

Pre-empting Communism: Kennedy, Johnson, and British Guiana

by

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On September 17, 2002, President George W. Bush formally issued his National Security Strategy, which set forth the “Bush Doctrine” that the United States would stop rogue states and the terrorists that they support before they could use weapons of mass destruction (wmd) against the United States or its friends by unilateral pre-emptive war if necessary. Ten days later, Sen. Edward Kennedy harkened back to his brother’s actions during the Cuban missile crisis. Taking “preventative military action,” was as ill advised in 1962 as it is today, he said. “Might does not make right. America cannot write its own rules for the modern world. To attempt to do so would be unilateralism run amok.”¹

Former Vice President Al Gore joined Sen. Kennedy, also castigating the doctrine of pre-emption: “[H]e is proclaiming a new, uniquely American right to pre-emptively attack whomsoever he may deem represents a potential future threat.... The doctrine of preemption is based on the idea that in the era of proliferating WMD, and against the background of a sophisticated terrorist threat, the United States cannot wait for proof of a fully established mortal threat, but should rather act at any point to cut that short.”²

Presidential historian, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who was a special assistant to President John Kennedy, called pre-emption “a tragically mistaken notion,” which “I regard with deep gloom.” Such faulty policies, he said, came because Bush and his administration “lack a sense of history.”³ Schlesinger said that it would have been ““unthinkable”” to follow such a strategy during the Cold War.⁴

Pre-emption did not begin with George W. Bush. In Guatemala and Iran, Dwight Eisenhower used the CIA to remove governments he feared were on the verge of turning Communist, and in the Congo, the CIA helped to overthrow its radical prime minister, Patrice Lumumba. President John Kennedy expanded pre-emption. In a pre-emptive pre-emption, he used the CIA, the Voice of America, and cuts in assistance to encourage the overthrow of South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem, despite Diem's strong anti-communism, because Kennedy believed that his inept rule was leading to Communist conquest.

During the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy claimed the pre-emptive right to remove weapons of mass destruction if they were obtained "under a cloak of secrecy and deception" in defiance of American and Western Hemisphere policy.⁵ Although Kennedy did not use the right of national self-defense as a justification, he told the world that with nuclear weapons, any sudden and secret change in their deployment or added likelihood for their use "represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive, and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace."⁶ The State Department's legal counselor, Abram Chayes, said that the president had made "some international law for the nuclear age."⁷

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara starkly reiterated that pre-emption was U.S. policy for preventing a nation like Cuba from secretly obtaining nuclear weapons. When a congressional committee questioned him about rumors that the United States had traded the Cuban missiles for Turkish missiles, McNamara lied. He said that Khrushchev knew that if he did not remove the missiles quickly, the United States would invade Cuba

and, if he tried to escalate, nuclear war could follow. “[W]e faced that night [October 27] the possibility of launching nuclear weapons and Khrushchev knew it, and that is the reason, and the only reason, why he withdrew those weapons,” McNamara said.⁸

The least known of Kennedy’s attempts at pre-emptively removing a leftist government took place in British Guiana, today Guyana, Great Britain’s only South American colony. Governed by Cheddi Jagan, a handsome and charismatic East Indian Marxist and friend of Fidel Castro, the colony was due to receive its independence by 1963. The prospect terrified President Kennedy and his men, who feared that Jagan would become a Castro on the South American mainland. Following Kennedy’s assassination, Lyndon Johnson’s administration shared Kennedy’s concern. The story of Kennedy, Johnson, and British Guiana was obscured until 1996 when the U.S. government finally released the Kennedy administration’s Guiana files, and 1998 when it began releasing key Johnson files.⁹

Jagan was elected premier in 1953, but the British ousted him 133 days later because Winston Churchill’s government concluded that he was a Communist. Despite the Guianese independence movement splitting along racial lines after his ouster, Jagan was overwhelmingly elected again when democracy was restored in 1957. His government ruled more moderately and toned down its pro-Soviet rhetoric.¹⁰ By the time he was preparing to run for re-election in August 1961 – the winner would presumably lead Guyana to independence – the British told the Kennedy administration that Jagan’s recent performance showed that he had learned from his mistakes and was an older and more responsible man. Furthermore, they said, he had the votes and could not be defeated in a fair election.¹¹

President Kennedy was unhappy. He saw British Guiana through the prism of Cuba. Jagan freely admitted that he was a Marxist, and Kennedy suspected that he was a Communist or at least a fellow traveler under the control of his Svengali wife, Janet, a U.S. native who had been a member of the Young Communist League while attending college in Detroit.¹² A week-and-a-half before the Bay of Pigs invasion, Secretary of State Dean Rusk warned the British foreign minister, Lord Home, about U.S. concern that Jagan might create “another Castro-type situation” once the colony was independent.¹³ In August, Rusk told Home, “[W]e are not inclined to give people like Jagan the same benefit of the doubt which was given two or three years ago to Castro himself.”¹⁴ He warned Home that failure to remove Jagan “would cause us acute embarrassment with inevitable irritations to Anglo-American relations.”¹⁵

President Kennedy himself tried to persuade British Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod to postpone independence so that they could have time to find an alternative to Jagan. “Do I understand, Mr. President, that you want us to decolonize as fast as possible all over the world except on your own doorstep?” Kennedy laughed and said, “Well that’s probably just about it.”¹⁶ Despite this personal intervention, the British remained unmoved. Elections went ahead as scheduled and Jagan won a sweeping victory despite receiving a plurality of votes.

Kennedy decided to see for himself if the British were right about Jagan. He invited Jagan to the White House for an October 1961 visit. The meeting was a disaster: Jagan was mealy-mouthed about whether he was a Communist, was insatiable in his demand for economic assistance, and after he returned home, his deputy premier,

Brindley Benn, declared, “It is easier to stop tomorrow than Communism.” Schlesinger wrote that the president was now “increasingly skeptical” that Jagan was salvageable.¹⁷

If the president had any remaining doubt about supporting Jagan, it vanished in February 1962, when Guianese trade unions launched a week-long general strike in protest against Jagan’s tax and civil service policies. The strike turned violent and rioters burned the capital’s business district. Kennedy ultimately concluded that Jagan was a Communist. A month after the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy told the Honduran president that “experiences with Jagan, the Chinese, and Castro demonstrate that Communists frequently take over a Government in the guise of enlightened, democratic, revolutionary leaders, and not as Communists per se.”¹⁸ British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan neatly summed up Kennedy’s concerns after an April 1962 meeting: “This colony is now ‘ripe for independence’. But this means ‘ripe for Communism’. Jagan is half-Communist; his wife is full-blooded and dangerous Communist.... If ‘independence’ comes he will be a second Castro. This naturally concerns us and fills the Americans with intense alarm.”¹⁹

Three days after the February strike ended, Rusk informed the British: “I have reached the conclusion that it is no longer possible for us to put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan.” Warning that Jagan could become another Castro, Rusk emphasized: “[T]he continuation of Jagan in power is leading us to disaster in terms of the colony itself, strains on Anglo-American relations and difficulties for the inter-American system.” Jagan had to go.²⁰

The letter amazed Macmillan for its “cynicism which I would have thought Dean Rusk could hardly put his pen to. He, after all, is not an Irishman, nor a politician, nor a

millionaire; he has the reputation of being an honourable and somewhat academic figure. How can the Americans continue to attack us in the United Nations on colonialism,” he wondered, “and then use expressions like these which are not colonialism but pure Machiavellianism.”²¹ Lord Home wrote the icy British reply. He blamed the United States for communism’s advance: “Now it was your historic role to have been for long years the first crusader and the prime mover in urging colonial emancipation. The communists are now in the van. Why? Amongst other things because premature independence is a gift for them.” As a result of U.S. rhetoric, he wrote, decolonization could no longer be held back: “cancelling [sic] the ticket for independence” would not slow communism, especially if the British tried to make British Guiana a “special case.”²²

Schlesinger later tried to shield Rusk’s Irish millionaire politician boss from responsibility for the letter, writing in his Kennedy biography, *A Thousand Days*, “The State Department at first thought we should make the try [to work with Jagan]; Rusk personally reversed this policy in a stiff letter to the British early in 1962.”²³ This is an odd charge from a man who had proudly claimed that President Kennedy had hired Rusk to be his detail man so that he could act as his own secretary of state, and claimed that Kennedy had ultimately become disenchanted with Rusk because of the secretary’s inability to make decisions.²⁴ In fact Rusk was pursuing the president’s policy. On March 7, Kennedy told his friend, British Ambassador David Ormsby-Gore, that “he was worried about the future of British Guiana.” He asked to meet with another friend, Hugh Fraser of the Colonial Office, to talk about the colony after Fraser completed a Guianese fact-finding mission.²⁵ They met for over two hours and Fraser reported to London that

Kennedy “makes it clear that the problem of B.G. in American eyes is regarded as one of critical importance.”²⁶ After Macmillan met with Kennedy in late April 1962, he informed his advisers, “They are probably moved by internal political considerations as much as by genuine fear of Communism. It is surely to our interests to be as co-operative and forthcoming as we can.”²⁷

In U.S. foreign policy, the spring and summer of 1963 saw what Schlesinger called “the great turning” that followed the Cuban missile crisis. Schlesinger and numerous subsequent scholars have argued that for the first time since the nuclear age began, the possibility of slowing or even stopping the nuclear arms race seemed real, as did the chance to reduce tension at international flash points. President Kennedy, they argue, responded with bold and quiet steps toward détente: Kennedy’s American University “peace speech” on June 10, proposing and pushing through the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, planning for the gradual withdrawal from Vietnam, and even taking first steps toward accommodation with Fidel Castro.²⁸

Contemporaneously with the “Great Turning,” Guianese unions launched a second general strike, this time to stop Jagan’s effort to take over the union movement. The strike lasted 80 days and again led to arson and violence.²⁹ Strike relief was provided by the AFL-CIO, costing around \$1 million. The money for strike relief was secretly funneled to the AFL-CIO by the CIA, or as J.C. Stackpoole of the British Foreign Office called them, “the AFL/CIA.”³⁰ The intervention was apparently called “Operation ‘Flypast.’”³¹ At what stage the CIA began to work with U.S. labor in British Guiana and whether they did anything beyond funding and organizing the strike is unclear because the documents have been destroyed or withheld from the public and because nobody

involved is talking. The U.S. government had previously denied to the British that the CIA had played any part in the February 1962 strike and violence,³² but it is suggestive that Howard McCabe, a labor organizer who worked with the CIA, was in British Guiana the entire week assisting the strikers,³³ and was also in British Guiana throughout the 80-day strike of 1963.³⁴

Although Macmillan had agreed to work with the president in British Guiana and was helping to maintain the “strike pressure,”³⁵ he began to lose his nerve as the racial violence, international opprobrium and financial expense grew. To restore his resolve, Kennedy asked for a meeting at the end of his Summer 1963 European tour. Ambassador Gore warned Macmillan that British Guiana was causing the Americans “the gravest concerns in the whole context of the ‘Cold War’” they see it as the most vulnerable point where Communists might easily take over and start a landslide in Latin America.”³⁶

Two days before the summit, Rusk met with Home and Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys. Home told Rusk that direct intervention would ruin “Britain’s image as a decolonising power and would cause the Africans to demand direct rule over Rhodesia.” Sandys added that the British were loath to intervene at such cost in a place with no great interest to Great Britain. Rusk replied that there was a profound British interest: U.S.-British relations. Sandys asked how the United States would be willing to help the British with their decolonizing hotspots. Rusk refused to be drawn in.³⁷

The president met with the prime minister at Macmillan’s home on June 30, 1963. Twenty days after Kennedy’s “peace speech” he baldly stated his fears about the danger posed by an independent Guyana ruled by Cheddi Jagan:

[The President said] It was obvious that if the UK were to get out of

British Guiana now it would become a Communist state.... He thought that Latin America was the most dangerous area in the world. The effect of having a Communist state in British Guiana in addition to Cuba in 1964 would be to create irresistible pressures in the United States to strike militarily against Cuba.³⁸

During the Cuban missile crisis eight months before, the president had refused to invade Cuba because he believed invasion would trigger a Soviet spasm response against Turkey or West Berlin, which would force the United States to strike back with nuclear weapons, thus starting World War III. Macmillan, who had been in almost daily contact with Kennedy throughout the crisis, had shared the president's worry. Listening to the president, he would have clearly understood Kennedy's underlying point: If Jagan led British Guiana to independence, the outraged reaction by Congress and the American people could set in motion a chain of events leading inexorably to World War III.

In the face of the president's apocalyptic fears, Macmillan finally agreed. Jagan would go. His government "fiddled" with the Guianese constitution, as opposition leader Harold Wilson put it, so that Jagan was legitimately voted out of office in a special December 1964 election. Afterward, Macmillan explained to Colonial Secretary Reginald Maudling that "in a world context the Anglo-American relationship was of much more importance ... than the future of British Guiana."³⁹ He told his diary, "It is, however, rather fun making the Americans repeat over and over and over again their passionate plea to us to stick to 'Colonialism' and 'Imperialism' at all costs."⁴⁰

A week later, the U.S. Ambassador, David Bruce, told a top Macmillan aide that, "nuclear tests apart, British Guiana was the issue of far the greatest importance to the President. If British Guiana became independent under a leader commonly believed in

the United States to be a Communist, the President would be vulnerable to damaging attack from all those who were far from content with the present position in Cuba.” Bruce concluded with a veiled warning about what would happen to Macmillan’s longed for test ban if Kennedy were defeated for re-election because of British Guiana: “It would be of no avail to us whether the President’s view coincided with our own or not on a variety of foreign policy issues if he was unable to be re-elected next year. It was as simple as that.” In September, the president thanked Macmillan for his “most helpful understanding of my special concern” about an issue “when there is so little advantage in it for you.”⁴¹

British Guiana marked a turning point for Kennedy. On November 18, 1963, he formalized his policy of pre-empting communism in Latin America when he publicly announced his “Kennedy Doctrine”: “‘Every resource at our command’ must be used ‘to prevent the establishment of another Cuba in this hemisphere.’”⁴² Four days later he was dead, and public memory of the doctrine disappeared in the trauma that followed. National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy did not forget though. The Johnson administration continued Kennedy’s Guianese policy (although documents at the Johnson Library evince almost no evidence of presidential interest) and Johnson expanded the policy to Brazil, where he did take a personal interest.⁴³ After the Dominican invasion in 1965, launched to pre-empt a possible Communist take-over, the president announced the “Johnson Doctrine”: it was the “Kennedy Doctrine’s” virtual twin.⁴⁴

British Guiana may also have forced a change in U.S. policy toward British decolonization. In Lord Home’s reply to Rusk’s controversial 1962 letter, he mischievously wrote, “You will know our present concern over Kenya, the Federation and other territories in East Africa. I take comfort from your letter to think that you will

be ready to understand and support us in solving these problems.”⁴⁵ Along with the sarcasm, Home had clearly put down a marker for the United States. Two days later J.D. Hennings, the Washington embassy’s colonial attaché, wrote to the Foreign Office that the United States was frightfully serious about British Guiana – he posited that Rusk’s brusque tone might be attributed to U.S.-British relations, which were at a “tipping point” that the colony could topple – and suggested that British Guiana should be a “bargaining chip” to impel the United States to support British decolonization policy elsewhere and to encourage the United States to create a “really imaginative aid programme [sic]” in British Guiana and the Caribbean.⁴⁶

Americans also saw Home’s statement as a ploy. A State Department paper on British Guiana shows that the U.S. government understood, noting that the British would probably want a “quid pro quo with respect to other British colonies, that is, U.S. support should Britain for its own reasons judge it desirable to slow down progress towards independence, e.g., in Kenya,” in exchange for their assistance in British Guiana.⁴⁷ When Kennedy met with Macmillan in April 1962, the British reported that “President Kennedy said that he was not aware that the United States Administration had been critical of British Colonial policy. He would be interested to hear of any recent expressions of responsible American opinion which had embarrassed the United Kingdom Government in the discharge of their Colonial responsibilities.”⁴⁸ The following year at Birch Grove, Home again implied that the British wanted a deal: “People would say that if the UK could resume power in British Guiana, why would it not be able to do the same thing in Southern Rhodesia.”⁴⁹ Sandys made “Mr. Sandys asked whether the United States Government was prepared to give the UK real support in the United Nations and publicly,

if the UK were to resume direct rule in British Guiana. ‘It would be a pleasure,’ said the President, ‘we would go all out to the extent necessary.’ ‘You didn’t give us that much support on Southern Rhodesia,’ piped up Lord Home. ‘Well, for that matter,’ said the President, in a light tone of banter, ‘you haven’t given us that much support on the MLF.’ The President added that he would be willing to review our stand on the resolution of the Committee of Twenty-four.”⁵⁰

At the risk of exhibiting a Guyo-centric worldview: British Guiana was the unique colony that President Kennedy did not want decolonized, it was the impetus for the Kennedy Doctrine, it may have been the break in the U.S. anti-colonial tide, it threatened the Special Relationship, and it was even harbinger for the apocalypse. Historians of the Cold War, the Kennedy administration, the Special Relationship, international labor, secret intelligence, and decolonization have almost ignored the story. It is time for scholars to take another look at British Guiana.

¹ Sen. Edward Kennedy speech at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, Mass., September 27, 2002.

² Al Gore speech at the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, Calif., September 23, 2002.

³ Brian Braiker, “Schlesinger on Iraq,” NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE, March 22, 2003, <http://www.msnbc.com/news/889365.asp?0cv=CB30#BODY>

⁴ Bonnie L. Cook, “Historian Faults Bush on Terrorism Policies,” February 13, 2004, *Philadelphia Inquirer*.

⁵ John Kennedy, “Radio and Television Speech to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba,” the White House, October 22, 1962, <http://www.jfklibrary.org/j102262.htm>

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Roger Hilsman, *The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle Over Policy* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996), 112.

⁸ McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Vintage, 1990), 447-48.

⁹ Eds. Edward Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar, W. Taylor Fain III, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XII, American Republics* [henceforth *FRUS*]. The editors report that six documents that they were denied in full permission to declassify six documents. Ibid., iv-x. The *FRUS* volume for the Johnson years is due for publication this year. Cary Fraser, *Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishers, 1994) made excellent use of those documents that were released prior to publication of the *FRUS* volume. Works dealing with the intervention that were written subsequent to the documents’ release include the following: Maurice St. Pierre, *Anatomy of Resistance: Anti-Colonialism in Guyana, 1823-1966* (London: Macmillan Education, 1999); Stephen Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Rabe, “John F. Kennedy and

Latin America: The ‘Thorough, Accurate, and Reliable Record’ (Almost),” *Diplomatic History*, v. 23 (Summer 1999), 539-552; Carey Fraser, “The ‘New Frontier’ of Empire in the Caribbean: The Transfer of Power in British Guiana, 1961-1964,” *The International History Review*, xxii (September 2000), 583-610; Jane Sillery, “Salvaging Democracy? The United States and British Guiana 1961-1964” (Oxford, England: Doctoral Thesis, Queen’s College, 1996); Gordon Daniels, “A Great Injustice to Cheddi Jagan: The Kennedy Administration and British Guiana: 1961-1963” (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Mississippi, 2000), 151-234; Graham Singh, “But Not in Guiana: Why did the British Government Support American Covert Action in British Guiana from 1961-63?” (Master’s Dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2001).

¹⁰ For British Guiana prior to 1961 see the following: St. Pierre, *Anatomy of Resistance*; Fraser, *Ambivalent Anti-Colonialism*; Thomas Spinner, *A Political and Social History of Guyana, 1945-1983* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1984); Leo Despres, *Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana*, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967); Ronald Graham, “The Day the Army Went into Guyana, The 1953 British Intervention Remembered,” *The Guardian* (London), April 6, 2001; Rita Hinden, “The Case of British Guiana,” *Encounter*, v. 2 (January 1954), 18-22; Cheddi Jagan, *The West on Trial* (St. John’s, Antigua: Hansib Caribbean, 1997, reprint of 1966 edition with new material); Jagan, *Forbidden Freedom* (St. John’s, Antigua: Hansib Caribbean, 1994, reprint of 1954 edition).

¹¹ Johes [U.S. embassy in London] to Rusk, August 9, 1961, John F. Kennedy Library [henceforth JFKL].

¹² In 2001, she admitted that she had been a Young Communist and had lied about it ever since because the cost of admitting to having been a Communist would have had too great consequences for Guyana. Author’s interview with Janet Jagan, Georgetown, Guyana, November 20, 2001.

¹³ Meeting held in the State Department, April 6, 1961, PREM 11/3666, Public Records Office, Kew, London, England [henceforth PRO].

¹⁴ Telegram containing letter from Dean Rusk to British Foreign Secretary Lord Home, August 11, 1961, *FRUS*, 519-520.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Nigel Fisher, *Harold Macmillan* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1982), 293

¹⁷ For Jagan’s visit see Arthur Schlesinger Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 774-77. See also Richard Reeves, *President Kennedy* (New York: Touchstone, 1994), 268; “Premier Cheddi Jagan’s Visit, Washington, October 21-26, 1961, Economic Background – British Guiana,” n.d., JFKL; “Premier Cheddi Jagan’s Visit, Washington, October 21-26, 1961, Economic Assistance to British Guiana,” October 17, 1961, JFKL; memorandum of conversation [with various high ranking administration officials], October 23, 1961, JFKL; memorandum of conversation [with Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles], October 24, 1961, JFKL; memorandum of conversation [with the president and other high ranking administration officials], October 25, 1961, *FRUS*, 536-538; author’s interview with former PNC leader who requested anonymity, November 19, 2001; memorandum of conversation of meeting between Foreign Secretary Lord Home and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Geneva, March 12, 1962, PREM 11/3666, PRO. The amount Jagan sought was as nebulous as his development program, with figures for the entire program ranging from \$250 to \$300 million and his hope for the U.S. role ranging anywhere from \$40 million to an unspecified amount over \$100 million. An impressively prescient report from State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research had predicted exactly this result just days before Jagan’s visit. See Roger Hilsman to U. Alexis Johnson, October 17, 1961, *FRUS*, 534-536.

¹⁸ Memorandum of conversation between Kennedy and Villeda Morales, 30 November 1962, *FRUS*, 331-33, quoted in Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 83.

¹⁹ Macmillan diary entry, September 27, 1962, graciously provided to me by Peter Catterall, who is completing an annotated edition.

²⁰ Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, February 19, 1962, *FRUS*, 544-45.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Foreign Secretary Home to Secretary of State Rusk, 26 February 1962, *FRUS*, 547-48.

²³ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 778.

²⁴ Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, 140-41, 424-26, 432-37, 1017;

²⁵ Telegram, Ormsby-Gore to Foreign Office, March 7, 1962, PREM 11/3666, PRO.

²⁶ Minute by Hugh Fraser to Reginald Maulding re his meetings in Washington, March 20, 1962, PREM 11/3666, PRO.

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- ²⁷ Prime Minister's Minute, "British Guiana," to Sir Norman Brook, May 3, 1962, PREM 11/3666, PRO.
- ²⁸ See Waters, "President Kennedy, British Guiana, and the 'Great Turning,'" typescript, paper delivered at the Kennedy Legacy Conference, Philadelphia, Penn., November 2003.
- ²⁹ On the general strike, see Waters and Gordon Daniels, "The World's Longest General Strike: The CIA, the AFL-CIO, and British Guiana," accepted for publication by *Diplomatic History*.
- ³⁰ J.C. Stackpoole file jacket note, June 13, 1963, CO 1031/5006, PRO.
- ³¹ The author extrapolated the name from an October 1964 State Department telegram by Consul General Delmar Carlson to the State Department's J. Harold Shullaw discussing a meeting that Carlson had recently held with the British Guianese governor, Richard Luyt. The governor reported that Jagan planned to fly to London to plead his case with the new Labor Party government. Carlson wrote that after the governor briefly discussed what little he knew about the new colonial secretary, Anthony Greenwood, he shifted back to the situation in British Guiana: "Governor mentioned that he doubted any of Labor Party leaders had knowledge Operation 'Flypast.'" Carlson to Shullaw, October 25, 1964, British Guiana, vol. II, Memos & Misc., 8/64-11/64, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas.
- ³² Attachment, Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Bruce), March 1, 1962, *FRUS*, 550-51; Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson), March 9, 1962, *FRUS*, 552-53.
- ³³ "Labor Responds to B.G. Request," [photograph of McCabe distributing airlifted food during the February 1962 strike], *Public Services International Interamerican Edition* [newspaper], vol. 3 [special edition], 2.
- ³⁴ See Waters and Daniels, "The World's Longest General Strike," accepted by *Diplomatic History* pending revision.
- ³⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: British Guiana, President Kennedy, Prime Minister Macmillan, et al., *FRUS*, June 30, 1963, 608.
- ³⁶ Richard Lamb, *The Macmillan Years, 1957-1963: The Emerging Truth* (London: John Murray, 1995), 364-65.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*
- ³⁹ Nigel Fisher, *Harold Macmillan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 293.
- ⁴⁰ Harold Macmillan diary, September 17, 1963.
- ⁴¹ Kennedy to Macmillan, received September 17, 1963 [the date it was sent is unreadable], CAB 21/5523, PRO.
- ⁴² Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 97-98.
- ⁴³ Peter Kornbluh, ed., "Brazil Marks 40th Anniversary of Military Coup: Declassified Documents Shed Light on U.S. Role," 31 March 2004, National Security Archive, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/index.htm>
- ⁴⁴ Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World*, 98.
- ⁴⁵ Foreign Secretary Home to Secretary of State Rusk, 26 February 1962, *FRUS*, 547.
- ⁴⁶ J.D. Hennings [British embassy in Washington] to Ambler Thomas [Colonial Office], 28 February 1962, FO 371/161948, PRO.
- ⁴⁷ "Possible Courses of Action in British Guiana," 15 March 1962, *FRUS*, vol. 556-57.
- ⁴⁸ Record of a meeting at the White House on Saturday, 28th April 1962, at 3:30 p.m., CAB 133/300, quoted in Singh, "But not in Guiana," 31.
- ⁴⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: British Guiana, President Kennedy, Prime Minister Macmillan, et al., *FRUS*, June 30, 1963, 608.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 609.