Richard M. Price, ed. Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. xi + 309 pp. $90.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-521-88816-5; $32.99 (paper), ISBN 978-0-521-71620-8.
Reviewed by Minako Ichikawa Smart (Universiy of New South Wales)
Published on H-Human-Rights (September, 2009)
Commissioned by Rebecca K. Root (Ramapo College of New Jersey)
Opening a Space for Ethical Debates in International Relations: A New Project of Constructivism
This collection of ten essays by constructivist scholars has made an outstanding achievement in proposing a new research agenda in International Relations, which has become divided over assessment of the development of humanitarianism since the end of the Cold War. Contributors include scholars who have led the constructivist analysis of humanitarian norms during the last two decades, such as Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, as well as those who embarked on their academic endeavors as liberal assumptions of constructivism came under criticism.
Richard Price, the editor, along with many of the contributors, acknowledges the limitations of the past achievements of constructivism, which has focused on demonstrating the causal impact of "good" norms on actors' behavior, failing to provide ethical reasoning for why certain norms are considered to be good (a criticism made by normative theorists such as Mervyn Frost), and tended to be optimistic about moral progress, neglecting the negative effects of post-Cold War humanitarianism (a criticism made by critical approaches). At the same time, contributors share a confidence that constructivists are well placed to reinvigorate ethical debates in International Relations. The case is powerfully demonstrated by the careful analysis of the theoretical literature in the introductory chapter by the editor as well as in the second chapter, by Christian Reus-Smit, and the case studies dealing with contemporary ethical challenges, including torture, humanitarian intervention, economic sanctions, immigration, and self-determination of indigenous peoples. There is a remarkable level of coherence among the chapters, as the authors of case studies engage with common theoretical questions set out in the introductory chapter. This book is highly recommended for scholars of International Relations engaging with normative issues of all theoretical orientations.
According to Price and Reus-Smit, constructivists have the potential to make distinctive contributions to ethical debates in International Relations, utilizing their sociological understanding of normative structure and research methodology grounded on empirical evidence. The aim is to examine limits of moral obligation in world politics that can be ethically justified under the current social structure. By applying ethical reasoning to the historically contingent social structure, the constructivists can provide practical prescriptions for action "actually available" (p. 18), unlike approaches of international ethics based on logical deduction of abstract principles. At the same time, constructivist analyses can provide empirical evidence of moral progress, which is merely a theoretical assumption in critical theory, whose focus on immanent moral possibilities has a strong affinity with the objectives of the book.
While a "bridge-building" role is assumed in relation to international ethics and critical theory (p. 18), poststructuralism is regarded as an opposite pole: between these two poles a space for new research can be opened. Although one of the aims of the book is to engage with the charges made by poststructural theorists regarding negative effects of humanitarian norms, the method chosen is to examine the extent to which such negative effects can be justified in order to achieve moral progress. A theoretical approach that rejects all forms of violence, domination, and exclusion, such as works by David Campbell and R. B. J. Walker, is condemned as a position "stranded between irrelevance or ethical paralysis" (p. 38). While the significance of opening a space between uncritical defense of humanitarianism and radical rejection of the moral foundations of modernity is powerfully demonstrated by the contributions to the book, it is possible to argue that radical criticism of what is considered to be legitimate under the current social conditions is an essential element of the process of social change. This question will be revisited at the end of the review.
Numerous ways in which constructivism can contribute to ethical debates in International Relations are enlisted in the first two theoretical chapters and developed in the following case studies. The chapter by Sikkink demonstrates the prevalence of ungrounded counterfactual assumptions in political discourses and the importance of empirical research in quarantining them. She carefully assesses different forms of counterfactuals, using the cases of torture and international tribunals for crimes against humanity. She successfully exposes that the claim that it is necessary to torture in order to prevent terrorist attacks is based on two types of ungrounded counterfactuals, that is, the “ticking time bomb” scenario that is merely a mental simulation of an extreme situation (pp. 99-100), and an assumption that things could have been worse if we had not used torture, which can be challenged by empirical evidence suggesting that tortures are ineffective. At the same time, she also proposes that a counterfactual claim grounded on empirical research can be used for assessing whether less-than-perfect institutions currently available (such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) are making the world a better place than what it would have been without them. Research like this is to be welcomed to the extent that scholars who have different opinions of the matter are encouraged to engage in theoretical as well as empirical debates. However, even if it is established that a currently available institution is better than not having it at all, criticism based on what Sikkink calls "comparison to the ideal" (pp. 104-106) should not be excluded if we were to seek continuous moral progress.
Each contribution to the volume engages with the difficulty of making moral judgments in an imperfect world, producing interesting insights that have not been made in the existing literature. Finnemore observes in her chapter that moral progress is no guarantee for good outcomes, as the normative structure of the contemporary world consists of competing and contradicting norms. In the case of humanitarian intervention, the tension between the norms of human rights and self-determination arises not only in making a decision of whether to intervene, but also affects the execution of intervention by demanding the intervening state to respect the agency of the population of the target state. While the rising expectation to attend to the voice of the local population is considered to be a moral progress, faced with a lack of political will among potential interveners, the outcome can be less than perfect, leading to dilemmas that cannot be easily solved. This interesting observation that some of the moral dilemmas we face are attributed to the gap between the rising expectation of humanitarian norms and the political will of the actors can be considered in conjunction with Sikkink's analysis of consequences and Marc Lynch’s engagement with hypocrisy in world politics. Lynch's analysis of economic sanctions in Iraq leads to an observation that pervasive hypocrisy inherent in the policy aimed at inflicting pain on the population while maintaining the moral high ground could not be sustained, despite the support of the most powerful states. This insight can lead to further research questions as to whether there is a condition for hypocrisy to be delegitimized. Could it be the case that harm on the innocent inflicted by the great powers advocating humanitarian values is particularly vulnerable? Could there be an explanation for why proportionate civilian casualties ("collateral damage") or abuse of suspected terrorists is more likely to be tolerated? Ann Towns's analysis of the case in which success in gender equality in Sweden has turned into an exclusionary discourse contrasting "Swedish culture" and "immigrant/ non-Western culture" shows that what can be considered as "progressive norms", such as gender equality or human rights, can generate negative representation of the "other." Towns demonstrates, by combining discourse analysis and empirical assessment of statistical data, that negative representation of the "immigrants" is based on groundless stereotype that can be effectively challenged by empirical evidence and that Swedish identity does not logically require representation of the "other" as morally inferior. This observation suggests that while negative representation of outsiders is prevalent in the discourse on national identity, it is possible to challenge it by presenting empirical evidence, an approach that can be strategically more effective than simply exposing the exclusionary logic inherent in the discourse.
Overall, the volume is an outstanding work, setting a new research agenda for ethical debates in International Relations and demonstrating its potential by proposing numerous interesting observations that have not been made in existing literature. At the same time, it seems to raise more questions than it answers, despite the remarkably high standard in theoretical argument and empirical analysis. The very idea of setting limits to our moral obligations will be opposed by poststructural theorists, and many of the proposals made in the volume are likely to be objected to as criteria of justice by poststructuralists as well as by cosmopolitan theorists. However, constructivist's project of identifying our moral limits and critical analysis of the identified limits by those with more radical orientations can be considered as constitutive elements of the process of moral progress. If moral limits have been justified on the basis of current structural conditions, radical criticism of the conditions justifying the current limit would be essential for further moral progress. Just as there is plenty of room for moral improvement between where we are now and a total revolution, there is a long way to go until we reach the stage where "the critical enterprise ha[s] nothing to critique" (p. 39).
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Citation:
Minako Ichikawa Smart. Review of Price, Richard M., ed., Moral Limit and Possibility in World Politics.
H-Human-Rights, H-Net Reviews.
September, 2009.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=24595
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