Ankit Panda. Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. xv + 393 pp. $27.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-19-006036-7.
Reviewed by Bianca Trifoi (George Washington University)
Published on H-Sci-Med-Tech (July, 2022)
Commissioned by Penelope K. Hardy (University of Wisconsin-La Crosse)
In his book, Ankit Panda explores the recent successes of the North Korean nuclear program and the resulting shifts in dynamics between the United States and North Korea. Panda’s main argument is that given Kim Jong Un’s success in creating an indigenous nuclear program, in particular a functional intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in 2017, the United States and the rest of the world must accept that North Korea and its nuclear program are here to stay, and the US must reevaluate how it will approach North Korea in the immediate future and in the long term.
As a journalist and editor at the Diplomat, Panda, to his credit, mostly avoids much of the sensationalist and alarmist rhetoric on North Korea that has long plagued media reports on the state. Instead, he argues that “North Korea is not going anywhere any time soon—and neither are its nuclear weapons” (p. 312). This is a refreshing take that hopefully signals a mainstream shift away from older ideas, such as the consideration of North Korea as an aberration in the global system or endless predictions on when the North Korean regime will fall. Panda counters such ideas early in his book, noting that North Korea is not backward and is indeed a rational actor that expresses the same concerns over regime survivability as any other state in the current global system.
Panda splits his book into three parts that focus on the North Korean regime and its goals, the North Korean nuclear program, and US-North Korea relations, respectively. Part 1 aims to provide some degree of historical context but is arguably the weakest section of the book. This part discusses Kim Jong Un’s rise to power as well as the North Korean nuclear program in the context of North Korean history. The historical context in these chapters is largely superficial and functions on assumptions that recent scholars of North Korean history have endeavored to dispel. For example, descriptions of Kim Jong Un on pages 28-30, and the title of chapter 1, “A New Emperor,” paint Kim and North Korea as more exceptional and peculiar than is necessary. Repeated references to Kim and North Korea as paranoid or deeply insecure could also use some corroboration in these chapters. Furthermore, within part 1, Panda argues that Kim Jong Un’s nuclear strategy is one of deterrence, in that it guarantees regime survival by deterring any conventional attacks on the state or on the ruling elites. Though his deterrence argument is convincing, it is weakened when Panda presents the idea of “regime survival” as a goal unique to North Korea.
Part 2 explores the recent development of the North Korean nuclear program in some detail. This section is particularly strong at presenting a great deal of technical information about nuclear weapons while still maintaining readability and accessibility for the average reader. Part 2, comprising six chapters, discusses the buildup of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, beginning with the first missiles in the 1960s and ending with the increased precision of advanced missiles under Kim Jong Un, the development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the late 2010s, and North Korea’s broad efforts to develop up-to-date nuclear technology despite the hindrance of sanctions and lack of access to information. Panda traces the development of intermediate-range missiles over the years and then arrives at the watershed year of 2017, during which North Korea completed its first successful ICBM test and became a de facto nuclear power.
Part 3 analyzes US-North Korea relations since 2017 and considers potential approaches for the future. Panda argues that Kim’s sudden turn to diplomacy with the United States and South Korea in 2018 confirmed that nuclear weapons granted North Korea some degree of international status, and thus Kim felt his leverage was great. Panda contrasts this with US officials’ thinking at the time, that Kim had been driven into a corner by the Trump administration’s offensive rhetoric and thus forced to the negotiating table. The final chapter discusses future dynamics between North Korea and the United States, as well as the balance of power in Northeast Asia. Panda also spends some time on sanctions and how North Korea has managed to continue funding its nuclear program despite these sanctions. Though the focus of his work was strictly the nuclear program, Panda does reference the “human rights abuses” and “unparalleled cruelty” (pp. 25, 300, 312) of the North Korean state. Thus, it would have been useful if he took this a step further and connected the problem of sanctions, nuclear program funding, and the North Korean domestic economy more directly. As is, his mentions of human rights abuses appear superficial and do not contribute to his arguments.
Despite this issue, the final chapter is very strong, with concrete insights that should be seriously considered by US officials. Panda argues that North Korea must now be recognized as a nuclear state, and the original US goal of disarming North Korea must be discarded (or indefinitely postponed) in recognition of the new reality. The two states must now “coexist as two nuclear powers” (p. 265). Panda suggests arms control as a way forward for the United States and North Korea. This is a refreshing take that would provide North Korea the respect of its sovereignty that it has ceaselessly demanded from the United States since the early Cold War. Panda’s insights into the future are very solid, as he also warns that if the US continues to disregard the new reality of North Korea as a nuclear state, and does not act, China may take its place as the new leader of Asian power dynamics.
As mentioned, the historical context provided by Panda in part 1 relies on outdated perceptions that paint North Korea as more unique and different than is necessary, and generally does not contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the history of the North Korean state and its goals. There are also many claims throughout the book that could have been strengthened with citations of sources. For example, Panda often references North Korea’s supposed reaction to world events or North Korean perceptions without any sources for corroboration. A more detailed review of more diverse sources would have helped strengthen his claims, but overall, the focus (and strength) of this book is its analysis of the present and future of the North Korean nuclear program more so than its past.
Kim Jong Un and the Bomb is a strong contribution to the understanding of the significance of nuclear capabilities in the contemporary global system as well as the understanding of North Korea’s own capabilities and goals. It provides a great deal of technical information on nuclear programs while still being very readable and engaging for any audience. This book is suitable for courses on nuclear history, contemporary international relations, and security studies, and for the casual reader interested in these topics as well as government or high-level analysts of North Korea. North Korea is here to stay, and it demands the respect of the US as a fellow nuclear power; thus US officials and scholars of international studies would be wise to heed Panda’s words.
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Citation:
Bianca Trifoi. Review of Panda, Ankit, Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea.
H-Sci-Med-Tech, H-Net Reviews.
July, 2022.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=57818
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