It strikes me that if Gettysburg was Lee's worst fought battle, it was
also one of Longstreet's poorest performances as a corps commnader (as
opposed to independent command, where his performance was consistently
mediocre) [with the possible exception of Fair Oaks, where he was serving
under Johnston]. In earlier battles, Lee seemed increasingly to have
given greater and greater latitude to to both Jackson and Longstreet in
managing the "close up" aspects of a battle (e.g., the timing of
Longstreet's attack on Pope's left at Second Manassas, or Jackson's wide
swing around Hooker's right at Chancerlorsville). By Gettysburg, he was
inclined toward non-pre-emptive "orders" such as the message to Ewell on
the evening of the 1st that he should sieze Culp's Hill "if practicable."
Many commentators have suggested that Jackson would have understood and
acted immediately whereas Ewell didn't "find a way." If anything, it is
suggested, Jackson would not even have required the hint, but would have
"anticipated" the need and already have attempted it (Lee's comment after
the war that he would have won at Gettysburg had Stonewall Jackson been
with him implies as much).
At Gettysburg, Longstreet was on the 2nd unhappy on several
counts: (1) his idea for sidling around the Federal left and assuming a
defensive position had been rejected; (2) he may have been unhappy with
Ewell's attitude and performance himself; (3) he was being ordered to
mount a frontal attack with only two thirds of his corps present (Pickett
still coming up from Chambersburg); and (4) he was being ordered to
attack a position that had not been properly reconoitered. His failure
to accept the recommendation of McLaws and Hood, especially the latter,
whose discovery that the Federal left was virtually hanging in the air,
was a major failure in anticipating the needs of the situation. It was
certainly not the sort of use of discretion that his commander ought to
have been able to rely upon in his one remaining experienced corps
commander.
Roger Cole