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Reviewed by:
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Review by **Sayuri Guthrie Shimizu**, Michigan State University

"When the Levy is Breached: Re-viewing Statecraft, Diplomacy, and Global Governance through the Lens of the Environment"

"The biosphere presents unique challenges to the world's diplomats. Trained to operate in the realm of military might and economic influence, these women and men are now faced with an array of environmental issues which defy traditional diplomatic solutions." Kurk Dorsey, coeditor of the special issue of *Diplomatic History* under review, opened his pathbreaking 1991 article, a creative fusion of international history and studies of the environment, with this observation. But questions arising from the natural world ineluctably beg diplomats and policymakers to confront

the unfamiliar, because "[n]atural resources, flora and fauna, and pollution rarely conform themselves to national boundaries: thus environmental issues take on an international context."[1] Seventeen years after its appearance in the premier journal of an academic discipline then at its budding stage, the opening passage of Dorsey's article on Progressive Era diplomacy on animal species conservation has not lost its inspirational luster.

Five years later, Mark Lytle, this special issue's other coeditor, similarly urged fellow diplomatic historians to break out of their ingrained comfort zones to tackle questions the natural world throws humanity's way. In a research note published in *Diplomatic History,* Lytle described the state of affairs regarding the proposed cross-pollination of international history and environmental history: "No amount of exhortation can change the fact that diplomatic historians prefer to focus their attention on state-centered policy and its human actors." But this did not keep Lytle from issuing a call to bold new action: diplomatic historians should rise to the occasion being presented by an exciting new trend in the field of environmental history. In the process of "[breaking] the ties to [Frederick Jackson] Turner and the American West," Lytle noted, a new generation of environmental historians had come to recognize "international dimensions of their field," and many of them began venturing out of the well-trodden geographical terrains upon which most of studies of the environment and wildlife had focused.[2]

Together, Lytle and Dorsey were anticipating the creative synergy that would come from a union of fields that had largely followed separate evolutionary trajectories. Their scholarship and exhortation intimated that time was now ripe for just such self-selected mutation, and indeed it was. The past decade saw a gradual yet steady growth in the literature on international environmental history, and this subterranean shift has produced a respectable body of academic monographs crafted mostly by younger scholars, such as Dorsey himself.[3] This special issue of *Diplomatic History* is another testimonial to the validity of the prognostication made more than a decade ago by these two standard-bearers.

Commentaries by Donald Worster and Akira Iriye, scholars paramount in the fields of environmental and international history, grace the closing part of this agenda-setting collection and eloquently summarize the volume's border-breaching significance. Acknowledging that most environmental historians have framed their inquiries within the foursquare bounds of the nation-state, Woster delights in the fact that others have leapt over national borders, "heading wherever weather, epidemics, ocean currents, or resource commodities flow." Equally to his delight, an environmental perspective has

[1] Kurk Dorsey, "Putting a Ceiling on Sealing: Conservation and Cooperation in the International Arena, 1909-1911," *Environmental History Review,* 15 (3), 27.

[2] Mark Lytle, "Research Note: An Environmental Approach to American Diplomatic History," *Diplomatic History,* 20 (2), 379.

[3] Kurkpatrick Dorsey, foreword by William Cronon, *The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy: U. S.-Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive Era* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998).

enabled diplomatic historians to reconfigure their fields.[4] Iriye, on his part, reiterates the cannon of transnational historiography, noting that questions pertaining to international governance cannot be understood if analyzed in national enclosures alone. The key to understanding the development of global history "would be to see how transnational forces and national sovereignties intersect one another," and the environment and the environmental movement seem "particularly susceptible to such analysis." Both commentators credit the five articles gathered in this special issue with showcasing the creative synergy generated by diplomatic and international historians channeling greater attention to human-nature interactions.[5]

While employing varied thematic foci and units of analysis, the authors of the five articles commonly address two overarching questions: what kinds of state power, civil society, and individual human agency have mediated human-nature interactions? What kinds of forces, both natural and human, created the norms, practices, and institutions delineating these interactions? Subsumed into these questions are several overlapping and mutually reinforcing themes emerging from the five articles. Foremost among them is the critical role played by international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in nature and wildlife preservation. As a force of civil society, NGOs spearheaded humans' collective search for a way to reconcile their extractive needs with what came to be recognized as the earth's finite resources and fragile ecosystems. Anna-Katharina Wobse and Jacob Darwin Hamblin effectively highlight the part of NGOs in tackling this old question of how to husband common goods for the maximum common good.

In a way reminiscent of Cecilia Lynch's study of peace organizations in the interwar period, Wobse demonstrates how reformers sought to work through the newly created League of Nations to find solutions to oil pollution of the seas. Central to her story is the activism of environmental NGOs such as the British Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSOCA) in multilateral arenas. Her conclusion points to the all-too-familiar limits of the international organization in the face of national interests jealously guarded by sovereign states. But like Lynch, Wobse tempers this oft-rendered grim verdict with a validation of the limited-yet-not-insignificant outcomes of the efforts made by concerned League officials and NGOs. The newly created international deliberative body in Geneva provided political venues through which NGOs could cooperate with each other and build coalitions with other reform-seeking groups, sharing tasks and lobbying government delegations and league officials. The League also enabled NGOs to publicize their claims and articulate ideals and visions larger than the sum of self-contained national interests. In the process, the NGOs helped bring problems concerning the natural environment to the attention of a wider global community and planted the seeds for transnational collaboration among environmentalists in the post–World War II period. Official and unofficial contacts among NGOs and the international organization

[4] Donald Worster, "Environmentalism Goes Global," *Diplomatic History*, 32 (4), 639.

[5] Akira Iriye, "Environmental History and International History," *Diplomatic History*, 32 (4), 644.

expanded also, creating a domain of activity relatively autonomous of the state and its narrow preoccupations.

This positive evaluation of the League and what it managed to accomplish resonates with Michael Callahan's eye-opening reinterpretation of the League mandate system. In his 1999 study, Callahan argued that the mandate system, often dismissed as nothing more than a fig leaf for continued imperialism, introduced a then-novel idea that colonial powers were answerable to institutions and mechanisms higher than themselves. As such, it laid the groundwork, however incipient, for the de-legitimization of colonial arrangements after World War II. Likewise, Wobse sees in the League an incubator of post-WW II breakthroughs, such as environmental ethics defined by universal humanitarianism and multilateral engagement with the protection of nature.[6]

The limits of problem-solving under the auspices of an international organization also come into bold relief in Hamblin's impeccably researched article. The focus of his analysis is the United Nations and how members of this post-WW II reincarnation of the Wilsonian dream wrestled with marine pollution in the nuclear age. After the historic 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm, the international community hammered out an agreement to ban the dumping of radioactive waste in the oceans. Deploying sources seldom used by diplomatic historians, such as the records of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and French-language archival materials, Hamblin meticulously reconstructs negotiations leading up to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (also called the London Dumping Convention).

Hamblin shows in illuminating (and recriminating) detail the motivations behind key signatories' negotiating strategies. He demonstrates that although the convention for the first time placed radioactive waste dumping under international law, its claim of "banning" disposal at sea was largely for symbolic value only. The United States enacted legislation controlling radioactive waste disposal to conform to this newly minted international norm, but the law merely regulated activities no longer practiced. Europeans governments behaved no better. They implemented "environmental monitoring" that only served to create illusions of compliance to common norms. In Hamblin's telling, Great Britain emerges as a particularly determined saboteur of a meaningful multilateral regulatory regime. In the end, existing ocean-dumping practices survived virtually intact despite an extraordinary surge in environmental consciousness that drove the Stockholm Conference. And yet "the creation of the environmental regime itself exerted a placebo effect upon public opinion" (p. 542). The hollowness of its content notwithstanding, was it better to put in place a multilateral agreement than none at all? Or, by creating a false perception of accomplishment, was a symbolic accord even more

[6] Michal Callahan, *Mandates and Empire: The League of Nations and Africa, 1914-1931* (Brighton, England: Sussex Academic Press, 1999).

hazardous? Hamblin refrains from taking an explicit position on this nettlesome question.

Lisa Brady's article on the creation of an accidental nature preserve in the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) also points to the incorrigibility of state power, but hers foregrounds a welcome if unintended consequence of the half century of military stand-off dictated by national interests defined and guarded by the opposing governments. Encompassing a basic catalog of wildlife species that have claimed the territory since the armistice, Brady's article reveals that the 2.5 mile wide, 155 mile long corridor traversing the Korean peninsula has come to safeguard more than a precarious peace between the two military adversaries. Wildlife thrived in the area, sheltered from the eviscerating effects of urbanization, economic development, and "modern" agricultural practices. The evolution of meanings invested in the DMZ is a subsidiary theme of Brady's article. What started out to be a potent symbol of deadly internecine war and physical destruction morphed into a safe haven for wildlife and a protective wall against pollution and advancing lines of deforestation. In the 1990s, an international NGO embarked on a campaign to make the strip of land a "World Peace Park for Humanity, Research, and Biodiversity" and a vehicle for Korean reconciliation and reunion. The accidental nature preserve then became a metaphor for a common future to be built together by the two Koreas.

In the conclusion of her article, Brady reflects upon the potential dilemma concerning the future of the natural sanctuary along the DMZ. Once national reconciliation is achieved and military tension recedes into history, will the juggernaut of economic development come blazing through this last preserve of unspoiled environment? Can this wildlife habitat be protected only as long as the inter-state antagonism persists? Drawing on mostly published English-language sources and secondary literature, Brady's article invites an intriguing question of how Korean historical records, when utilized for research, might shed additional light on these troubling questions that bear larger applicability to the world's other nature refuges incidentally bequeathed by inter-state conflict.

While state power can sometimes play an unwittingly nature-friendly role, individual human agency can be just as fortuitous a driving force for the advancement of environmentalist causes. That is a running theme of J. Brooks Flippen's article about Russell Train, the point man for Richard Nixon's newfound environmental awareness and a future director of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Armed with illuminating anecdotes and vignettes unearthed from newly opened government documents, Flippen, the author of a recent study of the Nixon administration's environmental initiatives, introduces us to a range of accomplishments made under Nixon's watch that, in Flippen's

words, "gave birth to American environmental diplomacy" and made the United States a "key player in [environmental] negotiations" (p. 638).[7]

In truth, the Machiavellian president cared little about the environment per se--he merely wanted to play to this emergent concern of the political Left at home and deflect the worldwide opprobrium for America's lethal actions in the Vietnam War. Nixon also envisioned environmental negotiations to be a useful auxiliary tool for engaging Communist China in his balance-of-power diplomacy. Flippen contrasts this political opportunism driving Nixon's embrace of environmental questions with the genuine concern for the fragile natural world that spurred Train's strong environmental advocacy within and on behalf of the administration. That juxtaposition is certainly noteworthy, but readers might equally be struck by the driving personal ambitions that undergirded Train's intra-governmental advocacy and energetic environmental diplomacy. Through the history of modern environmentalism, the confluence of genuine concerns for the environment and strong political personalities has often been a catalyst to political breakthroughs and the creation of new policy forums and implementing bodies. Dorsey's prize-winning book on conservation diplomacy in the early 20th century sheds light on similar cases of individual agency often coupled with personal ambitions. Such was certainly the case with Wilbert Chapman, an oceanographer turned federal fisheries bureaucrat and later a political activist, who left a lasting footprint on the United States' ocean resource management policy in the early post-WW II years.[8]

Flippen thus illustrates how institution-building for problems without ready electoral constituencies can be often advanced by such alchemy of morals and venalities. And here, he, too, emphasizes the value of incremental contributions made by new domestic and international institutions in furnishing the world with new avenues for debating ways to protect the environment from human excesses. In this vein, Flippen goes so far as to regard Nixon and Train as co-pilots ushering in "a new phase in international relations that promised collective action for global sustainability" (p. 638). It is perhaps equally important to note that these Nixon-era accomplishments did not come out of thin air; Dorsey's brief prehistory of the incipient environmentalism of the preceding Democratic administrations certainly rounds out the picture, as does Douglas Weiner's study of a parallel environmental movement in the USSR.[9]

[7] J. Brooks Flippen, *Nixon and the Environment* (University of New Mexico Press, 2000); *Conservative Conservationist: Russell E. Train and the Emergency of American Environmentalism* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2006).

[8] Dorsey, *The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy:* For Wilburt Chapmen, see Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu."American Occupation Policy and the Japanese Fisheries Management Regime, 1945-1952," Mark E. Caprio and Yoyeyuki Sugita (eds.), *Democracy in Occupied Japan* (London and NY: Routledge, 2007).

[9] Kurk Dorsey, "Water, Bread, and SALT: Environmental Politics in the Cold War," *New England Journal of History,* 64 (1), 102-118; Douglas Weiner, *A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

Political expediency or not, one tangible result of Nixon-Train environmental activism was the U.S.-Soviet Agreement in the Field of Environmental Protection, another détente accord reached in May 1972 in the shadow of the far more heralded arms control agreements between the two Cold War adversaries. Although the U.S.-Soviet environmental agreement proved short on tangible results, its historic significance perhaps should not be dismissed out of hand. As Dorsey has noted in a recent article, ideological divisions and associated political rhetoric during the Cold War tended to obscure "a surprising similarity in attitudes towards natural resources" between the two superpowers. Both nations pushed industrialization and modern agricultural techniques. They similarly viewed nature as a set of resources to be commodified and converted into goods. That these champions of the extractive and anthropocentric model of the nature-human relationship jointly acknowledged, at least as a symbolic gesture, that the environment should be protected as well as mobilized for perceived human needs, betokened a paradigmatic shift of sorts.[10]

It is the extractive paradigm that guided the American state during much of the Cold War that Robert Thompson seeks to dissect and reframe in his article, "This is the American Earth." In a transnational framework following the footprints left by Richard Tucker's pathbreaking *Insatiable Appetite,* Robertson reinterprets midcentury American thinking about nature as a form of imperial project. Drawing on analytical insights proffered by Richard Grove and Peter Anker, Robertson imaginatively historicizes the American experience with resources and the environment, arguing that what these two Europeans scholars have revealed about European imperial forerunners speaks to the American newcomer as well. Despite its coercive and hierarchical political and military structure, empire, as a geographical space, entails an organically connected network of resource allocation for its effective function. Colonial administrators and their academic agents thus came to see new types of environmental questions and necessities, in turn developing new forms of environmental awareness. The environmental thinking thus reformulated on the periphery seeps back to the empire's nervous center. Grove and Anker have also shown that environmental thought is deeply embedded in relations of power. Far from being a universally shared moral value transcending social hierarchy, the protection of nature is often motivated by, and thus reinforces, existing hierarchical power relationships. As Robertson aptly rephrases, concerns for nature "sometimes served as a handmaiden to empire (p.564)."[11]

Drawing implications of these preceding works for the American "empire" after World War II, Robertson suggests that the United States' newly globalized imperial reach, too, created a need for new types of globalized resource planning. Facing this new imperative, the U.S. government began to explore ways to mobilize natural resources on a new global scale, ultimately to serve the interests of the Cold War metropoles. This fundamentally "imperial" enterprise often resulted in destructive resource exploitation, skewed

[10] Dorsey, "Water," 102-3.

[11] Flippen, *Nixon and the Environment*

monoculture economies, and environmental degradation in peripheries--the kind of American footprints in the tropics highlighted by Tucker's compelling work. But Robertson also shows something else. U.S. imperial resource planning created experts and knowledge serviceable to environmental protection. The expanded horizon of American thinking about resource use also opened up a globalized view of resource scarcity and problems of pollution and hazardous wastes. Funding provided by private foundations such as the Ford Foundation accelerated the transnationalization of American ecological vision.

As long as imperial resource planning is geared towards satisfying American acquisitive and consumptive impulses and serving American geopolitical priorities at the expense of others on the planet, it fails to break out of the old extractive paradigm of nature-human interaction that was the hallmark of the attitudes of both Cold War superpowers. The old paradigm in its metamorphosed form could be even more baneful for its guise of scientific and supposedly "objective" problem-solving and communal rhetoric implicit in the notion of ecology. And yet Robertson's elucidation of the peripheral origins of American ecological thinking goes to the heart of the overarching themes of the volume: what kind of state power, or permutation thereof, bears on the evolving modes of interaction between humans and nature? How is that exercise of state power modulated by civil society and individual agency?

Running *sotto voce* through this remarkable volume is the primacy of national sovereignty in matters pertaining to the environment and the state's unequaled ability to co-opt individuals and to deflect reformist pressures emanating from civil society. If that primacy indeed circumscribes the arena of action, the best and perhaps only way to create an effective and equitable international regime for environmental protection and resource husbandry is to constantly replenish and expand the fount of reformist drives and supranational ideals generated by concerned individuals and transnational civil society. By connecting the historical subfields that have much to contribute to the replenishment of that reservoir of power and possibility, "New Directions in Diplomatic and Environmental History" has made a valuable step toward such collective endeavors to find sustainable human existence on this planet, no matter how frustratingly incremental that process might be.

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Review by **Frank Zelko**, University of Vermont

It is heartening to see an issue of *Diplomatic History* that tackles themes and issues raised by environmental historians over the past couple of decades. From my admittedly rudimentary knowledge of the field (unlike the contributors, who can legitimately claim expertise in both sub-disciplines, I am merely an environmental historian who occasionally dabbles in diplomatic history), plus discussions I've had with diplomatic history colleagues, it is clear that environmental issues have been a much-neglected aspect of diplomatic history. The essays by this group of dynamic young scholars illustrate how exciting and fresh an EH-DH collaboration can be.

Before commenting on more substantive issues, there are a couple of definitional matters I'd like to address. Without wishing to sound pedantic, some of the authors tend to be a bit imprecise and a-historical in their use of terms such as "environmentalism," "conservation," and "ecology." This lax interchangeable usage has long been a problem within our sub-discipline and is confusing for students and colleagues outside the field. For example, students in my classes regularly refer to John Muir, Gifford Pinchot, and Theodore Roosevelt as "environmentalists," thereby eliding the considerable differences both among these three figures and between them and later activists such as Rachel Carson and David Brower. Does it make sense, therefore, to refer to someone like the early twentieth century ornithologist, Eduard Trantz, as an "environmentalist"? Indeed, were there environmentalists before the term attained its specific modern meaning? Michael Bess offers some useful comments on this issue, suggesting that environmentalism is made up of four core ideas: finitude, interconnectedness, systemic rupture, and global socioeconomic transformation. Therefore, the study of environmental politics, as opposed to conservation, only makes sense from about the mid-twentieth century, roughly the point at which all these concepts came to be associated with the term "environment." Anything else, Bess argues, is merely a shallow form of analogy.[1] If we adopt this usage, and I think Bess makes an excellent case for it, then we need to distinguish environmentalism from related but distinct concepts such as conservation, preservation, nature protection, etc. If we employ this definition, Trantz is better described as a nature protection advocate, a *Naturschützer*, rather than an environmentalist. I would urge diplomatic historians intending to dabble in environmental history to clarify these issues before they begin.

Another set of terms that could use more definitional clarity are those various synonyms for "international": terms such as transnational, cross-border, transboundary, etc. Such words are often used synonymously and interchangeably, thereby both creating confusion and robbing them of their definitional power. Rather than trying to elaborate on this myself, I'll refer *Diplomatic History* readers to a recent article by Joseph Taylor which deals with precisely this issue.[2]

[1] Michael Bess, *The Light-Green Society*: *Ecology and Technological Modernity in France, 1960-2000* (Chicago, 2003), pp.60-64

[2] Joseph E. Taylor, III, "Boundary Terminology," *Environmental History*, 13(3), July 2008.

War zones in general, and the Korean Peninsula specifically, have received little attention from environmental historians, and Lisa Brady's article is a welcome and fascinating contribution to both. However, I can't help but feel that Brady presents a sad and ironic story in the rosiest possible light when she describes the DMZ as a "triumph for the peninsula's nonhuman residence" and an "environmental success." The DMZ remains the most fortified border in the world, a flashpoint where total ecological destruction is possible at the snap of a megalomaniacal dictator's fingers. At best, it is a fragile and precarious ecological artifact whose status remains assured only so long as tensions remain high. Either the outbreak of war or the reunification of Korea would probably ensure its demise. How seriously should we take this as an ecological reserve? What "natural boundary" does it define? As an ecological corridor, it seems arbitrary. Even as a Peace Park, its status as an ecological preserve will always remain secondary to considerations of geopolitics. Undoubtedly, the DMZ is a fascinating case study, and Brady has given us a superb account of its importance to 20th century Korean history and to environmental history more broadly. Nevertheless, I can't help but feel that it is ultimately a tale of tragedy rather than triumph. What state is the world in when a region's best hope for nature protection and maintaining ecological diversity lies in a narrow swath of heavily fortified and land-mined territory that is just a whisker away from total conflagration on the one hand, or intensive agro-industrial development on the other?

Looking beyond the tragic irony of the DMZ, Brady's work suggest another fascinating line of inquiry for scholars interested in the environmental impact of different political systems. The obvious dichotomy here is between open democratic systems and authoritarian ones. There is a sense among environmental historians that the former, despite their flaws, are generally preferable to the latter when it comes to their environmental impact. Post Cold War revelations about the ecological recklessness and destructiveness of the Soviet Union and its satellite states have generally boosted this perception. And in her book, *Mao's War against Nature*, Judith Shapiro has heavily emphasized the connection between the mistreatment of humans and of nature in modern China, and by extension, under all despotic regimes. Certainly, on one level, this seems to be a fair argument. Democracies allow people to voice their discontent and affect change. Thus environmentalists, by using the spaces and tools afforded by democracy, have been able to bring about more stringent regulations about how waste is disposed of and how various landscapes should be treated. And the litany of environmental disasters that Shapiro examines—ranging from the absurd to the nightmarish—leave one in no doubt that western democracies, for all their flaws, provide citizens with the opportunity to oppose outlandish and brutal development schemes. Nevertheless, if one steps back to look at the bigger picture, one can't help but be a little skeptical about all of this. Perhaps democracies are less likely to inflict egregious environmental crimes on their own citizens and ecosystems, but what about their practices outside their own borders? Before we get too smug about German recycling, Danish windmills, and American national parks, we need to also balance the ledger with

Agent Orange, nuclear testing, and the export of both toxic waste and the environmentally deleterious production of products for western consumers. And let's not forget climate change . . .

This is not to say that environmental historians have shied away from criticizing democracies for their ecological sins. Donald Worster's work is among the more prominent scholarship in this vein. Worster critiques what he sees as a malicious alliance between capitalism and the bureaucratic state, an alliance that has encouraged the creation of ever-larger, and ever-more-destructive, modes of production in the United States and elsewhere. Among the results have been the Dust Bowl and the creation of a hydraulic society in the American West. But in doing this, Worster certainly isn't advocating less democracy. Rather, he sees the undermining of democracy by various elites as a major cause of both social injustice and environmental despoliation in the West. The best solution to all of this, he implies, is more democracy. This is also Shapiro's conclusion from her study of China, as well as James Scott's in his highly influential *Seeing Like a State*.

If there are any environmental historians out there who are not small "d" democrats, I don't think I know of them. As a result, when environmental history has anything to say about which political systems are environmentally preferable, it generally criticizes authoritarianism in all forms while championing more democracy. Is it possible that this normative conception of democracy constitutes both an enormous bias and a blind spot, emphasizing the role of the state while exculpating its citizens? Perhaps it is time to conduct a less biased ecological audit comparing the environmental impact of democracies and authoritarian states of various kinds. Which systems have been most capable of enabling, indeed, producing, human needs and desires and transforming nature in the process? Is it possible that market democracies (are there any other kind?), by providing citizens with the tools with which they can realize their endless material desires, constitute a deadlier ecological menace than lumbering authoritarian states? Is it possible that authoritarian states, both ancient and modern, have in many ways been better environmental stewards than modern market democracies?

One can debate whether it is the historian's job to ask these sorts of questions, but if one feels inclined to pursue them then the two Koreas seem to offer fertile territory for this kind of inquiry. Until the mid-twentieth century, human impact on the peninsula's ecology had been more-or-less uniform. Subsequently, two nations with very different political and economic systems occupied the region. How different was their respective ecological impact? Which one has left the largest ecological footprint, not just on its own territory, but globally? Of course, such research can only occur once North Korea loosens its restrictions on foreign researchers.

One of the great ironies in the history of US environmental policy is that many of the landmark environmental acts and institutions of the modern era emerged during, and with the apparent support of, the Nixon Presidency. J. Brooks Flippen's piece reminds us

that Nixon's support for environmental reform did not end at the US border, and that under his watch environmental issues finally became a serious subject of international relations. However, as Flippen points out, Nixon himself had little interest in environmentalism outside the narrow calculus of electoral politics. He was only in it for the votes. It was Russell Train, a man genuinely committed to environmental reform, who convinced Nixon that he stood to gain a lot of good publicity. Among other things, this reminds us that Republicans, and conservatives in general, were among the earliest environmental reformers. In Oregon during the 1960s and 1970s, Governor Tom McCall, a Republican, pioneered some of the most far-reaching environmental legislation in US history. In West Germany, the well-known television personality and zoologist, Bernhard Grzimek, a Christian Democrat, was instrumental in raising environmental awareness and promoting international nature protection, especially in Africa's Serengeti. Herbert Gruhl, another German conservative, was among the founders of the Green Party. Many of these pioneers were marginalized once environmental reform became hitched to various social justice issues and a more radical politics, an association which makes environmentalism to this day seem like the preserve of the political left.

Flippen's thoughtful and well-researched article suggests tantalizing possibilities for future research on the impact of US environmental policy abroad. I recently heard the German historian, Karl Ditt, deliver a paper on the evolution of environmental reform in West Germany. Ditt emphasized the important role that American environmental reform played in kick-starting similar reforms in West Germany in the 1970s, and it seems likely that Train played an important role in this story. As Flippen depicts him, Train was the Johnny Appleseed of environmental reform, dropping seeds, which evidently sprouted, in numerous countries. Flippen shows us an important and unheralded side of US global influence: environmental reform as the flip side to consumerism. What we now need are scholars who can document the flip side of Flippen's story, tracing Train's influence on environmental policies in places such as Japan, Western Europe, and Russia.

Jacob Hamblin mines similar ground. Some of his findings, such as the Department of State directive to European embassies urging them to "exercise affirmative leadership" on environmental issues, strengthen Flippen's argument. However, Hamblin's study has a bleaker conclusion; for all their talk, the nations involved in international environmental issues, such as the London Dumping Convention, were mostly interested in placating public opinion at home rather than being genuinely concerned about the impact of dumping waste at sea. In other words, they were acting much like Richard Nixon. For the British in particular, the aim was to be able to continue a practice their scientists felt was perfectly safe and by far the most preferable method of waste disposal. It was not until the late 1970s, when Greenpeace began their high-profile actions protesting ocean dumping, that governments were finally forced to limit the activity. This reminds us of Akira Iriye's important work on the role played by non-state actors in the formation of global environmental policy. Groups such as Greenpeace were able, as Paul Wapner

noted, to threaten nation states with the "sting" of ecological sensibility."[3] By 1981, Greenpeace had attained observer status at the London Convention, thereby continually threatening participants with high profile "stings" should they renege on their stated commitments.

Anna-Katharina Wöbse's fine study of proto-environmental diplomacy shows us that NGOs played an influential role long before the arrival of groups such as the World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace. While I might quibble with some of her terminology, particularly the constant use of the word "environmentalism" to describe these early twentieth century efforts, I nonetheless fully concur with her argument that older organizations such as the RSPCA were vital forerunners of modern environmental NGOs. I also find myself saddened by how little some things have changed. The British shipping lobby and trade board's specious economic arguments against the installation of simple technology to filter oil that was flowing into the sea and killing bird and marine life are exactly like those we continue to hear from corporations and governments around the world today.

In his ambitious and sweeping piece, Thomas Robertson does a superb job of situating mid-twentieth century environmentalism in the context of the Cold War and US imperial ambitions. Influenced by Donald Worster's seminal *Nature's Economy*, Robertson attempts to move beyond narrow, empirically based conclusions, in addition searching for broader historical patterns and examining how a dominant cultural discourse, in this case, the idea of interconnection, can influence discourse and practice in multiple areas of life. The worldview that best describes this sense of interconnection, and which was influential among mid-twentieth century ecologists, was holism. Robertson briefly touches on the concept, but his argument about interconnection might be strengthened by a fuller exploration of its impact. Holistic philosophies have frequently been portrayed as a consequence of the disenchantment of modernity, and have therefore usually been located on the antimodern side of the modernist/antimodernist dichotomy. In the 1960s, holistic ecology picked up the antimodernist sentiments of John Muir and Aldo Leopold, raising critical questions about the costs of unfettered scientific and economic "progress" and calling for a more respectful, humble, and holistic view of nature and human beings' place within it. This brand of ecology merged easily with other discourses—such as Eastern religion, Native American spirituality, and the counterculture—that were critical of various aspects of modernity. It thereby proved to be a common denominator for dissenting groups of various political and cultural stripes. Paradoxically, it vested one of the prime forces of disenchantment—science—with a capacity for the reenchantment of nature.

On the whole, this is a very impressive set of articles. I will offer perhaps one final suggestion that I think more-or-less applies to all the authors, and to those embarking on similar work. As we write our narratives, it would be useful to describe, wherever

[3] Wapner, *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics* (Albany, 1996)

possible, the ecological worldview of various actors, be they governments, citizens or NGOs. What did they know about ecology and what did they think was important? What scientific paradigm were they working within and what sort of ecological knowledge or understanding did they possess? To what extent was their thinking guided by concepts like finitude and interconnection? In this way, we will be in a better position to compare the various "shades of green" that have characterized human attitudes toward nature, and how those attitudes have manifested themselves in diplomacy throughout the twentieth century.

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