Paul K. Davis, ENDS AND MEANS: THE BRITISH MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN
AND COMMISSION, Farleigh Dickinson University Press, Rutherford, (New
Jersey, 1994), 279 pp.
Reviewed by Paul Rich, Professor of International Relations and History,
University of the Americas, Puebla, Mexico
In 1914 the British, largely with Indian troops, landed at Basra
at the head of the Persian Gulf and began a march to Baghdad. They were
surrounded by the Turks at Kut and there suffered a defeat that was
compared to that of Yorktown. The casualties were among the highest of the
entire war. During the recent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it was amazing to
see that so little attention was paid to this invasion of what then were
the Turkish provinces of Mesopotamia. The region was of course to become
Iraq.
The ignorance displayed in current accounts of Saddam Hussain's
maraudings of just how Iraq was created after a series of British military
blunders is singular, because there have been many volumes on the subject.
In fact, a few years ago a publisher (Allborough Press) in England
reprinted under my editorship a number of books that had appeared in the
aftermath of the invasion -- Eleanor Egan's _The War in the Cradle of the
World_, Thomas Lyell's _The Ins and Outs of Mesopotamia_, C.M.Cursetjee's
_The Land of the Date_, Rupert Hay's _Two Years in Kurdistan_, Gertrude
Bell's _The Arab of Mesopotamia_ .
None of these in either their original editions or subsequent
reprints appear in the bibliography of Dr. Davis' study, which is fair
enough, but nor do many other books, both the contemporary and the more
recent, which might have been useful for background information. Some that
come to mind are E.S.Stevens' _By Tigris and Euphrates_, Henry A. Foster's
_The Making of Modern Iraq_, Yitzhak Nakash's _The Shi'is of Iraq_, Lord
Birdwood's _Khaki and Gown_, Geoff Simon' _Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam_,
S.Guyer's _My Journey Down the Tigris_, Gerald De Gaury's _Three Kings in
Baghdad_, Edith and E.F.Penrose's _Iraq_, A.H.Burne's _Mesopotamia: The
Last Phase_. Perhaps the most remarkable omission is of David Fromkin's
justly acclaimed _A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire
and the Creation of the Modern Middle East_.
In fact, with the exception of one book published in 1982, there
is not a citation offered of any book or journal article after 1979.
Apparently this is a doctoral dissertation done in the late 1970s and
published without updating and revision, which is a pity. Moreover,
Dr.Davis' opportunity for making a contribution to the subject surely
rested in what he might have unearthed about the work of the Mesopotamian
Commission after the war, a highly controversial fact-finding tribunal
investigating the British military blunders during the campaign. Charges
that it whitewashed the conduct of high British officrs have never been
resolved.
The story of the campaign itself, including the British defeat at
Kut, has been told so many times that the chances for such a slim volume
saying anything new would be limited. A.J.Barker in _The Neglected War:
Mesopotamia 1914-18_, and Briton Cooper Busch in _Britain and the Persian
Gulf_ and _Britain, India, and the Arabs_ , for example, have done such
notable work on the period and region that it would be indeed courageous
to retill the soil. But there are certainly many issues related
to the campaign that are still awaiting their monographs.
The reader may be put on guard by the inadequate list of secondary
sources that _Ends and Means_ mentions; he or she might not, however, be
equally critical of the extent of documents and papers listed. Few will be
in a position to judge Dr.Davis' work in the archives. However, the fact
is that the Mesopotamian Commission has always been something of a
bibliographical and archival puzzle. After promising to deal with the
Commission, Dr. Davis does little to unravel its mysteries. The working
papers of individual members and the publishing status of the reports
rendered have been an archivist's problem. Unfortunately Dr.Davis provides
no bibliographical essay and no comment on the Commission's publications.
The fact is that he spends so much time explaining the British military
campaign that he has little left for the Commission. Had he devoted far
less space to the war and far more space to the Commission, he would have
earned considerable gratitude from Middle East enthusiasts. It is the work
of the Commission in investigating the military debacle that is an untold
tale.
Since he feels that he has to recount once again the entire
military episode as well as deal with the Commission, his analysis is
thin. He must land the troops at Basra, drum them up the river, and get
them surrounded and captured by the Turks. That gives him little
opportunity to consider the war as a whole. For example, he skirts the
'Indianness' of the whole affair. The British decision to land at Basra
and occupy what became Iraq had much to do with the desire of those in
charge of the Indian Empire to extend Imperial rule into the Middle East.
The Gulf shaikhdoms were already part of that Empire and taking the head
of the Gulf and then going on to Baghdad was a logical extension of the
situation. Indian troops were prominent during the whole operation.
Out of necessity because of all the ground he feels he must cover,
Dr.Davis gives far too little attention to figures such as Sir Percy Cox
and Sir Arnold Wilson, Indian Political Service officers who were of
tremendous significance in pushing the invasion. If he wanted to deal
with the war, his book is far too short. But he really should have
concentrated on the Commission and not become involved in a rehash of the
campaign.
For his account of the war, Dr.Davis used files in the Public
Records Office and India Office Library and his citations of those files
will be useful to specialists. The maps are outstanding, and make the
siege of Kut and other operations intelligible. There is an excellent
index. Unfortunately, in choosing to once again belabor a story that
others have told at much greater length and (it must be said) with more
subtlety, and in falling so far short in dealing with the Commission, he
has missed a considerable opportunity. We did not need another short book
about World War I, the invasion of Iraq, and the fall of Kut. We did need,
and still need, a book about the Commission and the sincerity of its
efforts to get to the bottom of the British catastrophes at the hands of
the Turks. Dr.Davis should use his considerable knowledge about this
interesting period to provide that book, and regard this one as an instalment.
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Paul Rich rich@rico.pue.udlap.mx
Professor of International Relations and History
University of the Americas-Puebla
Sta. Catarina Martir A.P. 100
Cholula Puebla 72820
Mexico
Visiting Fellow
Hoover Institution
Stanford University