could have easily made it into the book but did not for reasons of space, emphasis, and time. For example, Speich points out that there could have been more attention to the International Labour Office. Like its cousins the World Health Organization and UNESCO, which are featured in the book, the ILO merits greater attention. Indeed, it is part of the pre-Cold War history of modernization. The ILO, along with the League of Nations, was a pioneer in the interwar period of a type of technical assistance that would be indispensable to Cold War modernization efforts.² Another of the ILO's kin, the World Bank, is hardly "ignored" as Simpson implies. Throughout the book, it surfaces

¹ There are other points not discussed here where I might disagree with assertions and emphasis of the reviewers.

² Daniel Maul is working to remedy this shortfall. See his "'Help Them Move the ILO Way': The International Labor Organization and the Modernization Discourse in the Era of Decolonization and the Cold War" *Diplomatic History* 33 (June 2009): 387-404.

as a significant historical actor. It is hard to remember now, when the Bank is a development colossus, that well into the 1950s the Bank was not focused on the “Third World” and into the 1970s its activities were dwarfed by official U.S. aid. In fact, one part of the story I tell is the rise of the Bank to its present leading position in the development community, a prominence that came under Robert McNamara who ran the bank from 1968 to 1981. What this means is that during many of the earlier historical moments explored in the book the Bank was a supporting player.

These points aside, a goal of the book was to make a point about the vital historical role that non-state actors played in the modernization process, something largely missing in the current literature. Nevertheless, there remains considerable room to expound on the vital role played by international institutions and NGOs. Unger is on target with her assertion that more could be said about the role of private business. I absolutely agree. Lilienthal’s private development firm, Development and Resources, was highlighted not only because it was instrumental at some dramatic points but because it draws out the crucial role such for-profit organizations played and still play on the world stage. In fact, the book discusses some of the dramatic changes in U.S. foreign aid policy in the 1970s, which placed far more emphasis on aid for development funneled through nonstate bodies, an increasing number of which were private businesses. That such organizations now have a tremendous influence on the shape of development beckons further scholarly attention.³

Gilman roughly questions whether a host of state and nonstate groups even bought into the liberal consensus. Here I really can only point to considerable historical evidence that is, of course, presented in the book. Many nonstate groups happily repeated and applied those terms and concepts that dominated the liberal approach to modernization. More to the point innumerable military, business, voluntary, religious, and other constituencies actively contributed to (in that they actually worked on) large-scale modernization programs in places like South Korea, Colombia, India, Iran, and numerous other spot around the globe. Not everyone believed utterly in plans and goals of modernization efforts (although many did); nevertheless, for several decades missionaries, soldiers, foundation staff, Peace Corps volunteers, and even private citizens tacitly supported the ideas behind the process with their active *participation* in it.

Rather surprisingly, Gilman asserts that he can see no unifying core to these mid-20th century efforts. Reports, media coverage, planning papers, recollections, and host of other documents cited in the book strongly suggest otherwise. While ideas certainly evolved (or in some cases devolved) over time, they drew inspiration from earlier programs often looking to the concepts that the TVA and other big modernization programs embodied. Lilienthal is surely a focus of the narrative, but he is but one of a generation that includes influential figures like Robert Nathan, Arthur Goldsmith, Gordon Clapp, and James Grant who carried these ideas into the world and key institutions that framed the implementation

³ There are a few excellent studies that show just how instrumental private enterprises are in the development and “nation building” business. The best of these is perhaps James M. Carter, *Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State Building, 1954-1968* (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

of modernization. Just tracing the careers of such individuals and their continued commitment to core ideas demonstrates the remarkable continuity. This holds not only in the justifications of strategists, politicians, and other authorities seeking to cloak their ambitions in a revered legacy but for those who actively sought to implement a particular style of liberal modernization.

Of course, Gilman is using this assertion to challenge the very idea that there was a liberal consensus on modernization. The term was used in part to evoke the contemporaneous “liberal consensus” in intellectual life that also came to grief in the tumult in the 1960s and 1970s. However, it was also used because it adequately reflects the general agreement that existed across large segments of government, academia, business, and civil society about how modernization was to be done. The one undisputed service Gilman did readers and this author was compiling the times the term “consensus” was used in the text (86 by his count). However, he misses the fact that the term was actually used by historical actors to describe established views on modernization in the mid-twentieth century. Take one of the strongest voices in the modernization chorus, Barbara Ward. In the early 1970s she noted that a changed world situation had “destroyed the old consensus.” (p. 226) She was just one of wide swath of prominent adherents (both institutional and individual) who, for much of the postwar period, had accepted the liberal template for pushing “progress.” Gilman fails to note that the consensus I describe does not imply lock-step uniformity but merely general agreement. He also overlooks that the book highlights dissenters like U.S. Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, writer Henry Hazlitt, and economist P.T. Bauer. For several decades they railed against many concepts and policies that were part and parcel of the liberal approach to modernization (particularly Bauer). They emphasize one point among the many Gilman fails to acknowledge. Even these dissenters consciously admitted they were fighting against prevailing trends—something that might just be called a consensus.

Books that approach an issue broadly can bait specialists who feel their own work has been shorted. Gilman faults me for not putting more emphasis on the subject he has studied, modernization theorists. That, of course, does not reflect any lack of understanding of their importance and influence but was intended to demonstrate that they were merely parts of a larger modernization community. Indeed, such theorists were often a step behind those actually out in the field. Contrary to conventional assertions, they were more often describing the lessons they thought had been worked out by many of the figures I discuss rather than being those who were the font from which modernization ideas and practices emerged. In his review, not unlike some of those modernization theorists, Gilman holds to a set of preconceptions he brings to the topic and prefers not to engage evidence that might require him to modify his own views.

Terminology and ideas shift in any wide-ranging historical topic where there is considerable change over time. This is the case with modernization. Simpson pulls out a section of the book’s introduction to question how the book categorizes aid to promote the process. Throughout the twentieth century very different types of programs ranging from education to large dams were seen to promote modernization. These programs were supported by aid offered under a broad range of rubrics, institutions, and programs. Take a

segment of my research that did not make it into the book due to space considerations. During the 1960s there was an extensive debate across American officialdom about the relation of military aid on the modernization process. There were those who thought the aid complemented economic and social development. Training thousands of men to be soldiers necessarily exposed them to modern techniques and ideas. This was assumed to complement larger processes of change that developing nations were seen to require. So military aid, at many points, was seen to have a modernizing component. This emphasizes the indistinct edges around the issues of modernization and the terms that frame it. When certain questions are being asked, historians of development might need to be less sensitive to which bureaucracy extended the aid than to what that aid was actually supposed to do.

Speich puts his finger on a related truism that science and technology and the views they inspire are ever shifting and can be further explored. The *Great American Mission* explains how a set of anxieties about where modern science and technology were taking humanity undercut modernization in the 1960s. The book puts particular emphasis on how an environmental critique changed not only the ideas but also the policies and practices of the aid community. It was not solely the term modernization that fell into disuse, as Simpson inaccurately states, it was a whole series of relationships, practices, and institutions that were sundered. In fact, the concluding two chapters deal with the collapse of the modernization consensus. To take one example, Simpson neglects to mention how the book goes into considerable detail regarding how USAID was sundered by this change and the Bank was promoted to its current, dominant position. This is only one example of how policy and actual programs were changed. So the “crisis of development” was far more than an exercise in semantics. To be sure, the rise of “sustainable development” out of these ashes did not mean that big infrastructural programs disappeared or that elements of the modernization ethos did not live on in various forms. What did change were the terms of debate as well as actual institutional capacity, particularly in the U.S. case. Development programs could be challenged in ways they had not been before. Nevertheless, the book does not claim to be the final word on what was a profound and sometimes tortuous shift in priorities and there is still much to be done to grasp its scope and limits.

One related point should be emphasized. The mid-twentieth century modernization formula connected science and technology to social and psychological change. The creation of modern people was a foundational part of liberal developmentalism—and was not alien to communist and fascist approaches either. Simpson and Gilman are critical of the emphasis placed on South Korea. They are right that U.S. modernization efforts were never structured as a Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) style plan (although the New Deal program and its officers were on Harry Truman’s mind when he dealt with the issue of South Korean modernization).⁴

⁴ David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton University Press, 2010), 133-34.

But they fail to grasp that the book traces modernization in South Korea as drawn according to the broader template of liberal development that the TVA had come to symbolize. It is odd that Simpson suggests that infrastructure is overlooked in the Korean case. The problem of electricity runs through the chapter (and power was a staple of the broader modernizing imagination, something surely informed at least in part by the image and example of the TVA). Gilman and Simpson seem insulated from the fact that the chapter on Korea also highlights the social change that was an integral element of the modernization equation. Liberal development practices (again, like their communist and fascist counterparts) assumed that individuals' daily habits and even personal psychology would have to be altered to make them modern. Hence the discussion of education and other programs that sought exactly this type of intimate transformation. To achieve this, the effort mobilized a swath of nongovernmental bodies (as did the TVA in the 1930s) as well as UN agencies (whose early programs the TVA, in part, informed). Institutionally, the massive activity in South Korea was in line with the prevailing liberal approach to modernization. Simpson jumps to entirely the wrong conclusion when he declares the book an effective history of the TVA. As I make abundantly clear throughout, that is not how it is intended. The TVA was just the most prominent example of a liberal consensus with its extensive goals of economic, political, and social transformation. Hence, it became easy shorthand for the type of large-scale modernization that prevailed in the period.

One basic goal of the book was to engage such issues and show that this type of modernization was an intimate process that made direct impressions on individual lives. Programs supported by the United States sought to change how people farmed, perceived their place in the world, what they ate, and even the language they spoke. Benefits surely accrued but there also were also direct costs to societies. Development could displace large numbers of people, lead to intense environmental despoliation, nagging political problems, social dislocation, and even disease. All of this is front and center in the book's descriptions of how modernization programs unfolded. Accordingly, I can say that Simpson's suggestion that I fail to discuss the impact programs had on people is well off the mark. Still, there is remarkable room for others to explore in rich and thorough detail how such intrusive elements of modernization programs impacted communities and individuals and how they were negotiated and resisted on the ground.

Simpson mentions the differences between the U.S. and South Korea over its "Big Push" in the 1970s. He is referencing a longer disagreement between the two governments over how South Korea was to modernize and be integrated into an East Asian (and world) liberal capitalist economy. The book hardly ignores these long-running disagreements that Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee had with their American counterparts as part of the modernization process. For the Americans this was a frustrating distraction but they never doubted whether modernizing South Korea was necessary. Still, Simpson raises a valid question the book engages but hardly exhausts as a historical topic. How do local regimes' and constituencies' visions of development segue or clash with the agendas of their patrons, be they governments, international organizations, or nongovernmental bodies?

Unger is incisive when she suggests a relationship between colonial development agendas and the unfolding of modernization ideas. For reasons of space and time this was only

gestured toward in the book but I will second the view that there is valuable comparative work to be done on this subject. Unger had a hand in the groundbreaking special issue on the global history of modernization in *Diplomatic History* last year. The exceptional work therein gave a savory taste of the variety of topics and approaches that will continue to illuminate the history of modernization and the larger concept of development.

Jogged by the reviewers, I will suggest just a few more of the many questions historians might pursue. The considerable overlap between domestic “reform” in industrialized or “developed” states and international development might be productively explored. For example, efforts to promote a “Great Society” in the United States were not only connected by ideas and rhetoric to modernization but by individuals and institutions (particularly foundations and key NGOs) that had cut their teeth on overseas programs. Communist international development activities before, during, and even after the Cold War are only beginning to be revealed. It almost goes without saying that there is a great deal to be written from the perspective of states, polities, and peoples in the “developing world.” If I can fault the reviewers for anything it is for overlooking the sincere importance of ideology in guiding and justifying modernization and development in the past but also in the present. Still, the reviewers have sharpened an understanding of the issues raised by *The Great American Mission* even as they remind us there is much rewarding work to be done.

Copyright © 2010 H-Net: Humanities and Social Sciences Online. H-Net permits the redistribution and reprinting of this work for nonprofit, educational purposes, with full and accurate attribution to the author, web location, date of publication, H-Diplo, and H-Net: Humanities & Social Sciences Online. For any other proposed use, contact the H-Diplo Editors at h-diplo@h-net.msu.edu.
