AAR 1999 Panel Report

By Reiko Ohnuma, Darthmouth College

Format:  Five individual, unrelated papers and no respondent.

Participants:  Reiko Ohnuma, Dartmouth College (presiding); Andy Rotman, University of Chicago (presenter); Jacob Kinnard, Northwestern University (presenter); Joseph Walser, Tufts University (presenter), Mathieu Boisvert, University of Quebec at Montreal (presenter); Sariya Jarasviroj, Arizona State University (scheduled presenter, but was not present)

Andy Rotman (University of Chicago):  The title of Mr. Rotman's paper in the program book was "Confidence in Uncertainties: Belief and Community in Avadana Literature," but his actual paper bore the slightly different title "Confidence in Uncertainties: Seeing and Believing in the Divyavadana."  The paper focused on the mental state of sraddha (provisionally translated here as "belief"), as it appears in some of the stories of the Divyavadana.

The first point demonstrated by Mr. Rotman was that sraddha is distinct from bhakti, with the Divyavadana clearly taking a positive view of the former and a negative view of the latter.  In several of the Divyavadana's stories, the act of "imploring" or "praying" (ayacana) to different gods or deities (such as Siva, Varuna, etc.) in order to achieve a desired result is denigrated as being ineffectual and futile, and in one passage, it is made clear that the mental state accompanying such "imploring" or "praying" is bhakti.  Thus, bhakti is implicitly "disparaged as an improper mental state" and no one is said to have bhakti in the Buddha, whereas sraddha is consistently depicted in a positive manner as something that should be cultivated.  Thus, sraddha is clearly distinct from bhakti.

What, then, does sraddha refer to?  After reviewing some previous scholarship on the term, Mr. Rotman first observed that in one frequently-cited passage from the Samyutta Nikaya, a distinction is made between sraddha and "knowledge" (jnana).  The passage suggests that sraddha is the "positive feeling of confidence or trust" one has in some truth without seeing it or knowing it for oneself, whereas "knowledge" is the mental state one develops only after directly seeing and knowing something for oneself.  Thus, sraddha is directed toward unseen and unknown truths, whereas "knowledge" pertains only to those truths that are directly seen and known.

Mr. Rotman then observed, however, that the stories of the Divyavadana fail to follow this definition of sraddha.  In the Divyavadana, characters develop sraddha in something only after they have seen and known it directly.  Through a long analysis of the Kotikarna Avadana in particular, Mr. Rotman demonstrated that characters must see something directly for themselves and have it explained to them as well before developing a feeling of sraddha.  Thus, sraddha in the Divyavadana is not confidence or trust in an unseen and unknown truth, but rather, one's belief in something based on having seen and known it directly.

At the end of the paper, Mr. Rotman suggested four possible speculative reasons why the Divyavadana should depict sraddha as being dependent on visual confirmation; some of these suggestions had to with the "sociology of the text's reception" and some had to do with the text's "rhetorical strategies."  Finally, Mr. Rotman ended the paper by raising (but not answering) the intriguing question of why the Divyavadana never depicts monastics as having sraddha.

Jacob Kinnard (Northwestern University):  The title of Mr. Kinnard's paper as it appeared in the program book was "Tracks of Multivalence: Footprints of the Buddha and/as Footprints of Visnu," but his final paper bears the pithier and more mellifluous title "The Polyvalent Padas of Visnu and the Buddha."

Mr. Kinnard began his paper by pointing out the ambiguous and fluid identity of the various padas (footprints) in and around Bodhgaya and Gaya, which are "venerated by both Buddhists and Vaisnava pilgrims, who attach very different identities and significances to the same images."  While Buddhists see them as the footprints of the Buddha, Vaishnavas see them as the footprints of Vishnu.  How are we to explain this fluid identity?  Mr. Kinnard's paper made three main points.

(1)  Mr. Kinnard's first objective was to point up the basic folly of those scholars who have tried to determine definitively "whose footprint is whose."  While those "on the ground" appear to be relatively unconcerned about the exact identity of the various padas, the same cannot be said of scholars; in fact, the scholarly literature on Bodhgaya and Gaya has displayed a stubborn concern with "whose footprint is whose" for more than a hundred years.  But assigning the footprints a definitive identity is complicated by numerous factors:  Many of the images have been moved around, and it is impossible to determine their original contexts; many are ambiguously marked, inscribed with symbols common to both the Buddhist and Vaisnava iconographic lexicons; and many of the markings have been obscured by weather and use.  Despite these problems, scholars persist in looking for defining features of identity:  One scholar has maintained that the wheel is the defining characteristic of the Buddha's footprint; another has claimed that the Buddha's footprints are always exact mirror images of each other, whereas Visnu's are not; and a third has claimed that Visnu's footprint is always singular, whereas the Buddha's footprints always appear in pairs (in a moment of wit, Mr. Kinnard also pointed out that the invitation to the Buddhism Section Reception was adorned with a singular footprint; therefore, we might have worried about "Vaisnava interlopers, out to co-opt our Buddhist cheese and Chardonnay.")  Mr. Kinnard then demonstrated the problems involved in each of these claims, and in a more general sense, the folly of believing that the identity of the image inheres within the image itself, rather than being affected by where the image is located and how it is regarded by those who actually participate in it.

(2)  A second suggestion made by Mr. Kinnard was that the footprint's fluid identity is perhaps made possible in part by the very nature of the footprint itself.  The footprint is a particularly ambiguous sort of symbol.  On the one hand, "a footprint is considered to be the actual mark left by Visnu or the Buddha, and thus has been regarded as a kind of corporeal extension, and even an actual embodiment or abode."  But on the other hand, "a footprint is not a foot, but rather, simply the empty mark left by a foot; it is thus a kind of empty signifier, a most graphic marker of an absence"; elsewhere, borrowing from Derrida, Mr. Kinnard calls the footprint "a relic under erasure, in that it is precisely the empty space that marks the place where the person is not that constitutes the footprint."  Moreover, the identity of the person who made the footprint is not self-evident; "a footprint is not an object that projects a specific identity, but one into which identity and specific significance is placed by the viewer."  Thus, Mr. Kinnard suggests that it is in part because of this inherent "iconographic open-endedness" that Buddhists and Hindus have been able to share these images on the ground.

(3)  A third suggestion made by Mr. Kinnard was that within Buddhist discourse in particular, the footprints have a "classificatory ambiguity" that might further contribute to their fluid identity.  Whereas Vaishnavas clearly see the footprint as the actual abode of Visnu, Buddhist discourse is much less certain about exactly what sort of objects these are.  While they are generally considered to be relics, it is not at all clear what kind of relic the Buddha's footprint is.  In regard to the tripartite division between corporeal relics (sariraka dhatu), relics of use (paribhogika dhatu), and relics of commemoration (uddesika dhatu), Mr. Kinnard noted that: (1) most discussions of the Buddha's footprints fail to identify which category of relics they belong to; (2) one discussion in the Buddhavamsa identifies the footprints as "relics of use"; (3) the authors of the volume The Image of the Buddha identify the footprints as "bodily relics"; but (4) in strictly logical terms, the footprints are perhaps most appropriately seen as "relics of commemoration."  Mr. Kinnard concluded that the classificatory ambiguity of the footprints highlights their fluid nature within Buddhist discourse and perhaps further leaves them open to being inscribed with multiple significance.

Joseph Walser (Tufts University):  The title of Mr. Walser's paper was "Nagarjuna and Early Andhra Monastic Institutions."  The paper focused on the question of whether or not Nagarjuna was a Mahayanist.

Mr. Walser began the paper by referring to several scholars who have argued that Nagarjuna was not a Mahayanist.  Generally, this claim is based on the fact that Nagarjuna's major work, the Mulamadhyamakakarika (MMK), is devoid of any reference to Mahayana and makes no mention of any Mahayana text, instead preferring to back up its claims by reference to Hinayana sources.

Mr. Walser then observed that the question of Nagarjuna's sectarian affiliation is not merely a logical or doctrinal question, but also an institutional one.  Therefore, rather than limiting ourselves to the MMKwhich addresses only logical and doctrinal issues, we must consider a text that addresses institutional issues.  By analyzing the Ratnavali, Mr. Walser aims to argue that Nagarjuna was indeed a Mahayanist, but also to explainin institutional terms, why a Mahayanist would rely so heavily on Hinayana texts.

The basic theoretical argument of Mr. Walser's paper was as follows:  "The success or failure of a social movement depends not only on the philosophical and psychological insights of a founder but also on the movement's ability to manipulate available resources for its own ends" resources such as "legitimation, money, facilities, labor, and access to media."  "If the new movement is somehow self-sufficient in its access to these items then it may be schismatic or separatist in its ideology.  If, however, the group does not have independent access to these resources, then its ideology must be constructed in such a way as to ensure its continued access to common resources.  It may only accomplish this by presenting itself as the type of group which the parent institution already has a commitment to supporting.  In short, if the new movement does not have independent resources, it cannot afford a separatist ideology."

Mr. Walser then applied this theoretical argument to Nagarjuna's arguments in the Ratnavali by making the following points.

(1)  The Ratnavali makes a basic distinction between Buddhists and Tirthikas.  It tells the king to honor the Buddhists and not honor the Tirthikas, and instructs the king to provide the Buddhists with various types of resources.  Therefore, in terms of resources, the Ratnavali divides the world into two groups: Buddhists and Tirthikas.  There is no further distinction made between Mahayana and Hinayana, as far as resources go.  Therefore, we must assume that whatever Mahayana Nagarjuna belonged to was not institutionally separate from the Hinayana, but expected to access its resources from the common store.

(2)  This is in line with the inscriptional evidence.  Nagarjuna could not have lived in a "Mahayana monastery" because none of the sects mentioned in the inscriptions from the area where he is presumed to have lived can be identified with the Mahayana; furthermore, as Schopen has demonstrated, the Mahayana does not begin to emerge in inscriptions as a separate and independent group until the 4^th century.

(3)  Therefore, we must presume that the Mahayana that Nagarjuna belonged to was some sort of loose association within an otherwise Hinayana monastery.  We must also presume that these Mahayanists recited the same Pratimoksa as their Hinayana counterparts and were subject to the same monastic rules.  One of these rules was not to cause a schism; therefore, the Mahayana advocates had to make their teachings "orthodox" and non-schismatic.  The rule for teachings to be "orthodox" was that they must be considered buddhavacana, or in other words, must conform to the two criteria known as mahapadesas, i.e. must conform to the Dharma and must conform to the Vinaya.  Thus, it was essential for Nagarjuna to appeal to the same sources of legitimization as any other monkÑin other words, to texts held in common by both groups, which would be Hinayana texts.

(4)  At the same time, in philosophical terms, Nagarjuna's Ratnavali makes a clear distinction between Mahayana and Hinayana, and claims that Mahayana is superior to both the Tirthikas and the Hinayanists.  Yet he proves this superiority by using Hinayana texts.  As Walser pointed out, "he is not arguing here for the superiority of Mahayana sutras over and above Hinayana sutras.  Rather, Mahayana consists in a more profound way of reading the common sutras.  By reading Hinayana texts in such a way as to produce Mahayana readings, Nagarjuna can establish Mahayana doctrines as Word of the Buddha, to the extent that they do not contradict commonly held scripture."

Thus, we must treat Nagarjuna's affiliation not only in philosophical terms but also in institutional terms.  The Ratnavali presents Mahayana as an institution which is philosophically distinct from Hinayana but not institutionally separate.  By taking this "institutional" view into consideration, we can see why Nagarjuna, the Mahayanist, relies on Hinayana sources.

Mathieu Boisvert (University of Quebec at Montreal):  The title of Mr. Boisvert's paper as published in the program book was "Monks and Nuns, but Where are the Kids?"  At the beginning of his presentation, Mr. Boisvert explained that his original intention was to present a paper on the dhammacarya national exam designed for monks between the ages of 9 and 10, and held every year in Myanmar.  However, due to some serious miscalculations involving the lunar calendar, he inadvertently missed the exam and was not able to complete the necessary fieldwork.  Therefore, the topic of his paper was changed.  The new title was "Conception and Intra-Uterine Life in the Pali Canon" (excluding, however, all references to the conception and intra-uterine life of the Buddha, which is a separate category).  Mr. Boisvert explained that both papers are part of a major research effort he is currently undertaking to investigate childhood in Theravada Buddhism, especially as represented in the Pali Canon.

(Please note that Mr. Boisvert's paper was full of Pali terminology, much of which turned to mush when the paper was e-mailed to me; therefore, some of his terminology is unavailable.)

Mr. Boisvert began by observing that the words usually used for conception in the sutta literature are gabbhassa avakkanti or gabbhassa okkanti.  The terms avakkanti and okkanti both signify "coming down" or "descent," whereas the term gabbha is ambiguous.  In some contexts, it refers to the embryo or fetus; in other contexts, it refers to the maternal womb where the embryo/fetus develops; and in yet other contexts, it refers to both.  In the phrases gabbhassa avakkanti and gabbhassa okkanti, it clearly refers to that which descends into the womb rather than the womb itself; these phrases can therefore be translated as "descent of the embryo/fetus [into the womb]."  Furthermore, although gabbha is sometimes used to refer to the womb, a more common term for the mother's womb is kucchi.

Mr. Boisvert then noted that the sutta literature is very clear as to the prerequisites for conception.  The Majjhima Nikaya tells us explicitly that in order to have conception in the human realm, three conditions must be present: the mother and father must unite, the mother must be in her season, and a gandhabba must be present (gandhabba referring to a being that is propelled by the mechanism of kamma into another birth).  If any of these three conditions is lacking, conception will not occur.

Nevertheless, despite the clear statement made by the Majjhima Nikaya, we encounter several passages in other texts that do not respect these three prerequisites.  For example, in one episode from the Vinaya, a monk emits semen on his robe, and his former wife (a nun) inserts the soiled robe into her vagina, whereupon she becomes pregnant.  Thus, in this case, there is no union between the mother and the father.  Likewise, in three different stories from the Jataka, an ascetic touches his wife's navel with his thumb, another ascetic touches his wife's navel with his hand, and the god Sakka touches a queen's navel with his handÑall three women become pregnant.  In two more stories from the Jataka, a doe becomes pregnant by eating grass or drinking water mixed with an ascetic's semen.  None of these cases conforms to the three requirements outlined in the Majjhima Nikaya.

Mr. Boisvert then noted that the Milindapanha is aware of these discrepancies and attempts to reconcile the differing points of view.  In the relevant passage, King Milinda mentions several different births that fail to follow the three prerequisites outlined in the Majjhima Nikaya, whereupon Nagasena attempts to argue that the three prerequisites are indeed present in all such cases of extraordinary conception.  Basically, Nagasena makes this argument by redefining "union of mother and father" as "union of semen and kalalam (ovum)" and by claiming that this union can also occur through the mouth (as when the doe drinks the semen).

Mr. Boisvert then addressed the canon's depiction of gestational development.  The sutta literature divides the period of gestation into five different stages.  First comes the kalalam, which refers to the fertilized ovum, and which is followed by four more stages (his paper gives the appropriate Pali terms).  The first four stages last for one week each and collectively correspond to the embryo, while the fifth stage lasts for thirty-eight weeks and corresponds to the fetus, for this is when the "five extremities" (head, two hands, and two feet) develop.  Thus, gestation takes forty-two weeks altogether.

Mr. Boisvert then addressed the four modes of birth.  The Majjhima Nikaya tells us that beings can be classified into four modes of birth: those born from eggs; those born from a jalabu; those born from moisture; and those born spontaneously or without visible cause.  Mr. Boisvert then discussed the term jalabu, concluding that jalabu refers to the placenta or amniotic sac.

The question-and-answer period following Mr. Boisvert's paper was quite lively, as one member of the audience felt that Mr. Boisvert's grasp of female reproductive anatomy suffered some of the same faults as his grasp of the lunar calendar.  The issue at hand was whether or not the placenta is distinct from the amniotic sac.  For a brief period, confusion reigned, as everyone in the room seemed to have forgotten their basic high-school biology.  Luckily, with a little help from a knowledgeable female member of the audience, the mysteries of the female body were soon cleared up, and in the final version of his paper, Mr. Boisvert distinguishes clearly between the two.  He believes that the term jalabu can refer to either the placenta or the amniotic sac, whereas another Pali term (unreadable in my version) refers exclusively to the placenta.

Our fifth scheduled presenter, Sariya Jarasviroj, was not present.  This left plenty of time for extra questions and discussion, which continued fruitfully until the end.