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**Giles Scott-Smith. "Introduction: The Name Looms Large: The Legacies of Theodore Roosevelt,"** 635-638. DOI: 10.1080/09592290802564338.

**Serge Ricard. "Theodore Roosevelt: Imperialist or Global Strategist in the New Expansionist Age?"** 639-657. DOI: 10.1080/09592290802564379.

**William N. Tilchin. "For the Present and the Future: The Well-Conceived, Successful, and Farsighted Statecraft of President Theodore Roosevelt,"** 658-670. DOI: 10.1080/09592290802564387.

**Jeffrey A. Engel. "The Democratic Language of American Imperialism: Race, Order, and Theodore Roosevelt's Personifications of Foreign Policy Evil,"** 671-689. DOI: 10.1080/09592290802564437.

**Annick Cizel. "Nation-Building in the Philippines: Rooseveltian Statecraft for Imperial Modernization in an Emergent Transatlantic World Order,"** 690-711. DOI: 10.1080/09592290802564452.

**Carl Cavanagh Hodge. "A Whiff of Cordite: Theodore Roosevelt and the Transoceanic Naval Arms Race, 1897-1909,"** 712-731. DOI: 10.1080/09592290802564502.

**J. Simon Rofe. "'Under the Influence of Mahan': Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt and their Understanding of American National Interest,"** 732-745. DOI: 10.1080/09592290802564536.

**David G. Haglund. "Devant L'Empire: France and the Question of 'American Empire,' from Theodore Roosevelt to George W. Bush,"** 746-766. DOI: 10.1080/09592290802564577.

**M. Patrick Cullinane. "Invoking Teddy: The Inspiration of John McCain's Foreign Policy,"** 767-786. DOI: 10.1080/09592290802564635.

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Review by Ross A. Kennedy, Illinois State University

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**A**s Giles Scott-Smith notes in his introduction to this collection of essays marking the sesquicentennial of Theodore Roosevelt's birth, the twenty-sixth president of the United States is "a figure whose reputation seems to grow with time, however controversial some aspects of it may be" (635). Certainly most of the scholars contributing to this special edition of *\_Diplomacy and Statecraft\_* have a favorable view of the president. According to Serge Ricard, Roosevelt was "a master diplomatist, a brilliant geopolitician, and a wise peacemaker;" to William N. Tilchin, he "left behind an exemplary record" (640, 666). The other authors – Jeffrey A. Engel, Annick Cizel, Carl Cavanagh Hodge, J. Simon Rofe, David G. Haglund, and M. Patrick Cullinane – avoid such explicit praise for Roosevelt, but they offer no criticisms either. Focusing chiefly on Roosevelt's worldview and policies during his presidential years, these articles tend to avoid analyzing ambiguities in TR's approach to international relations, portraying the president instead as a successful, purposeful leader with a coherent program and the skills to act on it.

The scholars in this collection essentially agree on the basic ideas that structured Roosevelt's thinking about international politics. Tilchin sums them up effectively, arguing that they boiled down to three "precepts": a broad definition of U.S. interests encompassing any major development overseas; a faith in military preparedness as the best way for the U.S. to defend itself and uphold its interests; and a dedication to Anglo-American leadership "grounded in the belief that some nations and peoples have progressed beyond others with respect to their political culture and international conduct, and that the world is far better off if the most advanced nations are also the most powerful" (659). The authors' treatment of the specifics of the last idea – TR's perception of the world as a hierarchy of more or less "advanced" nations – is varied, however, revealing the difficulty of pinning down exactly how Roosevelt thought about this issue. Ricard contends that Roosevelt saw Russia and Japan as civilized states but not, apparently, Germany, as he leaves Germany off the list of powers he thinks TR considered fit for "civilizing duties" in less developed regions of the world (645). Tilchin, on the other hand, implies that Roosevelt did not consider Russia, Japan, or Germany to be civilized while Engel argues that he saw the Russians and the Japanese as racially inferior to Anglo-Saxons but "sufficiently civilized to maintain their own affairs" (678). As for Germany, Engel asserts that Roosevelt at one time identified it as close to the Anglo-Saxon level of civilization, but by World War I decided it was a despotism opposed to orderly progress. Each author sounds confident in describing what they believe to be a clear conception of the world, but, given their divergent accounts, one wonders if TR's hierarchy of civilized states simply represented a list of powers he supported or opposed at different times depending on American interests in a given situation.

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Concerned as they are with Roosevelt's legacy, several authors compare and contrast Roosevelt's statesmanship with Woodrow Wilson's, usually to the detriment of the latter. Ricard argues that the two presidents had "totally different philosophies of international relations," that Wilson, unlike Roosevelt, was an indecisive, obstinate leader, and that in all likelihood TR would have been "the more effective wartime and post-war diplomat of the two" (652). Tilchin likewise sees little in common in the statesmanship of the two, emphasizing that Wilson "was ambivalent about the precept of U.S. power, and devalued the Anglo-American partnership" (667). Engel, in contrast, argues that Wilson was very similar to Roosevelt in evaluating other governments primarily in terms of their ability to deliver orderly progress to their people. More broadly, Cizel implies that Roosevelt's policies in the Philippines reflected "the reform character of the Progressive Era," an ethos certainly shared by Wilson (691).

The issue of the degree of similarity between Roosevelt and Wilson is complex, and it can be approached in a variety of ways. One angle would involve assessing TR's views concerning reform of the international system, a project central to Wilsonianism. According to the articles in this collection, Roosevelt had little interest in international reform. Several authors emphasize his preoccupation with preserving a balance of power among the world's leading nations; Hodge and Rofe in particular note Roosevelt's affinity for the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan, a naval strategist absorbed in the workings of the existing system of power politics. In addition, Tilchin asserts that Roosevelt opposed submitting anything vital to international arbitration hearings, believing that on important issues "the United States must be free to act as it saw fit" (660). From these points, it would seem that Roosevelt believed that world politics neither could nor should be reformed, a stance that would put him sharply at odds with Wilson.

But TR's ideas about international reform were not as clear cut as these arguments suggest. After he left the presidency, and especially during and immediately after World War I, Roosevelt actively promoted his own schemes for what he called a "world league for the peace of righteousness."<sup>1</sup> Although these plans were more limited in scope than Wilson's League of Nations (as Ricard observes in discussing a version of one of them), they included collective promises to use force to uphold the league's rules. By the end of 1918, moreover, Roosevelt publicly approved of William Howard Taft's movement for a League to Enforce Peace, so long as the United States kept up its military preparedness. This position implicitly endorsed a far more sweeping program of collective security than the one embodied in Roosevelt's own proposals. In short, Roosevelt was not exactly an unambiguous rejectionist when it came to organized efforts to change the world's existing structure of power politics or to the theory of collective security that underlay them.

If Roosevelt's view of Wilson's program of international reform was more complex than the authors here argue, so too was his response to World War I. Mirroring the relative

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<sup>1</sup> Theodore Roosevelt, "Utopia or Hell," *Independent* 81 (4 January 1915), 13, 16.

lack of attention to TR's post-presidential years in the historiography on Roosevelt, the articles in this collection do not deal very much with the former president's recommended policies concerning the war. Ricard and Engel have the most to say on this subject, but their discussion is limited. Ricard emphasizes that Roosevelt and Wilson were "poles apart in their response to the European war," with TR "preoccupied with the necessary destruction of German power both in Europe and Asia" and "on the whole in tune with the Allied leaders" when it came to war-related issues (651-652). Engel, on the other hand, sees Roosevelt as "much like Wilson" in defining the war as a battle against the Kaiser's militaristic government rather than the German people (684). Indeed, according to Engel, Roosevelt, like Wilson, did not blame Germany's people for the war.

In this debate, Ricard has the better argument. Roosevelt did make a Wilsonian-like distinction between Germany's autocratic government and its people early in the war, but he altered his position as the conflict wore on. By 1917 he concluded that Germany's autocratic leaders had "completely debauched the German people" and that the vast majority of Germans, including those in the Social Democratic Party, "eagerly supported the German autocracy in its course of international robbery and murder." In large part because of his distrust of both the German government and the German masses, Roosevelt was convinced that "the surest way to make them keep the peace in the future is to punish them now."<sup>2</sup> Engel, then, is off-base in arguing that TR shared the view of the Germans that Wilson put forward in his War Message, where the president most strongly distinguished between the Germans and their leaders. At the same time, however, Ricard overdraws TR's opposition to Wilson's policies. He fails to note Roosevelt's approval of the armistice terms Wilson ultimately negotiated with Germany, for example, as well as his consistent desire, first stated early in the war, to leave Germany's European territory largely intact – a goal pursued by Wilson too.

Whatever disagreements one might have with some of the authors, however, this is an interesting and useful collection of essays on a subject vital to any understanding of American foreign relations since 1898. They make a strong case for the effectiveness of Roosevelt's statesmanship, provide a good overview of his most important strategic conceptions, and make suggestive points about the shadow he casts over the rest of the "American Century" and beyond. Any student of Roosevelt would benefit from reading them.

**Ross A. Kennedy** received his Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley. He has taught at the Johns Hopkins University-Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies and is an associate professor of history at Illinois State University. He is the author of *The Will to Believe: Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and America's Strategy for Peace and Security* (Kent State University Press,

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<sup>2</sup> Roosevelt, *The Great Adventure: Present Day Studies in American Nationalism* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918), 87, 77, 195.

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2009). Professor Kennedy is currently working on a book analyzing U.S. national security strategy from 1921 to 1941.

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—*Commissioned for H-Diplo by Diane N. Labrosse*