



## **Comments on Panel 3**

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**Comments on Panel 3: Allende & the Chilean Coup of 1973**  
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General:

All three very well written and documented. Impressive archival work, interviews w/ principals (esp. THarmer). But certain subject matter was much more appealing to me, as a political scientist more interested in trends and patterns than detailed case studies, than other. Hence the following order of preference on my part.

Lubna Qureshi, Cal Berkeley. – 24p., 53 fn. on “Nixon, Kissinger, & the Overthrow of Chile”

My favorite of the three. If you are inclined to conspiratorial theories of history, this paper will provide you with all the substantiating evidence needed to confirm the worst suspicions you might ever have had re Nixon/Kissinger and the overthrow of the Allende regime.

(1-2) – K. to Viaux & Valenzuela in '70, forecasting future help. (CIA memcom w/ K.).

(2-3) – Great in 1970s signaling for '71,2,3? like to VN generals in '63. You wonder what took them so long to act.

(3-8) – Good on US CW dominoes mentality (still) in 1970 (WhiteWash Years), despite Amb.Korry, Vaky, Frei, even Helms, views re Soviets NOT wanting another ruble drain. Good on K “covert war” v. Rogers & DOS judgment (like IQ-intell.fight)\*. Warriors in ascendancy: esp. Kiss.Nix. fear of successful example of alternative ideological system.

(8-13) – Aside on ITT link, Justice’s anti-trust suit, '72 convention underwrite. Good on other companies ready to participate in econ.strangulation, fomenting of internal unrest. Good ITT internal memo sources.

(13-14) – Again on NSAdvisor distrust of DOS, even of CIA; wanted war-hawk control of intell. like Rummy yrs. later.\*

\*These flash aheads indicate nothing new under the sun; worth of history study.\*

(14-6) – 2<sup>nd</sup> MNC aside, on Pepsico link. Again, dominoes, successful natlizatn.example fears. Nixon lawfirm client like Guat.'54. Kendall feared global, not just regional, dominoes. Good cites (NSArchives, Pepsi Annual Reports, 1980s *Veil!*). on \$10 mill. to make economy scream

(16) – Good on *Times* obit of Korry still covering up Track I,II involvement. Good NSC detail on military-to-military ties (a la Indonesia, Mid-East today\*).

(17-20) – In sum, due to n=5 corporate investmts to protect + Nixon ethnocentric prejudice vs. Latins going back to 1950s spittle; but preferred to blame Soviets in public. (Great riotous Nixon tapes cites). And how détente did not apply to our regnl.hegemon area (or theirs), or in 3W either, apparently, only on direct Super Power matters.

(20-24) – Kiss/Metternich on order > justice. As defn. of (Great Power) legitimacy. Good use of Hersh on Kiss. “nothing important can come from the South” lashing of FM Valdes, 6/69. Good on Allende “legendary” 12/72 UN address, quoting Jefferson on “merchants w/ no ties to the soil, only interest in profit”). Conclusion on no détente w/in regional empire.

Also, style: Track II mentioned on p.12 before p.16; Ambrose in n.19 before n.40.

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Tanya Harmer, LSE, 45p, 190 fn. on “Cuba & the Chile Coup”

The longest, and probable the best (highest quality) paper. Author seems more a Cuba expert than a Chile one (tho this is not true; body of her Diss. is on Chile, this is just one chapter, worthy of publication)

VG on the multifacetedness of Cuba’s relations with various left groups in LAm., Chile. Great day-to-day story details, but so many (so long) the main points (theses) sometimes seem to get lost.

Seems to be saying that Cuba role was really quite modest (so why write about it at such length? (R/never been done before, a real service). To extent it is over-emphasized in US (& by Kissinger/Nixon) as reason for hostile action, and in Chile by Allende’s opponents,.... This was understood as provocative by Allende & his Pop.Unity Govt, (& esp. by Cuba itself, p.12) and thus all local parties did their best to tamp down the salience of Cuban presence, still to no avail.

Re 2-page abstract: Cuba role still hazily understood despite all the detail here; seems pretty modest (other than being realistic about the coming counter-rev. & preparing for it.).

Chile military on Nixon advisor (V.Walters) re “mortal struggle” “shape of future of world” [vs. Sen. Frank Church: dagger pointed at...Antarctica!]. Cuba only, not USSR involved. But Cuba constrained by Allende and his faith in his constitutional path.

Re 4 broad questions: 1. Cubans more prescient, less naïve than Allende. 2. story of 9/11 @ the Cuban embassy; 3. Junta’s antipathy/fear of Cuban presence described, not explained why such paranoia (stoked by US?-see above par.). 4. An “internatl. event” because the Chile Army’s mindset made it so.

Intro. (1-4)

Cuban Celebrations & Invitations to Struggle (4-18) – I gained greater respect for Castro (insights etc.) after reading this section (spent 25 days there to watch). Seemed he understood Chile better than Allende. Compared it/him to Goulart p. 16. Prescient.

“He was Pres. of Chile & we had to Respect him” (18-30) – Deteriorating situation up to 9/11/73. p.23: Castro had faith in people, Allende in constitution. 1972 quote on too idealistic Allende: no civil war because Chilean co-existence/humanity w/b affected for

generations” (p.25). Wonder, if he had opportunity to re-think, whether he would judge his path worth the 16 yr Pinochet reign of terror? In short, Cubans had a better understanding of situation than Allende by Su’73 (p.28). US didn’t know until 9/8 (p.29). (So not as involved as Lubna paper might lead you to believe, except for planting of seeds.)

Cuba’s 9/11 (30-9) – See above on too many details, no point really (tho fascinating). Ends by saying Moscow, more than Havana, accepted region as Washington’s sphere (p.38). Also Lubna point.

Conseqs. of the Coup (39-43) – Cuba focused more on state-to-state relations; and on Africa.

Conclusion (43-5) – Cuba FP always pragmatic (Jorge Dominguez), not dogmatic.

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Gert Boel, Ghent U., 21p, 49 fn. on “Alliance f. Progress Modernization: JFK/LBJ & Chile”

Shortest paper, least significant subject matter (in my opinion), but worth studying/reading if you are in to theories of foreign aid, and naively believe the point of it is to bring about economic development, and not as a tool for hegemony or other grossly political goals.

i.e., Did the “deciders” – i.e., JFK and LBJ, really believe (even aware of) the modernization theory of Walt Whitman Rostow that Alliance for Progress was based upon? Especially relevant to be suspicious of Rostow after he moved on to LBJ admin. & became one of the chief defenders of the VN War, precisely on the basis of its relationship to modernization theory, bending his theory as needed to justify the increasingly unjustifiable VN-War policies of Johnson. (NB. Panel 31 Rostow as Rasputin)

Paper good on nostalgia w/r/t the beliefs of FDR center-left liberals in early 1960s, actually trying to change social stratification in foreign countries (as well as in US). This dream was definitely gone by middle of decade, perhaps just naturally as power moved from JFK to LBJ, but especially destroyed by VN and the people who surrounded LBJ vs. old New Frontiersmen who departed (like Bowles, Galbraith, Schlesinger, Sorensen, RFK, (or died, AES)) vs. ones who stayed on (Rostow, Bundy, Rusk): i.e., FDR/JFK always presided over a rickety coalition as far as its left flank was concerned. The latter only had a brief moment on the scene, after 1961 (when AID, and ACDA were created), but their policies were never accepted “US” policy by the mainstream of US politics, even mainstream of Democratic Party, only by a few fringe guys (see above list and EARLY Rostow, soon dropped).

This trend back toward the center-right of the political spectrum is especially seen in the FP of LBJ, even in areas other than VN. If I might engage in a bit of promotion for my book, *American Adventurism Abroad*, I would draw attention to Ch. 3 on Kennedy

Johnson, and the cases of the Congo, Brazil, Dom. Rep., and Indonesia, in all of which Johnson's policy was considerably more militarized than that of Kennedy. Indeed, the military-to-military ties, in aid and other venues, foreshadowed a modality that was developed in subsequent decades esp. under Reagan and even Clinton, and assumed explicit ideological underpinnings in the grab for DOD power over intelligence and all other aspects of foreign policy under GWBush, Rumsfeld, and the WoT rubric.

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