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OLDER REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS IN AFRICA
by: Barry Stein
"Refugee problems demand durable solutions" is the opening statement of the Principles for Action in Developing Countries, adopted by the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in October 1984. Without a durable solution--integration into a community by means of voluntary repatriation, settlement or resettlement--refugees cannot fully establish themselves in a new life as contributing members of their new community. For the past thirty years UNHCR has established planned rural settlements for refugees in Africa as one method of pursuing durable solutions. This effort has not been very successful. Most refugee settlements are unable to achieve or sustain economic self-sufficiency and many refugees are not integrated into their host countries. These failures, particularly the inability to achieve durable solutions for refugees, have contributed to an financial crisis enveloping UNHCR and to a political crisis in Central Africa.
This paper is an updated report of a 1985 study of older refugee settlements in Africa conducted by the Refugee Policy Group through a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development. The objectives of the study were to investigate:
The research indicates that for thirty years there have been and are major difficulties in designing settlements, implementing the assistance program, and in attaining self-sufficiency. In part this troubled record is due to the sheer difficultly of creating a new community amidst volatile refugee movements. However, of more importance are political factors involving the host country's view of refugee settlements which impede the achievement of self- sufficiency, make it difficult to maintain if it is achieved, and which prevent the refugees "political and social integration into the host country."
Table I
REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS IN AFRICA AS OF 1982
21 were closed due to repatriation (with 7 being declared
self-sufficient before being closed)
11 were abandoned
30 were declared self-sufficient (but 21 received renewed
aid)
55 were not declared self-sufficient by 1982
______
117 Total number of settlements established of which
85 were still operating.
The starting point for this analysis was a 1982 UNHCR report "Phasing Out UNHCR Programmes for Local Settlement" (Heidler, 1982) and its accompanying table "UNHCR-Assisted Rural Settlements - Situation at the Beginning of 1982." The table lists 107 settlements in Africa. We have corrected the list by adding nine abandoned and two operating settlements and by subtracting one settlement, which was planned and listed but never established, bringing the total number to 117 settlements.1 In order to be able to deal with a stable sample we have not attempted to study any settlements that were established after 1982.2 At times we mention these additional settlements but they are excluded from the primary analysis.
This study focuses on the organized settlements as they have been the main recipients of international aid provided for refugee settlements. There are two main types of settlements for refugees, organized or planned settlement schemes and spontaneous settlement or self-settlement. As the term suggests, spontaneous settlements3 are unplanned, and they are also largely unassisted. The proportions for each type cannot be exactly known, but a rough estimate would be that half of all African refugees are self-settled (a minority of them in urban areas), that about one-quarter live in organized settlements, and that the remaining one-quarter are in relief or post-relief refugee camps where they are dependent on food rations and other international assistance. (Camps are distinguished from settlements in that there is little or no prospect or attempt for the refugees to achieve self- sufficiency.)
Of the 117 settlements in Table I, the primary focus is on the 30 organized refugee settlements that "were declared self- sufficient (but 21 received renewed aid)" by UNHCR between 1966 and 1982, and which are still in operation. See Table IV for a listing. A secondary focus, also from Table I, is 20 of the 55 settlements listed as "were not declared self-sufficient by 1982." These 20 settlements are listed in Table VI.
The selection of only 20 of the 55 "not declared self- sufficient by 1982" settlements was accomplished by excluding 35 refugee settlements in the Sudan--15 in the east for Ethiopian refugees and 20 in the south for Ugandans. When the decision was made, in 1985, to exclude the Sudanese settlements, we relied on three factors. First, the refugee situation was unstable with massive influxes into both eastern and southern Sudan. (By 1985 the number of settlements had already increased to 71 with 47 in the south and 24 in the east.) Second, the Sudan was experiencing major crises involving the overthrow of the Nimeri Government, the beginning of the civil war, and drought and famine. Lastly, it was felt that the eastern settlements had bleak prospects for self- sufficiency because the Sudanese government was choosing settlement sites against the recommendations of international survey missions.4 Between 1985 and 1990 the political crises and refugee flows in the Sudan have grown worse. All 47 settlements in the southern Sudan were closed in 1988-1989 when the refugees repatriated to Uganda. Although there had been welcome political changes in Uganda the return was spurred by the dismal security situation in the south including attacks on almost all of the settlements. In the eastern Sudan, none of the settlements has achieved self-sufficiency and the climate of acceptance for refugees has deteriorated (Refugee Policy Group, 1989a).
With regard to the 50 settlements that constitute our primary and secondary concern (see Table III and Tables IV and VI), in 1982 they included 30 settlements considered self-sufficient--including two in the Sudan, and 20 settlements still dependent on international assistance. In 1990 we find 32 settlements considered self-sufficient, but with 24 of them receiving renewed aid; 3 settlements that may be self-sufficient; 6 are self-reliant
Table II
1982 REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS IN AFRICA AS OF 1990
47 were closed due to repatriation (with
approximately 27 considered self-sufficient [7] or
food self-sufficient [20] before being closed)
11 were abandoned
32 were declared self-sufficient (but 24 received renewed
aid)
27 were not declared self-sufficient
______
117 Total number of settlements established of which
59 are still operating.
Table III
Settlement Self-Sufficiency in the
Sudan and the Rest of Africa in 1982
Rest of Sudan Africa Total Not self-sufficient 35 20 55 Self-sufficient but 1 20 21 aid renewed Self-sufficient 1 8 9 ---- ---- ---- Number of settlements 37 48 85
and experiencing significant voluntary repatriation; 3 more are doing well but are still receiving large numbers of refugees; and, six have closed due to voluntary repatriation. Thus of the 50 settlements only 44 are still operating and at least 33 are either dependent or receiving renewed aid. Furthermore, with regard to the original 117 settlements, only 59 are still operating and only 11 of them do not require international aid. (See Table II.)
Problems in Defining Self-Sufficiency
Throughout the paper there is an artificial and arbitrary
TABLE IV: THIRTY REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS SELF-SUFFICIENT BY 1982
Host Name of Year arrive/ Number &
Country Settlement self-sufficient Origin
Burundi Muramba 1962-1969 9,800 Rwanda
Burundi Kayongazi 1962-1969 5,300 Rwanda
Burundi Kigamba 1963-1969 11,727 Rwanda
Burundi Mugera 1963-1969 18,692 Rwanda
Comments: Report of 1982 assessment team finds the four settlements not
fully viable; allocates $773,000 for food production & marketing
vocational training, school repairs, water pipes. $2.5m for area
hospital. 1987 report level comparable to local population.
Tanzania Karagwe 1962-1966 2,500 Rwanda
Tanzania Muyenzi 1962-1969 5,000 Rwanda
Tanzania Mwezi 1964-1971 3,000 Rwanda
1987 report of 1,200 moved to new settlement named Burigi, due to
disturbances. Some may have been involved in 1990 Banyarwanda refugee
invasion of Rwanda from Uganda. Citizenship discussed 1985, not granted.
Uganda Oruchinga 1961-1974 4,750 Rwanda
Uganda Nakivale 1962-1974 8,405 Rwanda
Uganda Kahunge 1963-1974 9,220 Rwanda
Uganda Ibuga 1964-1974 2,350 Rw & Sudan
Uganda Rwanwanja 1964-1974 2,820 Rwanda
Uganda Kyaka I 1964-1974 2,230 Rwanda
Uganda Kyangwali 1966-1974 9,465 Rwanda
74,379 in eight settlements [including Kyaka II] in 1989. Major repairs
due to 1979 Tanzanian invasion; 1982 attack by locals on settlements;
1985 fighting to overthrow Obote. Refugees support winner - NRA. 1986
discussions to grant citizenship produce no results. Property rights
restricted. Reported "for most part better off than nationals." October
1990 refugees in ugandan Army desert and invade Burundi. Refugee numbers
at left are 1971 figures from Holborn (1975).
Zaire Ihula 1961-1970 3,000 Rwanda
Zaire Bibwe 1962-1970 1,190 Rwanda
Zaire Kalonge 1962-1967 700 Rwanda
14 years of no aid & Kalonge listed as abandoned. Minor aid requests
for $264,000 for schools and dispensaries not provided before. No
evidence of funding or implementation.
Rwanda Mutara 1974-1977 10,000 Burundi
$300,000 for 1984 to repair water system, build more schools, equip
health center. Overpopulation, no land. Income-generation aid for young
refugees. Largely self-sufficient but Gov't & refugees can't maintain
established infrastructure.
Tanzania Ulyankulu 1972-1980 26,000 Burundi
Tanzania Katumba 1973-1978 74,000 Burundi
$27m ICARA II: (includes Mishamo) for primary cooperatives, ag.
train & research, roads, health, water, & education. Additional
$9m from UNHCR. ICARA II cites serious jeopardy to viability. 1988
study finds serious problems in land use and overcrowding. Neumann
(1985) critical of TCRS "highstandard construction," absence of
technical expertise. Continuing refugee dependency, lack of
participation or self-reliance. Settlement wide gap over locals. Aug.
1990 exile attack on Burundi.
Zaire Mutambala 1976-1979 1,700 Burundi
Only ed. scholarships since 1980. Rumored closed by Zaire due to exile
activity v. Burundi.
Sudan Qala en Nahal 1969-1975 34,000 Ethiopia
Failed after handover in 1977, complex water and tractor probs. Marginal w.
NGO aid. Villages near food self-sufficiency. Plots too small for longterm
fertility and pop. growth.
Djibouti Mouloud 1979-1980 90 Ethiopia
Includes some locals. Extremely high p.c. cost - $1,345 - due to poor
soils, harsh climate, persistent drought.
Botswana Etscha 1968-1975 1,800 Angola
All refugees are believed to be citizens.
Zambia Mayukwayukwa 1967-1973 2,200 Angola
1988 construction of new community dev. facilities.
Zambia Meheba 1970-1982 22,000 Angola
ICARA II request for $3m for schools, health center, fish ponds. 10-12,000
refugees move from border area 1988-90 requiring major construction.
Zaire Cataractes 1976-1981 c.100,000 Angola
Very odd case, really assisted self-settlement. Food sufficiency since
1981. ICARA II - $4m rebuild roads, $2m community dev., $2.9m
dispensaries. Some on-going aid;long-term refugees are self-sufficient
Zaire Kanyama 1971-1972 750 Zambia
Lumpa sect. No aid reported.
Tanzania Pangale 1966-1971 700 Zaire
Minor ICARA II aid request.
Sudan Rajaf 1970-1977 5,000 Zaire No renewed aid. 1989: possible repat
due to security sit. in S. Sudan distinction between self-sufficient and
dependent settlements. If at anytime a settlement has been listed or
regarded as self-sufficient by UNHCR then it is in the self-sufficient
category. For some settlements, e.g. Qala en Nahal in the Sudan, the
period of self-sufficiency was either extremely brief or even mistakenly
judged. Similarly if a settlement has not been listed as self-sufficient
by UNHCR then we continue to treat it as a dependent (on international
aid) settlement. Although some settlements may have been mistakenly
listed as self-sufficient, most of those interviewed in the course of the
study felt that UNHCR tended to be rather late in declaring
self-sufficiency, thus underestimating the number of such settlements.
Lastly, if a self-sufficient settlement receives any renewed aid, it is
listed as requiring renewed aid.
In this study we offer no independent definition of
self-sufficiency. We have taken an expedient and practical approach,
accepting the definitions of others, primarily UNHCR. If a settlement has
been declared self-sufficient we do not question that judgement. As our
study covers thirty years of settlement history in a dozen countries we
recognize that self-sufficiency in different times and settings may not be
comparable.
A practical approach to defining self-sufficiency, one that
highlights the relationship between individual economic self- support and
the broader self-sufficiency needs of a settlement, comes from the Sudan:
- Dura [food] Self-Sufficiency - An average refugee
family can produce a sufficient quantity of dura
[basic foodstuffs] off their allocated land to pay
for all cost of production and yet have enough
left for the family's annual consumption.
- Family Self-Reliance - Dura self-sufficiency and
enough income from other sources to cover the cost
for the minimum household requirements (e.g. clothing
and bedding, fuel, household utensils, grinding
charges).
- Settlement Self-Reliance -- Family self-reliance plus
an overall income surplus is generated which can
cover the operating cost for the minimum settlement
infrastructure requirements in administration and
support services, water supply, education, health
care and sanitation. (Cree, 1983)
Clearly the target indicators for having reached self-sufficiency
will vary from one place to another. Nonetheless, a definition of
settlement self-sufficiency can be seen as including reaching the economic
level and general standard of living of the local community and being
integrated into the economic life of the area on a sustainable basis. In
addition, a settlement should be able to produce sufficient government
revenues to allow the government to operate its standard set of services
for the residents of the settlement (e.g. health facilities) and to
maintain the settlement's infrastructure at a level consistent with those
elsewhere in the country. A settlement that routinely required
international assistance, or that was experiencing a situation which
required external assistance in large amounts, could not be considered
self-sufficient.
THE IDEAL: SETTLEMENT AND INTEGRATION
The ideal view of a refugee settlement, particularly from UNHCR's
point of view, consists of two main phases, (a) the land settlement phase
to assist refugees settle on the land and become self-supporting, and, (b)
the consolidation and integration phase to complete development of
settlement infrastructure, promote a sense of community, and to integrate
the settlement into the larger social, political and economic life of the
host country.
In the land settlement stage a site is selected and prepared,
refugees move in and work on their own individual sites and the settlement
infrastructure, seeds and tools are provided, as well as food rations
until the refugees achieve food self-sufficiency. The expectation is that
rations will be needed for 2 to 5 years, but some refugee settlements
never end their need for food aid.
The land settlement phase is more than just land, seeds and a hoe.
It is the creating of a new rural agricultural community and involves
issues of community development, relations with neighbors, levels of
service and assistance, problems of administration, legal rights, and
self-help.
The consolidation part of the second phase is largely internal and
refer to achieving settlement self-reliance and a sense of community. The
integration aspect is largely external and involves the settlements
relationship to the local population, markets and towns, and to various
levels of government from local to national.
No settlement really stands alone. It must depend on local
government for many of its services and for upkeep of its infrastructure.
To thrive it must also be part of the larger local economy through
participation in markets, providing goods and services, and paying taxes
and fees.
Integration is directly related to achieving a durable solution.
UNHCR seeks to phase out international assistance to refugee settlements
and to handover responsibility to the host government. In an ideal case,
integration will include citizenship for the refugees (Gasarasi, 1990).
"Refugees are aliens, they are 'guests,' they are not voting citizens, and
they have little or no political leverage" (Coat, 1978).
The ideal of settlement handover and a phase out of international
assistance has not been realized in most instances. The term "handover" is
misleading by implying a completeness and formality to the transition
which is usually not the case. Only 11 of the 32 self-sufficient
settlements have been formally handed over to the host government. For
most settlements, "handover" is informal and piecemeal; as each input is
completed international assistance is phased out. However, either way, 24
of the 32 settlements received renewed assistance after handover. A more
accurate term for self-sufficient settlements would be "handover without
phase out."
HOST HESITANCY
Many low income host countries, for good reasons, are not prepared
to offer durable solutions to integrate refugees into their societies.
Choosing to integrate refugees is a far more complex, vital and difficult
decision than simply weighing the costs and burdens placed on the
international community. Host hesitancy toward integration derives from
many factors, including:
--political support for the refugees' cause--particularly
independence, secession, or autonomy--which would be
weakened by a solution other than repatriation;
--the size of the refugee group, which in absolute or
relative terms may be too large for the host to absorb;
--concern that integration would produce a pull factor and
encourage more refugees to flee to the host; and
--concerns that the refugees' ethnic, cultural, social, or
political background might make them unacceptable to
segments of the population. (Stein, 1987)
Furthermore there are economic factors that complicate the problem.
The number of low-income countries has increased from 34 to 42 in
just six years. Faced with a lack of development, a debt crisis, and
rapidly growing populations whose needs they cannot serve, host countries
are in no position to add to their burdens. They worry about being
accused of favoring refugees over needy nationals. Refugees can compete
economically with nationals. And, it is unreasonable to ask low-income
countries to make a financial contribution--either by sharing development
assistance from their own scarce resources or by going deeper into
debt--for the sake of refugees. Many hosts are twice-shy about
integrating refugees because of past experiences with international
integration assistance which established services and infrastructure but
did not cover the long-term recurrent costs of maintaining refugees.
There has been no agreement between hosts and donors on the issue of
additionality. Additionality refers to the request by the low-income host
countries that refugee assistance of all types should be over and
above--additional to--the normal development assistance they would receive
if there were no refugee problem. Donors, however, offer only partial
additionality. They indicate that if refugees are incorporated into
development projects, such as settlement schemes, they will become
potential contributors to their host's development. Therefore a share of
the development assistance should also apply to the refugee areas. The
hosts do not feel they can afford durable solutions that require them to
share scarce development funds or to borrow for aliens.
Lastly, many hosts have solid development reasons for not
integrating refugees. Refugees are often concentrated in peripheral areas
of the host. Refugee settlements may be the wrong project in the wrong
place with the wrong needs, thus skewing the national development plan.
RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFUGEES
Host hesitancy towards integration of settlement refugees springs
from an unresolved dispute regarding responsibility for refugees that
divides low-income host countries from UNHCR and the rich donor countries.
With rare exceptions--Botswana, Tanzania, Burundi--host countries have not
viewed integration as the goal of settlement. They have long and
consistently maintained that settlement is temporary and the refugees will
eventually repatriate. UNHCR and the donor countries, on the other hand,
consistently think in terms of durable solutions, refugee integration into
the host country, and the termination of international assistance.
In part, both parties are denying responsibility for caring for the
victims. Asylum countries, which bear a tremendous involuntary burden,
see themselves as humanitarian hosts to unwanted guests. They want
international burden-sharing to ease their load and to compensate them for
the great strain placed on their social, physical and economic
infrastructures.
Donors accept the idea of burden sharing but not as compensation.
They will fund burden sharing as a means to a durable solution. Donors
are concerned that burden sharing without an emphasis on durable solutions
will lead to open-ended, costly refugee situations. With international
burden sharing, host governments might have a reduced sense of
responsibility for refugees, actually impeding efforts to find durable
solutions.
In 1984 UNHCR's Executive Committee avoided this issue of
responsibility when it adopted the Principles for Action in Developing
Countries. Although beginning "Refugee problems demand durable solutions"
the Principles go on to indicate that voluntary repatriation is the "best
option." The Principles continue: "where voluntary return is not
immediately feasible, conditions should be created in the country of
asylum for temporary settlement" which does "not necessarily imply a
commitment to one or another long-term solution."
The practical result is that consolidation and integration of
settlements, a handover of responsibility, a phase out of international
assistance, the granting of citizenship, and the achievement of a durable
solution, would be a voluntary action by the host countries and would go
against their long-term announced intention that settlements be temporary.
TEMPORARY LOCAL SETTLEMENT
The UNHCR and donor concern that burden sharing without a durable
solution might be expensive has proved to be true. Settlement costs for
1988 (actual--$132 million of $338 million), 1989 (estimated--$160 million
of $360 million) and 1990 (estimated--$121 million of $323 million) range
from 37 percent to 44 percent of the total UNHCR General Program budget
(UNHCR, 1989b). Despite these high costs the settlement program is not
very successful. As Tables VI and VII indicate, at best only 15 to 20
percent of the settlements, mostly small ones, achieve lasting
self-sufficiency. Temporary settlements are likely to be permanent
recipients of international aid.
However, a critical consideration in the hand-over
process is the ... capacity of the local government
institutions to fully integrate settlements into their
ongoing programmes. Due to limited resources, the
inability of local institutions to cope with recurrent
operation and maintenance costs, a general lack of self-
reliance on the part of refugees and the additional needs
required as a result of population growth, further input
of resources by the international community has often been
necessary after a hand-over has taken place. (UNHCR, 1989b)
REVIEW OF THE EXPERIENCES OF THE OLDER SETTLEMENTS
EARLY RURAL REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS
Refugee rural settlements first appear as a form of UNHCR assistance
in the early 1960s. They developed as a response to large flows of
African refugees fleeing from independence and nation-building struggles.
"At the end of 1964 UNHCR was faced with a new situation in Africa,
characterized by a large influx of rural refugees estimated at about
400,000" (Diegues, 1981). From 1961 to 1982, UNHCR opened 117 refugee
settlements in Africa reportedly assisting some 940,000 refugees (Heidler,
1982).
The earliest settlements were for approximately 140,000 Rwandese who
fled to Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire and who had little prospect
of returning home. The first settlement was Bibwe in Kivu, Zaire opened
in October 1961. By 1966 there were 24 Rwandese settlements--nine in
Zaire, four in Burundi, three in Tanzania, and eight in Uganda--of which
seven were abandoned and seventeen achieved self-sufficiency and are still
in existence.
Contemporaneous refugee flows from Zaire, Angola, Portuguese Guinea
(now Guinea-Bissau), Sudan, and Mozambique led to the establishment of
approximately a dozen rural settlements in Uganda, Central African
Republic, Senegal, Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia by the mid-sixties. The
early refugee settlements had many difficulties getting established and
thereby served as the learning ground, often through trial and error, for
the inexperienced assisting agencies. Besides the abandonment of seven of
the twenty-four Rwandese settlements, three additional
settlements--Bambouti for Sudanese in the Central African Republic, Mao
for Angolans in Zaire, and Koboko for Sudanese in Uganda--were abandoned5
and four other settlements (for Sudanese and Zairians in Uganda) were
considered "not viable" (Heidler, 1982) before they were closed by the
repatriation of the refugees. (See Table V.) However, other settlements,
primarily in Tanzania, Senegal, and Zambia, did well.
Being the majority, the Rwandese settlements were the main learning
ground for UNHCR, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the other
international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGO). In
the settlement of the Rwandese refugees UNHCR played a more limited role
than it does today. At the beginning of the exodus in 1959, and for
several years afterward, UNHCR had no branch offices in sub-Sahara Africa.
It played a minor or non-existent role in much of the relief phase of
assistance. In many cases settlements began without UNHCR involvement and
the agency was only invited into the settlements after the host country's
resources were strained or other difficulties emerged. Initially, UNHCR
knew little of rural African life and the requirements for a successful
settlement and did not take a strong stand on site selection, farming
techniques and economic viability, and the size and function of the
settlements. Neither UNHCR nor the hosts were insistent, or consistent,
about appropriate levels of aid, and, with few exceptions, most of the
settlements received minimal infrastructures in the form of schools,
medical facilities, and other community facilities. Further, UNHCR's
active involvement with most of the settlements appeared to end soon after
subsistence or food self-sufficiency was achieved, or as soon as the host
government was willing to assume responsibility.
The Rwandese Tutsi (Banyarwanda) refugees were a difficult first
settlement experience for UNHCR. As an exiled elite they are often
described as being acutely aware of the rights and privileges due them.
Their sense of superiority frightened and alienated many of their new
neighbors, and their negative attitude towards settlement delayed their
progress toward self-sufficiency. Many were pastoralists who rejected
cultivation, and as militant exiles hoping to retake their homes and
power, they rejected the permanence of settlement. The refugees' view of
their exile as temporary was often shared by the host governments, who,
expecting repatriation, gave little thought to site selection (often
settlements were in the border area and represented a regrouping of large
refugee influxes that had settled spontaneously in the border zone) and
saw no reason to invest heavily in infrastructure for temporarily resident
aliens. Lastly, the militant and violent activities of many of the Tutsi
through the Inyenzi guerrillas involved them in dangerous forays into the
internal politics of three of their host countries (Holborn, 1975;
Gasarasi, 1990).
Part of the legacy of the Rwandese Tutsi can be seen in today's
UNHCR and Organization of African Unity (OAU) policies concerning moving
refugees away from the border, limiting refugee political activities, and
viewing the granting of asylum as a non-hostile action. The legacy shows
also in UNHCR's concern about promoting friendly relations with local
inhabitants6 and giving due attention to the economic viability of
settlements. From this experience, policies emerged on the need to
provide infrastructure early in a settlement's life--to indicate
permanence and to encourage those refugees who value education and other
services to remain at the settlement rather than to settle spontaneously;
and, on the administrative pattern for settlements--preferring to work
with agencies, usually NGOs, that were able to remain with a settlement
project through to its completion rather than only working on the relief
stage or settlement stage.
Abandoned Settlements or Major Population Declines
Although almost all of the early (1979 or earlier) settlements were
eventually declared self-sufficient, it is well to recall the troubles
they experienced along the way. Most of the 32 self-sufficient
settlements experienced major difficulties and sharp population declines
before stabilizing. Further, another eleven settlements were so troubled
that they were abandoned and four others were deemed "not viable" before
they were closed due to voluntary repatriation (see Table V).
In Burundi, the settlements of Muramba, Kayongazi, Kigamba, and
Mugera all experienced large out-migrations in their early years. In
fact, some of the settlements lost as much as 90 percent of their settlers
due to poor soils, a desire to be reunited with family members located in
other asylum countries, resistance to becoming farmers, and a lack of
opportunity for refugees from urban areas (Van der Meeren, c.1969).
In Tanzania, Muyenzi declined from 10,000 to 5,000 refugees as
settlers fled authoritarian officials (Gasarasi, 1984; Holborn, 1975) and
reunited with scattered family members. In the late 1970s, Ulyankulu had
its population more than halved as a preventive measure (Betts, 1981) to
accommodate inadequate soil and water resources.
In Uganda, several settlements had major difficulties, and one was
abandoned. In 1965, Kinyara failed and Ibuga had its Rwandese refugee
population leave (although they were replaced by Sudanese refugees)
because of a lack of water and community facilities. Oruchinga in 1964
had 12,000 refugees but land for only 5,000, and Nakivale peaked at about
30,000 before stabilizing at less then 20,000 settlers. Both settlements
were overcrowded because they were near the border and authorities kept
sending newly arrived refugees to them. Eventually their excess
populations were transferred to new settlements in the north.
Nakapiripirit, Onigo, Acholpi, and Agago for Sudanese and Zairian refugees
were deemed "not viable" before they closed due to voluntary repatriation.
In Zaire, six settlements--Kakobo, Mamba, Rambo, Lemera, Mulenge,
and Tshaminunu--were abandoned in the mid 1960s when they became involved
with the Congo rebellions and the host government ordered that they be
closed. Another settlement, Kalonge, was initially thought to have been
abandoned for the same reason but survived at about one-third of its
former size. Two other settlements, Bibwe and Ihula, were attacked by
local residents but survived. However, their combined population declined
from 13,000 to 5,000 refugees. Lastly, Kanyama was planned for 10,000
Lumpa refugees but only received 750 as most decided at the last minute to
repatriate to Zambia. In the Sudan, Qala en Nahal virtualy failed
immediately.
Table V:
ABANDONED SETTLEMENTS
- KINYARA in Uganda for 4,000 Rwandese refugees open 64
closed 69, refugees resettled from Zaire, low
morale, high mortality
- LWATEMBO in Zambia for Angolans 66-71, no soil survey
- KAKOBO }
- MAMBA } in Zaire for Rwandese refugees closed mid-60s
- RAMBO } after the refugees got involved
- TSHAMINUNU} in the Congo rebellion and the
- LEMERA } Gov't closed the settlements
- MULENGE }
- BAMBOUTI in Central African Republic for 27,000 Sudanese 1962-67
Originally refugees self-settled,
then regrouped by UNHCR.
Settlement had good prospects
but was too close to border.
1967 raid by Sudan killed six
refugee chiefs. Refugees
transferred to M'Boki 125 miles
from border.
- MAO in Zaire for 5,500 Angolans 1962-63. Refugees had
settled successfully on land
given them by locals and thus
rejected move to planned site.
- KOBOKO 12,000 Sudanese in Uganda 1962-1966-67. Closed
because too close to border,
involved in violence, and overcrowded.
At first refugees had self-settled
SETTLEMENTS DEEMED NOT VIABLE BUT
CLOSED DUE TO REPATRIATION after
handover due to overly complex and
highly capitalized designs for
provision of water and of tractor
services which did not have the support
of the local government (Rogge, 1985).
- Nakapiripirit for 9,000 Sudanese in Uganda; poor soil,
lack of rain because on wrong side of
mountain, and overcrowded beyond
planned capacity of 3,000.
- Onigo for 2,500 Sudanese in Uganda; peaked at 5,050, set
up in 1965, deemed not viable in 1971
due to water problems, drought, and
insufficient agricultural inputs.
Repatriation in 1972.
- Acholpi for Sudanese in Uganda; 1964 to repatriation in 1972.
Merged in 1969 with Agago [# 4 below].
Not viable in overcrowded condition
in 1971.
- Agago for Sudanese and Zairians in Uganda; 1966-72. Same
fate as Acholpi [#3 above].
(Sources: Holborn, 1975; Heidler, 1982.)
Lastly, in Zambia, two settlements, Lwatembo and Mayukwayukwa, were
begun without soil surveys. Lwatembo eventually was abandoned, and
Mayukwayukwa proved viable only after two-thirds of its population was
transferred to Meheba. Key Obstacles to Attaining Self-Sufficiency
The history of the older refugee settlements in Africa indicates a
number of factors which can be major obstacles to the attainment of
self-sufficiency by a refugee settlement. While the following discussion
is based primarily on the experience of the older settlements, written and
interview information on more recent settlements indicates that these
points have considerable validity for newer settlements as well.
- Site Selection
Proper site selection is critical for attaining self-sufficiency.
The three chief characteristics of a suitable settlement site are good
soils, adequate rainfall (or a source of irrigation water), and sufficient
drinking water. These are the primary and permanent factors that
determine self-sufficiency. All other factors--such as plot size,
overcrowding, refugee attitudes, etc.--are secondary. The key attribute
of the secondary factors is that they can be changed, improved or overcome
if they are a hinderance. Problems with permanent factors can be
overcome, if at all, only at prohibitive expense. If good soil, rainfall,
and drinking water are available only in limited amounts, then these
limits will determine the viable TABLE VI: SETTLEMENTS NOT SELF-SUFFICIENT
IN 1982 (other than Sudan)
Host Name of Year arrive Number &
Country Settlement Origin
Angola Cassege 1978 1,050 Zaire
Angola Dongue 1979 1,200 Zaire
Angola Sta Eulalia 1981 2,850 Zaire
Angola Cacanda 1981 300 Zaire
Angola Kitola 1981 1,760 Zaire
Angola Maua 1981 210 Zaire
1985: security problems led to abandon all but Mawa. 1986: 13,000 down
to 9,654 in 1990. Access very difficult. Minor aid, mostly
self-reliance. Cassege doing well; others at food self-sufficiency.
On-going repatriation program slowed by UNHCR financial crisis. Most
refugees likely to voluntarily repatriate. 3,972 repat so far.
Botswana Dukwe II 1980 469 varied
Progress hampered by 6 year drought & major fluctuations; peak 4,559
in 1987. Zimbabweans repat. Namibia repat. 1990: 204 Angolans, 190 S.
Af. In 1989, 200 Zimbabweans accepted for naturalization.
Burundi Bukemba 1974 5,330 Rwanda
Selfsufficient at same level as other Rwandese settlemts
Swaziland Ndzevane 1980 6,500 S. Africa
Handover expected in 1984 still not realized due to influx of 7,000
Mozambique MzB after 1986. Overcrowded. Inadequate managerial
skills. Suitable site for new sett identified but not allocated by gov't.
1990: major reorg increased eco self-suff of S. Af. & reduced their
dependence on HCR
Tanzania Kigwa 1980 244 varied
Rural settlement and transit center for urban Rs. Still getting
transfers and aid in 87-88. Land and ag supplies. Health & ed
infrastructure
Tanzania Mishamo 1978 30,000 Burundi
Selfsufficient & handed over in 1985. Still recieving major aid.
Neumann (1985) criticizes TCRS's high standard construction, failure to
end dependency or promote participation or training. Settlement level higher
than locals.
Zaire Kimbianga 1977 8,400 Angola
Zaire Lundu-Matende 1977 10,000
Zaire Mfuki 1978 8,600 Angola
Population estimate varys 40,000 in 1978 to 12,000 in 1984 for the three
settlements. Unclear; may be self-sufficient since 84; at level of local
population but need maintenance aid. Income-gen and coop aid planned in
86, minor ed ass't in 88. May be some VR to Cabinda in 89.
Zaire Adobia 1980 45,000 Uganda
Zaire Popo 1980 Uganda
Zaire Biringi 1981 Uganda
Zaire Lanza 1981 Uganda
Zaire Irumu 1981 Uganda
45,000 in six settlements in 1982. Lack arable land, overcrowded w. new
arrivals. Rapidly declining pop in mid-80s due to spontaneous repat.
17,000 by 1985. Organized repat leads to colosing of settlements in
by 1985. Organized repat leads to closing of settlements in 88-89.
Population capacity of the settlement.
Although the choice of a settlement site rests with the host government,
it is exceptionally important that UNHCR and the international donors
take an active interest in the decision (Drucker, 1987). The long-term
consequences of a poor site choice, such as in the Sudan (see p. 4
above), can be extremely expensive in monetary terms and in the labor,
energy, and hopes invested in trying to make a poor site workable.
As the overwhelming majority of refugee settlements in Africa are
based on cultivation--several Sudanese settlements are based on refugees
earning wages in nearby towns or as agricultural workers (Rogge, 1985;
Kibreab 1990); soil quality is of paramount importance. Marginal soils
are especially susceptible to rapid deterioration, so that food harvests
of the early years often cannot be maintained without measures to ensure
fertility. It may also be necessary to allow for variations in plot sizes
to take into account individual variations in the quality of soils on
different plots. Into the 1980s many settlements, even major ones, were
undertaken without adequate soil surveys. In some, cursory surveys were
made that did not uncover all of the important local variation which
existed. In others, the expansion of a settlement led into unsurveyed
areas.
Although irrigation is an alternative to rain in dry areas. The
complexities and difficulties of irrigated farming are well-known and few,
if any, settlements based on irrigation are likely to meet their operating
costs and maintenance requirements without continuous outside assistance.
Drinking water is likely to be the most immediate problem in a new
settlement and it must be continuously available for a settlement to
function. Treatment of water or pumping from deep wells can be expensive
and the recurring costs may require repeated external assistance.
Problems with the repair and maintenance of water systems have been a
frequent cause of renewed aid to settlements after hand over. The
availability of drinking water has limited the size of several
settlements, and access to water has repeatedly been a point of conflict
between refugees and local residents, but only Qala en Nahal appears to
have had its viability threatened by a lack of drinking water.
b. Political Difficulties
While African nations have often been generous in providing asylum
to refugees, the record of the older settlements shows numerous cases of
severe difficulties caused by political involvements. Many refugee
settlements, particularly the Rwandese, got embroiled in the ethnic
politics of their host country with severe consequences if they backed the
wrong side. Other settlements located close to the border have supported
guerrilla activities7 or been the targets of cross-border attacks and
diplomatic pressures on their host. Involvement in local or international
politics was the major cause for the abandonment of eight settlements in
Zaire, Uganda, and the Central African Republic, and five settlements in
Angola were vacated in 1985 due to their host's security situation (see
Table V). Forty-seven Ugandan settlements in southern Sudan closed after
being attacked. See footnote 6 regarding Rwandese refugees in Uganda.
Mutambala in Zaire is rumored closed due to exile political activity. "In
May, Tanzania deported some 5,000 Burundian Hutu refugees.... Burundian
exiles attacked their home country from Tanzania last August" (Africa
Confidential, 1990b).
c. Refugee Attitudes
Many settlements in their early years experienced refugee resistance
to any activities which might imply that they were putting down roots in
the new land, rather than planning to return home. This was especially
pronounced in the case of Rwandese Tutsi's, many of whom continue to seek
to forcibly regain control of Rwanda. "Rwandese refugees' early attitude
... opposed anything that even remotely suggested possible permanency"
(Gasarasi, 1990). The Rwandese refugees also experienced difficulties in
changing from being primarily pastoralist to becoming farmers, which many
viewed as a lower status occupation.
Refugee resistance to putting down roots is often matched by the
host country's insistence that the refugees will eventually repatriate
(Kibreab, 1989; Gasarasi, 1990). Very few settlement refugees have been
granted citizenship by their host. As a result, refugee status passes to
new generations.
d. Overcrowding
Once a settlement has opened there is a great temptation to continue
to send newly arrived refugees (or spontaneously settled refugees who have
been rounded up by the host government) to the site. Ndzevane in
Swaziland and Meheba in Zambia recently doubled in size to accommodate new
arrivals. The plan may be to expand the settlement, or to use it as a
transit center or holding camp, while planning an additional settlement or
hoping for repatriation. The government is often reluctant to accept the
need for additional settlements, feels constrained by lack of staff
resources, or is disinclined to go through the search and negotiations
required to provide another settlement site.
Overcrowding can be a sign of poor planning, unrealistic beliefs
about the settlement's viable size or ability to expand, a failure to
think clearly about a site's functions, or a lack of other options. Sharp
reductions in size may be needed to bring available resources, which often
were not surveyed in advance, into balance with the number of refugees.
This process could continue over many years if inadequate provision has
been made for maintenance of soil fertility which would lower a
settlement's carrying capacity over time. Population declines may be
needed to enhance a settlement's ultimate viability.
e. Agricultural Programs and Policies
Agriculture is the cornerstone of most refugee settlements. In
addition to meeting the food needs of the residents, achieving an adequate
agricultural income is vital to the development of refugee livelihood.
The sale of crops is a source of cash on which other activities and
employment depend. Many of the agriculture-related problems of refugee
settlements are connected with larger African problems; Africa is the only
continent to suffer declines in per capita agricultural production over
the past two decades (World Bank, 1981, 1989; Eicher, 1986).
The chief problems noted were (a) plot sizes which were too small to
allow for more than mere subsistence farming (which would thus eliminate
any economic locomotive effect of agriculture in stimulating the total
settlement economy) and for necessary conservation measures, and (b)
efforts to coerce refugees into communal farming, which produced
considerable resistance and minimal crop yields when compared to families
farming their own plots.
f. Other factors
A number of other factors appeared to cause problems in attaining
self-sufficiency, but were either less powerful, or were only noted as
critical in a few instances. One was authoritarian administrators who
left little room for refugee input or participation. Another was overly
complex technologies which could not be sustained without continued
outside assistance.
One of these factors has been the lack of refugee participation in
determining the priority needs which assistance programs are to address,
and of refugee input into the design and implementation of such programs.
This often reflects an attitude by some host government officials that
refugees are guests who should not control affairs which occur in the host
country. However, even NGOs which advocate refugee participation on paper
often fall short of this ideal in practice. "After years of TCRS
(Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service) guidance, refugee settlers have not
realistically perceived what their responsible role should be in the
post-handover phase" (Neumann, 1985).
POST-HANDOVER ASSISTANCE
Because host countries do not assume responsibility for refugees, treat
the settlements as temporary, and do not grant citizenship to most
refugees, it is inevitable that "handover" of refugee settlements will not
lead to the phase-out of
TABLE VII: RENEWED AID TO SELF-SUFFICIENT SETTLEMENTS
I- No Renewed Aid
Etscha, Botswana 1,800 Angola
Moulard, Djibouti 90 Ethiopia
Kanyama, Zaire 750 Zambia
Mutambala, Zaire 1,700 Burundi
Rumored closed by Gov't due exile activity against Burundi
Rajaf, Sudan 5,000 Zaire
1989: possibly repatriating due to security situation in S. Sudan
Karagwe, Tanzania 2,500 }Rwanda
1987 report of 1,200 moved to new settlement named Burigi, due to
disturbances.
Muyenzi, Tanzania 5,000 } "
Some may have been involved in 1990 Banyarwanda refugee invasion of
Rwanda from Uganda. Citizenship discussed in 1985, not granted.
Mwezi, Tanzania 3,000 } "
II- Minor Renewed Aid to Provide New Facilities or Repair Old Ones
Muramba, Burundi 9,800 }Rwanda
Kayongazi, Burundi 5,300 } "
Kigamba, Burundi 11,727 } "
Mugera, Burundi 18,692 } "
Bukema, Burundi 5,330 } "
1982 report finds four settlements not fully viable. 1987 report finds
at level comparable to local population. Aid to water supply, hospital,
handicrafts, agricultural implements.
Mutara, Rwanda 10,000 Burundi
Overpopulation, no land. Income-generation aid for young refugees.
Largely self-sufficient but Gov't & refugees can't maintain
established infrastructure.
Pangale, Tanzania 700 Zaire } For all 4 settlements,
Bibwe, Zaire 3,000 Rwanda } minor aid requests
Ihula, Zaire 1,190 " } at ICARA II. No evidence of
Kalonge, Zaire 700 " } funding or implementation.
Mayukwayukwa, Zambia 2,200 Angola
1988 construction of new community dev. structures.
III- Major Renewed Aid to Improve or Maintain Economic Viability
Ulyankulu, Tanzania 26,000 }Burundi
Katumba, Tanzania 74,000 } "
Mishamo, Tanzania 30,000 } "
ICARA II cites serious jeopardy to viability. 1988 study finds serious
problems in land use and overcrowding. Neumann (1985) criticizes TCRS
"high-standard construction," absence of technical expertise. Continuing
refugee dependency, lack of participation or self-reliance. Settlement
wide gap over locals. 1990 exile attack on Burundi.
Cataractes, Zaire 100,000 Angola
Odd case, really self-settled, ongoing aid, longer-term refugees are
self-suff.
Meheba, Zambia 22,000 Angola
10-12,000 refugees moved from border 1988-90 requires major construction.
IV- Substantial Aid to Restore Settlement to Full Functioning
Qala en Nahal, Sudan 30,000 Ethiopia
Failed after handover in 1977, complex water and tractor probs. Marginal
w. NGO aid. Villages near food self-sufficiency.
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