Christopher Clapham. The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 256 pp. $27.95 (paper), ISBN 978-0-19-068018-3.
Reviewed by Derick Becker (University of Nottingham Malaysia)
Published on H-Africa (September, 2019)
Commissioned by David D. Hurlbut (Center for Global Christianity and Mission, Boston University School of Theology)
In The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay, Christopher Clapham produces an accessible history of one of the most unique corners of Africa. Reading much like a reflection on his decades of work in the region, Clapham dispenses with the usual academic strictures to tell the reader this is what I know and here is why it matters. His focus is the history of state formation (and, notably, decay) in the Horn. His thesis is clear and simple: to understand the states in the region, we must look primarily at the region’s internal dynamics and history and not to outside forces. For contemporary scholars of Africa such an emphasis on the historicity of the states and peoples of the continent is hardly a radical novelty. But for Clapham the necessity of looking to internal dynamics turns on the nature and history of the Horn itself. The region has the only non-colonized state in Africa: Ethiopia. It is home to the only real nation-states too: the Somali states of Somaliland, Somalia, and Djibouti. It is home to one of only two successful secessionist movements: Eritrea.[1] And it is that rare patch of African territory to have fought interstate border wars. From this history and autonomy, Clapham puts forth his only theoretical claim—and an underdeveloped one at that: the geography of the region has left its mark on social organization, which in turn has shaped and shapes the forces of state formation and decay.
Clapham organizes his text around the history of each particular country—with the exception of Djibouti, which is given only cursory discussion and folded into the chapter on Somalia and Somaliland. Few will be surprised that Ethiopia consumes the largest part of this book. Ethiopia has long played the role of regional hegemon. The politics of neighboring (and aspiring) states reflect its influence like gravity tugging at galactic bodies in motion. And it is the organization of Ethiopia itself, from its imperial past to the present, that adds the limited flesh to the theoretical bones undergirding the text. Ethiopia, and by extension its now independent neighbors, can be divided into a highland core, a near highland periphery, and a periphery. Each region has a particular geography and climate shaping its sociopolitical organization. The highland core with its temperate climate allowed for settled agriculture and, in his reading, a hierarchical political culture reflective of this settled existence. The periphery is more arid and conducive to a pastoral life resting on a diffuse and horizontal power structure based in the clan. In between lies the highland periphery, which for historical reasons has been more exposed to the hierarchy of the core as Ethiopian power radiated outward. Ethiopia’s relative stability and strong state comes from the dominance of this highland core and what Clapham argues is its culture of hierarchy.
By contrast, the Somali peoples are doomed to a fractious political culture of diffuse power in a rigid clan structure. Such structures serve the people well in a pastoral society but are inimical to a strong and efficient modern state. Mobile pastoral societies involve a fair amount of long-distance travel and trade, making clan ties essential in sustaining networks of support. The robust and largely informal networks used by the Somali diaspora today to send remittances back home are testament to the system’s strength and utility. But these same structures make interclan cooperation difficult as trust and mistrust are baked into its ethos of loyalty. Djibouti’s relative stability can be explained, according to Clapham, as a result of its dominance by a single clan, the Issa (and incidentally the French security guarantee, it should be noted).
But it is here where Clapham’s ambiguous theorizing begins to cause trouble. Clapham argues that the politics of the region are sui generis and thus engages in little to no comparative analysis. While the historicity of any region or state is by its nature unique, there is some value in comparing this work, if not to state theory more broadly, to two other texts on the state in Africa: Jeffrey Herbst’s States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control (2000 [new ed. 2014]) and Jean-Francois Bayart’s The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (1989 [2nd. ed. 2009]). The former shares Clapham’s penchant for macro-geographical analysis of weak/strong states, while the latter’s extraordinary local historical detail shares his desire to focus on the local context.[2] The clarity of these authors’ theoretical frameworks, however, makes it far easier to assess any sweeping claims they may make. In contrast, Clapham’s theoretical opacity and his tendency toward near essentialist claims leaves the reader bewildered.
Let’s start with the broadest view: Clapham’s veritable “geography is destiny” argument. That a society will reflect its environment or, further, that any mode of production will have a concomitant and supporting sociopolitical organizing structure is hardly contentious. A certain degree of density and settled agriculture, for instance, is conducive to government power and its effective exercise in a given polity. For Herbst, the expansive geography and low population density of most African states has historically provided an “exit option” for any discontented party to escape the influence of a given power structure. This in turn has shaped how power is exercised (often diffuse and consultative). But Clapham leaves no room to explain how this is a truly dynamic process that can and will evolve over time. David Shingirai Chanaiwa’s study of equally pastoral Zulu society in the nineteenth century, published in African Studies Review, for instance, demonstrates how geopolitical processes can change reducing exit options and propelling centralizing tendencies.[3] No doubt Clapham might accept such logic, but his work leaves the impression of a static world.
The second issue is the almost essentialist nature of some of his claims. For example, Clapham argues that such distinct ethno-political groups living in close proximity (within and across state borders) are inevitably going to come into conflict. Yet Daniel N. Posner’s study of Zambia, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (2005), shows that ethnic diversity alone cannot explain ethnic tension and conflict. Clapham is equally essentialist in repeatedly claiming that Somali pastoral society is simply inimical to the formation of an efficient state. But aside from the simple fact that culture is never frozen in time, his own study of Somaliland undermines his point. Somaliland is remarkably stable precisely because it drew on culturally resonant strategies of negotiation that brought all relevant stakeholders into lengthy consultations to produce its political structures.
Such criticisms, however noteworthy, must be juxtaposed with the author’s purpose and, perhaps, intended audience. For the professional scholar or advanced student this book will prove to be a tad underwhelming. But for the beginning student in an introductory course on African history or politics, this book is a remarkably well-written and enjoyable introduction to a part of the world few will know much about. This is no small accomplishment. This is no breezy and vacuous beach read. Clapham has clearly marshalled the full weight of his experience and expertise to produce an important book of history that is frankly a pleasure to read.
Notes
[1]. The other, of course, being South Sudan, which is only just outside the generally accepted boundary of the Horn.
[2]. Though his invocation of Bayart’s concept of “extraversion” seems to be misapplied.
[3]. David Shingirai Chanaiwa, “The Zulu Revolution: State Formation in a Pastoralist Society,” African Studies Review 23, no. 3 (1980): 1-20. David Strang makes a similar point on Menelik’s drive to centralize and strengthen the Ethiopian state as colonization in the Horn begins (“Contested Sovereignty: The Social Construction of Colonial Imperialism,” in State Sovereignty as Social Construct, ed. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 22-49).
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Citation:
Derick Becker. Review of Clapham, Christopher, The Horn of Africa: State Formation and Decay.
H-Africa, H-Net Reviews.
September, 2019.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=54470
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