AAR Buddhism Section Top Page

AAR 1999 Panel Report

"Non-Theistic Ethics" and "Buddhism and Phenomenolgy" (A44)

By Gereon Kopf, Luther College

Non-Theistic Ethics

Presenters:

Respondent: Sumner B. Twiss (Brown University)

(The report focuses on the Buddhism section of this panel)

          In her paper, Professor King explores the role of the natural law (Pali: dhamma) in Theravada Buddhist ethics and argues that such an ethics, especially in the interpretation of Phra Prayudh Payutto, supports democratic systems of government and individual rights.
          King commences her argument by citing Stephen Buckle's definition of natural law as "an unchanging normative order that is part of the natural world." Thus defined, natural law grounds ethics in the order of the cosmos as the natural rather than supernatural source of normative behavior. Similarly, King argues, Theravada Buddhism grounds ethical reasoning in the dhamma, which Buddhadasa Bhikkhu paraphrases as "nature itself," "the laws of nature," and "a person's duty to act in accordance with the laws of nature." Payutto further distinguishes between "saccadhamma" as "the conditions ... of dhamma" and "cariyadhamma" as the "knowledge pertaining to the application of saccadhamma." That which harmonizes human behavior with the conditions of reality Buddhadasa calls "sila." Thus defined morality constitues normalcy, that is, harmony with the nature of things, individually and socially. In this sense, Theravada Buddhism replaces the moral extremes of "bad" and "good" with "unskillfull" and skillfull."
          The natural law, specified as the law of conditioned origination (paticca-samuppada) and the law of karma is merely desciptive rather than normative. King argues that Theravada Buddhist ethics differs from the Confucian natural law theory in that the latter is normative in character while the former is predominantly descriptive. The moral imperative as implied in the law of karma explicates this descriptive nature of Theravada ethics. King explains: "[i]f one violates the moral law, or in other words, behaves in an anti-dhammic fashion, it is inevitable that unpleasant consequences will follow, since that is how the universe is constructed." Morality, then, becomes a matter of conforming to and harmonizing with "the way things are." Metta, love, karuna, compassion, upekkha, equanimity, and samaggi, unity, constitute the appropriate response to the world and its order. Buddhism comprises the observation that humans tend to be in disharmony with nature and experience suffering (dukkha) and provides a "cure" for this problem, as formulated in the four noble truths.
          In the second half of her paper, King asks how such an ethics based on the observation of the natural law and an "emphatic, caring, compassionate response" to the human predicament, can support the value of the individual and respond to unjust governments? She argues that the notions of causal interdependence and harmony with "the way things are" does not justify tyranny as one aspect of the interdependence between government and its people but rather implies "non-egocentricism" and harmony with the natural law (not that of "a particular social system"). To the contrary, a government that does not harmonize with the dhamma violates the natural order itself and "could be easily challenged on that ground ground, simply for the sake of putting an end to suffering." Even Buddhadasa argues that a violation of the dasarajadhamma (the ten virtues of a ruler) justifies rebellion.
          However, while Buddhadasa and Payutto agree that independent critical thinking is necessary, they disagree in their interpretation of the relationship between individuals and society. Buddhadasa, who proposes a "dhammic socialism," argues that liberalism and individualism underestimate the power of human defilements (kleseas) and, therefore, interprets non-egocentricism to privilege society over the individual. Payutto, on the contrary, argues that the freedom of the individual is interrelated to the freedom of other individuals and thus is important to society. Based on his interpretation of interdependence, Payutto formulates the idea of a "dhammic democracy" which "balances the interests of individual and society." Thus Buddhadasa seems to emphasize the importance of human defilements, on the one hand, while Payutto stresses human potential, on the other. King argues that Payuttto's view is both "more philosophically adequate" and "truer to the values of Shakyamuni Buddha."
          Professor Twiss commences his response by outlining the three different kind of complexities involved in a comparative study. Comparative studies face methodological complexities insofar as they apply, critique, or dialogue categories across cultures and traditions; they face social complexities insofar as they cross cultural and religious boundaries; and they face the problem of having to negotiate complexities with individual traditions. Since both, Slingerland and King refrain from a cross-cultural critique of ethical categories, Twiss concludes they are "implicitly rather than self-consciously comparative." Finally, he acknowledges his bias in favor of an interpretation of Buddhist ethics as virtue ethics and thus against King's reading of Theravada Buddhist ethics as a natural law theory. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that King's interpretation is "plausible" and decides to focus on King's definition of natural law. By the same token, he suggests that while he contends that King's interpretation of Confucianism as natural law ethics is "not utterly off-the-wall," he definitely leans towards an interpretation of Confucian ethics as value ethics.
          In general, Twiss argues that Kings definition of the natural law neglects "an emphasis on the role of reason" and " the socio-moral functions of natural law ethics." Central to a natural law theory are general and specific principles which enable a moral life, a social order, and a critique thereof. These principles are found in "the natural cosmic order," in what it means to be human, by "general consensus," or in divine revelation. Based on this expanded notion of natural law, Twiss argues, that a consideration of the "epistemic warrants" of the Theravada position could highlight "the uniqueness of the Buddhist view" and would engage in a "fruitful dialogue with natural law positions in other traditions." At the heart of this issue, however, lies the question, whether a natural law or a law of karma, for this matter, can serve as the basis for a moral theory if it is purely descriptive and devoid of any normative character. It is the answer to this question which will determine the value of the Buddhist natural law theory for the reconstruction of a Buddhist social ethics.

Buddhism and Phenomenology

Chair: Dale Wright (Occidental College)
Panelists: John Cha (Gustavus Adolphus College); Gereon Kopf (Luther College)
Respondents: Dan Lusthaus (Florida State University); Steven Heine (Florida International University)

The purpose of this panel was to discuss the research on the relationship between phenomenology and Buddhism and to interpret these comparisons as bilateral hermeneutics which not only interpret Buddhism in the light of phenomenology but also phenomenology in the light of Buddhism.

          John Cha's paper focused on a comparison between the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the Yogaacaara philosophy of Vasubandhu and Sthiramatii. He gave particular emphasis to the their respective projects to overcome the dualisms dominant in the contemporary philosophical discourse and to their examination of the relationship between transcendence and immanence.
          In this sense, Merleau-Ponty tries to mediate between empiricism, which gives priority to sense data, and intellectualism, which emphasizes the "meaning giving structures" of the constituting consciousness. Thus as epistemological theories both empiricism and intellectualism presuppose the same ontological dualism juxtaposing consciousness and the world. Their difference lies in their emphasis: Empiricism identifies the transcendence of the external world as the ground of human knowledge, intellectualism, on the contrary, prioritizes the immanent cognitive structures of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty suggests as the middle ground perception and the "ambiguous facticity" of the human body as "being-in-the-world." Merleau-Ponty's conception of embodiment" designates the "pre-reflective, non-dual position." At the same time, empiricism implies continuous uncertainty insofar as "[e]mpiricism cannot see that we need to know what we are looking for, otherwise we would not be looking for it" (Merleau-Ponty) and insofar as its object remains permanently unreachably transcendent. Thus empiricism fails to account for knowledge. By the same token, intellectualism is incapable of accounting for error because it assumes that "all meaningful perception is already given in the immanent structures of consciousness." Merleau-Ponty attempts to solve this dilemma by collapsing immanence and transcendence in the relationship of the embodied subject to the world.
          The Yogaacaara Buddhism of Vasubandhu and Sthiramatii attempts to mediate between the ontological extremes of "absolute existence," namely the independent existence of the "objects of consciousness" and "consciousness" itself, and "absolute non-existence," namely the non-existence of both consciousness and its objects. In analogy to Merleau-Ponty, Yogacaaraa Buddhism argues that both extreme positions are untenable and their juxtaposition constitutes a false alternative. Vasubandhu suggests the three transformations of consciousness, which are never devoid of an object as the middle way. As Cha observed, "[a]ll modes of cognition have the structure of consciousness/object," and "it should be stressed that the division between unreal objects and of consciousness and the real process of perception is only a theoretical one. In reality, the transformation of consciousness does not occur without the non-existent conceptions of self and factors of experience." To resolve the soteriological problem that arises from non-dualism of immanence and transcendence, Yogaacaara Buddhism asserts an ontological non-dualism of transcendence and immanence and, simultaneously, maintains that "[e]pistemologically speaking, ultimate reality is transcendent." In his "Madhyaanta-vibhaaga-bhaas.ya," Vasubandhu outlines the path from the cognition that constitutes consciousness and object as separate to the non-duality of emptiness through dialectical negation. On the basis of this dialectical negation lies his differentiation between the concept "cognition-only" and cognition-only. Cha concludes that "[w]hen the Yogaacaara assert the primacy of cognition-only they are implicitly disclosing the pre-subjective, pre-objective realm of perception."
          Finally, Cha observes that Merleau-Ponty attempts to solve the problem of transcendence and immanence by identifying the embodiment of the "being-in-the-world" as common ground, while Vasubandhu conceives of a transcendence of everyday cognition. Vasubandhu's epistemological transcendence is motivated by his soteriological concern.
          In his response Dan Lusthaus praises Cha's exploration of the conceptual connections between Merleau-Ponty and Vasubandhu. He underlines Merleau-Ponty's emphasis on ambiguity in order to establish the foundation of epistemology and the >Wissenschaften< in general and points out that it is important to emphasize that Merleau-Ponty defines rationality as the "essence of intersubjectivity." While, Vasubandhu focuses on the the distinction between "process of cognition" and "content of cognition," he emphasizes, in contrast to phenomenology, the role of causality for the philosophical enterprise. In addition, Vasubandhu's terminology of acitta makes the Yogaacaara claim "consciousness is real" the more difficult. Lastly, Lusthaus questions Cha's translations of "absolute existence" and "absolute non-existence."

Gereon Kopf's paper revisited the famous opening paragraph of Dougen's Genjoukouan:

When all dharmas become the buddha-dharma, there is illusion and enlightenment, there is practice, there is birth and death, there are buddhas and sentient beings. When all dharmas and the self are without a self, there is neither illusion nor enlightenment, neither buddhas nor sentient beings, neither birth nor death. Because the buddha-way originally transcends abundance and lack, there is generation-and-extinction, illusion-and-enlightenment, beings-and-buddhas. However, even if we describe it this way, flowers fall amidst loathing and weed flourishes in the middle of disgust.

          Most interpreters seem to agree that the four lines imply 1) affirmation and dualism, 2) negation and monism, 3) dialectical affirmation and non-dualism, and 4) impermanence and suffering or affectivity (Kasulis). These fourfold structure is reflected in Dougen's fourfold modification of "buddha-bature" (busshou) as being-buddha-nature, non-being-buddha-nature, emptiness-buddha-nature, and impermanence-buddha-nature. Kopf argues that the first three lines describe three standpoints affirmation/dualism, negation/monism, and dialectical affirmation/non-dualism, which are preceded by three status descriptions, namely "[w]hen all dharmas become the buddha-dharma, there is illusion and enlightenment, there is practice, there is birth and death," "[w]hen all dharmas and the self are without a self," and "[b]ecause the buddha-way originally transcends abundance and lack." The fourth line indicates that this non-dualism is not something in addition to the previous two layers, but is experienced /enacted in the impermanence of sam.saara. This interpretation is supported by what Kasulis calls Dougen's "phenomenology of zazen, namely his threefold conception of thinking (shiryou) as thinking, not-thinking, and non-thinking where non-thinking is defined as "thinking about not-thinking."
          Kopf argues that these three standpoints identify three realms of knowledge. Drawing from the terminology of Merleau-Ponty and Nishida, he refers to these realms as the "phenomenal world," the "lived world," and the "actual world." The "phenomenal world describes the realm of everyday experience where the self experiences itself as separate from others, the world, and, ultimately, itself. Dougen symbolizes this standpoint as "people outside the mountains" (sangenin). The lived world describes the realm of subjectivity and activity where, as Dougen puts it in his "Sansuikyou," "there is not one person who meets another." This world is symbolized by the "people inside the mountain" (sannainin). The third world, the actual world, Kopf interprets as the dialectic of the phenomenal world, that is, affirmation, duality, and objectivity, on the one side, and the lived world, that is negation, monism, and subjectivity, on the other. Kopf cites four reasons for this interpretation: (1) the radical non-dualism of the Mahaayaana thinkers which developed and elaborated in the double conception of s'uunyataa and pratiitya samutapaada to resolve the problem of juxtaposing binary realm if sam.saara and the non-dual realm of nirvaan.a. (2) Dougen himself develops the non-dualism of self and world when he declares that "the actualization of myriad dharmas constitutes the casting off body and mind of self and other, of self and other as in his fascicle "Kattou," of past and future qua birth-and-death (shouji), and of universal and individual in his fascicle "Zenki." (3) In the opening paragraph of the "Genjoukouan," Dougen distinguishes between the preambles to the first two lines, which, starting with "when" indicate a particular apsect, and the third line, which indicates "the way things are." (4) Nishida, whose conceptual structure reflects that of Dougen, conceives of this third realm as the dialectic of the previous two, which he paraphrases as the dialectic of noesis and noema.
          In conclusion, Kopf argues that such a reading of Dougen's "Genjoukouan" enables an interpretation of his conceptions of self-awareness and temporal continuity as discussed in the same fascicle. In addition, this conception of the actual world as the dialectic of the phenomenal world and lived world will contribute to the controversy between foundationalism and relativism insofar as it identifies a ground of knowledge which ever escapes human cognition.
          Steven Heine lauds the revisiting of the opening paragraph of the "Genjoukouan." He describes the three layers of the Genjoukouan discussed in Kopf's paper and suggests that the fourth diomension has to be considered more fully. Heine argues that fourth layer is fundamental to Dougen's conception of the "genjoukouan" insofar as it adds not only the notion of impermanence but also of embodiment to Dougen's philosophical non-dualism.
          In the discussion three basic questions were raised. (1) The first question concerned the neuro physiological correlate to the mystical experience - all participants in session passed on this question. (2) The second question inquired why it is considered problematic if Vasubandhu turned out to be an idealist. Cha answered that an idealistic interpretation of Yogaacaara Buddhism would be not problematic but simply "karmically unbeneficial." Lusthaus argued that while Vasubandhu's philosophy might be interpreted as an epistemological idealism, it would be rather difficult to interpret it as an ontological idealism. Kopf added that any ontological idealism would presuppose a dualistic metaphysics, which Vasubandhu clearly rejects. (3) Professor Kasulis suggested some improvements to Kopf's translation and asked how the affective dimension articulated in the fourth line could be integrated into an interpretation of Dougen's philosophy. Kopf referred to Professor Nagatomo's Attunement Through the Body as an interpretation of Dougen which emphasizes the affective dimension of human existence.