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Manufacturing and the ruralist ideology
of the political economy in Queensland, 1859-1930.
David Cameron
A paper presented to the ‘Looking Ahead’ Postgraduate
Conference, Newcastle, 3 July, 1998
During a debate on a motion to establish a state iron and steel works,
put before the Queensland Parliament in 1906, John Mann, M.L.A. for
Cairns, argued that an economy and its society could not exist on primary
industries alone. Mann, dissenting from the usual calls to bolster rural
development, stressed that secondary industries should be encouraged
and that Queensland actually required a ‘manufacturing population’ to
underpin the consumptive demand necessary to support a dynamic manufacturing
sector. (1) Mann’s sympathy for secondary industries and urban development
were politically unfashionable at this time and manufacturing was very
much the black sheep of the political economy in Queensland. Over a
decade later the keen eyed Queensland political observer Charles Bernays
expressed the commonly held perception that the state of the manufacturing
sector in Queensland was ‘well nigh beneath contempt’. (2) Bernays’
comment reflected the political stigma associated with manufacturing
that remained largely unchallenged in Queensland until well after the
Second World War. The developmentalist zeal of Queensland colonial and
state governments was avowedly pro-rural and anti-urban, with the secondary
industries generally considered less than worthy of government attention
or aid. In Queensland, unlike the other eastern states, manufacturing
was virtually ignored because urbanisation was more than counter-balanced
by rural expansion and significant decentralisation. The political,
economic and geographic factors that limited urbanisation in Queensland’s
decentralised economy also reduced much of the potential for the expansion
of its secondary industries. However, the vast geography and decentralised
nature of Queensland did encourage localised manufacturing activity
to service regional markets and the rapidly expanding primary exports
sector. Nonetheless, despite the political and social marginalisation
of the manufacturing sector these industries have made a crucial and
significant contribution to the successful economic development of Queensland.
Queensland’s economic development is the story of the complex interaction
between distant export markets, politically powerful pastoral and mercantile
elites, an increasingly active and electorally successful labour movement,
rural isolation and intensification, decentralisation, and varying degrees
of urban growth and urbanisation. (3) The centralisation of production
in the metropolis was not as pronounced in Queensland as it was in the
southern states, because of Brisbane’s eccentric location in the extreme
South-East, nor did manufacturing grow to dominate the economy to the
degree that it has in the southern states. The centripetal forces of
the metropolis were counter-balanced by the centrifugal forces of foreign
and domestic markets, rural production, and patterns of settlement,
leading to distinct economic and demographic divisions in the South,
Centre and North. The colony was so large that the growth of the metropolis,
and its numerous feeder towns concentrated in the South-East, did not
hinder the development of large and small urban clusters in the Centre
and the North. Queensland’s economic geography therefore ensured that
the trade flows of commodities, from its expanding and contracting economic
frontiers, were not funnelled predominantly through the metropolis.
The spatial diversity of Queensland’s natural resources guaranteed the
development of ports and urban clusters to the north of Brisbane such
as those at Maryborough, Bundaberg, Gladstone, Rockhampton, Mackay,
Bowen, Townsville, Cairns, Port Douglas and Cooktown. Two of these ports,
Rockhampton and Townsville, eventually dominated trade in their hinterlands
and became the defacto capitals of Central and North Queensland respectively.
(4)
Manufacturing in the Nineteenth Century
As populations began to develop from the 1840s in the South-East, and
in the hinterlands of Rockhampton and Townsville during the second half
of the nineteenth century, the demand for local manufacturing industries
grew. Indeed, the rate of industrial growth in Queensland in the nineteenth
century was quite rapid. (5) There was an expanding market for locally
manufactured "essential" items, these goods included basic food and
drink, soap, clothing, leather goods, building materials, tools, agricultural
implements, fabricated iron products, wagons, barrels, boxes and so
on. The market for "non-essential" items, such as imported foodstuffs,
textiles, Manchester, cutlery, specialised machinery, chemicals, etc.,
was at first generally denied to local manufacturers. Factors that contributed
to the delay in development of "non-essential" goods manufacture in
Queensland included, inter-colonial and overseas competition, a lack
of access to investment capital, (6) the relatively high costs of materials,
labour and transport, difficulties in achieving economies of scale,
(7) and a cultural preference for imported items that only began to
recede during the First World War. (8) Growth eventually occurred in
the "non-essential" sector as the economy expanded and local products
were adopted or adapted to suit local conditions and markets. Eventually,
with the growth in population densities, these markets would reach a
point of critical mass when it became viable to establish "non-essential"
goods manufacturing enterprises. (9)
Throughout the nineteenth century the manufacturing sector struggled
to develop beneath the shadow of a pastoral sector that clearly dominated
both the economy and political discourse in Queensland. Pastoral development
was a consistent priority of all Queensland governments. While successive
Queensland colonial governments became increasingly active in the affairs
of the pastoral and agricultural sectors, in which most parliamentarians
were intimately involved promoting developmental railways, pastoral
expansion, and ultimately closer settlement agriculture, manufacturing
was generally left to its own devices. (10) For Queensland’s pastoral
and mercantile power elites manufacturing was generally considered unnatural
and unnecessary as their profits relied on the continued development
of exporting rural commodities to the United Kingdom. Indeed, British
investors were much more inclined to support a cycle of trade and profit
based upon importing Queensland’s commodities to fuel Britain’s factories
and exporting their manufactures back to the colonies. Moreover, this
cycle of finance and pattern of trade reflected the hegemony of the
political economy of Empire.
Within this context the Queensland government initiated rural development
programs that were aligned with this hegemony and sought to tap into
this trade cycle, and the government became increasingly reliant upon
massive British loans, and the revenues derived from the wool trade,
to finance these schemes. When the wool market collapsed in the late
1880s, the government attempted to prop-up rural investment via land
sales associated with closer settlement schemes. (11) Historian Glen
Lewis has described this process of political economy as the ‘Trinity
of Hope’ (land, immigration, and developmental railways). From separation
through to the mid-1880s, the trinity was unchallenged as the primary
means of promoting economic development and discouraging urbanisation
and industrialisation. (12) However, by the turn of the century it had
become clear, even to the political promoters of this strategy, that
the trinity was fiscally unsustainable and had failed in its task of
socially engineering greater rurality on a scale envisaged by its political
patrons. (13)
Despite the intense focus on rural development, there were some measures
taken to encourage selected manufacturing activities. Several governments
sought to encourage meat processing and exports and later also offered
financial and regulatory assistance to the sugar industry to help establish
cooperative controlled sugar crushing mills. (14) Two legislative measures,
the Manufacturing Industries Act 1869 and the Encouragement of Native
Industries Act 1869, were adopted in 1869 in the hope of fostering textile
production in Queensland. However, both of these Acts failed in their
objectives. (15) Nevertheless, by the mid-1870s the composition and
distribution of secondary industries had achieved reasonable levels
of complexity and decentralisation, if not in overall sophistication
and diversity.
The data available in the Statistics of Queensland for the 1860s is
not reliable enough to indicate the true shape of the sector in that
decade, however, by 1875 we know that there were 578 factories operating
in Queensland. (16)
During the 1870s and 1880s the growth of the sugar industry, mining,
smelting, and railway construction promoted expansion in the metals
and engineering sectors in the regional urban centres of Ipswich, Toowoomba,
Maryborough, Bundaberg, Rockhampton, Mackay, and Townsville. The growth
in domestic and export demand for meat products promoted a general expansion
in the number and scale of operations of meat works and associated processing
industries. (17) Moreover, growth in urban populations, and the trend
toward higher wages and levels of consumption, created new and expanding
forces of demand for local and imported manufactures. By 1885 there
were 1079 factories, and this expanded quickly to over 2600 by 1899;
an increase of over 350 per cent. Production and employment figures
are only available from 1892 and they indicate that employment increased
by ninety-six per cent, from 12,209 to 23,879 between 1892-1899. The
value of output also increased, expanding from 4.6 million in 1895 to
,8.9 million in 1899. (18) These figures demonstrate something of the
dynamism of the secondary industries during the 1890s, a truly remarkable
achievement in the shadow of the early 1890s depression.
The 1890s were a critical and pivotal decade for the economic development
of Queensland. The manufacturing sector performed well and was the stand
out success of the decade, despite the bitter depression of 1891-1893.
The depression, which was experienced Australia-wide, was induced by
financial speculation and over-production in Europe which drove down
commodity prices, and therefore reduced export incomes in Australia,
to the extent that the levels of public debt became temporarily unserviceable.
The ensuing credit squeeze effectively cut off the economic fuel supply
to much of Queensland’s economy. (19) The extent of the impact of the
depression, and droughts, floods and federation later in the decade,
on Queensland’s economic development can be seen in the reduction of
immigration and population growth. Net immigration decreased markedly
during 1891-1892 and stagnated for the rest of the decade. Queensland
again experienced net migration losses between 1900 and 1905, and a
decrease in its population, as a result of another depression associated
with the long drought of 1898-1903. (20)
Nevertheless, after the tumultuous economic changes of the early 1890s,
Queensland’s economy recovered more quickly than the other colonies.
Indeed, the unique characteristics of Queensland’s decentralised rural-urban
structure underpinned the colony’s recovery, as its workforce was less
reliant upon large scale manufacturing centred in the metropolis. It
must be remembered that Queensland’s economy was not homogenous, as
it was, and still is, comprised of several distinct regional economies
subject to wide variations in climate, commodity markets, and population
densities. While population growth stalled between 1899-1903, Census
data indicates that from the mid-1890s Queensland’s workforce grew faster
than the Australian average in percentage terms. Apart from transport
and communications, Queensland’s urban based workforce also grew more
quickly in percentage terms than the rest of the states. (21) Nevertheless,
the manufacturing workforce still lagged proportionally behind the Australian
average. (22)
In terms of the overall composition of Queensland’s workforce primary
producers accounted for approximately thirty-eight per cent of the total
workforce in 1901, this had fallen to less than twenty-five per cent
by 1933. Likewise urban workers accounted for fifty-seven per cent of
Queensland’s workforce compared to sixty-four per cent for Australia
as a whole. Those working in Queensland classified as having urban occupations
accounted for over fifty-three per cent. (23) This indicates that Queensland
was more reliant upon its primary industries, and that it’s population
was less urbanised than the Australian average. However, a rather different
picture emerges when one considers non-rural occupation classifications
(manufacturing, commercial, etc.) irrespective of urban or rural location,
here the statistics for Queensland demonstrate a clear dominance of
non-rural employment. That is, the vast majority of employees and employers
were involved in occupations other than those directly engaged in primary
production. For example the combined non-rural workforce as a percentage
of the total workforce fluctuated between sixty-eight and seventy-five
per cent between 1881 and 1933. (24)
Federation and Manufacturing in Queensland
The distinctly rural and decentralised nature of Queensland’s economic
geography has led historians to generally assume that Queensland’s manufacturing
sector was relatively primitive and underdeveloped; a rather laggardly
cousin compared to its southern competitors. (25) Indeed, federation
in particular has often been blamed for seriously retarding Queensland’s
manufacturing sector in the early twentieth century, due to the introduction
of cheaper imports from interstate following the dismantling of colonial
tariff barriers. (26) In many respects this is true, as Queensland’s
manufacturing sector did tend to be less sophisticated and underdeveloped
when compared directly to those in the southern states. Although Queensland’s
secondary industries made great progress after the depression of the
early 1890s, these gains were quickly whittled away by the economic
repercussions of the long drought, and by the changes to intercolonial
trade after federation in 1901. The number of factories in Queensland
declined markedly through to the First World War and the sector was
in a constant state of flux. However, what appeared to be a massive
regression in the fortunes of the manufacturers was, under closer examination,
a combination of decline in some industries and dynamic reorganisation
in others that suggests this sector was not as backward as it is generally
assumed.
The statistical record illustrates some of the structural changes that
occurred at the time of federation. In fact a rapid and dramatic decline
in the number of factories had begun to occur prior to federation, and
taking into account the changes in classification methodology, (27)
the collapse had largely stabilised after 1902-1903. The most dramatic
decrease occurred between 1899-1902 corresponding with the worst years
of the long drought. Indeed, many contemporary observers, and some historians,
concede that the drought had a greater negative economic impact than
federation. (28) The subsequent slump between 1906-1909 is, however,
more attributable to the impact of post-federation trading conditions.
The decline in factory numbers was also initially accompanied by an
appreciable reduction in employment between 1901 and 1903, however,
this was followed by a strong growth curve that stabilised between 1909-1910,
prior to a much stronger expansion that continued through to 1913. In
the early years of the 1900s the firms with between one and four, and
more than sixty hands employed were the most effected by changed trading
conditions associated with federation. The medium sized firms of five
to sixty hands, either remained stable or experienced some growth in
number. (29) Taken together these trends indicate that some manufacturing
industries foundered in the wake of the drought and federation, however,
there was a more important process of structural change occurring, most
prominently that of consolidation where fewer factories employed more
hands and increased production. (30)
Manufacturing in the Early Twentieth Century Queensland
Essentially many manufacturers in Queensland were severely weakened
by the economic impact of the drought and the simultaneous onset of
free trade proved too much for many of the more marginal operations,
leaving them more exposed to interstate competition. (31) The stronger
industries tended to profit from the competition and increased their
market share. Large concerns grew larger, swallowing up their local
competition, an in some cases, began exporting goods interstate. (32)
Indeed, when one closely examines the decline in factory numbers a significant
structural change can be identified.
It is evident that many Queensland factories were experiencing a process
of consolidation where fewer factories employed more hands and increased
production. This process of consolidation is clearly evident within
the Statistics series. In 1899 there were 2610 factories employing 23,900
workers operating in Queensland. By 1900-1901 this number had declined
to around 2100 factories employing approximately 26,000 workers. Factory
numbers then stabilised between 1900-2000 with employment bottoming
out at 19,300 in 1903 (in the wake of the worst year of the long drought),
and then recovered to 25,400 by 1906. The number of factories declined
to a low of 1420 in 1909 before increasing from 1910 onwards, although
it was not until 1930 (2104 factories and 40,474 employees) that the
number of factories recovered their 1901 level (2110). (33) It is important
to note that the change in factory classification (from two or more
to four or more hands) after 1907 negatively distorts the actual scale
of the decline. This is so because all of the many smaller factories
employing less than four employees were not counted in the official
statistics from 1908, making the slump look much worse than it was.
The ‘factory’ figures certainly suggest stagnation in the manufacturing
sector. While there were fewer factories in operation by 1930 than there
were in 1901, and keeping mind there was a recession experienced in
Queensland from 1927 (2118 factories), these factories actually employed
over 40,000 workers compared to the 26,000 of 1901. Factory employment
grew from 26,000 to a peak of 50,500 in 1924-25 and then settled back
to between 46,000-48,000 until 1930. This represents an increase of
fifty-six per cent between 1900-1930 and ninety-four percent between
1900 and 1925. (34) During this period the larger factories with fifty-one
or more employees improved somewhat, the middle range ones of eleven
to fifty stagnated, while the smaller factories grew steadily in number
throughout. (35)
Furthermore a close examination the Factories and Shops Reports [F&SR]
(36) provides an alternative range of statistics that suggest there
were many more factories operating in Queensland than is revealed in
the Statistics. The F&SR records 1261 registered factories in 1900,
lower than the Statistics figure of 2078 because of problems with employers
not submitting statistical returns, 2832 in 1915 (Statistics: 1742),
and 4411 by 1930 (Statistics: 2104). The disparity between these series
is due to the F&SR utilising different census collection dates and
district boundaries to the Statistics (the former collected by the Department
of Labour the later by the Registrar-General’s Department) and included
all registered factories regardless of the number employed or motive
power used.
Further evidence of consolidation can been found in the Statistics
series which indicate that there were consistent increases in output
and productivity. In 1901 manufacturing output (wholesale value of manufactured
goods) was valued at ,8.9 million, by 1909 this had increased to ,12.7
million, tripled to ,39.8 million by 1920, and peaked at ,47.6 million
in 1928. (37) The gross value of output actually increased by over 500
per cent during this period, despite the apparent stagnation in factory
numbers. In this area Queensland’s performance was second only to New
South Wales between federation and the Second World War. (38) Estimates
of the value of production (crude estimate of value added by the manufacturing
process) are not available until 1911, in that year the value of manufacturing
production was recorded as £5.5 million, peaked at £18.8 million in
1924 (an increase of 242 per cent), fluctuated between £16-18 million
until 1929, and declined to £14.9 by 1930 (an increase of 171 per cent
between 1900 and 1930). Moreover, an examination of the relative output
values of the various industry sectors in Queensland, from late in the
nineteenth century onwards, shows that manufacturing consistently out-performed
every sector, except the pastoral industry. Indeed, official estimates
of the value of manufacturing output are at least three times greater
in value than that attributed to the agricultural and mining sectors
combined. (39) When one considers the combination of factory numbers,
workers employed, and value of output and production, the broader statistical
picture suggests that the manufacturing sector performed reasonably
well under the often difficult circumstances it endured between 1890
and the late 1920s.
In terms of the industrial geography of manufacturing and centralisation
of production, the ratio of factories to head of population in Brisbane
was only slightly ahead of its share of the population between 1900-1930.
Indeed, between sixty and seventy-five per cent of factories were located
outside of the metropolitan area. (40) Of the three great divisions
of Queensland, the South accounted for over fifty per cent of all factories
and manufacturing employment, Central Queensland less than thirty per
cent, and North Queensland less than twenty per cent. (41) Moreover,
thanks to Queensland’s unique economic geography, the majority of the
state’s workforce may not have made the metropolis their home, but they
nevertheless lived and worked in urban or semi-urban environments. The
high rate of non-rural employment reflects the reality that manufacturing,
and particularly the tertiary sector, were key components of Queensland’s
economy. The uniqueness of the growth in manufacturing production in
Queensland was its simultaneous linkage to urban intensification, rural
development, and primary production. These linkages encouraged the consolidation
of the larger enterprises in the metropolis, and also enabled smaller
and larger operations to exist in distant locales where they enjoyed
a degree of immunity from southern competition.
Manufacturing and the Political Economy
Queensland’s manufacturers were not, however, immune to government
apathy and neglect. Glen Lewis has argued that the allure of industrialisation
and manufacturing did not generally impress Queenslanders. (42) This
is especially true of the state’s political leaders. A bias towards
rural development infused the political economy of Queensland for most
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. All Queensland governments,
regardless of their political persuasion, adopted overtly ruralist policies,
only differing in their emphasis towards pastoral or agricultural development,
and their degree of opposition or support for socialist principles.
(43) Indeed, for many on both sides of politics, industrialisation,
urbanisation and manufacturing were almost anathema. Various excuses
were offered as to why the government should not encourage the development
of secondary industries. These included concerns that it would detract
from the ‘essential’ task of rural settlement, that industrialisation
and urbanisation would unleash new social evils, lead to the occupational
cohabitation of males and females, encourage young people to covet an
urban life instead of a rural existence, that the climate was too hot
for factories, and it was generally an ‘unnatural’ industry to Queensland
and ran counter to the yearning of the people for a life and employment
in the bush. (44)
Prior to the First World War the conservative Philp and Denham governments
flatly rejected any proposals to materially assist or encourage the
development of secondary industries. The notionally labour oriented
Morgan and Kidston coalition governments expressed some interest in
manufacturing, however, they both preferred to champion closer settlement
schemes. After the First World War, while the other states and the Commonwealth
were pro-active in fostering secondary industries, the Labor government
in Queensland adopted a strategy of patronage towards primary producers.
(45) Labor successfully courted the farming vote thanks largely to government
efforts towards the reorganisation of the agricultural sector by encouraging
cooperative dairy production, commodity pooling, price fixing, and producer
controlled marketing of primary produce. (46) This political economic
strategy was avowedly anti-urban and an exercise in neo-socialist agrarianism.
One Nationalist Party critic noted in the late 1930s that rural development
had been accompanied by polices that simultaneously suppressed ‘the
aggregation of large populations in cities and towns’. (47) Historically
the full force of developmental policy in Queensland was directed primarily
towards rural intensification in order to check the spread of urbanisation
and the perceived social and moral evils that attended it. (48)
The political divide between urban and rural development was driven
by a deep seated ideology that openly opposed urbanisation and industrialisation.
In the popular mind and populist politics of Queensland, the city and
its modern problems (overcrowding, social unrest, noise, pollution etc)
was unfavourably compared to the perceived wholesome and morally superior
rural lifestyle. Ideology is, of course, difficult to quantify, but
it can be discerned from the public discourse on the political economy
in the press and from the temper and language of parliamentary debate
and political policy. The political appetite for rural development and
the yeomanry ideal was perhaps, in part, the result of the personal
experiences and social memory of the tens of thousands of migrants who
had left the urban confines or semi-feudal agricultural backwaters of
the United Kingdom and Europe for an new life in Queensland. This mass
migration occurred in the wake of the great social and economic upheavals
associated with the acceleration of the industrial revolution from the
1850s. A new vast and distant landscape offered the potential fulfilment
of the yeomanry ideal in the manner expressed by the populist utopians
such Edward Wakefield, Henry George, John Dunmore Lang, and Queensland
radical William Lane. This popular antipodean imagery of a new world
fit for the new agriculturalists, was championed over the evils and
degradation of the urban, and found its most potent political expression
in Queensland. (49) The voices advocating industrialisation were few,
and until after the First World War they were largely drowned out by
what Queensland historian Ross Johnston has succinctly described as
the ‘call of the land’. (50)
The yeomanry ideal, the dream of closer rural settlement based upon
small scale family farming, shared popularity across the political spectrum.
(51) The working class saw it as a mode with which to counter the social,
political and economic power of the squattocracy and the largely British
controlled mercantile and pastoral companies that dominated the pastoral
industry. (52) The middle class liberals welcomed closer settlement
for similar reasons and also to counter the growth in radical socialist
ideals among the working class. (53) The pastoral companies and individual
pastoralists did not generally oppose it after the 1880s, as closer
settlement potentially provided them with a more permanent and compliant
workforce (as opposed to the transitory and militant one they usually
had to contend with). Indeed, the break up of the larger pastoral runs
for closer settlement enabled many pastoralists to convert the best
land to freehold and rural intensification effectively increased the
value of their freehold lands. (54) All sides thought it important to
populate the interior and all suffered the common racist paranoia of
a constant fear of invasion from the north with the credo ‘populate
or perish’ being a particularly strident one in Queensland politics.
Nevertheless the rise of urban concentrations in Queensland, especially
in the South-East, continued apace despite the vast sums thrown at developmental
railways, assisted immigration and closer settlement schemes. Regardless
of its overtly ruralist identity, Queensland was as intensely urbanised
and decentralised as it was agrarian. Here the contradiction is compelling.
Nowhere was the political drive for rural development so strong, and
the reluctance of immigrants and urban dwellers to partake in closer
settlement so contradictory. Successive Queensland governments worked
against the demographic reality and continued to promote rural development,
despite the fact they could not induce nearly enough people to take
up a new life on land. This can be seen in the Census data that indicates
that those engaged in non-rural occupations increased from sixty-eight
to seventy-four per cent of the total workforce between 1881-1933.
While Queensland governments virtually ignored the manufacturing sector,
there is evidence to suggest there was an embryonic shift towards state
support for the development of secondary industries during the First
World War. In 1917 Labor Premier T. J. Ryan proposed the establishment
of a State Iron and Steel Works, a project that was intended to provide
a panacea to the state’s endemic unemployment problems, to promote rural
infrastructure development, and ultimately the greater industrialisation
of Queensland. (55) During the war it became apparent to the Labor cabinet
that the iron industry was of critical strategic importance, and that
it also symbol of economic progress and societal maturity. In a sense
the Labor cabinet were being influenced by the broader logic of modernity
associated with twentieth century industrial capitalism, albeit tempered
by their unique agrarian socialist ideology. In another sense this was
a pragmatic response to the fiscal reality of the ever increasing cost
of importing iron and steel products, particularly iron rails, for rural
infrastructure projects.
After a Royal Commission in 1917, and several years of detailed investigations
and much speculation, a site for the steelworks was eventually chosen
at Port Denison near Bowen in 1920. Surviving documents indicate that
it was estimated that the works would have cost 2.4 million to establish
and Premier E. G. Theodore had attempted to raise the necessary finance
for the project during his visit to the United Kingdom in 1920. (56)
The Bowen site was, however, inferior to alternative sites at Urangan
(Hervey Bay) and Bulimba (Brisbane) in the South, and its selection,
against the advice of the appointed expert John W. Brophy, was a clear
demonstration of the rural decentralist bias and political expediency
of a Labor Cabinet dominated by North Queensland M.L.A.’s. Prominent
Labor politicians such as Theodore, William McCormack, Charles Collins
and others made no secret of their collective desire to promote northern
development, particularly if this meant avoiding the greater centralisation
of manufacturing production, urbanisation and industrialisation in Brisbane.
(57) Moreover, there may have been a significant link between Theodore’s
long held dream to establish a new Australian state in North Queensland,
and his desire to establish a heavy industrial base in the North. (58)
Whatever the case the Labor cabinet’s decision cannot be justified on
economic or commercial grounds, as the Bowen works would have cost about
,500,000 more than locating the works in Brisbane. (59) The Labor cabinet
were clearly prepared to pay a premium of at least twenty-five per cent
for the pleasure, and perceived political gain, of locating the works
in North Queensland. Nevertheless, both Ryan and Theodore were genuinely
committed to the project, along with the other state manufacturing enterprises,
and the project’s ultimate demise in 1923, after six years of planning,
was almost entirely due to financial restrictions forced upon the government
during the London loans embargo of 1920-1924. (60)
If the state steelworks was a victim of this funding crisis, so too
were the embryonic plans of the Theodore government to assist the development
of Queensland’s secondary industries. However, the level of Labor’s
commitment to industrial development should not be overstated. The agrarian
development ethos would have remained intact regardless of the success,
or otherwise, of a steel industry in Queensland. (61) Indeed, during
the 1920s the Labor government held fast to the electoral certainties
of supporting the rural vote, and the manufacturing sector was again
generally left to fend for itself. It is nonetheless historically significant
that the overtly ruralist Labor government was moving towards state
support for, and involvement in, the secondary industries sector from
late in its first term in office.
Support for the encouragement of secondary industries was also apparent
within the ranks of the conservative opposition during the 1920s. A
conservative government under the Premiership of Arthur ‘Boy’ Moore
(1929-1932) attempted to address Queensland’s lack of sophistication
in manufacturing in the late 1920s. Moore clearly understood the importance
of fostering secondary industries and secured the passage of the Industries
Assistance Act 1929. The Act was intended to aid the establishment of
new manufacturing enterprises through the provision of practical and
financial assistance by the government. This laudable scheme was, however,
unfortunately timed and its provisions proved to be impractical in application,
and any future potential it might have had was cut short by the Great
Depression. (62) The die was cast in the loans crisis of the early 1920s,
the opportunity of heavy industrialisation was lost, and the primacy
of rural development would retain its hegemony in the political economy
until the 1960s.
In conclusion it is clear that Queensland’s self-image, and economic
and demographic structure, has been shaped by several inter-related
factors. These factors include its late development, its vast and demanding
geography, the strong links between the source of most of Queensland’s
investment capital and its export markets, and the particularly strong
influence of the ruralist ideology that infused its political economy
and social identity. The various factors, economic, political, social
and ideological, that restricted urbanisation also tended to limit the
expansion and centralisation of secondary industries. The centralisation
of production was not as apparent in Queensland, its manufacturing sector
was more decentralised, less sophisticated and generally of a smaller
scale. Queensland’s urban workforce were more reliant upon the primary
and tertiary sectors, and its factories on the processing of primary
produce. The machinations of the political economy consistently favoured
of rural development and this deprived the urban clusters of much needed
public and private investment in infrastructure and services. Governments
offered little by way of encouragement to secondary industries, and
when they did, it was usually too little or too late. The financial
services sector all but ignored the manufacturing sector and capital
investment in manufacturing came primarily from earnings being reinvested
in businesses, therefore placing unnecessary limitations upon growth
in this sector. The benefits of industrialisation, and the urban lifestyle
that accompanied it, were not seriously considered within the political
economy until the economic and social implications of the First World
War shook some from their agrarian slumber. The political economic power
of the pastoral interests forestalled the progress towards outright
industrialisation in the early 1920s, and the Labor government abandoned
its uneasy industrial embrace for the more familiar rural landscape.
Nonetheless, by the late 1990s the manufacturing sector was the single
most significant contributor to Queensland’s Gross State Product (12.41
per cent or more than $7 billion per annum), employing in excess of
180,000 people. (63) In the final analysis it is clear that the manufacturing
sector has proved to have been of critical importance to the successful
economic development of Queensland and its rather laggardly and marginal
reputation is not wholly justified.
Notes
(1) Mann, Queensland Parliamentary Debates [QPD],
98 (1906), p.1344.
(2) C.A. Bernays, Queensland Politics During Sixty
(1859-1919) Years (Brisbane: Queensland Government Printer, 1919),
p. 383.
(3) Margaret Stubbs-Brown, The Secondary Industries
of Queensland: 1875-1900, B.A. Hons, University of Queensland., 1962,
pp. 28-9.
(4) Ibid., pp. 13-14 & 84-85.
(5) J. Laverty, 'The Queensland Economy 1860-1915',
in D.J. Murphy, R.B. Joyce, C.A. Hughes, eds., Prelude to Power:
The Rise of the Labour Party in Queensland 1885-1915 (Brisbane:
Jacaranda Press, 1970), pp. 31 & 37.
(6) A. L. Lougheed, The Brisbane Stock Exchange,
1884-1984 (Brisbane: Boolarong Publications, 1984), p. 75.
(7) A. L. Lougheed, A Century of Service: History
of the Brisbane Chamber of Commerce 1868-1968 (Brisbane: Brisbane
Chamber of Commerce, 1969), p. 27.
(8) G. Stupart, Maryborough Chamber of Commerce Annual
Report, 1904-05 [MCCAR], Maryborough, 1905, p. 9, John Oxley Library
[JOL];’A Self-supporting Commonwealth’, Worker, 26 August, 1915,
p. 6; ‘Support Local Industries’, Worker, 26 August, 1915, p.
7; ‘Foreign Made Goods’, Worker, 4 November, 1915, p. 5; ‘New
Industries’, Worker, 11 November, 1915, p. 16; ‘Australia's Importing
Habit’, Worker, 16 December, 1915, p. 7; Bundaberg Chamber of
Commerce to Premier Ryan, 24 August, 1915, PRE/A499, 9938, Queensland
State Archives [QSA]; Brisbane Chamber of Commerce Annual Report,
1915-16 [BCCAR], pp. 21 & 33, JOL.
(9) Stubbs-Brown, The Secondary Industries of Queensland:
1875-1900, pp. 2-5.
(10) Ibid., pp. 22-3.
(11) Herman Schwartz, 'Foreign Creditors and the Politics
of Development in Australia and Argentina 1880-1913', International
Studies Quarterly, 33, 3, (1989), pp. 290-1.
(12) Glen Lewis, A History of the Ports of Queensland:
A Study in Economic Nationalism (Brisbane: University of Queensland
Press, 1973), pp. 6, 76 & 83.
(13) Secretary for Agriculture James Tolmie admitted
to parliament that the Special Agricultural Selections Act had
been a failure. Tolmie, QPD, 113 (1912), p. 29.
(14) Herman Schwartz, 'Foreign Creditors’, pp. 290-1.
(15) The Manufacturing Industries Act 1869 was
meant to encourage the production of woollen and cotton textiles from
local materials, and the Encouragement of Native Industries Act 1869
proposed grants of land in urban and rural locations for the establishment
of new factories.
(16) ‘Summary - Manufacturing Factories, Output &
Employment’, Statistics of the State of Queensland [QSS], QPP,
1 (1931), p. 20k. No industrial statistics are available prior to 1863.
‘Output’ is defined as the selling price at the factory of manufactured
goods, whereas the value of ‘production’ relates to an estimate of the
value added to a commodity by the manufacturing process.
(17) Stubbs-Brown, The Secondary Industries of Queensland:
1875-1900, pp. 33 & 88-99.
(18) ‘Summary - Manufacturing Factories, Output &
Employment’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), p. 20k.
(19) A.R. Hall, The London Capital Market and Australia
1870-1914: Social Science Monograph No. 21 (Canberra: Australian
National University, 1963), pp. 171-6. & W. Ross Johnston, The
Call of the Land: A History of Queensland to the Present Day (Brisbane:
Jacaranda Press, 1982), pp. 129-30.
(20) ‘Table Ad, Immigration over Emigration - Queensland
1862-1905', in ‘Report on Vital Statistics’, QPP, 1 (1906), p.
1215; ‘Table No.V, Immigration over Emigration - Queensland 1905-1909',
in ‘Production’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1909), p. 241 & ‘Summary -
Mean Population 1856-1931', QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), pp. 2-3k.
(21) ‘Comparative Statement of Occupations - Queensland:
for Censuses of 1891, 1901 & 1911', Census of the Commonwealth
of Australia [Commonwealth Census], 3, 7, (1911), p, 1288. &
‘Queensland - Occupations of Males & Females’, Commonwealth Census,
1, 7, (1921), pp. 896-901.
(22) . Laverty, ‘Queensland Economy’, p. 37.
(23) ‘Australia - Industry of the Population for Censuses
1901, 1911, 1921 & 1933', Commonwealth Census, 2, 12, (1933),
p. 1192. & ‘Queensland - Males & Females Recorded in Urban &
Rural Divisions by Industry’, Commonwealth Census, 2, 12, (1933),
p. 1198.
(24) ‘Comparative Statement of Occupations - Queensland',
Commonwealth Census, 3, 7, (1911), p, 1288; ‘Queensland - Occupations
of Males & Females’, Commonwealth Census, 1, 7, (1921), pp.
896-901; ‘Queensland - Males & Females Recorded in Urban & Rural
Divisions by Industry’, Commonwealth Census, 2, 12, (1933), p.
1198. & Glen Lewis, The Crisis Years: Economic Development in Queensland
1885-1895, B.Ec. Hons, University of Queensland, 1964, Appendix II,
pp. 238-9.
(25) For examples of the ‘laggard’ thesis see M. Gough,
H. Hughes, B.J. McFarlane, et. al., Queensland: Industrial Enigma,
Manufacturing in the Economic Development of Queensland (Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press, 1964), pp. 7-9; C. Hughes, The Government
of Queensland (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1980),
pp. 6-9; B. J. Costar, Political and Social Aspects of the Great Depression
in Queensland, 1929-1932, M.A. Qual., University of Queensland, 1973,
pp. vi-ix & B. J. Costar, Labor, Politics and Unemployment: Queensland
During the Great Depression, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Queensland,
1981, p. 2.
(26) A. M. Hertzberg, BCCAR, 1903-04, Brisbane,
1904, pp. 11-12. & BCCAR, 1904-05, Brisbane, 1905, p. 9.,
JOL; ‘Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories & Shops’ [‘F&SR’],
QPP, 2, (1903), p. 129; D. Denham, QPD, 99, (1907), p.
638; Ross Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland: From the Dreaming
to 1915 (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1986), p. 298;
Costar, Political & Social Aspects, pp. viii-ix. & Laverty,
Queensland Economy, pp.40-1.
(27) Prior to 1901 a ‘factory’ was only recorded if
it employed four or more hands, this was temporarily changed to two
or more hands between 1901-1907, then reverted back four or more hands
from 1908.
(28) G. Stupart, MCCAR, 1902-03 & 1904-05,
JOL; ‘F&SR, 1903’, QPP, 1 (1904), p. 726; J. W. Thurlow,
BCCAR, 1908-09, pp. 7-8., JOL; Stubbs-Brown, The Secondary
Industries of Queensland: 1875-1900, 1962, p. 185; C. Hughes, The
Government of Queensland, p. 324.
(29) ‘Factory Tables’ in ‘F&SR, 1900', QPP,
2, (1901), p. 1594; ‘1901', QPP, 1, (1902), p. 841; ‘1902', QPP,
2, (1903), p. 124; ‘1903', QPP, 1, (1904), p. 708; ‘1904', QPP,
1, (1905), p. 642; ‘1905', QPP, 1, (1906), p. 1582; ‘1907', QPP,
2, (1907), p. 309; ‘1908', QPP, 2, (1908), p. 323; ‘1909', QPP,
2, (1909), p. 85; ‘1910', QPP, 2, (1910), p. 744.
(30) ‘Summary - Factories’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931),
p. 20k.
(31) Alan Jenkins, Attitudes Towards Federation in Queensland,
M.A., University of Queensland, 1979, pp. 156-164.
(32) Queensland manufacturers exported goods such as
clothing, hats, timber furniture, doors and windows, saddlery and leatherware,
beef, mutton, bacon, hams, cheese, butter, timber, refined metals. Lesina,
QPD, 97, (1906), p. 233; E. J. T. Barton, ed., Jubilee History
of Queensland: A Record of Political, Industrial, and Social Development
(Brisbane: H.J. Didamms & Co., 1909), pp. 232-38 & 255-59. &
MCCAR, 1904-05, JOL.
(33) ‘Summary - Factories’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931),
pp. 20-1k.
(34) ‘Production - Manufactories - Hands Employed',
QSS, QPP, (1900-1931). Females comprised at least seventeen per
cent of the manufacturing workforce over this period. For an excellent
analysis of the role of women in industry see Helen Hamley, The Limits
of Choice: White Women, Their Work & Labour Activism in Queensland
Factories & Shops 1880s to 1920, M.A. Qual. Thesis, University of
Queensland, 1992.
(35) ‘Production - Manufactories by Type, Number of
Hands, & Power Used’, QSS, QPP, (1911-1930).
(36) ‘F&SR’, QPP, 2 (1909), p. 85; QPP,
2 (1920), p. 684. & QPP, 2 (1930), p. 112. The first Factories
& Shops Act was passed in Queensland in 1896. Districts were
enlarged, new ones added, (from 6 to 14 by 1921) and the application
of factory regulations varied between districts.
(37) ‘Production - Manufactories Output etc.’, QSS,
QPP, (1900-1909), & ‘Production - Manufacturing Queensland
- Principal Products’, A.B.C. of Queensland Statistics [ABCQS],
Brisbane, 1910-1931.
(38) D. C. Rich, The Industrial Geography of Australia
(Sydney: Methuen, 1986), p. 40.
(39) ‘Production of Queensland Industries - Estimated
Gross Value Since 1871', ABCQS, 1929, p. 199. & 1932, p.
234; Commonwealth of Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics,
‘Table 158 - Summary of Australian Production Statistics for the years
1909-10 to 1919-20', Production Bulletin No. 14, p. 103. &
‘Summary - Production’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), p. 20k.
(40) ‘Production - Mills, Manufactories, Works - by
Police Districts’, QSS, QPP, (1900-1931).
(41) See Tables in C. P. Harris, Regional Economic
Development in Queensland 1859 to 1981 with particular emphasis on North
Queensland (Canberra, Australian National University, 1984), pp.
70-1. & 92-3.
(42) Lewis, History of the Ports, p. 194.
(43) For details on the developmental ethos of Queensland
governments from Federation onwards see David Cameron, ‘Queensland,
the state of development: The State and economic development in early
twentieth century Queensland’, Queensland Review, 4, 1, (April
1997), pp. 39-48.
(44) Rutledge, QPD, 85 (1900), p. 1423; Groom,
QPD, 85 (1900), p. 1424; Leahy, QPD, 98 (1906), p.1342.
& Jenkins, QPD, 97 (1906), pp.225-28.
(45) Lewis, History of the Ports, p. 194.
(46) This rural corporatist ideal found its most effective
practical expression the successful Queensland Producers’ Association
scheme, see E. G. Theodore & W. N. Gillies, Queensland Producers'
Association - Scheme for the Organisation of the Agricultural Industry
of Queensland: Presented for the Consideration of the Farmers of Queensland
(Brisbane: Queensland Government Printer, 1922).
(47) Lewis, History of the Ports, p. 194.
(48) Johnston, The Call of the Land, p. 145.
& M. Williams, 'More and Smaller is Better: Australian Rural Settlement
1788-1914', in J. M. Powell & M. Williams, eds., Australian Space,
Australian Time (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 83.
(49) J. M. Powell, ‘Patrimony of the People: The role
of government in land settlement’, in R.L. Heathcote, ed., The Australian
Experience: Essays in Australian Land Settlement and Resource Management,
(Melbourne: Longman, 1988), pp. 16-7. & J. M. Powell, Plains
of Promise, Rivers of Destiny: Water Management and the Development
of Queensland, 1824-1990 (Brisbane: Boolarong Publications, 1991),
p. 24.
(50) Johnston, The Call of the Land, p. 49.
(51) Kay Cohen, ‘Lands Administration 1859-1910', in
Kay Cohen & Kenneth Wiltshire, eds., People, Places and Policies:
Aspects of Queensland Government Administration 1859-1920 (Brisbane:
University of Queensland Press, 1995), pp. 132-33. & Johnston, The
Call of the Land, pp. 49-55, 89-92, & 145-49.
(52) ‘Queensland’, Worker, 12 December, 1903.;
Lewis, A History of the Ports of Queensland, p. 83. & T.
Cochrane, Blockade: The Queensland Loans Affair 1920 to 1924
(Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1989), pp. 36-37.
(53) A.M. Hertzberg, BCCAR, 1904-05, p. 12.,
JOL; Lewis, A History of the Ports of Queensland, p. 83. &
Fitzgerald, >From the Dreaming to 1915 , pp. 125 & 188.
(54) Sean Glynn, Urbanisation in Australian History
1788-1900 (Melbourne: Nelson, 1975), pp. 19-21; Powell, Plains
of Promise, p.24. & Schwartz, 'Foreign Creditors', pp. 281-301.
For a fascinating regional account of the squatters move onto the Darling
Downs and the later struggle break up the pastoral monopoly over land
to make way for closer settlement see Beverley J. Irwin, A Million
Bushels of Wheat: The History of the Clifton Shire 1840-1988 (Clifton:
Clifton Shire Council, 1989), pp. 16-41. and also D.B. Waterson, Squatter,
Selector & Storekeeper: A History of the Darling Downs, 1859-1893
(Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1968).
(55) D. J. Murphy, The Establishment of State Enterprises
in Queensland, 1915-1918, M.A. Qual., University of Queensland, 1965,
pp. 64-6.
(56) For details on the State Steelworks proposal see,
‘Report of the Royal Commission on the State Iron & Steel Works’,
QPP, 2, (1918), pp 1815-99; Documents relating to the Establishment
of Iron & Steel Works in Queensland 1918-1923 [Iron & Steel
Works Papers], Batch 291 - Part 1, Folios 1-265, held by the Department
of the Premier & Cabinet, Brisbane & Mines Department, Queensland,
Report on the Queensland State Iron & Steelworks, 1918, MIN/A,
Bundle A/8714, QSA.
(57) Ross Fitzgerald, "Red Ted": The Life of E.G.
Theodore (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1994), pp. 162-3.
& I. Young, Theodore: His Life and Times (Sydney: Alpha Books,
1971), p. 41.
(58) Fitzgerald, "Red Ted", p. 162.
(59) J. W. Brophy to A. J. Jones, Minister for Mines,
10 November, 1919, ‘Report on the Selection of Iron and Steel Works
Site - 1919’, Iron & Steel Works Papers, Batch 291 - Part
1, Folios 147-146.
(60) Cochrane, Blockade, 1989. The loans embargo
occurred when the City of London money markets refused to continue to
furnish the Queensland government with developmental loans, this action
was triggered by political intervention in the government’s loan negotiations
of 1920 by Queensland and British pastoral interests outraged at amendments
to the Land Act that threatened the privileged position of pastoral
lease holders.
(61) Theodore & Gillies, Queensland Producers'
Association, 1922.
(62) The Industries Assistance Bill of 1929', QPD,
153, (1929), p. 738; A. Armitage to Premier Moore, 17 June 1930, PRE/A999,
3684, QSA; W.M. Patterson to Premier Moore, 10 June, 1930, PRE/A998,
3539, QSA, & B.J. Costar, 'The Great Depression: Was Queensland
Different?', Labour History, No. 26, 1974, pp. 37-8.
(63) . Paul Fennelly, ‘It’s more than ‘rocks ‘n crops’
says metals group’, Queensland - Special Report, Australian Financial
Review, 3 October, 1997, p. 74. & 'Table 4 : Gross Domestic
Product at Factor Cost by Industry and Principal Components, Queensland’,
Government Statisticians’ Office, Queensland Statistics - Compendium,
(Brisbane: GSO, 1997), http://www.gso.qld.gov.au/compend/tab105.htm
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