From: Geoff Froh
gfroh@us-japan.org
I have something to contribute of interest to the recent dfs discussion on
the issue of the U.S.-Japan security treaty and kempo revision. The
Japan-America Society of the State of Washington hosted former PM Hosokawa
at our annual dinner two days ago. The topic of his keynote address was
"Rebuilding the U.S.-Japan Security Structure" in which he touched on a
variety of issues including Japanese pariticipation in ACSA vis a vis
Article 9.
Rather than attempt a poor analysis of the speech myself, I'll leave it to
network members to hash through its content. The English and Japanese texts are
available at:
http://www.us-japan.org/jassw/what/archive/96/031296Hosokawa.html
For those without easy access to the web, I'll post the English version
here (in two parts).
Regards,
Geoff Froh
Program Manager
Japan-America Society of the State of Washington
http://www.us-japan.org/jassw/ || http://www.us-japan.org/
hosokawa text ------
"Rebuilding the US-Japan Security Structure" by Morihiro Hosokawa
Keynote Address at Japan-America Society of the State of Washington
Seattle, Washington March 12, 1996
(English translation of speech was provided by PM Hosokawa. Philip Jones
served as interpreter at the event.)
Although my term as Prime Minister lasted only about a year, I worked
hard as a "reformer" to achieve changes in Japan, such as the
fundamental political reform of the Japanese political system embodied
in the legislation to prevent corruption and to reform the electoral
system for the Diet. I also worked hard to secure passage of the
implementing legislation for the Uruguay Round of the GATT, and to
further the process of administrative reform through measures for
deregulation. I think these were solid achievements, although I was
Prime Minister for a short period of time and one is constrained by the
limits of time and the need to establish limited goals andpriorities.
Unfortunately, we haven't begun to tackle the programs of reforming a
host of domestic structural problems, such as the change of our fiscal
system and the overall bureaucratic structure in Japan. We need to
address these issues earnestly in the near future. I should like to
address those problems at another time since my time is limited tonight.
But I would like to take this occasion to give you my thoughts as a
reformer in the area of national security issues, and specifically those
of Japan-U.S. ties in the security arena.
The fundamental stance of Japan's foreign policy
Until World War II, Japan's destiny of course was largely determined by
our relations with China. In fact, the most serious issues Japan may
confront in the future may well be those related to China. The single
most important determining factor in Japan's national interest is the
relationship between Japan, China, and the United States. We must build
and maintain friendly relations with China in the future just as we have
with the United States.
China, as our huge neighbor in the Pacific, will undoubtedly develop the
industrial base and armaments commensurate with its large size and huge
population. Over the past 100 years, China has had a history of
difficult trials and tribulations. It is a history in which
nationalistic impulses haven't been entirely fulfilled. Hence I think
it's necessary to pay sufficient attention to the latent desires of the
Chinese state and the instability this introduces to Asia. Although one
doesn't know with certainty if China itself is aware of this, it is
unmistakable the other neighboring countries are aware of a "big China"
and must inevitably have strong concerns.
The emergence of China as a superpower -- whether it be nuclear weapons
testing, the expansion of its navy, or its territorial assertions in the
South China Sea -- reminds one in some ways of "Imperial China" of the
past. In fact, such a style of diplomacy may carry considerable strength
in the "borderless economy" today. Yet another scenario for China may be
the world's first "multi-currency state" in which full reunification
isn't achieved while its imperial ambitions fall along with wayside, as
they did for the imperialistic dreams of the former Soviet Union. In
Shanghai, for example, one could conceivably trade with Hong Kong
dollars, the Taiwanese dollar, or U.S. dollars, thereby creating
competing economic warlords each controlling a certain fiefdom, which
would be similar to the military cliques that divided and controlled
China's economy in the past. This development, if it happens, would
change the discourse about a "nation-state" in modern political science.
I believe there is really only one strategy to maintain ties as a good
neighbor with such a China. The most important first step is to
acknowledge once again the importance of strong ties between Japan and
the United States. Setting aside the intention of China, as a strong
state emerges on the continent, the only option for Japan's security as
maritime state is to build strategic alliances in the Asia-Pacific by
joining hands with the United States, which has similar interests as a
maritime power in the Pacific, and other countries in the region. At the
start of this century, Japan was inexorably compelled to form an
alliance with England as it was in its signing of the security treaty
with the United States as a means of countering the northern threat
embodied in Russia. In a similar vein, the other newly industrializing
countries of Asia along with Japan would not feell comfortable being
influenced heavily by China. This is why a continued American presence
in the Pacific is necessary.
In such a way, the joint interests of maritime nations in the Pacific in
a future-oriented mutual security system could become the "Key Concept"
for this region. Let me stress this is in no way intended as a structure
to contain China. The basis of the concept of "balance of power" is
that, when a problem occurs, that the relationships of power in that
region only allow a resolution of the issue through peaceful means. It
is possible to create such a structure in Asia that provides for Asian
stability and the maintenance of friendly ties with China.
Although China-Taiwan tensions have suddenly increased in recent weeks,
the problems related to China for Japan, as a maritime nation, are in
one sense those issues related to Taiwan. The issue of Taiwan for Japan
is similar to that of Calais in relations between France and England, or
Gibraltar during the Napoleonic wars, or the issue of Iceland or the
Azores during World War II. For a continental nation these issues are
merely thorns in one's throat, but for maritime nations they are vital
lifelines of support. Under the terms of the San Francisco Treaty, Japan
relinquished its rights to the region of Taiwan. Yet I believe there are
certain constant factors which don't change over time in the relations
between maritime and continental countries from a geopolitical
standpoint.
The situation on the Korean peninsula is another area of great interest
to Japan. Several of the visible symptoms in North Korea indicate an
acute situation, which, if it worsens, could create potential scenarios
such as: a military takeover; a cleansing of the leadership along the
lines of Rumania; or an implosion of the state itself along with lines
of East Germany. All cases are possible, but it is far beyond our
imagination as Japanese to predict the likely outcome.
In order to prevent an explosion and engineer a soft landing in North
Korea, the United States may decide to play the rather dramatic card of
creating close to normal diplomatic relations with the North in the
future. Again, let me say that this is only my imagination. Of course,
the United States would have to consult closely with its allies in Seoul
and Tokyo about such a move and not leave them in the cold But it is
undeniable this diplomatic card remains available to American diplomats.
The US-Japan security system
How should we consider the future course of Japan-US relations, which
form one axis of the global structure today, given this analysis of
relations within the Asia-Pacific region and its impact on international
issue? One can certainly point to a large number of bilateral structures
and associates to handle to host of economic issues that challenge us.
Yet in the security realm, due to domestic political reasons, there has
been practically no attention paid to these security issues.
However, the very unfortunate incident of the rape of the young Japanese
girl in Okinawa has brought much attention to the Japan-US security
relationship. There could be several reasons for this heightened
interest by the Japanese public. First, the emotions of the public are
already high given the desire to "reach closure" with the legacy of the
end of World War II fifty years later. Another reason is perhaps the
expectation of some type of "peace dividend" due to the end of the Cold
War. Or it could reflect some feeling of remorse or reflection about the
neglect most Japanese have demonstrated toward the "detached southern
island", Okinawa, for many years. In any case, the issues surrounding
Japan-US security issues are the subject of vigorous debate in Japan
today.
It is clear that, even in a post-Cold War world, the basic structure of
support for Japan's national security will continue to be the security
treaty between our two countries. One cannot deny that the continued
strong relations between the United States and Japan are of similar
importance to each country which cannot be easily substitued.
Despite this, the context within which Japan-U.S. relations exists has
changed greatly. The most important change in the context really isn't
the change regarding Russia, China, or the Korean peninsula; it is the
change in the Japan-U.S. relationship itself. If one doesn't think in
this way, we will agree to go beyond the "confirmation" to a
"redefinition" of our relationship as if an urgent response can quickly
improve our security ties. In my view, the basic thrust in the Nye
report on East Asian security that we can put Japan-U.S. security ties
back on track with minor adjustments is misguided. In fact, if the
recommendations are carried out, it is hard to believe that such
policies recommended in the report could produce beneficial impacts on
relations in the future.
For example, the commitment in the report for the U.S. Government to
maintain 100,000 American troops in East Asia for a period of 20 years
could not be guaranteed if a drastic step like reunification on the
Korean peninsula were realized. Who is going to take the responsibility
for maintaining such a commitment over the long term? Also, the report
leads one to think that U.S. troops at Okinawan bases can be kept on in
the present configuration indefinitely. Governor Ota of Okinawa
prefecture has said the U.S. Government has a better understanding of
his situation than the Japanese Government. I think the Japanese
Government can no longer avoid addressing these issues and must speak
more openly about the importance of the Japan-U.S. security ties with a
sense of realism and a pragmatic outlook toward the United States.
Although it's easy to say the slogan "Global Partnership," the hard
reality of our security relationship hasn't changed much over the years.
In other words, the treaty is really about military bases: Japan
provides valuable bases within its territory while the United States
provides for the security of Japan. Sometime in the near future, I
believe it is inevitable that we will debate a "redefinition" of the
currently redefined relationship, in other words, two definitions,
instead of merely habitually agreeing to renew our security ties based
on the traditional thinking that assumes the existence of the current
Japan-U.S. security treaty as the start of our discussion.
One of the focal points of the current security treaty and its extended
framework is the activities of the U.S. troops stationed in Japan within
the so-called "Far East" region. The international environment has
changed a great deal since the days of the Korean and Vietnamese wars
when Japan served as a valley, "staging ground", between the two
regions. It is no exaggeration to say that the importance of the U.S.
bases in Japan have increased in the aftermath of the Cold War. In fact,
the treaty has already taken on the character of a military cooperation
agreement on a global scale.
However, the message from the Japanese side has been merely to reiterate
its support for U.S. strategic policies and goals without offering any
explanation about these substantial changes in the functions of the
security treaty and by not engaging the Japanese public in a real debate
about the pro's and con's of such changes. One cannot expect the
Japanese public to merely accept the current reality of the expansion of
the military activities of U.S. forces stationed in Japan from the Far
East to the Middle East -- without any discussion or debate.
In short, one can flatly say that there has been practically no dialogue
from the Japanese side with America in the last 50 years, although a
bilateral security agreement has been in effect during this time,
there's been no dialogue about the level of troops stationed in Japan
and their necessity from a national security standpoint. At least, there
has been no dialogue with the Japanese public about these issues. Some
of the following questions may be ripe for discussion:
* How far can Japan go along in supporting the global strategy of the U.S.
military?
* How can one resolve the internal contradiction of Japan's
strong anti-nuclear weapon policies with its protection under the
nuclear umbrella of the United States?
* Why is it necessary to maintain a level of 47,000 U.S. military troops
in Japan?
* What are the respective functions of the Yokota and Kadena military
bases?
Also, the issues of host nation support should be discussed. Although a
simple comparison can't be made, while Germany provides about $1.4
billion for the stationing of about 80,000 U.S. troops, Japan provides
about $6 billion in annual funds for the maintenance of 47,000 troops at
U.S. bases in Japan. What is the basis for the payment for troop
maintenance in Japan that is about ten times greater than that of
Germany? One can argue that, compared to U.S.-German defense ties, there
is a lack of reciprocal obligations in Japan U.S. security ties. In any
case, it will be next to impossible. considering our domestic
circumstances to shoulder any more of the burden of host nation support.
Therefore, it is more necessary than ever before for the Japanese
Government to answer these questions and doubts persuasively in order to
maintain the structure of Japan-U.S. security ties.
Of course, it's important to develop the capability to respond quickly
to an emergency on the Korean peninsula. We should consider the example
of the Europeans in this case. They have developed an arrangement called
POMCUS (Prepositioning of Overseas Material Configured to Unit Sets)
that allows the pre-positioning of critical supplies and provides a
framework for the dispatch of personnel during an emergency -- and this
is done during peacetime. Under such a scheme, could we not develop
adequate procedures that would allow for a reduction in the area and
facilities of U.S. bases in Japan? More specifically, it should be
realistically possible to transfer the main Marine bases in Okinawa to
Hawaii or Guam.
Furthermore, of course, we must expeditiously proceed to resolve legally
the problems involved in providing for the defense of Japan and in
addressing the issues of Japan's influence on stability and security to
our neighboring countries in Asia. Regarding Japan's Self-Defense
Forces, although they have a stated role to provide for the defense of
Japan's territory from foreign aggression, their role as a complement to
U.S. defense forces is rapidly increasing, just as they expanded during
the Cold War as a one player in the U.S. strategy of deterrence against
the former Soviet Union. We should begin to debate soberly the
obligations of the Self Defense Forces within the constraints of our
Constitution.
In such a context, one must discuss seriously the concept the "the right
of collective self- defense". Yet Japan faces rigid constraints
regarding this point due to our peace Constitution compared to other
countries. It will be difficult politically to either change the
Constitution or interpret its provisions to allow such authority.
Within our limited options, therefore, it becomes important to clarify
which activities are prohibited under a collective security scheme given
the current interpretation of the Constitution. In other words, one can
consider there is ample flexibility to take actions even without
bringing forth the concept of collective self-defense.
In any case, we must determine quickly what Japan can do in terms of
rear support for the U.S. military forces forwardly deployed in East
Asia. If we do so, I think we can consider the cooperative models
created by Germany during the Cold War as the most realistic policies,
such as "emergency host nation support" and an agreement to assist in
supplying materials during an emergency called the Acquisition and
Cross-Servicing Agreement or ACSA.
Tonight I have limited my speech to a discussion of security issues, and
excuse me for doing that. Prime Minister Hashimoto visited briefly with
President Clinton last month in California. At the time your
President,visits Japan in April, I think these issues will be a central
and focal point of discussion between the two leaders. I think both
leaders should take this opportunity to engage in a serious airing of
these difficult issues. I appreciate the chance of sending a message
with my personal thoughts on the eve of such an important meeting.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your kind attention tonight. I would
be happy to answer your questions.
*****************************************************************************
End of H-Japan Message