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**Mervyn O'Driscoll.** "Explosive Challenge: Diplomatic Triangles, the United Nations, and the Problem of French Nuclear Testing, 1959–1960," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 11:1 (Winter 2009): 28-56. DOI: 10.1162/jcws.2009.11.1.28. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2009.11.1.28> .

URL: <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reviews/PDF/AR229.pdf>Review by **Ralph Dietl, Queen's University Belfast***A Veiled Challenge. Anglo-French Nuclear Co-operation, 1959-1960.*

**M**ervyn O'Driscoll's *Explosive Challenge* offers a new scholarly contribution to the abounding literature on the pre-history of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the nuclear sharing debate within the Atlantic Alliance and the interdependence of Euro-Atlantic security issues and developments on the periphery.<sup>1</sup> O'Driscoll's main aim is to show that De Gaulle's contention that "les Anglo-saxons" purposefully "instigated global condemnation" of French nuclear testing (O'Driscoll, p.30) is invalid. In reality the Anglo-Saxons were trying anxiously "to minimize the national protests against France" (O'Driscoll, p.30). The United Kingdom in particular tried to counter criticism of French nuclear testing within the United Nations in order to pave the United Kingdom's entry into the European Communities.

O'Driscoll's research agenda thus promises to make an interesting contribution to the recent re-evaluation of the Euro-Atlantic and Cold War policies of the Macmillan

<sup>1</sup> Possible additional literature: Benjamin Greene, *Eisenhower, Science Advice and the Nuclear Test Ban Debate 1945–1963* (Stanford: SUP 2007); Barton C. Hacker, *Elements of Controversy: The Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation Safety in Nuclear Testing, 1947–1974* (Berkeley: UCP 1994); Jack H. Moll, *Atoms for Peace and War, 1953–1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission* (Berkeley: UCP 1989); Robert Divine, *Blowing in the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954–1960* (New York: OUP, 1978); Susanne Schrafstetter, *Die Dritte Atommacht. Britische Nichtverbreitungspolitik im Dienste der Statussicherung und der Deutschlandpolitik, 1952–1968* (München: Oldenbourg, 1999); Marilena Gala, *Il paradosso nucleare: Il Limited Test Ban Treaty comon primo passo verso la distensione* (Florence: Polistampa, 2002); Robert J. Watson, *History of the Office of Defense*, vol. IV: Into the Missile Age (Washington: DoD Historical Office, 1997); Lincoln Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Franklyn Griffiths, *Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament, 1954–1964* (Cambridge: MIT, 1966).

Administration.<sup>2</sup> The latter corrects the traditional interpretation of a concerted Anglo-American response to the Gaullist challenge to the Euro-Atlantic security architecture – as formulated in the seminal study of C. Pagedas.<sup>3</sup> O’Driscoll’s hypothesis that the national interests of the United Kingdom and the United States differed since the United Kingdom had started to prioritize regional, the United States global interests merits close attention (O’Driscoll, p. 31). Thus it is somewhat surprising that O’Driscoll’s framework subchapter on the nuclear triangle: United States, United Kingdom, France neglects key features of the independent diplomacy of HMG. This gap is due to a somewhat patchy “reconstruction” of the linkage policies in the multi-levelled Euro-Atlantic security architecture of the Cold War. The Atlantic partial system – and in particular the European subsystem – might have merited more attention in order to substantiate the structural constraints under which British diplomacy was labouring. Another weakness has to be addressed: the shift of focus from “secret” cabinet diplomacy to public diplomacy. The latter creates an analytical problem. Thus please allow me here to draw somewhat on my own research in the issue area of Euro-Atlantic defense relations<sup>4</sup> in order (1) to embed the nuclear question under scrutiny into the linkage policies in the multi-levelled security architecture of the chosen time period and (2) in order to evaluate the implied shift of focus from a national security to a global security agenda – namely to public diplomacy on global health issues. What is needed here is a clearer picture of the hierarchy of priorities in British foreign policy decision-making.

The key question to be evaluated here is the United Kingdom’s concept of and position in a global, regional and sub-regional nuclear order. Given the two interpretative schools outlined above – it has to be analyzed here whether the Macmillan Government envisaged the creation of a *Europe puissance* capable of surviving between the superpowers, or whether it embraced the idea of a trilateral nuclear directorate of the West thus stabilizing the bipolar Cold War system. In brief, did the Macmillan Government support bi- or trilateral nuclear sharing with France or did it defend “Anglo-Saxon” nuclear exceptionalism within the Alliance?

The point of departure for an analysis of the nuclear order is indeed the recreation of the Anglo-American special relationship in the year 1957.<sup>5</sup> The latter – according to O’Driscoll – forced the United Kingdom to a “strict non-proliferation policy towards third

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<sup>2</sup> Nigel Ashton, “Harold Macmillan and the Golden Days of Anglo-American Relations Revisited, 1957–1963,” *Diplomatic History*, 29,4 (2005), 691–723; Peter Mangold, *The Almost Impossible Ally. Harold Macmillan and Charles de Gaulle* (London: Tauris, 2006); Ralph Dietl, *Emanzipation und Kontrolle. Europa in der westlichen Sicherheitspolitik, 1948–1963*, 2 vols (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2006/07).

<sup>3</sup> Constantine Pagedas, *Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the French Problem, 1960–1963: A Troubled Partnership* (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

<sup>4</sup> Dietl, *Emanzipation und Kontrolle*, vol. 2, 17–112; Ralph Dietl, “Sole Master of Western Nuclear Strength? The United States, Western Europe and the Elusiveness of a European Defence Identity,” in Wilfried Loth (ed), *Europe, Cold War and Co-existence, 1953–1965* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 132–172.

<sup>5</sup> The executive agreement and other key documents on the re-creation of the nuclear Anglo-American special relationship are edited in: Ralph Dietl, *Dokumente zur Europäischen Sicherheitspolitik, 1948–1963* (Stuttgart: Steiner 2009).

countries.” (O’Driscoll, p.32). This evaluation is correct. Missing, however, is the U.S. rationale for the re-creation of the nuclear special relationship – an indispensable feature in order to grasp the U.S. architectural concept. It was the aim of the Eisenhower Administration (1) to embrace the United Kingdom and (2) to boost Continental European integration. Both policies served one major purpose, namely to forestall the re-emergence of a *Europe puissance* project formed around a Franco-British *entente* – a concept underlying the challenge to the U.S. global and regional order in the crisis year 1956.<sup>6</sup> The bilateral Anglo-American executive agreements of 1957<sup>7</sup> and the one sided revision of the U.S. *Atomic Energy Act* in 1958<sup>8</sup> enabled the United Kingdom (1) to maintain her nuclear status even without testing (O’Driscoll, p. 34), but (2) – and this is the important element – hindered the United Kingdom’s ability to utilize the “nuclear” for her European policies, thus easing Anglo-American alignment on European, Atlantic and Cold War policies. The re-creation of the nuclear special relationship thus had a clear-cut structural function.

The British and U.S. concepts of a Euro-Atlantic nuclear order nevertheless remained incompatible, due to (1) HMG’s support for de Gaulle’s vision of a trilateral global directorate of 1958 and (2) the gradual emergence in 1959/60 of an Anglo-French concept for a future European order. Both projects were pursued either independently or interdependently, as the first project served in British long-term planning as a stepping stone to establish the latter. Thus both projects were not necessarily contradictory. Trilateralism aimed at the formation of a *Western Atomic Standing Group* guaranteeing a common Anglo-American-French control over the Western deterrent forces. A transformation of NATO in line with the French concept of Trilateralism would allow France (1) to give up her independent nuclear program and (2) to adhere to a Test-Stop agreement.<sup>9</sup> Nuclear sharing among the “Big Three” would also open an avenue for

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<sup>6</sup> Ralph Dietl, “Suez 1956: A European Intervention?” in *Journal of Contemporary History* 43 (2008), 259–278.

<sup>7</sup> Dietl, *Emanzipation und Kontrolle*, vol 1, 391–395, 425–431.

<sup>8</sup> “The PM also expected de Gaulle to ask for an improved nuclear position of France. The Secretary expected that this will pose very difficult questions for us especially since the Joint Congressional Committee report is loaded in favor of the UK and against France. He predicted that it would be ‘extremely difficult’ to obtain Congressional approval for a bilateral agreement with France of the type we are working out with the UK.” Memorandum of Conversation, Anglo-American Relations with General de Gaulle’s Government, 9 Jun 1958, DDEL, DDE, International Series, box 24, Macmillan-President 6/1/58 to 9/30/58 (7); “Admiral Strauss remarked that the report of the Joint Committee was almost embarrassing in that it favored the UK so much in contrast to other countries.”, Memorandum of Conversation, U.S.-UK Agreement on Nuclear Weapons, 9 Jun 1958, *ibid*.

<sup>9</sup> “General de Gaulle said France’s difficulty was that at present she had no share in this possession. If, by some means or another, France could be in possession of atomic weapons this year, thereafter the question of suspending tests would look very different from her point of view. At present she was excluded from the crucial decision on the use of these weapons, which had to be taken at the summit of the alliance, namely in Washington. The question of suspending tests was all the more difficult for France in that she was within a few months of having her own atomic weapons. So at present France could not agree to a suspension of tests.” Record of a Visit of Prime Minister Macmillan and Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd to

Anglo-French cooperation in the formation of a *Europe puissance*. In other words an extension of the special relationship would free the United Kingdom from the strictures on nuclear sharing imposed by the executive agreement of 1957 and would thus enable Anglo-French nuclear co-operation as a pre-requisite for the formation of a *Europe puissance*. The British were aware that any rejection of Trilateralism would force France to (1) continue her independent nuclear program, to (2) reject any test stop agreement, to (3) seek Continental technological assistance and (4) to deconstruct NATO.<sup>10</sup> The United Kingdom thus supported the concept of Trilateralism, in order to keep an avenue open for an Anglo-French concept of Europe.<sup>11</sup>

The U.S. rejection of nuclear Trilateralism<sup>12</sup> and the U.S. pronouncement of a moratorium on nuclear testing immediately after the completion of the British “grapple test series” dampened the prospect of an Anglo-French alignment<sup>13</sup>, but offered France an opportunity to align the Continent with French policies on nuclear testing. France rejected adherence to any future test stop agreement as long as the Continent had not obtained the technological data that the United Kingdom obtained under the revised U.S. *Atomic Energy Act*. France was gradually building up the Continent, i.e. the Community of the Six, as a pressure group to (1) obtain equality of status with the “Anglo-Saxons” in a transformed NATO or (2) to force the United Kingdom to align herself with a *Europe*

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Paris 29/30 Jun 1958, PREM 11/2326, TNAUK; General de Gaulle’s Plan for Reorganizing the Western Alliance. Memorandum by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, 30 Sep 1958, FO 371/137820 TNAUK.

<sup>10</sup> “Presumably if the Americans and ourselves reject the one essential feature of the General’s proposal he will conclude that the ‘Anglo-Saxons’ are resolutely opposed to any tripartite consultations ...some may hold that the General is going neutralist. ...This may be the eventual outcome but it may not happen, I suggest, before he has tried another course. This other course is to organize ‘Europe’, in conjunction with the German chancellor, against the ‘Anglo-Saxons’.” Sir Gladwyn Jebb-Foreign Office, 18 Oct 1958, FO 371/137822 TNAUK.

<sup>11</sup> “...if he were completely snubbed over his memorandum [De Gaulle’s September memorandum on Trilateralism], there was little chance of him being statesmanlike over the free trade area. Therefore, we strongly favoured some kind of tripartite discussion with the French on the topics raised in the General’s memorandum,” Record of Part of Conversation between the Secretary of State and Mr. Dulles at Brize Norton Airfield on 19 Oct 1958, FO 371/137822 TNAUK.; “I [Jebb] then said that I had, however, an oral communication to make, and I read him [de Gaulle] our statement based on my instructions, the essential point of which was that ... Her Majesty’s Government were very much in favour of the proposed tripartite talks at Ambassadorial level, provided only of course that they were so organized as to cause the minimum embarrassment to our Allies ...the General asked for a copy of our statement, but I would not give it to him. He then asked whether I would make it orally to M. Couve de Murville... which I gladly agreed to do.” Sir Gladwyn Jebb- Foreign Office, 21 Oct 1958, FO 371/137822 TNAUK.

<sup>12</sup> “I [Roberts] than asked Larry Norstad [SACEUR] about the French atomic programme. He told me at once there was no question of the United States making any atomic defence information available to France. This has been the U.S. position before de General de Gaulle came to power and Congressional reluctance to entrust France with such information was now even stronger...If the French chose to go ahead on their own, no-one could stop them but it would be an extremely costly and futile activity...” Sir Frank Roberts to Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, 18 Jun 1958, FO 371/137819 TNAUK.

<sup>13</sup> John Baylis, *Ambiguity and Deterrence. British Nuclear Strategy 1954-1964* (Oxford: OUP, 1995).

*puissance* now first and foremost to be constructed around a Franco-German core.<sup>14</sup> The French bargaining position was further enhanced by the outbreak of the Second Berlin Crisis in 1958 and the Rapacki Plan for an all-European security architecture. The latter envisaged a “de-nuclearization” of Central Europe. U.S. support for a test-stop agreement, whereby no nuclear power would be allowed to support Non Nuclear Weapons States with a transfer of nuclear data – the very principle governing (a) the despised Anglo-American executive agreement of 1957 and (b) the future Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 – made France finally shift priorities towards the second option: namely the construction of a Continental Europe.<sup>15</sup> The “continental bloc” was to serve France as a bargaining chip to force the United Kingdom to align herself with the Continent in the formation of a *Europe puissance*.

France and the Federal Republic started to harmonize their foreign policies in Euro-Atlantic affairs first and foremost to forestall the “de-nuclearization” of the Federal Republic or of Central Europe and thus to establish a platform for a European construction with a nuclear capability – either through nuclear sharing within NATO or a European Political Union. Both countries furthermore supported a “package deal” for negotiations with the Soviet Union. The package linked any settlement of the Berlin and German question with a breakthrough in the UN negotiations on *general* disarmament. A connection of a settlement of the German question with measures for *regional* disarmament was anathema to de Gaulle and Adenauer. The former procedure – i.e. general disarmament – would not only forestall a discriminatory regime for Central or Continental Europe, but enhance Europe’s relative position in the world. France and the Federal Republic thus followed a clear relative gains calculus.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> “... the French had been urging the Italians to agree to a strengthening of political consultation among the Six as a substitute for political consultation within NATO which the French had implied would soon break down. ...Baron Bentinck...made it pretty clear that the authorities in the Hague regarded this Franco-Italian move as largely inspired by General de Gaulle in a further attempt to assert himself, vis-à-vis the Anglo-Saxons and that they were also very suspicious of the line the Germans were taking in this matter.” Sir Frank Roberts-FO, 2 Jul 1959, FO 371/146265 TNAUK.

<sup>15</sup> “Specifically the U.S. agreed with those security measures in Annex A upon which there was general agreement in the Working Group (i.e. in Stage I: renunciation of the use of force and of giving aid to aggressors, declaration on non-transfer of nuclear weapons into custody of countries comprising the Special Security Area; in Stage II: exchange of information on military forces in the Special Security Area; in Stage III: establishment of ceilings on indigenous and non-indigenous forces in the Special Security Area ... An effective inspected prohibition on production by countries within the Special Security Area (all of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland and possibly Hungary) of chemical, bacteriological and nuclear weapons should be instituted in Stage II ... The French will generally oppose the institution of measures involving inspection within any area of Europe ... The French view is primarily based on their belief that inspection will lead the U.S. to withdraw from the inspected area their most modern weapons, thus setting in motion a process leading to military neutralization followed by political neutralization.” Tripartite/Quadripartite Meeting, Washington, Mar 31–1 Apr, 1959, DDEL, WHO, National Security Council Staff, Security Council Staff Papers, 1948–1961, Executive Secretary’s Subject File Series, box 19 (Tri-Quadripartite Meetings (1)); M. Alphand à M. Couve de Murville, 21 Nov 1958, DDF 1958 II, no. 352.

<sup>16</sup> “...the negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva concerning nuclear tests and their prohibition can make sense only if pursued under the aspect of a world relaxation of tensions. ...It seems to me necessary to resume, within the framework of the United Nations, the disarmament negotiations .... And

A relative gains calculus also dominated the British approach to the European sub-, the Atlantic partial- and the Cold War system. The United Kingdom was the first European power to challenge U.S. prerogatives in East-West relations. Macmillan's "solitary pilgrimage" to Moscow furthermore re-opened the option of a Franco-British alignment. The Anglo-Soviet *Communiqué* of 3 March 1959 envisaged (1) the abolition of nuclear weapons, (2) the signing of a test stop agreement and (3) an all-European security architecture with arms limitations and a control and inspection system.<sup>17</sup> The somewhat cold reception in France and Germany of the project changed after the Anglo-French Talks of March 1959 – mainly due to the fact that Harold Macmillan supported arms control measures in a "zone allant de l'Oural à l'Atlantique."<sup>18</sup> A geographically thus defined European security system re-opened the perspective to co-create a Europe under Anglo-French leadership. Such a wider concept would safeguard France from being submerged into a discriminatory Continental security grouping and thus ease the formation of a *Europe puissance* capable of surviving between the super-powers. Another facet is worth mentioning: the United Kingdom now started to prioritize an All-European security architecture over a test-stop agreement. The United Kingdom was interested in creating a window of opportunity for France to proceed with her national nuclear programme in order to establish an Anglo-French regional hegemony in the future order of Europe. The Eisenhower Administration viewed the re-emergence of an Anglo-French *entente cordiale* with unease. Washington feared being confronted with an Anglo-French package deal that linked NATO reform, European integration and East-West negotiations in order to establish an Anglo-French regional hegemony on the Old Continent.<sup>19</sup>

The mission of Field Marshall Montgomery of Alamein to Moscow in April 1959 further complicated measures. The Soviet Union's preference for the creation of a "Sonder-sicherheitszone" – barring strategic nuclear weapons from being deployed in Central Europe – seemed acceptable to the Western European powers, who shared Soviet discomfort about a further nuclearization of the Bundeswehr – in line with the planning

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to link them up with the Soviet Russian move concerning Berlin and Germany ...In an atmosphere of relaxation ... the reunification of Germany, could be negotiated about with some prospect of success." Adenauer-J.F. Dulles, 30 Jan 1959, DDEL, DDE, Papers of the President of the United States 1953–1961 (Ann Whitman File), International Series, box 15, Adenauer 1959 (5); .M. François Seydoux à M. Couve de Murville, 20 Jan 1959, DDF 1959 I, no. 37; "[De Gaulle:] Our two countries (Germany and France) must always remain united. Together we can be the salvation of Europe." Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, 5 Mar 1959, FRUS 1958–1960 VIII, pp.425ff.

<sup>17</sup> Dietl, *Emanzipation und Kontrolle*, vol 2, 51

<sup>18</sup> Compte Rendus des Entretiens Franco-Britanniques de Paris, 9–10 Mar 1959, M. Couve de Murville à M. François Seydoux, 11 Mar 1959, DDF 1959 I, nos 146, 147; "In the Chancellor's view, proposals for a controlled demilitarized zone which did not stretch from the Urals to the Atlantic but included only Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany were a military absurdity, destructive of NATO and discriminatory to Germany. The Chancellor could never agree to such an arrangement." Memorandum of Conversation, Eisenhower-Adenauer, 27 August, 1959, DDEL, WHO, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Trips and Meetings, box 8, DDE Trip to Europe, Memoranda of Conversation (1).

<sup>19</sup> Dietl, *Emanzipation und Kontrolle*, vol 2, 57f.

of the SACEUR of NATO.<sup>20</sup> France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union rejected the formation of a strategic NATO Nuclear Force – although for different reasons. The U.S. now felt a need for bloc consolidation. The U.S. intended to forestall the emergence of a European Europe that would challenge U.S. preferences for a Continental European construction & NATO Nuclear Forces. Eisenhower invited Khrushchev for bilateral U.S.-SU summit talks to Camp David – thus virtually disconnecting the Europeans from further East-West negotiations. In a parallel process the U.S. started to push for the creation of a Continental European Political Union, negotiated an accord with the FRG about the stationing of IRBMs on German territory and developed the so-called *Monnet sequence*, which connects a supranational European Political Union with a multilateral NATO Nuclear Force. The Anglo-French alignment was thus balanced through an U.S.-Italian and U.S.-German alignment.<sup>21</sup>

It was the “usurpation” of the East-West negotiations by the Eisenhower Administration after Camp David and the parallel drive towards establishing a multilateral NATO Nuclear Force that made the Macmillan Government side openly with France in the United Nations debate on French nuclear testing – the key topic of O’Driscoll’s thesis.<sup>22</sup> The United Kingdom was seeking a nuclear France as a partner (1) to forestall the formation of multilateral NATO Nuclear Forces and thus (2) to preserve the option of a co-creation of a *Europe puissance* under Anglo-French leadership. Franco-British negotiations of November 1959 led to a far-reaching co-ordination of the foreign policies of both countries in order to co-construct a *Europe puissance* and thus to prepare the Old Continent for the future disengagement of the United States from Europe without having to fear a German regional hegemony.<sup>23</sup> The Macmillan Government now even toyed with

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<sup>20</sup> “Selwyn Lloyd interjected that in discussing this general concept with Gromyko in Moscow, Gromyko had made no demand that nuclear weapons be barred in Germany but asked Lloyd whether it would be possible to draw a distinction in such a zone between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Lloyd said that he gave Gromyko no direct response.” Memorandum of Conversation, President-Prime Minister, European Security, 21 March 1959, DDEL, DDE, International Series, box 24, Macmillan (1 Oct 1958-20 Mar 1959 (1)); Dietl, *Emanzipation und Kontrolle*, vol 2, 59; “Das Gespräch konzentrierte sich dann auf das deutsch-englische Verhältnis. Ich [Blankenhorn] überbrachte ihm [Adenauer] die Klagen über das völlig unbegründete Misstrauen des Kanzlers gegenüber Macmillan ....Der Kanzler bestätigte mir dieses Misstrauen und begründete es mit der Haltung Macmillans in Moskau und den Vorschlägen der britischen Regierung ...” Blankenhorn Tagebuch, 2 Jun 1959, BA, NL *Blankenhorn*, Bd. 98b.

<sup>21</sup> “For example, perhaps there is a middle ground between NATO control and national control. What about Community of Six control – no decision to use the IRBMs except by unanimous consent of the 6 nations? Such an offer would really make de Gaulle sweat. A proposal to make the EEC a political-military entity with respect to nuclear weapons systems has many possibilities...” Robert E. Kranich-Robert Magill, 3 Jul 1959, NARA RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of European Regional Affairs, Records of the NATO Advisor 1957-1961, box 2 (Production of IRBM in Europe).

<sup>22</sup> Rapport de la Direction des Nations Unies et Organisation internationales sur la XIVe Session de L’Assemblée Général des Nations Unies, New York 15 Sep-13 Déc, DDF 1959 II, no. 279

<sup>23</sup> Conversations Franco-Britanniques de Paris, 11-12 Nov 1959, DDF 1959 II, no. 224; “Le gouvernement français...continue à attacher une grande importance au rôle que le Grande-Bretagne doit jouer en Europe et il est tout disposé à faciliter une reprise des contacts politiques au sein de l’UEO ...” Consultations politiques à Six, 21 Nov 1959, DDF 1959 II, no. 238.

Anglo-French nuclear co-operation. Selwyn Lloyd used the successful French nuclear test in Reggane to advise Prime Minister Macmillan to revive the Foreign Secretary's draft Cabinet paper of December 1956. The latter envisaged the establishment of a WEU nuclear force.<sup>24</sup> On 16 February 1960 French Ambassador Chauvel requested a revival and further institutionalization of Anglo-French defense co-operation. The latter issue featured prominently in the Anglo-French summit talks of 12–13 March 1960 where Macmillan and de Gaulle discussed a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals under Anglo-French leadership. The latter necessitated Anglo-French co-operation in nuclear arms and delivery systems. The British Secretary of Defence Harold Watkinson, Chief of the Defense Staff Lord Mountbatten and Secretary of Aviation Duncan Sandys were thus asked by Macmillan to liaise with their French counterparts to analyse options for a bilateral construction of nuclear delivery systems.<sup>25</sup>

Given the stakes for the future standing of the United Kingdom in a future global and regional nuclear order, the United Kingdom's own vital interest demanded it to discard (1) the anti-nuclear movement and (2) the protests of the non-aligned states against French nuclear testing. Given the importance of Franco-British negotiations in late 1959/early 1960 it is only too understandable that the Foreign Office discarded the policy preference expressed in the Colonial and Commonwealth Office (O'Driscoll, p. 40). The occasional expressions of sympathy for a global security agenda were nothing else but a matter of public diplomacy necessary for (1) domestic consumption, (2) Commonwealth relations and (3) the appeasement of the United States – whose European policies were challenged by the re-emerging Franco-British co-operation.

Let me conclude with some remarks about O'Driscoll's thesis. The assumed "basic split" (O'Driscoll, p. 36) between the "Anglo-Saxons" on the one hand and France on the other did not exist – since the United Kingdom tried to emancipate herself from the strictures imposed on her by the executive agreement of 1957 in nuclear sharing. It is also doubtful whether HMG really preferred French adherence to a test suspension or test-stop. The very fact that "British" officials (in the United Nations) expressed concerns should not be overestimated. (O'Driscoll, p. 37) Either these British officials were not informed about the secret defense links of HMG with France – which is likely – or Britain's public diplomacy served to deceive the public in order to guard the secret bilateral negotiations under the veil of a global security agenda. The latter was surely necessary in order not to alarm the United States unduly and thus to torpedo an attempt to disconnect the United Kingdom from an exclusive embrace by the United States. Any step beyond the diversionary British resolution might have complicated (1) East-West contacts, (2) European policies and (3) relations with the Commonwealth countries even further.

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<sup>24</sup> Selwyn Lloyd to Prime Minister, 15 Feb 1960, PREM 11/2998, TNAUK. For documentation on the draft cabinet paper – see Dietl, *Dokumente zur Europäischen Sicherheitspolitik, 1948–1963* (Stuttgart: Steiner 2009), Chapter: WEU Grand Design; . Dietl, *Emancipation und Kontrolle*, vol 2, pp.107–110.

<sup>25</sup> Entretiens du Général de Gaulle et de M. Macmillan, 13 Mar 1960, DDF 1960 I, no. 109; M. Chauvel à M. Couve de Murville, 24 Mar 1960, DDF 1960 I, no 131; P. de Zulueta, Memor on Rambouillet Talks, 14 Mar 1960, PREM 11/2998 TNAUK.

If we can discern a basic split in late 1959/early 1960 in the cabinet policies of the nuclear triangle France, the United Kingdom and the United States, it would be a split between the European powers on the one hand and the United States on the other. Having analyzed the cabinet policies in more depths it seems even less likely that the “Anglo-Saxons” stoked the Anti-French outcry over French nuclear testing. But neither O’Driscoll – nor the survey of Anglo-French diplomacy offered in this commentary – does offer any proof that the “Anglo-Saxons” either did or did not stoke an outcry against French nuclear testing. No paper-trail is offered as supporting evidence. What is offered are possible rationales – or correlations between cabinet diplomacy and public diplomacy. Isn’t it imaginable, and even likely, that a government is pursuing a public diplomacy as a cover for secret negotiations. Criticism of French nuclear testing might have been instigated by the governments of the “Anglo-Saxons” – though for various and even contrasting reasons. Or the criticism might have been instigated by British and/or American societal groups who were utterly unaware of their governments’ policies. Finally, Charles de Gaulle might highlight in his *Memoirs* “Anglo-Saxon” opposition to French nuclear testing either (1) in order not to reveal the described Anglo-French defense contacts in a time period of Anglo-French frictions – since Anglo-French relations took another turn before the publication of the memoirs – or (2) for purely domestic consumption and party political calculus. In brief, the connection between public diplomacy and cabinet policies is not analyzed by O’Driscoll. Thus there exists a kind of a level of analysis problem – since only one level in this – let me say – “two level game” is analyzed by O’Driscoll.

A last point: the author of this commentary/review totally concurs with O’Driscoll’s insight that issue linkages are frequently overlooked by public opinion. Some of the linkages were overlooked by O’Driscoll himself. Thus a certain tension has been created between the introduction and the conclusion of the article on the one hand and the main body of the article on the other. The main body of the text follows a traditional route of Anglo-American diplomacy facing the Gaullist challenge. The intro and the conclusion by contrast highlight the “revisionist” or “new approach” of a distinct Anglo-French agenda in European and Alliance affairs. Thus the author took the liberty in his commentary to complement and redirect O’Driscoll’s argument by further highlighting some of the key ambiguities of Anglo-American and Anglo-French bilateralisms within the multi-leveled security architecture. The latter ambiguities were due to conflicting U.S., French and UK concepts of the United Kingdom’s position in the future nuclear order: global, regional and sub-regional – and structural constraints. Finally, the reviewer has tried to establish a clearer hierarchy of priorities – clearly relegating the concerns of the non-aligned into the category of issues of non-vital importance. O’Driscoll’s key hypothesis that regional i.e., European concerns triumphed in the United Kingdom over global issues is thus supported. Whether the U.S. prioritized global issues over regional matters, however, remains to be debated. The U.S. seemed to use global discontent with French nuclear testing to a much larger extent to foster the U.S. concept of Europe: a concept that guaranteed the U.S. a nuclear regional hegemony in Europe.

## H-Diplo Article Review

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