



Mead, Addams, Balch: feminism,
pragmatism, and the vicissitudes of
liberal internationalism

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This paper is a small part of the larger enterprise of trying to make sense of the experience of liberal intellectuals and activists during a war that divided them along numerous axes, fracturing the tentative unity of progressives between 1898 and 1917. I look here at a variation of the famous Randolph Bourne-John Dewey debate of 1917-18, where two pragmatists fought over the implications of pragmatic social theory applied to war. In this instance, I am looking at three people whose thinking intersected in Chicago in the 1890s and early 1900s, whose initial approach to the question of patriotism shared common pragmatist assumptions, and yet who ultimately divided on what a pragmatic social theory meant for nationalism and war in 1917.¹

¹ I should offer a word on pragmatism itself. Although Pragmatism is mostly associated with Americans Charles Sander Peirce, William James and John Dewey, it emerged from a number of post-Darwinian challenges to both idealism and rationalism. As James articulated it, pragmatism argued that "truth" was contingent on human experience rather than abstract principles and categories. Philosophy's dream of providing an intellectual mirror in the mind of nature (reality) was a dangerous fiction that led nowhere, pragmatists argued. Ideas are essentially intentions of human desire, and they *produce* the world rather than reflect it, in so far as these ideas provide some return. Pragmatists replace abstract truth with the word "experience," which translates roughly into our modern term "culture." The world is thus constantly in the making by collective human action. In practice, this also means that the best ideas, as products of social interaction, are dependent

The difference here, of course, has to do with feminism, since two of the three were also feminist internationalists who carried with them certain ideas about what "socialized democracy" meant in international practice. The lone male of this trio, George Herbert Mead, is usually considered a feminist himself, certainly a great friend and teacher of a number of pragmatic feminists, such as Jessie Taft, but by 1918, he too had succumbed to the seductions of liberal war.² Was there a difference, then, between feminist interpretations of pragmatism and those of mentors like Mead, that led one group toward pacifism and another toward military internationalism.

At its heart, all three thinkers explored the problem of patriotism in an increasingly interdependent world, in which nationalism, and the extraordinary demands placed by the war state on the lives of its citizens, seemed increasingly out of step with the evolving culture of globalism, commerce,

on maximizing the amount of human experience at play in the production of ideas. Pragmatism was therefore politically committed to radical democratic openness and to anti-racial theories cultural pluralism. It saw human identity as plastic, evolving through collaborative activity, and never arriving at a final place. The role of the pragmatist was to keep the experiment going through a wider and wider democratic sphere. Louis Menand, *The metaphysical club* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2001); H.O. Mounce, *The two pragmatisms: from Peirce to Rorty* (London: Routledge, 1997); David Hollinger, "The problem of pragmatism in American history," *The Journal of American History* 67 (June 1980); Eric MacGilvray, "Experience as experiment: some consequences of pragmatism for democratic theory," *American Journal of Political Science* 43, 2 (April 1999); James Kloppenberg, "Pragmatism: an old name for some new ways of thinking?" in Morris Dickstein, ed., *The revival of pragmatism: new essays on social thought, law, and culture* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 83-127.

² Mitchell Aboulafia, "Was George Herbert Mead a feminist?" *Hypatia* 8, 2 (Spring 1993), 145-58; James Livingston, *Pragmatism, feminism and democracy: rethinking the politics of American history* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 71-73; Mary Jo Deegan, *Jane Addams and the men of the Chicago School* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988), 116, 120, 210-11.

immigration, and the variegated transnational ties that bound labour, women, religion, and science across borders. A number of Americans raised questions about nationalism and patriotism during the war—Randolph Bourne and Thorstein Veblen among them—but the theorizing of women peace activists who clustered around Addams and Balch has attracted less intellectual interest, in part, I think, because some scholars, even feminist ones, have tended to dismiss their pacifism as a species of Victorian sentimentalism or Christian humanism. The assumption is that American women responded to the war in basically two ways: as conservative defenders of the sexual order and male patriotic prerogative (the Daughters of the American Revolution for instance), or as pacifist maternal guardians of humanity. In both cases, women were assumed to have played essentially static roles derived from the limited intellectual currency available to them. Yet, as much as these traditional vocabularies may have echoed through much of their work (although Jane Addams insisted that her social work was more “a *revolt* against Puritan conceptions than a continuation of them—a substitute of ‘works’ for dogma.”),³ it is my contention that both Addams and Balch advanced a deeply modernist conception of progressive global

³ Quoted in Christopher Lasch, *The new radicalism in America: the intellectual as social type* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1965), 11. Balch, it is also true, promoted international understanding during the war because she believed “the way of Christ” was also “the law of the moral cosmos.” Balch, “The great solution,” (1917) in Mercedes Randall, ed., *Beyond nationalism: the social thought of Emily Greene Balch* (New York: Twayne, 1972), 220.

integration that also depended on the socializing effects of radical democracy.

I see Mead, then, as something as a foil to this argument. He shared a great deal intellectually with Addams and Balch, and they worked in the same reformist circles from roughly the same theoretical terms of references.⁴ Yet Mead's internationalism—like Dewey's, Lippmann's, Croly's and other war liberals, as Bourne derisively called them—drew on the hope that the war offered a chance to bring about a democratic deepening of both the United States and the world. Despite his profound skepticism about militarism that kept him on the fence until 1917, Mead found himself drawn into the Manichean struggle between American democracy and German absolutism. The feminist internationalism of Balch and Addams, on the other hand, which grew out of the experience of social amelioration in the inner cities and was primarily sensitized by the lack of political power available to women in the public sphere, pointed in a radically different direction once the exigencies of war and patriotism were put to the test. The story of how progressive liberalism fragmented and became disillusioned during the war is well known, as is the peace activism of the Women's Peace Party and the Women's

⁴ Jean Bethke Elshtain discusses Mead's influence on Addams, which she concludes was not inconsiderable in many ways. On international affairs, however, she thought Mead was "out of touch, to put it mildly." But she bases her position on a slightly eccentric proposal Mead made for an international insurance scheme. It was certainly by no means the only odd proposal coming out of the war years and it was, moreover, the least representative thing Mead ever wrote on American foreign policy. Elshtain, *Jane Addams and the dream of American democracy: a life* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), fn. 311.

International Congress.⁵ This paper offers a look at how the experience of two women reformers tore a hole in a close intellectual family of otherwise like-minded internationalists because their ameliorative projects at home made them deeply skeptical of the rational application of military force as a means of social progress, and because war, by underlining the exclusion of women as citizens, undermined the capacity of democracy itself.

Of the three, two are well known (Addams and Mead) but of them only Addams was known for her forays into foreign policy; the third, Emily Balch, however, won the Nobel Peace prize in 1946 (fifteen years after Addams did) and was, in fact, an important part of this circle of progressive era social reformers-turned-peace-activists. She accompanied Addams on her famous trip to The Hague International Congress of Women in 1915, co-writing the history of it, and was fired from her position at Wellesley in 1918 for her peace activism. In the 1920s she served as secretary for the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), and as the major author of a WILPF committee report on the U.S. occupation of Haiti, a report that influenced the Hoover Commission's recommendation that the U.S. withdraw

⁵ Notably in Gertrude Bussey and Margaret Tims, *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1915-1965* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965); Carrie A. Foster, *The women and the warriors: the U.S. section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1915-1946* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995); Catherine Foster, *Women for all seasons: the story of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom* (Athens, G.A.: University of Georgia Press, 1989); Marie Louise Degen, *The history of the Women's Peace Party* (New York: Garland, 1972); and Erika A. Kuhlman, *Petticoats and white feathers: gender, conformity, race, the Progressive peace movement, and the debate over war, 1895-1919* (Westport, C.T.: Greenwood, 1997).

from the country. Mead, for his part, was also a friend of Addams's, a treasurer of Hull-House, and an intellectual beacon to both John Dewey and Addams, whose evolutionary, pragmatist conception of history and truth deeply informed their views of nationalism and internationalism. Although better known for his pioneering work on symbolic interactionism, Mead, like most pragmatists, was politically engaged.⁶ When he moved to Chicago with Dewey in 1894, he joined the reform-minded City Club in 1906 (chairing its Committee on Public Education, and serving as president in 1918), worked at Hull-House, served as vice-president of the Immigrants Protective League of Chicago, and on various strike settlement committees.⁷ He was, as Hans Joas called him, a "radical democratic individual."⁸ Like Addams, he defined democracy not simply as an abstract right to self-government through the vote, but the full elimination of "the evils which economic inferiority exposes great masses of men."⁹ On foreign policy issues, he became only more active, intellectually and organizationally, after 1914 shocked the nation out its complacency that a great internationalist movement had supposedly been sweeping the globe that would make war obsolete. He had favourably reviewed Addams's *Newer ideals of*

⁶ Hans Joas, , *G.H. Mead: a contemporary re-examination of his thought* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985, 1997), 15-32.

⁷ Dimitri Shalin, "G.H. Mead, socialism and the progressive agenda," *American Journal of Sociology* 93, 4 (January 1988), 924.

⁸ Joas, *G.H. Mead*, 10; Gary A. Cook, *George Herbert Mead: the making of a social pragmatist* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), 105-08.

⁹ G.H. Mead, "Industrial education, the working man, and the school," *Elementary School Teacher*, 9 (1908-09), 387-81.

peace when it came out in 1907 (and later Thorstein Veblen's somewhat more opaque critique of patriotism, *The nature of peace*, in 1918), and served as an honorary vice-president of Louis Lochner's Chicago Peace Society.¹⁰ But the war—including his son's involvement in it in 1918—brought these foreign policy issues into tangible focus.¹¹ So let me start with Mead's concept of what was called the "social self," and then show how this affected the general concept of nationalism and internationalism in American thinking prior to the war.

Broadly speaking, what unified those at the turn of the century who called themselves Progressive liberals was a skepticism of 19th century notions of liberalism that came from John Locke, through Adam Smith, and Spencerians like William Graham Sumner. This older liberalism argued that the individual was the basis of all social goods, an atomistic, rights-bearing being whose self-interest should be enabled by a weak state. By the end of the 19th century, laissez-faire liberalism had come to express itself in unprecedented social and economic inequities, the debasement of labour, the phenomenal growth of chaotic

¹⁰ Mead's involvement in the CPS is not evident from his personal papers, but his name appears on their letterhead from at least 1915 (Lochner to Robert LaFollette, November 3, 1915, LaFollette Papers, box B78).

¹¹ G.H. Mead, review of *The nature of peace and the terms of its perpetuation* by Thorstein Veblen, *Journal of Political Economy* 26 (1918), 752-62; Christopher Capozzola, "Thorstein Veblen and the politics of war," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, 13, 2 (1999), 255-71. On Veblen ambivalent relationship to pragmatism, see Rick Tilman, "Veblen and American pragmatism: the case of John Dewey," in *The intellectual legacy of Thorstein Veblen: unresolved issues* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 109-141; John Patrick Diggins, *Thorstein Veblen: theorist of the leisure class* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 180-82.

cities, the disintegration of families, and so forth. But these new social concerns had few ideological precedents for engaging the power of the state to deal with the problems of industrialism, because laissez-faire liberalism demanded a passive state. Some Americans reached to religion—which was acceptable because Protestant communalism was the other founding political tradition of America—but it was ill-equipped to organize the entire nation

Ironically, the most persuasive answer was provided by the very forces of industrial capitalism transforming American society, namely the way in which it integrated a complex network of labour and capital into a single enterprise. What was innovative about industrial capitalism was its corporate structure, replacing proprietary individualism of older capitalism with stockholding companies owned by people scattered across the country, and run by boards of directors and an army of middle managers.¹² Add to that the new organizations of labour, women, the cities, and so forth, and the lived conditions of modern life actually demonstrated a considerable degree of social interdependence that made life not an aggregate of individuals but a genuine social community.¹³ The collectivist form of

¹² This is, in part, the thesis of James Livingston, *Pragmatism and the political economy of cultural revolution, 1850-1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

¹³ G.H. Mead review of Jane Addams, *Newer ideals of peace*, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, 13 (1907), 121-28. Dewey's response to the Pullman Strike, unfolding just as he was trying to move to Chicago in 1894, shows how important the new consciousness of cooperative labour had become to pragmatic social criticism. It exposed what Louis Menand called "the tangle of contradictions and anachronisms [that] lay

capitalism known as corporate industrialism, therefore, provided the basis for social theorists in the 1880s and 1890s to postulate that the atomistic individual of the past was, in the end, a fiction, and that all individuals are products of the social order from which they emerge.¹⁴ The assault on the liberal individual came from a number of directions. In one of Dewey's earliest essays, "The ethics of democracy," (1888) he argued that the classical liberal fallacy was to assume that individuals exist prior to society. On the contrary, it was the "non-social individual," he argued, that was "an abstraction." Individuals can never be conceptually separated from their interdependence, their relations, which help define their identities. In this formulation, democracy exists as the political forum for social reciprocity; the nation-state itself is not the proper focus of our patriotic loyalty, but the civic ideal of what Dewey called "conjoint communicated experience."¹⁵ The argument drew on the sociology of Chicago's Albion Small (with whom Mead would later found the *American Journal of Sociology*) and Lester Ward.¹⁶ This

in the accumulated mixture of Christian piety, laissez-faire economics, natural law doctrine, scientific determinism, and popular Darwinism that characterized many people's attitudes toward social and economic life in the decades after the Civil War." *The metaphysical club*, 295-306.

¹⁴ See James Livingston, *Pragmatism, feminism and democracy: rethinking the politics of American history and Pragmatism and the political economy of cultural revolution, 1850-1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

¹⁵ John Dewey, *Democracy and education: an introduction to the philosophy of education* (New York: Free Press, 1966 [1916]), 87; see also Jonathan M. Hansen, *The lost promise of patriotism: debating American identity, 1890-1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 67-75.

¹⁶ John Dewey, "The ethics of democracy," (1888), *The early works, 1882-1898*, vol. 1 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-71),

new subjectivity, central to progressive liberalism, was called "the social self"

Mead was one of the first to explain what exactly this was. He argued that the self is actually composed of an "I" (the subject of all action and desire) and a "Me" (the object concept of the self as others see you). Humans use symbols to communicate with each other, anticipating how our use of these symbols will be interpreted by others. In other words, we condition and direct our behaviour by mentally playing the role of the other person and internalizing the way others might see us, as part of our self-consciousness. The *I* thus becomes a *Me*, our individualism being constituted by a negotiation between ourselves and the entire field of other people who make up our social environment. An individual acts in order to initiate a stimulus in another person; to the extent that our action thus anticipates the kind of stimulus we might get, we adapt our actions according to this prediction, which we can only make by imagining how the *other* will see our action.¹⁷ This is we come to know ourselves.

The self which consciously stands over against other selves thus becomes an object, an other to himself, through the very fact that he hears himself talk, and replies. The mechanism of introspection is therefore given in the social attitude which man necessarily assumes toward himself, and the mechanism of thought, in so far as thought uses symbols which are used in social intercourse, is but an inner conversation.¹⁸

232; see also Louis Menand, *The Metaphysical Club* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2001), 304-05.

¹⁷ G.H. Mead, "Social consciousness and the consciousness of meaning," *Psychological Bulletin* 7 (1910), 397-405.

¹⁸G.H. Mead, "The Social Self," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Method* 10 (1913), 377.

In this sense, the self is not an autonomous agent (a pre-existing core set out into a world made up of other such agents) but a *semi*-autonomous agent whose identity is from the outset oriented toward others. Our goals, ethics, values, desires, interests, wants, indeed all meanings, are thus socially derived:

Our rights and our privileges, our distinctions of capacity and skill, our superiorities and our inferiorities, our social positions and prestige, our manners and our foibles not only distinguish and separate us from others but they constitute us what we are to ourselves. They constitute our individualities, the selves that we recognize, when we thank God that we are not as other men are, and when we determine upon what terms we can live and work with members of our families, with our neighbors and our countrymen ...

The political consequence of this was, of course, to enable the state to cope with the social problems confronting the nation, as long as the state was radically democratic and open to the voices of the sum of all individual parts. In effect, saying the individual was socially created, meant that changing social conditions would to a considerable extent change the character of the selves that make up society and vice versa.¹⁹ Any concern with the moral evolution of individuals—which was the concern of all liberal theory—thus demanded more integrated social organizations to bring these relationships into greater coordination, or, in the terminology of the day, “adjustment.”

But there was an important corollary to this: for Mead and other sociologists an enlarged sense of the social individual would ultimately bring about social harmony in the nation; a recognition that where the nation had previously been torn apart

¹⁹ Mead review of Warner Fichte's *Individualism: four lectures on the significance of consciousness for social relations*, *Psychological Bulletin* 8 (1911), 327-28.

by economic and social conflict, a more developed sense of the *social self* said that we were not pursuing *autonomous* goals but goals that were derived from our continuous interaction. Once we realized that our goals were thus not fundamentally in conflict (that labour and capital, in effect, needed each other) both sides would ameliorate their demands on each other and fashion a more cohesive and harmonious whole. Mead called this phenomenon "self-consciousness," and it was the beginning of using democracy as the sole medium by which all these social selves could negotiate a common sense of purpose to help satisfy our differentiated desires.²⁰ In their attack on *laissez-faire*, Progressive liberals tried to reconcile the antinomy between *selfish individualism* and *community obligation* (in other words, between the two founding ideologies of liberalism and republicanism) by sociologically redefining the self in terms of the national community.²¹

In all of this new sociology, war and a more expansive foreign policy, played a critical, if somewhat contradictory role. When the United States went to war against Spain in 1898, it was thought to herald a new imperial confidence in the United States. What we sometimes lose sight of is that the widespread

²⁰ Menand postulates that the fear of violence informed much of the intellectual fit pragmatism had with the nation between 1898 and 1917. The fragmentation of the nation along class, ethnic and regional lines gave rise to fears of what was politically called excessive selfishness but, philosophically, the pragmatists regarded as the idolatry of abstract ideas and absolute principles. Menand, *The Metaphysical Club*, 373-74.

²¹ G.H. Mead, "Social consciousness and the consciousness of meaning," *Psychological Bulletin* 7 (1910), 397-405.

appeal of the war in America often had less to do with specific strategic or economic ambitions, and more to do with the desire for a new *national* feeling the war induce. Theodore Roosevelt's "Strenuous Life" speech in 1899, which argued for maintaining possession of the Philippines, claimed that war gave Americans a chance to slough off the decadence and ennui of prosperity and selfishness to find a sense of manly duty in bringing civilization to savages, in strengthening the nation against domestic selfishness and fragmentation.²² The argument was, in various less masculinized forms, endemic to those who would call themselves Progressives. Even Social Gospel theologian Walter Rauschenbusch—who would become a Christian pacifist during the First World War—believed that the Spanish-American War showed America's national coming of age:

We have realized as never before in this generation the throbbing life of our nation. We have felt that we belong to a larger whole. Ordinarily we go about our business and are absorbed in our personal concerns and duties But this year, when the national body leaped into action, when the nation's heart beat fast, and every nerve and muscle was tense passion and effort, we felt it, we realized this immense collective life It is a boon to forget our little selves in anything that is greater than we, in the family, in some institution or society or church to which we belong, in the town of which we are citizens, and most of all in our country. Such self-surrender to the greater life is an education of the better self. It makes better men of us ... This is our first thought, that the experiences of this year have helped us realize our national life.²³

In 1909, Herbert Croly, author of that great statement of Progressivism, *The promise of American life*, said that the Spanish War "created a condition of public feeling," that "made

²² Roosevelt, "The strenuous life," in *The strenuous life: essays and addresses* (New York: The Century Company, 1901).

²³ Walter Rauschenbusch, "The present and the future," *Post Express*, November 25, 1898.

possible the revival of Hamiltonianism" that was dear to Roosevelt and other Progressives. The complacency of prosperity, the violence engendered by class and racial conflict, corroded the democratic commitments needed to make American republicanism work, and the war, whatever its economic merits, provided a taste of what might be done in a modern state.

That war and its resulting policy of extra-territorial expansion, so far from hindering the process of domestic amelioration, availed, from the sheer force of the national aspirations it aroused, to give a tremendous impulse to the work of national reform. It made Americans more sensitive to the national idea and more conscious of their national responsibilities, and it indirectly help to place in the Presidential chair the man who ... represented both the national idea and the spirit of reform. The sincere and intelligent combination of those two ideas is bound to issue in the Hamiltonian practice of constructive national legislation.²⁴

And socialist-feminist Charlotte Perkins Gilman wrote in June 1898:

The sublimity of the soldier's work is in its full expression of the social service; the full recognition that we live here as a society, not as individuals, and that the highest duty of the individual is to serve society.

The woman's admiration for the soldier rests on the same basis ... In the soldier as in the priest is the same great principle embodied - the devotion of the individual to the service of humanity. When we have grown still further in our social consciousness; when we see that art and trade, and manufacture and every possible product of human power are but forms of social service, and more noble because more highly developed, we shall feel in our daily work the same deep stimulus that stirs the warrior's soul, shall find in daily living the avenues for splendid exertion, courage, devotion and

²⁴ Herbert Croly, *The Promise of American life* (New York: Macmillan, 1909), 169. See also Hansen, *The lost promise of patriotism*, 132-35; David Levy, *Herbert Croly of the New Republic: The Life and Thought of an American Progressive* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 182-83; Charles Forcey, *The Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Weyl, Lippmann, and the Progressive Era, 1900-1925* (New York, 1961), 38-39. On the influence of Hegel, see David W. Noble, "Herbert Croly and American Progressive Thought," *Western Political Quarterly* 7 (1954): 537-53.

sublime self-sacrifice now open only the soldier and the missionary
... War is the first socializer.²⁵

Even William James's famous dissent on the imperial crusade and the virtues of war conceded that the martial sacrifices of combat satisfied a deep and primordial need that had certain social benefits. He merely believed that societies needed to find less destructive outlets for this atavistic and seemingly universal tendency.²⁶

The problem here is that while war gave us vast quantities of "social emotion," as Mead called it, it was based on cultivating a *national* ego that interrupted transnational interactions between like-minded people. The concepts of industrial democracy that were vital to Progressive liberals were ones derived from a belief that the trials of modern capitalism were common to all industrializing nations; that labour in America was unified with labour in Britain and Germany and France; that suffragists and women's peace organizations shared common cause with other women against patriarchy, and that all of these were essentially transnational movements devoted to acknowledging the common interests of humanity over the specific interests of the nation which, in many cases, remained in the hands of the very oligarchs Progressive liberal democracy aimed to dislodge.

In the Spanish-Philippine War this was not immediately a problem because for Social Gospel reformers, for example, the enemy was a decadent Catholic empire, or the lesser natives of

²⁵ Charlotte Perkins Gilman, "War as a socializer," *The American Fabian* (June 1898).

²⁶ William James, "The moral equivalent of war," (1910).

the Philippines who needed moral uplift. Jane Addams and William James were clearly opponents of the imperialist urge, but other progressives found the whole mood of national sacrifice enlivening. But what might happen if war involved one of those advanced industrial nations that Progressive liberals praised as being a model of industrial legislation and public works? A state, say, like Germany? When the United States began to debate whether it would participate in the European war, Progressive liberals divided because while they had seen the advantages of war in bringing about national spirit, they had also seen the potential for the emergence of a war-state that might destroy social progress, consolidate the power of the oligarchs over the people, militarize society, and so forth.²⁷ Moreover, the war demanded that social groups in the US surrender their narrow interests to the common good, that is, that labour could no longer have common cause with labour in other capitalist societies, but must work together with their oppressors at home; that the cosmopolitan ideals of reform might be sacrificed for the ideals of nationhood. This was the position of socialists like Eugene Debs, Walter Rauschenbusch, and Randolph Bourne. It also caused deep conflict among African-Americans like W.E.B. Du Bois whose "double-consciousness" (a perfect illustration of the multiple-personalities of the social self that Mead wrote about)

²⁷ This debate is covered in Thompson, *Reformers and war: American progressive publicists and the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and Thomas Knock, *To end all wars: Woodrow Wilson and the quest for a new world order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

meant that sometimes he wanted to reject the war as a racial war (that was also fellow pragmatist African American Alain Locke's view of it) and other times he saw it as means by which blacks could prove their Americanism by fighting along side white Americans.

Mead's initial reaction to the European war mixed despair and clinical excitement. He wrote his son in October 1914: "I never dreamed that I would have the chance to observe the phenomenal of social psychology on so titanic a scale, and the actual paying down of the awful price for our helplessness in consciously controlling the formation of national selfhood."²⁸ For Mead, then, the outburst of European nationalisms that rent the fabric of the continent's growing internationalism underscored how difficult it was to apply human intelligence to the "social emotions." War still offered the outside chance to supersede the selfish self by creating greater self-consciousness but it was, in this respect, also an "utterly stupid method of settling differences between different nations."²⁹ War nevertheless remained, Mead thought, the most common means of acquiring social solidarity in any nation because it touched on the psychological longing of the members of any nation for the unity that their actual political and social lives deprive of them. The trouble of course is that this form of group self-consciousness is acquired mainly by cultivating a sense of superiority over others. "It is

²⁸ G.H. Mead to Henry C.A. Mead, October 3, 1914, Mead Papers, box 1, folder 7.

²⁹ G.H. Mead, "National-mindedness and international-mindedness," *International Journal of Ethics* (1929), 386.

part of the almost instinctive technique of the community and its government," Mead wrote in 1915, "to stimulate and play upon this hatred because it provides another mechanism for the sense of social identity after the exalted feeling of devotion has ebbed."³⁰ It also, moreover, hinges on the state's ability to employ the emotional longing created by social conflict at home. In other words, because business and labour hate each other, the state is able to use this hatred to generate patriotism by promising that the unity of war will overcome all differences. "Patriotism" taps into an inchoate longing for solidarity with those whose lives we depend upon but fail to realize. If the nation were to solve its inner conflicts and create real social coordination and adjustment, as Mead hoped, the state would find it difficult to find the emotional alienation that create the longing for patriotic solidarity.

So what, then, might be the psychological bases for *internationalism*? In 1915, while the United States was neutral, and before the preparedness debates of 1916, Mead wrote a lengthy essay in Paul Kellogg's magazine *Survey* on exactly that. It drew extensively on arguments he made about the social self. He pointed out that never in its history had Europe, on the eve of war in 1914, been so thoroughly internationalized, so deeply entwined in the international life of commerce, industry, intellectual exchange in social ideas, literature, science, education and even sport. "The labor movement was international.

³⁰ G.H. Mead, "On militarism and nationalism," undated [circa 1914-15], Mead papers, box 3, folder 1.

Science was international ...There was not a social issue, an idea dear to the hearts of the European community, that could by any possibility be defined with any one nation or its peculiar institutions."³¹ There was no national finance that was not based on international finance, no national science that was not an outgrowth of international science, no civilized race that was not the product of migration and intermingling of peoples, and no civilized nation without the intercourse of ideas that makes ideas universal. Paradoxically, this meant that the mobilization of moral forces within each nation to fight this modern war had to be articulated in terms of self-defense. National self-consciousness had to be written in ways that reflected the new interdependent consciousness (none of the modern nations dared voice its militarism in terms of old-fashioned Napoleonic conquest) and yet enabled the *nation* still to assert its moral prerogatives. Hence the need to justify the war to public sentiment in terms of self-defense: "*nations, like individuals, can become objects to themselves only as they see themselves through the eyes of others.* Every appeal to public sentiment is an effort to justify oneself to oneself."³² Unfortunately because modern war depended not only on offensive action but at the very least the primitive, violent, battle-fury of widespread "terrorism", governments inevitably must also suppress all reports of "that terror which is the logic of offensive

³¹ "The psychological bases for internationalism," *Survey* 33 (1915), 604.

³² *Ibid.*

fighting," because to admit it would erode social solidarity at home and engender it amongst one's enemies. Even flaunting military power as a means of preventing war or emboldening diplomacy (utterly disproved by the events of 1914, Mead acerbically pointed out) "inevitably crowds out consideration of right, as a file of soldiers introduced into a convention or a court silences every claim except that supported by the bayonet ... The monstrous puerility of it all!"

The contradictions of militarism notwithstanding, Mead believed that *ultimately* cosmopolitan human rights would supplant national ones. Nations were, in a sense, like individuals, in so far as their sense of self was a function of their emergence in an international system or society. The very concept sovereign *right* was socially produced by the international collective that recognizes the existence of the nation itself. This means that, in time, international or human rights, would transcend the narrower claims of nations, just as the egoistic self was replaced by the social self, with its built in understanding of democratic reciprocity. The claims of the warlords, holdovers from the armoured age of what he derided as the "Hohenstaufens," would be displaced by the international social "equipment" and "audience" that gave voice to the scientists, financiers, educators, writers, and reformers of the modern age. Yet, we are still, at heart, "afraid to lose ... the sense of superiority to people of other nations, and the patriotism and lofty devotion which seems to be dependent upon national egotisms." In this

sense, Mead argued, war was fundamentally a psychological encrustation. Modern *communities* can vastly better safeguard the needs of humans than can armies or navies, and yet still we fight. "It is the feeling of enlarged personality, of the national *amour propre*, a feeling not so much of what a people have or want as of *what they are*, that militarism supports in national life." Human progress, Mead insisted, was a function of possessing an international personality; war stood therefore in its way.

Here, he conceded, the militarist "throws out his chest, and contrasts his red-blooded virility with the feminist, philanthropic reform, and asks us whether we are willing to exchange the fighting man for the milksop. We will not stop to consider the childish assumption that we must pull down amid fire and slaughter the whole structure of the western world to secure bulging sinews, deep chests, and red corpuscles. The real question is: Why should anyone consider the work with which these reforms are occupied as white-blooded and feministic? They are the identical interests...for which our forefathers fought, bled, and died." But dying in the past is no longer a compelling reason to die today. We cannot fight for these goals anymore, Mead argued, because the modern militaristic state is so at odds with the entire social structure emerging in modernity, which is fundamentally international in character.

Militarism is not simply an evil in itself. It is typical and conservative of a state that is narrowly national in its attitude and that refuses to recognize the international society, that after all has made the self-conscious state possible. The problem is then

largely a psychological problems, for it has to do with a change of attitude, the willingness to accept the whole international fabric of society, and to regard the states and the communities of which they are the instruments, as subject to and controlled by the life of the whole, not as potential enemies for whose assault each state must forever be on the watch.³³

Mead conceded in this bold article—that owes as much to Addams' *Newer ideals of peace* as it does to symbolic interactionism—that Wilhelmine Germany was both the most national and international of the European states. Long admired by American reformers for its social efficiencies, the militaristic tendencies of the ruling class nevertheless placed all German internationalism at the behest of a narrow tribalism.³⁴ By early 1916, Mead had begun to draw a narrow distinction between the two sides of the war. Mead, who studied in Leipzig and Berlin between 1888 and 1891, had once greatly admired Germany as a model of the type of social organization desired for America—the rational and efficient handling of social problems through planning and a commitment to the common good. But Germany's achievements were too much dependent on the military organization of their society, dependent, in other words, on the instruments of war to create solidarity; its nationalism, therefore, was socially oppressive,

³³ Ibid, 607.

³⁴ On the other hand, Mead later defended parts of German nationalism under the Hohenzollerns, namely its ability to instill a sense of greater community life and to promote progressive social legislation. See his review of Veblen's *The nature of peace and the terms of its perpetuation* in *Journal of Political Economy* 26 (1918), 752-62. Mead faulted Veblen for reducing patriotism to a social version of the search for prestige rather than seeing it as also being a function of proper "social organization." G.H. Mead to Henry C.A. Mead, March 24, 1918, Mead Papers, box 1, folder 9.

not the full expression of the enlarged, democratic social self.³⁵ He grew more "anti-German" but still hoped for a stalemate that the vestiges of internationalism might be preserved. He was, to this end, opposed to the "preparedness" movement in 1916, seeing it as offering the worst of both worlds. "A vast amount of money will be spent with no very appreciable result," he wrote in March, "unless we get ourselves hopelessly committed to a militaristic policy. In any case we will lag far behind Europe either in military efficiency or in democratic internationalism."³⁶ Yet by November, with Wilson re-elected, Mead grew more optimistic that the spirit of a war for democracy was giving purpose to American national life. "I should not be surprised," he told his daughter-in-law Irene, "if this might be the beginning of the democratic movement which the war might bring to birth."³⁷

Naturally his criticisms of war *per se* grew more muted when, in 1917, the United States joined the fray. In February, he conceded that Wilson's position seemed to reflect a commitment to take the US into a "world state" in which war would be replaced by international policing. The important point was to retain America's commitment to internationalism and avoid either Bryan's

³⁵ "What I am pointing out in passing is that the German ... utterly ignores this dependence of his Kultur upon a General Staff, a War Lord, and a Schwertadel. These he accepts as an unpleasant necessity fastened upon him by a ring of conscienceless enemies." Mead to Henry C.A. Mead, April 28, 1916, Mead Papers, box 1, folder 8. See also Mead to Henry C.A. Mead, March 3, 1916, same file.

³⁶ G.H. Mead to Henry C.A. Mead, March 3, 1916, Mead Papers, box 1, folder 8.

³⁷ G.H. Mead to Irene Mead, November 12, 1916, Mead Papers, box 1, folder 13.

isolation (which violated the spirit of internationalism) or Roosevelt's commitment to the Entente, which would lose America "any distinctive position." "But can the people become self-conscious enough to take this attitude"?³⁸ By April, though, such doubts had been shed. Mead wrote excitedly to his family. "There is no doubt in my mind that the hour has struck at which America from the standpoint of her own history and the philosophy of her own institutions must become a part of the world society in responsibility, and that this involves getting ready to fight as the other nations are fighting, but to end the fighting, not settle the quarrels of the European states out of which this Armageddon arose. At this point follows a long disquisition that I rehearse to imaginary audiences ever and anon."³⁹ But his audience was not so imaginary. In a series of articles in the *Chicago Herald* in the summer of 1917, Mead justified his militant internationalism using the pragmatist devotion to seeing ideas as a function of embedded social habits:

[O]ur fundamental political habits of feeling, thought and action have been such necessary outgrowths of the doctrine that government must be with the consent of the governed, that we could never associate ourselves with the imperialistic aims which have so largely dominated the alliances and hostilities of European nations ... It is with this background that we have found ourselves in this war, from which there was no escape which we were willing to accept, and it is this background of political attitudes and habits that America must use if the country is to fight it with wholeheartedness and express itself in the undertaking. No country can put through successfully any undertaking of supreme importance which is not an expression of its fundamental subconscious habits. A nation that by disposition is not imperialistic, that has deliberately put the temptation of imperial rule and dominion behind

³⁸ G.H. Mead to Irene Mead, February 18, 1917, Mead Papers, box 1, folder 14.

³⁹ G.H. Mead to Irene Mead, April 8, 1917, Mead Papers, box 1, folder 13.

it, that has no world aim to enforce by a mailfisted diplomacy, that has no international policy to which it has been committed, except that of excluding European imperialism from this hemisphere: that has not sought consciousness of self in the fear it inspires in other peoples, and yet a nation that finds itself so essentially a part of the society of nations that it must enter the struggle contrary to its own traditions, such a nation can fight with grim determination and willingness to exhaust all its resources of lives and treasure only if its aim is to be done with war as the arbiter of international life. If that is clearly the goal of the war, America will fight it to the finish.⁴⁰

...

Wilson made a great speech in Boston and quite in the proper sense. He made it evident that it was because of the disinterestedness of America that the larger issue of the war—that for Democracy—appeared and that all Europe— or rather all the European peoples look to America to stand for the completion of the program, so that the attitude of unwillingness to support the League of Nations would come as a failure on America's part to carry out the very undertaking she had made possible.⁴¹

Mead framed the disinterestedness of American foreign policy in social-self terms, explaining that its new *national self-consciousness* made it possible to fight for ideals rather than the gratification of that pathological desire for solidarity. This sounds like American exceptionalism writ large, and we might fault Mead for the sin of nationalism, as Hans Joas does, for his failure to imagine that the narrative he has written about American history is grotesquely wrong, or for his naïve belief that the United States could mobilize for total war without crushing the forces of cooperative reform at home. But his argument in 1917 was more complicated because it rested on a distinction between two types of nationalism. The first nationalism is always incomplete, artificially cultivated by the state in order to sustain its rule; it uses war to expand the authority of the oligarchy over the people; it works because it

⁴⁰ "America's ideals and the war," *Chicago Herald*, August 2, 1917

⁴¹ Mead to Henry C.A. Mead, February 25, 1919

satisfies that longing of a divided society for social harmony; it more likely rests on "militaristic" military organization. The second nationalism Mead called *national-mindedness*, and it is the consummation of the social self within the nation. Its end point is the incorporation of all people into a national consciousness that acknowledges their mutual interest in each other, and their willingness to put older, more selfish concepts of identity behind them. Once there, this new national consciousness enables the nation to transcend its own tribalism and see itself as a member of a wider international society. Such states do not seek out war to satisfy a psychological desire for inner unity because they already have inner unity; their *national-mindedness* is a precondition for the participation of the nation in the cultivation of an emerging *international* consciousness.⁴²

Mead believed, wrongly of course, that the United States was just such a state in 1917, or at least was on the verge of becoming one; whereas Bismarck's Germany was too unstable and based on a reflex of cultural inferiority that demanded war as a social cement.

The militaristic state must look upon itself as the potential enemy of all other states while most of the social structure within which growth is taking place, is international. The state as the instrument of the separate community is the organ through which these changes get formulated in that nation. But as long as it is necessarily hostile to internationalism, it cannot become properly responsive to the labor movement, to social science, or even to industry. It follows that these movements of social reform and integration within the separate states are deformed, are allowed to advance only so far as the interests of the state in its separation permits them to go.⁴³

⁴² G.H. Mead, "National-mindedness and international-mindedness," *The International Journal of Ethics*, 39, 4 (July 1929), 385-407.

⁴³ "The psychological bases for internationalism," *Survey* 33 (1915).

In this configuration, nationalism, properly conceived, is not the enemy of a cosmopolitan, internationalism, but is the crucible of a truly global socialization. He wrote that nationalism

has been a divisive factor in so far [as] peoples have come to consciousness of themselves in their opposition to others, and especially in so far as they have undertaken to break the yoke which has subjected them to other peoples and to dynasties foreign to themselves. But *there is no movement which has so quickened the conscious life of the society of the western world as this growth of nationalism*. It has brought together peoples [who] have found that in their differences they had common interests. It has awakened sympathetic response of those who are of different tongue and race. *Every increase in the consciousness of the selfhood of a community has meant an increase in the awareness of other groups and had aided the foundation for the community of interest and endeavor which has had its greatest expression in the formation of the League of Nations.*⁴⁴

His initial enthusiasm was tempered, of course, by the sad outcome of the war, namely America's refusal to join the League of Nations.⁴⁵ He believed, as many left progressives did, that the war could only be redeemed by its consequences, that is, by the promotion of a radical, democratic peace. He was encouraged in the spring of 1918 by the British Labour Party's "Memorandum on War Aims" adopted in February 1918 in the wake of the Fourteen Points. The Labour platform seemed to indicate to many American progressives the transnational potential for a postwar social democratic revolution tied to a genuine democratic peace after the war.⁴⁶ Until the Paris Peace conference ended, Mead held out hope for a transcendent internationalism that would transform

⁴⁴ G.H. Mead, "On Kant and German nationalism." Undated [circa 1917-1918], Mead Papers, addenda, box 2, folder 27.

⁴⁵ Mead to Irene Mead, September 5, 1919, Mead Papers, box 1, folder 21.

⁴⁶ G.H. Mead to Irene Mead, March 2, and March 11, 1918, Mead Papers, box 1, folder 15; Thompson, *Reformers and war*, 207-08, 231-32.

nation-states as much as the international system itself. By 1929, Mead's grim conclusion was that even the United States still needed to "attain a higher degree of national-mindedness" than it clearly had. The litmus test of its maturity remained the degree to which it found itself defending national honour and "peculiar interests" as *causae belli*. Yet the outcome of the Great War, Mead believed, had nonetheless brought the United States into more intimate human and economic contact with Europe than ever before. Moreover, it proved that war as a rational instrument of cultivating the hallowed sense of at-oneness was no longer a rational instrument of the state: that "we can no longer depend upon war for the fusion of disparate and opposing elements in the nation." This did not mean wars would cease, but that the conditions of lasting peace would most likely spring from the task posed by the war: how to become nationally-minded so that the conditions of ever deepening international contact and exchange, of industry, commerce, art, science, literature—which at first might appear divisive—can evolve into a true international-mindedness.

The rational attitude is to find what common values lie at the back of divisions and competitions. Within our communities the process of civilization is the discovery of these common ends which are the basis of social organizations. In social organizations they come to mean not opposition but diverse occupations and activities. Difference of function takes the place of hostility of interest ... The Great War has posed the problem before contending nations of carrying civilization into the community of nations; that is, it has left us with the demand for international-mindedness. The moral equivalent of war is found in the intelligence and the will both to discover these common interests between contending nations and to

make them the basis for the solution to existing differences for the common life which they make possible.⁴⁷

Mead's solution to the problem of peace thus sutured the Progressive liberal idea of a harmonious nation with the evolutionary development, over time, of such a nation dedicated to the social harmony of the entire world community, a reconciliation of nationalism (self) and internationalism (society). In this sense, internationalism was not a policy option so much as the fulfillment of America's own social trajectory. Mead extrapolated from his views on the social self to argue that social selfhood comes when nations are capable of viewing their actions in terms of an "other". He seemed to prematurely believe that the United States had already become a sufficiently internationalized state, conscious of its identity as a cosmopolitan nation, as to play the role of disinterested universal agent. Like Dewey, the war experience, and especially the rejection of the League of Nations by the most reactionary elements of American society, disabused him of this faith, although he clung to the possibility that it still lay ahead for the United States.

Mead's friend Jane Addams was one of the most internationally respected American social reformers at the beginning of the 20th century. Her founding of Hull-House in 1889

⁴⁷ Mead, "National-mindedness and international-mindedness," *The International Journal of Ethics*, 39, 4 (July 1929), 385-407. Mead's plea for greater international cooperation would, in fact, be echoed by Emily Balch's post-World War Two career. After receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1946 at age 79, she wrote a series of articles arguing for the internationalization of aviation, key waterways, strategic bases and even labour. See the Balch essays in Randall, *Beyond nationalism*, 162-181.

gave her an urban laboratory for studying the problems of the modern American industrial city and its growing heterogeneity. The work attracted the attention of Dewey and Mead, both of whom worked and lectured at Hull-House from time to time. Addams' experimentalism and her conviction that human development was responsive to the environment society created, dovetailed with their pragmatist epistemology, which saw the world as one made by applied human intelligence and cooperation. Like them, she insisted that experience was the producer of knowledge, and that therefore the only system of government consistent with the valuation of diverse human experiences was a thoroughly socialized democracy. Their shared rejection of "mechanistic and individualistic interpretations of Darwinian evolutionary theory," as Charlene Haddock Seigfried puts it, brought them into a relationship of close mutual influence.⁴⁸

Merle Curti once wrote that history may have done justice to Addams's heart but has been less generous to her mind. Partly this was because Addams's wrote to be accessible, and her thinking always reflected the keen connection between ideas and practice rather than philosophical reflection for its own sake. Undoubtedly, too, the sentimentalizing of Addams's reputation has been a function of intellectual condescension from those who saw her during the war, as Theodore Roosevelt did, as "poor bleeding

⁴⁸ Charlene Haddock Seigfried, *Pragmatism and feminism: reweaving the social fabric* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), chap. 4. Dewey and his wife named one of their daughters Jane Mary after Addams and her partner Mary Smith. See also Seigfried's introduction to Jane Addams, *Democracy and social ethics* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002).

Jane." Her peace activism during the Great War cost her widespread support. And there has been a tendency, even among some modern feminist writers, to link her activism to Victorian maternalism.⁴⁹ Today, though, many feminists, including Linda Schott, Marilyn Fischer, Judy Whipps and Charlene Haddock Seigfried, have restored Addams's intellectual credentials by affirming her role as a formative pragmatist whose social theory rested on a startlingly modern cosmopolitanism and a rejection of essentialist categories for women and men. They have also demonstrated—convincingly—that her pacifism was neither naïve nor sentimental, but a function of the evolutionary social psychology she learned at both Hull-House and with pragmatists like Dewey and Mead.⁵⁰

Although Addams had been a member of the Anti-Imperialist League during the debate over the Philippines after 1898, and shared the podium with William James at a banquet of the

⁴⁹ Merle Curti, "Jane Addams on human nature," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 22 (1960), 240-53.

⁵⁰ Linda Schott, *Reconstructing women's thoughts: the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom before World War Two* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Fischer, "Addams's international pacifism and the rhetoric of maternalism," *NWSA Journal*, 18, 3 (Fall 2006), Judy D. Whipps, "The feminist pacifism of Emily Greene Balch, Nobel Peace Laureate," *ibid.*; and Seigfried, *Pragmatism and feminism*. Curti, to be fair, insisted that Addams came by her pragmatism before meeting Dewey or James, although he also reminds us that it never led to a rejection of her Christianity, as it did with the philosophers. Curti, "Jane Addams." 472. Even Randolph Bourne, who should have been a fellow cosmopolitan, evidently saw Addams' social work as condescending, and dismissed her as "Lady Bountiful." See Bourne to Aylse Gregory, March 13, 1914, and the recollection of Beulah Amidon to Aylse Gregory, October 4, 1948, Bourne Papers, Butler Library, Columbia University.

Universal Peace Congress in Boston in 1904,⁵¹ her first real foray into foreign affairs was the 1907 book *Newer ideals of peace*. And the book carried a decidedly Jamesian subtitle, "The moral substitutes for war."⁵² Like James, Addams conceded that war held a certain appeal in its capacity to bring people together, to sacrifice the extraneous elements of modernity for the heroic and dutiful and higher goals of human nature. In Mead's review, he called the patriotism that war induces the "highest form of social emotion."⁵³ Unlike James, however, who fretted continuously about social ennui and effeminacy and therefore believed that some moral equivalent of bellicosity would perpetually be needed, Addams believed there were others ways of satisfying a desire for self-sacrifice than sublimated masculine aggression.⁵⁴ Indeed, she

⁵¹ Linda Schott, "Jane Addams and William James on alternatives to war," *Journal of the History of Ideas* (1993).

⁵² James would not publish his essay "The moral equivalent of war," until 1910, but its main ideas had been circulated earlier. They were part of his chapter on "The value of saintliness" in *The varieties of religious experience* (1902), based on his Gifford lectures for 1901 and 1902, and were delivered again in a lecture at Stanford in 1906.

⁵³ Mead, "Review of *New Ideals of Peace* by Jane Addams," *American Journal of Sociology* 13 (1907), 122.

⁵⁴ James was explicitly critical of Addams's solution: "the only sentiment which the image of pacific cosmopolitan industrialism is capable of arousing," he wrote, "is shame as the idea of belonging to such a collectivity." (Quoted in "The moral equivalent of war," 357). I suspect that while some of this opposition might have been James's perpetual fear of excessive "tenderness" in modern society, it was also a function of his radical individualism and its distaste for all forms of collective enterprise, from corporations to nation-states. See Deborah Coon, "'One moment in the world's salvation': anarchism and the radicalization of William James," *Journal of American History* (June 1996), 70-99. Elshtain rightly suggests that there is something of a contradiction between Addams's pragmatist pluralism and her belief that peace was possible by the "primitive" universality of human nature that was becoming more and more clear in American cities. Pluralism and universality were terms constantly in tension in pragmatic social thought. James's fear of ennui and excessive "tenderness" is discussed in George Cotkin. *William James, public philosopher* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990). It is consistent with the view of both

argued, the modern age was gradually making war superfluous, as human energies were poured toward socially complex and cooperative production. The primitive need for warfare as the sole outlet for self-sacrifice was being replaced by a new international industrial order of mutual dependence. Although she knew it remained to be seen whether the spread of a more penetrating and egalitarian democracy would diminish the chance of war, or whether industrial relations could be properly democratized, she saw it on the horizon and sensed that her little corner of Chicago was showing the way.⁵⁵

Jean Bethke Elshtain and Mary Jo Deegan think Addams is here at her most unpersuasive, perhaps because they also think her faith in a coming age of peace was at least partly a function of a Victorian sentimentality.⁵⁶ But it was a position shared quite widely among American advocates, male and female, of the new internationalism. Columbia University anthropologist Franz Boas, in a 1912 pamphlet for the American Association for International Conciliation entitled "An anthropologist's view of war," argued that human history demonstrated the constant enlargement of the

George Santayana at the time, and Ann Douglas in our time, that Pragmatism was connected to modernity in ways that made it "tough-minded" and masculine, rejecting the sentimental idealism of Victorian America. See Santayana, *The genteel tradition: nine essays by George Santayana* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998); Ann Douglas, *The feminization of American culture* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1978), and *Terrible honesty: Mongrel Manhattan in the 1920s* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1996).

⁵⁵ Addams, *New ideals of peace*, 136.

⁵⁶ Elshtain, *Jane Addams and the dream of American democracy: a life* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 217-221; Mary Jo Deegan, *Jane Addams and the men of the Chicago School, 1892-1918* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1990), 225-27, 242. Elshtain's criticism also draws on realist international relations skepticism about the viability of creating an international society.

basic units of social organization. And he predicted that this enlargement would ultimately displace the nation-state and its associated loyalties. "If we understand," he wrote, "that the feeling of opposition to the stranger, which accompanies the feeling of solidarity of the nation, is the survival of the primitive feeling of specific differences, we are brought clearly face to face with those forces that will ultimately abolish warfare as well as legislative conflicts between nations."⁵⁷ True, this optimism would be shattered in 1914, but Addams' approach to peace in 1907 was more modern than it sounded, however much it indulged occasional maternalist rhetoric to help women enter the foreign policy sphere.⁵⁸

Her conception of peace derived explicitly from a pragmatist interpretation of her Chicago experience, in what she called "the immigrant city." The diverse labouring force of the great American cities provided the motive force and evidence of a new internationalism:

It is possible that we shall be saved from warfare by the "fighting rabble" itself, by the "quarrelsome mob" turned into kindly citizens

⁵⁷ Franz Boas, "An anthropologist's view of war," no. 52 (American Association for International Conciliation, March 1912), 14. The Association's Council of Direction included Charles Francis Adams, William Jennings Bryan, Nicholas Murray Butler, David Starr Jordan, and Elihu Root, among others. Undeterred by the First World War, Boas repeated this evolutionary argument in his landmark *Anthropology and the modern age* (New York: Norton, 1928), notably in chapter 4.

⁵⁸ Clearly maternalism was a two-edged sword. Addams' could advance women into the public sphere less threateningly by emphasizing the traditional characteristics of women that make such "intrusions" possible. A modernist or pragmatist conception of human relations that erased gender and racial essentialisms would have been more theoretically audacious and appealing to those who, for instance, followed the thinking of Herbert Croly or Walter Lippmann's *Drift and mastery*. But it would have sounded unusual coming from a prominent American woman.

of the world through the pressures of a cosmopolitan neighbourhood. It is not that they are shouting for peace—on the contrary, if they shout at all, they will continue to shout for war—but that they are really attaining cosmopolitan relations through daily experience. They will probably believe for a long time that war is noble and necessary both to engender and cherish patriotism; and yet all of the time, below their shouting they are living in the kingdom of human kindness. They are laying the simple and inevitable foundations for an international order as the foundations of tribal and national morality have been laid. They are developing the only sort of patriotism consistent with the intermingling of the nations; for the citizens of a cosmopolitan quarter find an insuperable difficulty when they attempt to hem in their conceptions of patriotism either to the 'old country' or to their adopted one.

...

There arises the hope that when this newer patriotism becomes large enough, it will overcome arbitrary boundaries and soak up the notion of nationalism.⁵⁹

Addams conception of nationalism was therefore evolutionary and progressive. She imagined that what began as a feudal relic of masculine tribalism was, by the 20th century, turning into a vast system of international interdependence that made such atavistic attachments increasingly irrelevant. But she was also struck that the state, by failing to attend to the needs of ordinary citizens, was actually abdicating the bonds of loyalty to citizens themselves. The people, the unions, the neighbourhoods of Chicago, had done more to create social cohesion through their reciprocal relations, than the distant liberal state had. The government, in effect, could only resort to primitive, masculine notions of honour and violence to cultivate patriotism.⁶⁰ Addams' experience at Hull-House was the centerpiece of an attempt to "socialize democracy," meaning, that social relations of trust and solidarity, equality and mutuality, had to be so woven into the fabric of daily life that the arbitrary tribalism of the past

⁵⁹ Addams, *Newer ideals of peace*, 10.

⁶⁰ Hansen, *The lost promise of patriotism*, 128-29.

would simply be displaced. Her fellow pragmatists called this the "reconstruction of experience," a process through which attitudes were changed and understandings of reality altered.⁶¹ "Because this reconstruction of experience," argues Marilyn Fisher, "is integral to the process of change and is in fact, one of the outcomes, 'means' and 'ends' cannot be separated. Democratic, just ends can only be obtained through democratic, consensual means. When violent methods are used, the violence affixes itself within the 'reconstruction of experience' and corrupts the outcome."⁶²

There is nothing particularly sentimental about this. It is informed by an evolutionary, progressive, anti-essentialist, experiential, and pluralistic rejection of old liberal abstractions. It is a deeply cosmopolitan vision of world society, reflective of the influence of pragmatism on Addams's thought. Though it saw human cooperation in the heart of the modern industrial order, it did not celebrate the commercial values of capitalism. Indeed, Addams argued that "unrestricted commercialism" was excellent ethical preparation for state aggression and imperialism, in so far as it taught people how to obscure the "moral basis of self-government" behind a screen of

⁶¹ Addams used the expression "reconstruction of experience" in *Twenty years at Hull-House* (1910), and attributed it directly to Dewey's aims in philosophy and what she had learned from him. On the need to "socialize democracy," see Addams, "The objective value of a social settlement," (1892) in *The Jane Addams Reader*, ed. Jean Bethke Elshtain (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 14-28, originally published in *Philanthropy and social progress* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell and Co., 1893), 27-40.

⁶² Fischer, "Addams's internationalist pacifism," 3.

economic successes. Her industrial order was not Darwinian but cooperative, consistent with the reform Darwinism of progressive liberals, and aiming to bring greater democratic authority to the integrative forces of industrialism.⁶³

It also, naturally, had something to say about women and state violence. First, as Mead pointed out in his review of *Newer ideals of peace*, the primitive concept of war carried with it the assumption that citizenship included only the warrior willing to defend the community. But the modern community had become so entwined with the interests and functions of women, that such a separation of authority was unintelligible. For women, "the whole industrial nature of the community relates her and her interests as closely to the process of social control as the man." The traditional functions of women in society had become political, democratic functions of adjusting and ameliorating the collective needs of industrial society.⁶⁴ Addams called this political step "enlarged housekeeping." As the economic order became more deeply integrated into every facet of life, as it made the sphere of *community* larger, and demanded a greater democratization of that order, women expanded their sphere of expertise from the household to the city, the city to the state, the state to the nation, and, ultimately, the nation to the world order itself. The need of a vastly integrated economy that knew no boundaries, demanded that it include women in the public

⁶³ Addams, *Newer ideals of peace*, 136.

⁶⁴ Mead's review of Jane Addams, *Newer ideals of peace*, in *The American Journal of Sociology*, 13 (1907), 127.

sphere as agents of human amelioration. Thus, she argued, history is a passage from walled militarism to industrialism and finally on to international humanitarianism. This final stage she called, absurdly by her own admission, "cosmic patriotism."⁶⁵

In this light, the Great War was a dramatic step back toward the primitive walled-state.⁶⁶ Unbowed by her poor predictive skills, Addams insisted, as she organized the American Women's Peace Party and prepared to chair the International Congress of Women in April 1915, that women had a right to protest this reversion, and to insist that the continuously enlarged sphere of humanitarian housekeeping would produce a new form of *internationalism* that sanctioned the voice of progressive, politically and socially-engaged women in international politics. Addams concluded that peace between nation-states was ultimately, then, a function of social justice at home, the extent to which the social order reflected non-

⁶⁵ Fischer, "Addams's internationalist pacifism." "Cosmic patriotism" in Addams, *Newer ideals of peace*, 145. See also Allen F. Davis, *American heroine: the life and legend of Jane Addams* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 187.

⁶⁶ As was the new Progressive Party's orientation under Theodore Roosevelt toward military preparedness. Addams had, controversially, stepped into partisan politics and endorsed the Progressives in 1912, writing parts of their platform for the party's Chicago convention. She hoped that the new party would continue to redress the wrongs of the industrial order and back women's suffrage. After it lost, she moved her support to Wilson in 1916, especially as it became clear that the "Bull Moose" Progressives, at least, were not a peace party. Davis, *American heroine*, 184-97; Elshtain, *Jane Addams*, 191-94. Addams was not the only person to be shocked out of her complacency by the war. Ray Stannard Baker lamented that "we have produced the mechanical tools faster than the spiritual power which enables us to use them." And Randolph Bourne editorialized in the *New Republic* castigated America's "mental unpreparedness" that imagined the world happily evolving toward a new "cosmopolitan" peace. Baker and Bourne quoted in Thompson, *Reformers and war*, 88.

hierarchical pluralism, a commitment to radical, democratic openness, and a new industrial order. All of these new attitudes, she believed, were not simply a tribute to the success of the American experiment (which, she conceded, had its blind spots), but were a microcosm of the world itself. Her hopes for peace activism were "founded," she wrote, "chiefly upon the fact that the settlement at the end of this war may definitely recognize a fundamental change in the functions of government taking place in all civilized nations." The war-state was a peculiar retreat to its primitive self-defence function. "But because this primitive conception of the function of government and of the obsolete division between the lives of men and women has obtained during the long months of the European war, there is obviously great need at the end of the war that women should attempt, in an organized capacity, to make their contribution to that governmental internationalism between the nations which shall in some measure approximate the genuine internationalism, already developed in so many directions among the peoples."⁶⁷ At its heart, Addams grounded her conception of women's role in diplomacy not from an essentialist reading of female biology but from their experiences in the homes and polyglot cities of modern industrial society.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Addams, "Women and internationalism," in Addams et al, *Women at The Hague*, 65.

⁶⁸ "Our protest reflects our emotions as well as our convictions, but still more is the result of deep-grounded human experience." See Addams, "What war is destroying," (1915) in eds. Marilyn Fischer and Judy Whipps *Addams's essays and speeches on peace (1899-1935)* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2003), 75-78

These thoughts guided her entry into international peace politics. Paul Kellogg, the editor of *Survey*, a magazine for which both Addams and Mead contributed (Addams was an associate editor and served on its national council), invited her to join a round table conference on peace at Lillian Wald's Henry Street settlement in New York in the fall of 1914.⁶⁹ Addams, in turn, invited her friend Emily Balch, then teaching economics and sociology at Wellesley, to join.⁷⁰ The Henry Street group became the locus of New York's anti-interventionist activism, but initially its aims were simply to urge the United States and other neutral states to do something constructive to stop the slaughter in Europe. During the 1916 preparedness debate, the Henry Street group also founded the American Union Against Militarism (AUAM). In discussions with Carrie Chapman Catt and Emily Balch, however, Addams decided that while she preferred men and women working together on public projects, the war posed unique questions about the urgency of women's activism. Women, she argued, were not better than men, nor did their biology dictate their pacifist natures. But her concept of "enlarged housekeeping" gave women a more powerful interest in stopping war and in thus claiming their citizenship in the public sphere. Using the suffrage infrastructure, and encouraged by Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence and Rosika Schwimmer, she assembled a gathering of several women's groups to the New Willard Hotel in Washington

⁶⁹ Davis, *American heroine*, 212-13.

⁷⁰ Lillian Wald to Emily Balch, September 22, 1914, Balch Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection.

in January 1915 to form the Women's Peace Party (or WPP, which in 1919 became the U.S. section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom or WILPF). With Fannie Garrison Villard, the seventy-one year old daughter of William Lloyd Garrison, at her side, Addams insisted that women "must start the work of preventing war," because "there are things upon which women are more sensitive."⁷¹

The WPP's preamble walked a blurry line between defining feminist pacifism as a biological outcome of maternalism, or a cultural product of the role historically allocated to women as nurturers of humanity. Addams's position in *Newer ideals* and her evolutionary pragmatism clearly leaned toward the latter. Women, the WPP argued, had a "peculiar moral passion of revolt against both the cruelty and waste of war." Women demanded a "share in deciding between war and peace."⁷² The ambiguity here was also reflected in the tension between tying pacifism to suffrage. Although the WPP was assembled largely through existing suffrage networks, there were compelling tactical reasons to separate them. Catt feared that women's opposition to the war might cost them political credibility and affirm the anti-suffrage argument that women could not be trusted with nation's defenses. Conversely, some WPP members insisted that it would be a tragedy

⁷¹ Quoted in Linda Schott, *Restructuring women's thoughts*, 40.

⁷² Quoted in Harriet Hyman Alonso, "Introduction," to Jane Addams, Emily G. Balch, and Alice Hamilton, *Women at The Hague: the International Congress of Women and its results* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2003), xi-xii. See also Lela B. Costin, "Feminism, pacifism, internationalism and the 1915 International Congress of Women," *Women's Studies International Forum* 5, 3/4 (1982), 301-15.

for, as in the case of Jeanette Rankin, "the first women ever in Congress to vote for war."⁷³ Balch's own brother—who admitted he carried with him unrepentant prejudices—attacked her decision to form a *women's* peace precisely because he perceived it as an attempt to inject the universal cause of peace with the "thoroughly selfish" interests of the women's "clique." Balch, understanding that the equality of women was not a particularist interest but central to the pluralism in which all Americans had an interest, ignored her brother's intemperance. She replied patiently from Amsterdam that women, "being outsiders have a peculiar locus standi which is proving to have considerable strategic value."⁷⁴ Indeed, because women *could* meet more freely than their male counterparts at the time, the WPP and IWC platforms were actually the first serious attempts to establish a comprehensive postwar peace along democratic lines.

The Women's Peace Party's "program of constructive peace" included arms limitations, the nationalization of arms manufacturing (to prevent blood profiteering), the removal of the economic causes of war (tariff barriers), democratic control of

⁷³ Schott, *Reconstructing women's thoughts*, 60.

⁷⁴ And yet Balch conceded later that the delegates at The Hague who had the vote (the Danish and Norwegian delegates) "showed an additional timidity—the timidity of those who are in a critical and delicate position." Francis Balch to Emily Balch, April 7, 1915, and Francis Balch to Emily Balch, undated [April 1915]; Emily Balch to Francis Balch, May 16, 1915. Balch Papers, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. Balch later wrote that women were "in the main outside of the politics of the past ... free from the bad old political habits and traditions, and free to strike out a new political method, not dominated by party, in which social and moral values shall outweigh all others." Quoted in Leila J. Rupp, "Constructing internationalism: the case of transnational women's organizations, 1888-1945," *American Historical Review* 99, 5 (December 1994), 1585; Addams, Balch, Hamilton, *Women at The Hague*, 10.

foreign policy, self-determination, freedom of the seas, and the construction of a "Concert of Nations." It was, in short, a prototype for the Fourteen Points. It supported America's neutrality and proposed that the country lead in creating a league of neutral states that could engage in what it called "continuous mediation." This concept, drafted by the Canadian-born University of Wisconsin English professor Julia Grace Wales, called for the creation of International Commission of experts to devise mediation proposals ("in the spirit of constructive internationalism") to put before the belligerents. This would avoid war-states waiting for an armistice only under favourable military conditions, would be a pool of creative ideas for postwar settlement, and ensure a measure of disinterestedness in the armistice process.⁷⁵ The WPP's platform, as detailed and thorough as any circulating in 1915, became the basis for the International Congress of Women when it assembled in The Hague at the end of April. Dutch women provided the original impetus for the gathering (and over one thousand delegates), but Addams was asked to serve as chair. Balch's expertise in economics and immigration secured her an invitation from Addams to go to the meeting along side 45 other Americans.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ Julia Grace Wales, "International plan for continuous mediation without armistice," brochure, Wales Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society; Barbara Steinson, *American women's activism in World War I* (New York: Garland, 1982), 52-53; Mary Louise Degen, *The history of the Woman's Peace Party* (New York: Garland, 1972), 46-47; Jane Addams, *Peace and bread in time of war* (Urbana, Il: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 7.

⁷⁶ Addams to Balch, March 26, 1915, Balch Papers, reel129.5.

Though less prolific than Addams, Emily Greene Balch's intellectual trajectory show the same relationship between social experience and pacifism, tying, as with Addams, the idea of peace to the industrial immigrant experience in the United States. The Boston-born Balch became a feminist at Bryn Mawr, which she attended in the late 1880s shortly after the nominally non-denominational but largely Quaker college opened. In her final year she switched from literature to economics after reading Jacob Riis's *How the other half lives* and at the encouragement of one of her teachers, the progressive sociologist Franklin Giddings. She won a scholarship to study overseas after graduating from the first class at Bryn Mawr in 1889, and went to Paris to study French public assistance programs under Émile Levasseur (1890-91). She returned to the US, worked for the Children's Aid Society in Boston and then, in July 1892, attended Felix Alder's Summer School for Applied Ethics in Plymouth. The curriculum included lectures by numerous emerging social reformers and academics, including Henry Demarest Lloyd, John Bates Clark, Henry Carter Adams (a friend and inspiration to Dewey at Michigan), Franklin Giddings and John W. Burgess. Also on the list of lecturers was Jane Addams.⁷⁷ There she explained the political implications of Hull-House. It endeavors, she said, "to make social intercourse express the growing sense of the economic unity of society. It is an effort to add the social function to democracy. It was opened on the theory that the

⁷⁷ "Program of School of Applied Ethics," *International Journal of Ethics* (July 1891), 483-94.

dependence of classes on each other was reciprocal; and that as the social relation is essentially a reciprocal relation, it gave a form of expression that has particular value."⁷⁸

As a result of that summer and her new friendship with Addams, Balch and Helen Cheever opened the settlement Denison House in Boston the next winter. Through the next few years, she also spent time with Addams at Hull-House, although in the end she decided she was better suited to being a teacher than a social worker (Adler's lectures urged people to pursue their "vocation"). Balch furthered her education at the Harvard annex, and then for a quarter at the University of Chicago in the spring of 1895 (the first year Dewey and Mead taught there), followed by a full year at Berlin in 1895-96. In Chicago, she studied sociology under Lester Ward and Albin Small.⁷⁹ At Berlin, where she was one of the first women allowed to study, she sat in on the seminars of "state socialist" economist Adolph Wagner⁸⁰ and social theorist Georg Simmel.⁸¹ In Germany and later London, she

⁷⁸ Jane Addams, "The subjective necessity of social settlements," in Christopher Lasch, ed., *The social thought of Jane Addams* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

⁷⁹ Mercedes M. Randall's introduction to *Beyond nationalism: the social thought of Emily Greene Balch*, ed. Mercedes Randall (New York: Twayne, 1972); Randall, *Improper Bostonian: Emily Greene Balch, Nobel Laureate, 1946* (New York: Twayne, 1964). There is no evidence of contact with Dewey or Mead who, at that stage, were teaching in the Philosophy and Psychology Department.

⁸⁰ On Wagner's influence on American progressive economists, notably Richard Ely but also Emily Balch, see Daniel Rodgers, *Atlantic crossings: social politics in a progressive age* (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 1998), 90-91, 95.

⁸¹ Balch was one of two American women in Simmel's seminar that met in his home. She refers to this in a wartime letter to Simmel in her papers, July 11, 1915. Simmel would later dismiss American Pragmatism as a superficial branch of a wider philosophical current. But his 1895 essay "On a relationship between the theory of natural selection and

became exposed, for the first time it would seem, to radical socialists and Marxists. On the ship back to the United States, she met Katherine Coman from Wellesley, who invited her to join the teaching staff there, which she did immediately. She specialized in economics (teaching "Wagner's law of the ever-widening social functions of the state," as Rodgers puts it) and sociology and, relying on a Deweyan-teaching method that stressed first-hand experience.⁸² She urged her students to become involved in social reforms and to work in Boston's inner-city institutions (including Denison House) as preparation for both professional and academic work. She also conducted research for her first book, *Our fellow Slavic citizens* (1910), which took her to Austro-Hungary and back to Slavic communities in the US. The book, one of the first serious studies of an American immigrant group, disputed the common view that immigrants were a threat to American norms. Balch predicted that immigration would change both immigrants and natives (biologically through intermarriage "fusion" and culturally by working toward the amelioration of ethnic frictions). Balch's view was pluralistic, like Addams'. Native-born Americans needed to abandon efforts at forced or coercive assimilation, and focus on a common commitment to "justice, for humane conditions of living, for beauty and for true, not merely formal, liberty." The resulting society would

epistemology," was acknowledged by James as an independent contribution to the evolution of pragmatism in the late 1890s. See Hans Joas, *Pragmatism and social theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 101-02.

⁸² Rodgers, *Atlantic crossings*, 95.

"preserve every difference to which men cling with affection, without feeling ourselves any the less fellow citizens and comrades."⁸³

Balch's thinking here converged with the work of Franz Boas (who arrived at Columbia a few years before Dewey) and Chicago sociologist William I. Thomas, both of whom, in their own ways, had begun unraveling the scientific bases for accepting race and sex differences. While Boas attacked immigration restrictions by arguing that even immigrant physiology was mutable,⁸⁴ Thomas, who had ties to Mead and Dewey, was earlier part of an extensive debate over the role of the "environment" (what today we might refer to as *culture*) in forming the characteristics of race and gender that most Americans attributed to biology (or God). Besides Thomas, the debate involved one of Balch's colleagues at Wellesley, Cordelia Nevers. Nevers pointed out that behavioural

⁸³ Emily G. Balch, *Our fellow Slavic citizens* (New York: Charities Publication Committee, 1910), 424-25.

⁸⁴ Balch gave a cautiously favourable review to a 1912 collection of essays edited by Jeremiah Jenks and W. Jett Lauck entitled *The immigration problem*, which included an important essay by Boas. The book was a *de facto* summary of the work of Roosevelt's Immigration Commission and argued that the racial fears generated by American nativists were largely misplaced. Balch review of J.W. Jenks and W.J. Lauck, *The immigration problem* in *Political Science Quarterly* 27, 3 (September 1912), 549-52. Boas contributed to the Dillingham Commission in immigration but his position on nationalism and assimilation placed him squarely next to Dewey, Addams and Balch. "If we once recognize the contributions that varying forms of thought have made to the cultural advance of mankind, we shall see that it would be a wise policy to preserve and cultivate all useful elements that are brought to our shores by the untold millions who seek a home here. It seems to my mind that if Americanization is to mean the extinction of all these individual characteristics, if it is to mean the imposition of a new form of thought and the suppression of everything else, we deprive ourselves of one of the elements that might be made a most powerful stimulus in the development of our cultured ideals." Franz Boas paper [Immigrants and immigration], n.d., Boas Professional Papers, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia.

tests that set out to demonstrate the innate differences between the sexes could not possibly eliminate environment as an influence until such time as men and women were equally free to enter any profession. Male scientists tended to assume that cultural conditions were a *consequence* of biology and therefore did not have to be eliminated as variables. Balch took her position in the Sociology Department at Wellesley just as this controversy was heating up. Moreover, William Thomas's wife Harriet would become the executive secretary of the Women's Peace Party.⁸⁵ Circumstantially, at least, the WPP was organized around ideas that challenged the essentialism of sex-differences, and used that challenge as a basis for linking sexual equality to peace.

Like many of her generation, Balch thought that the industrial age had forever subverted America traditions, or at least made the abstract, "over-intellectualized" doctrines of the 18th century less relevant to modern life. The immigrant nation made a mockery of what James called the "vicious abstractionism" of tradition American racial attitudes.⁸⁶ The Founding Fathers "were innovators in their day," Balch wrote, "We can follow them not by servile imitation but by innovation in ours." These passages, of course, refer to the common progressive complaint that America had become dogmatically wedded to a formal and legalistic version of atomistic, laissez-faire liberalism that

⁸⁵ Schott, *Reconstructing women's thoughts*, 50-52.

⁸⁶ James quoted in Horace Kallen, "A meaning of Americanism," in Kallen, *Culture and democracy in the United States* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Press, 1998), 55.

was simply used to justify vast concentrations of economic wealth. "The new age," Balch insisted, "must be a social age, an age of more fraternal relations between men, an age in which exploitation by class is outgrown, an age in which brutal and greedy rivalry of nation with nation is outgrown, an age in which the unlikeness of other races will be conceived to be as much an asset as the unlikeness of wind and string instruments in a symphony."⁸⁷ This pluralism, a homage to a world made by the application of intelligence, bears all the traces of a fully developed pragmatic social theory.

Balch's work on immigration did not prepare her for the War either, which she thought was simply "a senseless interruption of social-economic progress."⁸⁸ Although she claims to have become interested in international arbitration while at Wellesley, her peace writings reflected, too, the imprint of Addams's *New ideals of peace* in asserting an evolutionary understanding of how the coming industrial order might make war irrelevant, at least in so far as that order reflected a pluralistic socialized democracy. Because Balch's internationalism rested on extrapolating from the integrative model of American immigration, it too linked itself to the pragmatist position that people "defined themselves

⁸⁷ Emily G. Balch, "What it means to be an American," address delivered at Wellesley College, February 22, 1916, in Randall, *Beyond nationalism*, 39. The orchestral metaphor may have been influenced by pragmatist Horace Kallen's famous essay "Democracy versus the melting-pot," published in *The Nation* in a year earlier, February 1915. It is reprinted in Kallen, *Culture and democracy*, 59-117.

⁸⁸ Emily G. Balch, "Toward a planetary civilization," (1942) in Randall, *Beyond nationalism*, 163.

largely through changing relationships with others."⁸⁹

Understanding the social nature of the self, allowed Balch to conceive of nationalism as a macrocosm of this interdependent identity building to which individuals within modern communities have adjusted themselves. If antagonistic elements of the cities could acquire the integrative tools of democratic engagement with, so too could nation-states, at least if their own socialization were sufficiently developed. So far, all of this resonated with Mead's concept of the social-self morphing into *international-mindedness*.

In practical terms, it led Balch toward the Henry Street group in 1914, the Women's Peace Party in January 1915, the dramatic trans-Atlantic voyage to The Hague in April 1915, which in turn produced the Women's International Committee for Permanent Peace in Amsterdam. The Hague meeting, despite widespread hostility from the press, sent delegations to fourteen capitals of both belligerent and neutral countries, including the Vatican. While Addams met with the leaders of the belligerents, Balch went north to Scandinavia and Russia. By this point, the Scandinavian countries had conveyed their willingness to sponsor a conference of neutrals if the United States would take the lead. Balch returned to the United States to help Addams lobby Wilson.

⁸⁹ Quoted in Sondra Herman, "Internationalism as a current in the peace movement," in Charles Chatfield, ed., *Peace movements in America*, (New York: Schocken Books, 1973), 173.

The two met with the president repeatedly but separately in the second half of 1915, at a time when the president still believed he had some room to maneuver as a potential mediator. Addams had toured numerous belligerent countries after the ICW broke up in May, meeting with the prime ministers of Britain, Germany, Austro-Hungary, Italy, France, Belgium and Russia.⁹⁰ But she knew the key actor in this process remained the United States and she returned home in July. Between July and December 1915 she paid six visits to Wilson. On July 19th, she met with House in New Hampshire, but House was skeptical from the outset. Though he thought Addams was more sensible than her friend Oswald Villard, he did not think either of them "had anything of value to say." He believed Addams had been deliberately filled with misinformation during her European tour and only tolerated her because he believed she had widespread influence in the country and could not easily be dismissed.⁹¹

Balch met him on August 18, but Wilson told his wife Edith that he simply could not see himself leading a conference of neutrals at that point. Balch reported to Addams that the meeting had gone well but Wilson remained uncommitted.⁹² She requested another interview for her and the main organizer of The Hague meeting, Dutch suffragist Aletta Jacobs, which Wilson declined

⁹⁰ Addams, *Peace and bread in time of war*, 12; Davis, *American heroine*, 221-22.

⁹¹ House to WW, July 17, 1915, and House to WW, July 19, 1915, *WWP*, 33, 516, 532-33.

⁹² WW to Edith Bolling Galt, August 18, 1915; Emily G. Balch to Jane Addams, August 19, 1915, *WWP*, vol. 34 (1915), 243, 250-52. A letter to his wife on August 20th suggests it was an idea her was considering. WW to Galt, August 20, 1915, 260-61.

for fear of adverse publicity. Balch and Jacobs met instead with Lansing on August 31. Lansing was condescending. "I shall not bore you with an account of the conversation which took place. I tried to have them explain what they meant by 'continuous mediation,' but they seemed rather vague as to its meaning. I said that we had offered our services and that the offer still stood ... I have said enough to show you the futile character of the interview. These ladies impressed me as most earnest in purpose and inspired by humanitarian motives but failing to view the situation practically. The perversity and selfishness of human nature are factors which they have left out of the problem." Wilson agreed and asked Lansing to inform them formally that he did not think "it would be wise for the United States to take the initiative in calling such a conference."⁹³ Balch would later argue that the liberal warriors and so-called realists were the ones who misread human nature.

We must remember always, in dealing with others, the peculiarities of human nature, and we can best understand human nature by the rule, which is as scientific as it is good, of believing that others are likely to act as we should act in a given situation. How far will a threat of outside force lead a nation to change its political customs and institutions, and how far will it act as a riveting and consolidating force upon those elements of self-will which are so powerful in us all?⁹⁴

⁹³ Lansing to WW, September 1, 1915, and WW to Lansing, September 1, 1915, *WWP*, 34 (1915), 397-99; Addams, *Peace and bread in time of war* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 17.

⁹⁴ Emily G. Balch, "War and its relation to democracy and world order," (1917). While House and Lansing routinely dismissed the women petitioners to Wilson, clearly the "authoritarian progressivism" of House's *Philip Dru* was a far cry from the open-ended radical democracy of Addams and Balch, even though Dru is himself in favour of women's suffrage. On *Dru*, see Godfrey Hodgson, *Woodrow Wilson's right hand: the life of Colonel Edward House* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 273, 50-53.

Balch was deeply disappointed with her failure in Washington, even though she claims she left the meeting with her "greatest admiration" for Wilson still in tact.⁹⁵ In October, she wrote an article for *The Survey* outlined the case for neutral mediation, and reminding Americans that however much the war might appear to be a conflict between "two conceptions of national policy," democracy and imperialism, in fact war, once enjoined, did its best to blur the distinction by ripping the forces of democracy to shreds. Moreover, any settlement produced by the battlefield alone would be an "arbitrament of violence" in which relative power would beat out any just and stable adjustment of the international order.⁹⁶ She headed back to Scandinavia to work for the Committee on Constructive Peace, an offshoot of the Stockholm Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation. There she drafted, among other things, a position paper on "International Colonial Administration," which anticipated the League of Nation's Mandate system.⁹⁷ When she finally returned to the United States in 1916, the country had moved from neutrality into a bitter preparedness debate that was the overture to the 1916 presidential election. Balch took sabbatical from Wellesley and moved to New York to be closer to the Henry Street Group and its Committee Against Militarism

⁹⁵ Emily G. Balch, "Working for peace," *Bryn Mawr Alumnae Bulletin* 13, 5 (May 1933), 78.

⁹⁶ Emily G. Balch, "The time to make peace," *Survey* 35 (October 2, 1915), 24-25.

⁹⁷ "International colonial administration," (1916) pamphlet issued by the Stockholm Neutral Conference, in Randall, *Beyond nationalism*, 87-91.

(which became the American Union Against Militarism). Wilson's 1916 meetings with members of the AUAM brought out, at last, his conviction that military force was, in the end, the only thing that can vindicate moral force.⁹⁸ Balch did not relent, but clearly a pacifist organization would lose the ear of the administration as it geared toward preparedness and war. She attended lectures at Columbia and prepared her book *Approaches to the great settlement* (1918), an anthology of proposals for postwar peace that AUAM chairman Amos Pinchot regarded as a work of "great public importance" in the upcoming debate over the postwar peace.⁹⁹ As the United States moved toward intervention in early 1917, Balch worked for more radical peace groups, including the Emergency Peace Federation and the closely watched People's Council of Americans for Democracy and Terms of Peace. It was this work that eventually got her fired from Wellesley.

Fortunately for Lansing and House, Addams' return to the US coincided with the biggest misstep of her career, the controversial Carnegie Hall speech on July 9 during which she claimed that soldiers in the trenches had to be drugged to take part in bayonet charges.¹⁰⁰ The outburst in the press set back Addams's career for years, and undoubtedly weakened the message she had brought back to Wilson, even though she continued to

⁹⁸ "A memorial to the President of the United States by the American Union Against Militarism," [May 8, 1916]; "A colloquy with a group of antipreparedness leaders," May 8, 1916, *Woodrow Wilson Papers*, vol. 36, 632-48.

⁹⁹ AP to John A. McSparran, October 11, 1917, Amos Pinchot Papers, Library of Congress.

¹⁰⁰ Degen, *History of the Women's Peace Party*, 111-114.

testify before Congress in the winter of 1916 on the dangers of militarism and insist that real popular opinion about the war was already being repressed by a patriotic press.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, Thomas Knock believes that Wilson took the WPP platform seriously, calling it "by far the best formulation which up to the moment has been put out by anybody." Addams and her allies believed for a while that they had provided Wilson with a nascent version of the Fourteen Points, a framework for a democratic peace after the war that they seemed increasingly powerless to prevent. And if proof were needed, Roosevelt openly believed that Wilson, in 1916, had fallen under the egregious influence of the "ultra-pacifists."¹⁰²

As progressive liberals moved toward a robust and patriotic policy of intervention in the War, feminist internationalists mediation efforts were necessarily overshadowed by their pacifism. To the question of what to do to stop German militarism, Balch conceded she had no firm answer. But she tried in 1917 to address Wilson's and John Dewey's argument that because force lay behind all political change, there might indeed be progressive objects worth fighting for.¹⁰³ Balch agreed that there could be no *a priori* principles governing the morality of force, that since energy is present in all actions, in and of itself force had "no moral color." What mattered was coercion.

¹⁰¹ Hansen, *The lost promise of patriotism*, 171-73.

¹⁰² Thomas Knock, *To end all wars*, 52, Roosevelt on 61.

¹⁰³ Dewey, "Force, violence and law," (1916) and "Force and coercion," (1916) *John Dewey: The Middle Works*, 10 (Carbondale, Il: Southern Illinois University Press, 1985), 211-15, 244-51.

"Violence is coercion by force, but the wills of others may be as effectually coerced by other means as by violence, and as wrongly. The essence of wrongful coercion is violation of that liberty which is the most sacred treasure of personality." Drawing on her understanding of social psychology, Balch explained that coercion invokes "the heats and confusions of fighting animal instinct," and the refusal to acknowledge in one's self "the existence of any but the purest motives." This clash of primitive wills invariably inverts the means-ends calculus by stirring counter-productive resistance, and by causing each side to forget "rational aims" but to fight for victory *per se*, "if not for mere fighting's sake. It is an appetite, lust, as real as any other."¹⁰⁴

War as a technique of social change, Balch's fellow Henry Street activist Randolph Bourne wrote famously, sets its own ends—victory—and its own correlating means—whatever aids in victory. "In wartime," he wrote, "one's pragmatic conscience moves in a vacuum. There is no leverage to clutch. To a philosopher of the creative intelligence, the fact that war blots out the choice of ends and even of means should be the final argument against its use as a technique for any purpose whatever war is just that absolute situation which is its own end and its own means, and which speedily outstrips the power of

¹⁰⁴ Emily G. Balch, "The great solution," *The Friend* (July 16, 1917), in Randall, *Beyond nationalism*, 220-21.

intelligent and creative control."¹⁰⁵ Not only had the promise of Pragmatism been corrupted by the exaltation of means over ends, but the war had exposed what Bourne always believed to be the case: the nation-state was merely a "mystical concept existing for the convenience of the governing classes," and that war was one of the vital instruments by which States sustained that wretched mythology. Although Balch's writing lacked Randolph Bourne's forceful elegance, her conclusion was similar to his: war creates its own ends and defies any optimistic attempt to rationally control its outcomes.

Despite her brief influence on Wilson, Addams's stature never recovered from the Carnegie speech, that is, it never recovered from openly challenging the pieties of patriotism. She was eventually forced to challenge Wilsonianism directly by asking "was not war in the interest of democracy for the salvation of civilization a contradiction in terms, whoever said it or however often it was repeated?"¹⁰⁶ But one of the lessons learned by both Balch and Addams during the war was that patriotism had the capacity to muffle other voices, even in a seemingly robust democracy. Addams made her attacks on the press central to her reminiscences of the peace Congress after the war. She insisted, probably rightly, that opposition to the war was much more widespread in Europe (and America) than one ever would

¹⁰⁵ Randolph Bourne, "Conscience and Intelligence in War," *Dial*, 63 (September 13, 1917), 194.

¹⁰⁶ Addams, "Patriotism and pacifists in wartime," (1917) in Jean Bethke Elshtain, ed., *The Jane Addams Reader* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 361; Emily G. Balch, "The time to make peace," 24-25.

have guessed had it not been for the intimidation of free speech, for the linking of combat to patriotism, and patriotism to traditional concepts of masculine and feminine virtue.¹⁰⁷ For a brief while, women had, as Balch put it, some strategic *locus standi* in making the case for mediation and peace, a small space in the public sphere allowable to them because of their perceived standing as unique and privileged defenders of motherhood. But it was not a space that could long survive the "megaphone" of patriotic utterances in America, once Wilson had elected to join the war.

On the surface, much of the thinking of the Women's Peace Party came from the same fertile intellectual soil as Mead's internationalism, with its glowing support for Woodrow Wilson in 1916. But as the United States moved from neutrality to preparedness to intervention, the differences became more pronounced. The problem is to figure out why. If I were to offer a pragmatist account of these differences, of course, I would ground them in the cultural experiences of Mead, Addams, and Balch. These experiences naturally have much to do with their accounts of the social power of women in patriarchy, but if anyone ought to be capable to stepping outside of a perspective and seeing the self as a social construction, it should have been a pragmatist. But their different positions on the war do bear

¹⁰⁷ Addams, "Factors in continuing the war," in *Women at The Hague*, 39-46; Balch, "The time to make peace," *Survey* 35 (October 2, 1915), 24-25.

the indelible traces of their experiences as reformers, and their hopes for the future. In that sense, in so far as pragmatists argue that ideas are "intentional" and "purposive," the feminist internationalism of Balch and Addams reflected their desire to insert women into the international public sphere, beyond the transnational suffrage movement that anticipated the peace movement. Their view of nationalism was conditioned by the exceptional *fact* of international cooperation and solidarity between women seeking suffrage. The very act of gathering women from neutral and belligerent nations during wartime demonstrated that many women, *qua* women, felt a powerful loyalty outside the bonds of the very nation-states that denied them full-citizenship.¹⁰⁸ Their definitions of war and peace shared much with Mead, but their understanding of the social costs of war, its ability to exclude marginalized voices, and to drive women from citizenship, meant that pacifism was the only possible position to take consistent with socialized democracy.

I would suggest that if anyone's writings exhibit wishful thinking and idealism, it was Mead's. Like Dewey, the consequences of the war were as much of a shock as the war itself. He seemed so desperately to want to vindicate the emerging role of the United States, to hope that what drove it forward was a genuine global altruism that signaled its full emergence as an internationally-minded nation-state. If one were

¹⁰⁸ Jo Vellacott, "A place for pacifism and transnationalism in feminist theory: the early work of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom," *Women's History Review* 2, 1 (1993), 32.

a psychologist, one might speculate that this might have had something to do with his son's involvement in the war. In a letter to his son on the eve of his departure to the front, Mead wrote:

It is becoming true on this side too that the issue is clear. Workingmen and socialists have come to believe it. It is getting bigger and realer than anyone believed it could become. So far there has been nothing here to mar our attitude or our spirit. There has been bungling and waste, but it was not to be avoided. Perhaps America is bigger and more self conscious than we thought she was. It's too great to be realized, but it is so real that it takes along and puts men in the situation that creates the ideas, if they haven't been there before ... You are in the greatest thing the world has ever known, and you have the finest stuff of which men are made, though you may not know it. I trust that things will so fall out that some of the meaning may get into your own experience so that it will be your own. It won't get into mine for you and the rest of you are doing my fighting for me.¹⁰⁹

But there's enough common ground with his friend Dewey here, to imagine that for a moment, the instrumentalism of pragmatism—that is, its loud assertion that the world was plastic and made by the applied intelligence of humans—was simply too intoxicating for Mead. Progressive liberals were certainly divided over the implications of the war but there had been a rough consensus of optimism that the end of the war might see the final struggle, as Ray Stannard Baker put it, between the old order and the emerging new one.¹¹⁰ The predictions of the demise of private, selfish capital were stunningly consistent in the final year of the war, perhaps a desperate attempt to make sure that the blood and sacrifice, the repression of rights at home, might be redeemed by the evisceration of reactionary forces abroad. These hopes were also stunningly wrong. But to the *feminist internationalists*, the

¹⁰⁹ G.H. Mead to Henry Castle Mead, May 8, 1918, box 1, folder 9, Mead Papers.

¹¹⁰ Thompson, 233.

collapse of the democratic peace in Europe was *not* a surprise. The war had interrupted all the channels of internationalism that made this conversion from an oligarchic economic order to a socialized and democratic one possible. Nationalism was part of the problem, linked to protectionism, the power of capital to control the state in its interests, and the like. A war waged through the instrumentalities of tribal cohesion, even if in the name of a new world democracy, could not also be the means of giving birth to a cosmopolitan democracy.

The stories of the WPP and the WILPF have been well covered, even if they have perhaps not attracted the sort of interest they warrant outside of feminist and peace research. As an expression of an alternative vision of a post-nationalist American internationalism (if that makes sense), the thinking of Balch and Addams offers a profound critique of the nation-state and the sociology of patriotism. More than that, they point, in Leila Rupp's words, toward a "more universal collective identity." Colin Powell once called the United States the "first universal nation," but American internationalism in the 20th century has still depended too much on a narrower definition of the nation. While American internationalism continues to speak in terms of universalizing a community of values, it depends on a highly ascriptive patriotism at home to mobilize support for the exercise of world power. If Mead was right, this exceptionalist habit may well be an indictment of the United States' fragile sense of nationhood, not its self-confidence.