> ..... I had heard only the St. Lee and Jackson versions of
Southern-Civil War History.
>As I studied and read about the Civil War, I began to question why
Longstreet
>got such a bad rap by Southerners.
> In relation to what Claude said about "Manassas to Appomatox" I don't
>think Longstreet was necessarly loose with the truth, rather, he was an
>embittered old man whose former friends were now his enemies and whose
former
>enemies were now his friends. His version of Gettysburg changed somewhat
>over time, but the essentials were always consistent. He disagreed with
Lee's
>offensive strategy on 2 and 3 July 1863.
Cpt. Brooks;
I agree with your assessment of "Manassas to Appomatox" as it relates to
Longstreet's version of the truth. This is based on excerpts I have read and
the views of other's whom I respect. I am looking forward to making my own
assessment as soon as my copy arrives. I believe that Longstreet on 2 and 3
July 1863 protested Lee's orders to attack right up to the point of
insubordination. On 2 July Longstreet and his division commanders (Generals
Hood and Mclaws) protested Lee's orders to attack the roundtops frontally. It
is reported that General Hood begged four times in the last hour before the
attack to be allowed to move farther south and attack from behind the
roundtops. All to no avail; Lee was determined. IMHO the only action that
Longstreet should be criticized for is trying to shift the burden of ordering
the attack on 3 July of Pickett's and Pettigrew's divisions to his artillery
commander, Col. Porter Alexander. After telling General Lee, the night
before, of his strong belief that the attack would fail, his only
alternatives were to accept his orders and vigorously carry out the attack or
resign. Instead he seems to have spent the time preceding the assault looking
for an excuse to countermand Lee's order. Having failed to accomplish this he
shifted the responsibility for the go-no go decision to the shoulders of a
junior subordinate. This was not consistent with a man who had on many
previous occasions (and many occasions afterwards) demonstrated the height of
personal courage and intestinal fortitude.
>Lee had never been a ground commander; he was an engineer by trade and
training. Longstreet, >on the other hand, had been an infantry officer in
combat during the Mexican War and on
>the Texas and New Mexico plains. Longstreet seems to have had a better idea
of the capabilities >of his soldiers -- remember it was his corps which did
most of the fighting on both days, thus giving >and receiving the most
casualties. Longstreet had risen to Corps command by his consistent good
>work in fighting the Union armies. He made many mistakes which he tried to
minimize (sounds like >a normal person to me), but he learned from them. He
was a Brigade
>Commander at 1st Manassas, Division Commander and Wing Commander from the
summer of >1862 until September -- his soldiers did the majority of damage to
the Union Army of Virginia at >2nd Manassas. After Antietam, Lee had him
promoted ahead of "Stonewall" Jackson to Corps >command, etc.
There are those who might take exception to your comments that Lee had never
been a ground commander. By the time of Gettysburg he had commanded the Army
of Northern Virginia for a year (since June of 1862.) He had led that army in
The Battles of: Seven Days, Second Manassas, Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, and
Chancellorsville (considered by some to be the greatest tactical victory by
either side during the war.)
> By the time of Gettysburg, Longstreet was not only the only good Corps
Commander Lee
>had, he was already recognized as such by Lee before the Chancellorsville
Campaign. >Longstreet did not inherit his position because Jackson died, as
many southern historians would >suggest; he was Lee's most trusted Lieutenant
prior to that time. Longstreet correctly viewed
>his position as the primary sounding-board for Lee's employment of troops.
I believe that a
>great subordinate commander has as much or more of a responsibility to tell
his boss that he is >making a mistake than in carrying out poorly planned
orders. Longstreet proved himself to be
>the best Corps Commander in either Army throughout the war.
I concur with your evaluation on the role of a subordinate commander but I
also believe that once that assessment has been given and rejected, it is
that subordinates responsibility to execute those orders with their full
commitment. One could make a case that Longstreet's preoccupation with his
view of what should be done distracted him from carrying out his
responsibilities for the overall coordination of the assault. This lack of
coordination with the troops that were assigned to him from A.P. Hill's corps
seriously crippled the effectiveness of the attack. It may have been true
"that no 15,000 men ever arrayed for battle could take that (Union) position"
but stranger things have happened on a battlefield.
> I think I have convinced many of my fellow instructors here at West
Point that Longstreet
>was the most complete officer in either Army. His Strategic vision was
unsurpassed, and his >tactical prowess was peerless. He was not a successful
independent commander, as evidenced >by his Knoxville Campaign after
Chicamauga in late 1863. Perhaps he did not have the ability; >perhaps he
was not supported correctly. Let history judge.
> I hope you will continue to read about and study Longstreet's career
and his
>accomplishments. He is only now being reconstructed by southern historians.
I think the movie >"Gettysburg" will help in many ways. Michael Shaara
recognized that Longstreet had received >bad press for too long when he wrote
"The Killer Angels."
> I hope this tome is not too one-sided; I do not wish to besmirch the
reputations of others to >elevate Longstreet to his proper place in the
pantheon of Southern Civil War Saints. I simply >believe that he was poorly
treated by the Lost Cause crowd of southern historians who needed
>to create a religion after their defeat. In the vein of Judeo-Christian
religions, since Lee was
>obviously the Christ-figure, and Jackson was a martyr, then Longstreet must
serve as Judas >Iscariot. Had Longstreet died of his wounds at the Battle of
the Wilderness in May 1864, he would >have been accorded his position by his
peers. Since he lived to say that Lee blundered at >Gettysburg, he was
vilified.
>CPT P.R.M. Brooks, Jr.
>Department of History
>United States Military Academy
>West Point, New York
What if he had not been wounded at the Battle of the Wilderness? At the time
that he went down he was in position to possibly rout two corps of Meade's
Army of the Potomac. The delay in the attack, due to Longstreet's wounds,
allowed the federal forces to recover and the advantage was not fully
exploited. Another great what-if that we'll never know the answer to. There's
another aspect to Longstreet that I believe has gone unrecognized; he
advocated, before the firing on Ft. Sumter, that the south should free the
slaves to remove it as an issue that would prevent foreign governments from
recognizing the Confederacy. Somewhat insightful for a career army officer
from South Carolina in 1861. I apologize for the length of this post but I
felt CPT Brooks views deserved comment.
Claude
claude5382@aol.com