Claude P. Foster
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>>Jeff,
>> "Killer Angels" and hence "Gettysburg" took a very positive >view
of
>Longstreet. Personally, I think Longstreet hesitated in >Pickett's charge,
>ruining any chance of success---surprise was of >the essence. If the charge
>had not been delayed so long, the >attack might have split the Union army,
>and we would be studying >the brilliance of Lee and Longstreet today.
>>James Owens
>
>James;
> IMHO surprise would have been impossible on that field. I don't think
you
>can assault across a mile and a half of open ground with essentially a corps
>of infantry and maintain any element of surprise. I also believe the
>artillery barrage that preceded the attack was essential to the plan having
>any chance of success, Part of the failure was that the barrage landing on
>the back side of the ridge instead of along the top where the federal
>infantry and artillery were dug in. I believe that Longstreet's failure to
>properly coordinate the troops from his and A.P. Hill's corps killed any
>chance of success that the assault may have had. Actually a better case
could
>be made that the attack should never have been ordered in the first place.
If
>you accept "that no 15,000 men ever arrayed for battle could take that
>(Union) position" then the real fault lies with the commander who ordered
the
>attack -- General Robert E. Lee.
>
>Claude P. Foster
>
Claude,
I have to echo your comments; I've been to G-burg about 18 times now.
Lee's plan called for a simultaneous Infantry assault and Cavalry
exploitation in the center of the Union lines. This is about as difficult a
maneuver as
one can have given that the enemy is in full view and has had over 24 hours
to
prepare. In one of my previous notes I stated that Lee was not a tactical
commander; I continue to maintain that stance. He never commanded a tactical
unit in combat, unless you consider the Marine detachment at Harper's Ferry
vs. John Brown. He was undoubtedly a superior operational and Strategic
commander, but he did not understand the intricacies of face-to-face combat.
The book,
Killer Angels" does not portay Lee as a nut like the movie seems to indicate.
He had made a habit of listening to his subordinate commander's; at G-burg,
he did not. Longstreet correctly assessed the situation as hopeless at best.
The bottom line is this: so what if Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble had
breached
the Union lines on Cemetery Ridge? One must be able to follow up the
successful penetration with an exploitation force; the Confederates had none!
Stuart's Cavalry did not make it to the show; they got stopped by Federal
Cavalry about three miles from the stadium. None of the remaining infantry
units advanced in support of Longstreet's attack, thus, once again, Old Pete
was on his own.
I maintain that Longstreet had every reason to be more than miffed at
his boss! His idea of successful combat was to force the enemy to waste his
energy in fruitless offensive battle. Even in his greatest maneuver battle
-Chancellorsville- Lee did not destroy the Army of the Potomac. Words cannot
describe my admiration for the courage Lee showed in his decision to allow
Jackson to take the major unit to envelop the Union position, but what won
that battle was a personal fight between the operational commanders, not the
tactical commanders; Lee out-generaled Hooker, period.
Gettysburg was another matter altogether. Meade was not Hooker. He did
not take counsel of his own fears. Lee did not have the Wilderness to shield
movements and dissipate Union combat power. It seems to me that Lee was
trying to replicate his actions at Chancellorsville using 1st Corps.
Longstreet was
not Jackson; he was better than that. Anyone who blames Longstreet for the
debacle at Gettysburg simply does not understand military operations. Look
at the facts: which units fought the major engagements and took the majority
of
casualties? which units destroyed or crippled the majority of Union forces?
who commanded the most difficult actions? who actually entered into the
planning
of his operations? The answers are 1st corps, 1st corps, and Longstreet.
Another idea -- give some credit to the Union Army. I understand that
after the war, when the recriminations began to fly about who was to blame
for the Confederate defeat, MG Pickett, in a moment of sublime precience,
answered that he had always thought the Yankees had something to do with it.
Nuff said!
CPT Brooks