Re: Longstreet
(no name) ((no email))
Wed, 6 Apr 1994 14:19:14 ECT
I must confess I do not understand some of the criticism of Longstreet
at Gettysburg. His orders on July 2nd were based on assumptions that did
not hold by the time his troops were in position. If he had taken the time
to adjust to the new situation, there would have been no time left to
launch the attack (it went off at around 4 p.m. as it was) and we would
be here blaming him for excessive delay. Pickett's Charge on the 3rd was
doomed from the start. Most, if not all, of the successful assaults on
prepared positions were over much less open terrain. Hood's attack at
Gaines' Mill came out of a swamp, I believe, so the final dash at the
Union lines -- the killing ground, so to speak -- was very short.
Sedgewick's attack at 2nd Fredericksburg was against a _very_ thinly held
line and so hardly counts as assaulting a prepared position. Thomas's
attack at Missionary Ridge was over broken ground which shielded his
troops; moreover, the Rebel first line was ordered to fall back from the
base of the ridge, and therefore _blocked_ the field of the fire of the
main line on top of the ridge. At Gettysburg, Pickett et al had to march
across an open plain for nearly a full mile. They were enfiladed on
the right by batteries up on Little Round Top, and on the left by batteries
on Cemetary Hill. The distance they had to cover allowed the defenders to
recover from the (admittdly ineffective) artillery barrage; several fresh
batteries were brought up, for example. The Rebels were doomed, and I think
it is entirely possible that Longstreet knew it ahead of time.
I think Lee lost Gettysburg because he drew the wrong conclusions
from his victory at Chancellorsville. He refused to believe (or never
realized) that he won that battle because of his own skill and because
his opponent screwed up (even after Jackson's attack, Hooker should have
won that fight), so he drew the tragic conclusion that he won because his
men were better than the Union troops. Hence, he thought his men could
carry out an assault like Pickett's Charge and win.
Two minor side points and then I will shut up. 1) Longstreet's
July 2nd attack is considered by many to be one of the best tactical
assaults of the war. He pushed back a larger enemy force for a nontrivial
distance, and was only stopped because of darkness and fresh enemy troops.
so it is hard for me to accept that he was ineffective during the campaign.
2) It seems to me that a double-standard is often employed in this
criticism of Longstreet. No one suggests that Jackson's manifest
failures during the Seven Days cost the Rebels the war, or warrented a
court-martial.
Jim Epperson
epperson@math.uah.edu