

Banu Turnaoğlu. *The Formation of Turkish Republicanism.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017. 320 pp. \$39.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-691-17274-3.

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The historiography of intellectual currents and political ideas in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic has remained by and large a supplement to political history for the better part of its development. Led by fields other than its own, the field has suffered from a lack of adequate attention to methodological and theoretical reflections, and has remained largely descriptive and stifled by Orientalist assumptions which prioritized “the impact of the West.” Particularly for an English-speaking readership, works on modern Ottoman political thought were limited to a few canonical works: chiefly Bernard Lewis’s heavily Orientalist and outdated works and Şerif Mardin’s 1962 *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, which, despite its excellence, was too elaborate for the uninitiated reader. From the 1990s onward, however, a revisionist wave has challenged methodological nationalism as well as the outdated teleological narratives of imperial decline, linear modernization, and Westernization. This wave has benefited from the linguistic turn as well, and consequently the field of Ottoman history has seen a revived interest in political thought. Leading Ottoman historians such as Cornell Fleischer, Virginia Aksan, and Rifa’at Ali Abou-El-Hajj have contributed landmark studies in early modern Ottoman political thought, while Şükrü Hanioglu has done the same for late Ot-

toman intellectual trends. In the last decade in particular, important studies on Ottoman political thought by Marinos Sariyannis and others have begun to remake the field. [2] However, we still lack a general survey of Ottoman political thought that combines the advances of the past century of scholarship and uses them to bridge the gap between early modern and modern Ottoman political thought.

Banu Turnaoğlu’s *The Formation of Turkish Republicanism* attempts to provide exactly such a revisionist account, by tracing the sources and development of what it insists is a centuries-old tradition of “republicanism” in Ottoman and Turkish political thought. The book has an ambitious scope which covers almost the entire history of the empire from its inception to the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The dissertation upon which the book is based received the Ernest Barker Prize from the UK Political Science Association, and the book itself has been hailed by leading scholars as a compelling revisionist interpretation. Still, the book falls far short of its aspirations for three main reasons. First of all, the book fails to provide satisfying evidence of its most sweeping claims that would speak to students of the field. Second, the book dismissively condemns previous scholarship in the field or ignores it altogether, much to its own detriment; such a lack of

engagement makes it very difficult to assess the original contributions of the author. And finally, the unimaginative analytical framework on which the argument is built does not stand up to any kind of scrutiny and fails to do justice to the complexity of the material under discussion. Beyond these main pitfalls, a plethora of mistaken historical details and sloppy use of sources seriously undermine the potential contributions of the book as well.

Turnaoğlu starts with the observation that today's Turkish Republic is going through a political crisis whose "source is inherently intellectual" (p. 1). Kemalists and Islamists have been contesting the meaning of the republic since 1980s; her intervention is to challenge the supposedly orthodox narrative that "the Republic and its doctrines emerged abruptly in 1923 without an intellectually substantial foundation" (p. 3). Instead, she argues that "Turkish republicanism represents the outcome of *centuries of* intellectual disputes between Islamic, liberal, and radical conceptions of republicanism" (p. 9, emphasis is mine). This argument is puzzling, first because revisionist narratives concerning the origins of the republic have dominated Turkish historiography since the early 1990s, with hundreds of scholarly works and half a dozen textbooks appearing to bust the myths of Kemalist historiography. One would be hard-pressed to find recent scholarly work arguing for a republican rupture in 1923. Indeed, the only references Turnaoğlu provides for this outdated argument are the early Republican historian Enver Ziya Karal, who passed away in 1982, and a handful of even more obscure references (pp. 3 and 219). While the authors of *Atatürkçü Düşünce El Kitabı* ("The Handbook of Atatürkist Thought") might be shocked to find out that the republic was not a complete break with the past, it has been common sense in the Turkish historiography of the last three decades. The second problem her argument faces is that late Ottoman political thought and its various trends have been well documented—albeit wanting in more refined

analysis—since the 1950s, owing to the works of Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Şerif Mardin, Şükrü Hanioğlu, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, and Mete Tunçay, among others. While recognizing some of these contributions, Turnaoğlu nevertheless discards these earlier works with one stroke of the brush for being "limited by their singular focus on Westernization as a response to external pressure" and failing to "appreciate the full intellectual richness and originality of Ottoman thinkers" (p. 9). Throughout the book, she repeats her dismissal of Şerif Mardin in particular without ever fleshing out her critique. This leads the reader to expect a significantly revised narrative of late Ottoman intellectual trends, an expectation which is by and large unfulfilled.

A second aspiration of Turnaoğlu's work is to "transcend the conventional geographical boundaries between Western and non-Western political thought by illustrating the striking and highly consequential exchange of ideas between these spheres" (p. 8). Inspired by the Cambridge school of political thought associated with J. G. A. Pocock, Quentin Skinner, and John Dunn (under whom she studied), Turnaoğlu provides a brief history of republican thought in the West and its global spread after the French Revolution, before noting that "studies of republicanism have been limited largely to the Anglophone world, and typically present it merely as a European and American phenomenon" (p. 8). Her work aims to rectify this provincialism by expanding the study of republicanism into the Ottoman and Turkish sphere. Yet in picking up on the topical focus of the Cambridge school, she seems to have left its methodological concerns and innovations aside. The Cambridge school authors are known for their emphasis on context, authorial intent, audience, and historicism, upon which they established their analysis of early modern and modern republicanism. In contrast to the kind of history of ideas practiced by North American scholars after the fashion of Arthur Lovejoy, which separates ideas from their social and political context and

presents them as timeless units of analysis, Cambridge scholars have presented the history of republicanism as a historically grounded debate particular to western Europe. Turnaoğlu could have taken these methodological innovations of the Cambridge school and appropriated them for a study of the Ottoman context (as has been done by Gabriel Piterberg and Marinos Sariyannis, for instance) instead of focusing on the republicanism debate. Instead, she simply argues for an indigenous Turkish republican tradition without addressing methodological problems involved in the transfer, circulation, and translation of ideas (as has been done by Einar Wigen, for instance). Throughout the book she is content to identify and occasionally summarize the sources Ottoman intellectuals were inspired by, while failing to engage with the question of what happens to ideas when they travel to contexts far from their origin. Her presentation suggests a timeless exchange of abstract ideas between equals, which completely ignores the colonial dimension of the spread of Western thought.

Of course, there is more than one way to do intellectual history, and methodological debates will never cease. However, Turnaoğlu's argument calls for an elaborate conceptualization of republicanism, or at least a working definition which would make the case for a plausible Turkish republicanism. Turnaoğlu admits that the Ottoman thinkers under discussion rarely identified with republicanism, if at all, while she herself appears to consider any political project that is not an absolutist monarchy within the umbrella of republicanism, stretching the concept to the point of stripping it of any analytical use. She uses republicanism as a catch-all category under which to discuss constitutionalism, positivism, materialism, nationalism and many other late Ottoman intellectual trends. What does gathering these trends under the banner of republicanism contribute to our understanding of them? How is it preferable to categorize them as liberal, radical, or Islamist republicanism instead of simply liberalism, radi-

calism, or Islamism, as the literature has tended to do? Turnaoğlu's initial answer to such questions does not go much further than stating that liberal and radical notions were both inspired by French republicanism, with the latter advocating revolution and the Islamic conception taking "its inspiration from the Islamic state in the period of the four caliphates and medieval Islamic thought" (p. 10). Far from being resolved, this ambiguity regarding the conceptual framework is perpetuated throughout the book and even further complicated when Turnaoğlu starts qualifying various kinds of republicanism as liberal, authoritarian, and so on without showing how their paradoxes are reconciled.

Turnaoğlu does not provide a chapter plan in the introduction or a general structure of the argument and hence, the direction and the narrative of the book emerge only after one reads through the whole volume, which at times becomes a trial in patience. The first chapter, which presents a survey of political thought in the Ottoman Empire from its founding until the end of the eighteenth century, is by far the weakest. It soon emerges that the Ottoman Empire did not really have a republican tradition up until the French Revolution, despite the initial promise of "centuries of intellectual debates" between various strands of republicanism. The chapter relies heavily on (and reiterates the arguments of) Bernard Lewis's and Niyazi Berkes's mid-twentieth-century works, completely ignoring dozens of books and articles published in the last thirty years. To be fair, Turnaoğlu briefly nods to the revisionist literature when she recognizes that the early modern Ottoman polity was not simply an absolutist sultanate, as Westerners believed, but demonstrated constitutionalist characteristics which provided checks and balances against tyranny through the model of the circle of justice, an ideal construct which posits a tacit contract between the ruler and the ruled (p. 14). Still, the reader is treated not to these constitutionalist ideas but to a summary of the seventeenth-centu-

ry authors Koçi Bey, Katip Çelebi, and Mustafa Naima, arguably the three most canonical absolutists of the Ottoman political tradition whose works have been the cornerstones of the superseded “decline” paradigm in Ottoman historiography. In fact, this would have been a wonderful opportunity for Turnaoğlu to provide evidence of that robust republican tradition in Ottoman thought she promised us. Recent scholarship would have provided abundant support: for instance, Baki Tezcan has shown us that Janissaries contemplated doing away with the dynasty and instituting a kind of “republic” (*cumhur cemiyeti*) in the early eighteenth century.[3] It would have been an excellent contribution and a fresh discussion for a Western audience if Turnaoğlu had incorporated this literature into her book.

Instead, the first chapter concludes with the assessment that Ottomans’ dissatisfaction with their own political thinking (that is, Ottoman theories of order and the circle of justice) was what prompted their eventual “turn toward and opening up to the West” (p. 30). One desperately hopes for an elaboration of this assessment, which goes further than Lewis and Berkes in arguing for an Ottoman Westernization while completely going against the grain of more recent scholarship on eighteenth-century Ottoman thought. Instead, Turnaoğlu takes us back in historiographical time when she proposes İbrahim Müteferrika’s one-page summary of political regimes of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy as a “novel attention to understanding Western political systems” (p. 32). Recent scholarship has demonstrated that Müteferrika’s summary was simply a verbatim repetition of encyclopedic knowledge from Katip Çelebi’s earlier work.[4]

This tendentiously selective reading of Ottoman sources and stubborn adherence to Bernard Lewis’s “classic” account continues in the second chapter, which attempts to demonstrate the emergence of a new vocabulary of freedom, equality, and law in Ottoman political writing

with the impact of the French Revolution during the reigns of Selim III and Mahmud II (1789-1839). Turnaoğlu draws on the same sources cited by Lewis to show that Ottomans were receptive to the ideas of the French Revolution, mostly ignoring the fact that these receptions were mainly negative. The abuse of sources reaches a new dimension in this chapter, with misquotations and a failure to provide adequate context. For instance, we are told that Sadık Rifat Paşa wished the empire to become a “modern constitutional state” (p. 46), and that Mustafa Sami Efendi used the phrase “We have to Europeanize!” (p. 47). While Sadık Rifat Paşa was an advocate of reform, he was one of the more conservative figures of his time, and a desire for a modern constitutional government is at best a wishful interpretation of his vast corpus of letters. Similarly, Mustafa Sami Efendi’s call to Europeanize (cited here from an abridged and simplified edition of his writings) was a call for nothing more than an importation of European sciences and knowledge, tempered by the explicit caveat that European superiority owed nothing to their religion or political mores.

Finally in the third chapter, we are introduced to what could be comfortably called republican thought: that of the Young Ottomans. After a superficial sketch of the imperial edicts of 1839 and 1856 and other Tanzimat reforms, we are presented with a sketch of Young Ottoman ideas and the tripartite classification of Turkish republicanism into liberal (embodied by Namık Kemal and Ziya Paşa), radical (Mehmed, Reşad, and Nuri) and Islamic (Ali Suavi)—the division on which the book’s argument rests. Still, Turnaoğlu does not spend the effort required to flesh out this sketchy analytical framework. Beyond the obvious fact that Islamism, liberalism, and radicalism are not mutually exclusive categories, Young Ottoman authors, who had decisively more similarities than differences, definitely defy such a rigid categorization. For instance, Turnaoğlu proposes Ali Suavi’s revivalist agenda and emphasis on the example of early Islam as the basis of his “Islamic

republicanism,” but the same revivalist agenda and examples from different eras of Islamic history, as well as references to the Qur’an, the prophetic traditions, and classics of Islamic thought are found in abundance in both Namık Kemal and Ziya Paşa’s articles. This is also the case with “the radical republicans,” Mehmed, Reşad, and Nuri: Turnaoğlu does not seem to recognize that the motto of their short-lived newspaper *İnkılab*, “The tyrants will come to see with what kind of a revolution they will be toppled” (cited in French, my translation), is actually part of a Qur’anic verse (26:227), which is cited on the right-hand side of the same newspaper in its original Arabic (p. 83). Indeed, all of the Young Ottomans (excluding their Greek and Armenian members), as well as the rest of the political writers of the period, frequently justified their arguments with reference to the vast corpus of the Islamic tradition. What, then, justifies the singling out of Ali Suavi as an “Islamist republican”? Similarly, Ali Suavi was at least as “radical” in his ideas (he called for the execution of Ali Paşa, “the chief tyrant,” and he died leading a coup attempt); and Namık Kemal and Ziya Paşa would occasionally use the threat of a popular revolt in their arguments. Moreover, while Turnaoğlu uses a wealth of Young Ottoman writing, she ignores several other major figures of the era whose works bear on the debates surrounding republicanism, including but not limited to Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, the most prominent historian of the era, as well as the anonymous author of the famous *Tanzir-i Telemak*, which called for the abolition of the sultanate and the founding of a Muslim republic (a text discussed at length by Şerif Mardin, among others). She also overlooks the debates around the first Ottoman constitution as well as the constitution itself. Underlying these omissions is a failure to consider the reach and the audience of the texts discussed; the Young Ottomans seem to have been selected purely for their visibility and utility to the author. This pattern of omission and narrow use of sources as well as ignorance of a

wealth of secondary literature continues well into the rest of the book. Each chapter focuses on a few names and their ideas at the expense of dozens of others, without providing a rationale for their selection or an acknowledgement of the broader field from which they were chosen.

The fourth chapter deals with the “positivist universalism” of the first generation of Young Turks (1890-1908). While admitting that they scarcely debated republicanism, Turnaoğlu devotes a whole chapter to the humanist, positivist, and progressive ideas championed mainly by Ahmed Rıza, with frequent reference to his European influences. She concludes that the first generation of Young Turks “pioneered a modern, pluralist worldview that transcended the conventional geographical boundaries between Western and non-Western political thought by underlining the interaction of ideas in a striking and highly consequential way” (p. 113), yet the chapter does not include any discussion of non-Western elements in their texts. The fifth chapter discusses the concepts of liberty, justice, equality, and fraternity as well as the place of women in the ideas of the Young Turk revolution of 1908. However, Turnaoğlu does this almost exclusively through newspaper columns written by Hüseyin Cahit. If this was indeed meant to be a general survey, it would be fitting if she were to spend a few pages on female authors of the period, such as Fatma Aliye, or the ample number of women’s journals and newspapers published in this era, and discuss where they stood in relation to the revolution and the place of women in Ottoman society. Also, in discussing Young Turk ideology, Turnaoğlu concedes that “at no point did they define themselves as a republican movement” (p. 118), thus perpetuating the image of the book as a loose and highly selective survey of late Ottoman political ideas.

The sixth chapter engages with the authoritarian turn in the Young Turk government during the Balkan wars of 1912-13 and the emergence of militarism, nationalism, and social Darwinism un-

der the influence of particularly German ideas. The chapter centers around the ideas of Ziya Gökalp, yet it ignores dozens of articles—many of them in English—on this, the single most-studied figure in Turkish intellectual history after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Here, Turnaoğlu sounds a familiar refrain when she concludes that, despite their failure to bring success to the empire, Gökalp's generation "did much to found the central radical republican ideas of nationalism, populism, and a strong centralized state" (p. 164). Here, for instance, one particularly misses an engagement with Taha Parla's work, which discusses Gökalp's corporatism and its influence on Republican ideology. The seventh chapter similarly follows Ottoman political thought during World War I, focusing on the ideas of Ziya Gökalp, Celal Nuri, and Yunus Nadi.

Casual readers may find themselves at a loss in the face of this loose selection of source material and concerns, which seem to be bound together simply by chronology rather than a progressive narrative of republican thought. Some readers may conclude that the works cited are the chief surviving examples of Ottoman political thought. Yet to the Ottoman or Turkish historian who is familiar with the literature, a pattern slowly emerges: absent from her account are the countless liberals, socialists, and especially the broad range of Islamists whose voices were part of the Ottoman political conversation, and who produced an immense variety of political writing both advocating and criticizing republican trends. Instead, Turnaoğlu's chapters and topics seem to have been chosen with an eye to those ideas and thinkers who eventually influenced Mustafa Kemal's thinking to varying degrees: the Young Ottoman patriotism and republicanism, positivism, militarism, Turkism, and social Darwinism identified as formative by Şükrü Hanioğlu in his *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*. Unfortunately, it is impossible to verify this suspicion, since Turnaoğlu does not elaborate on her source selection and cites virtually all the texts from their original

Ottoman sources without mentioning other literature or critical editions which include or discuss the same texts.

The teleological thrust implicit in this kind of selective reading becomes even more apparent in the final two chapters, which cover the War of Independence (1919-22) and the founding of the Republican regime. She argues that the constitutional revolutions of 1876 and 1908 "each reinforced each other and pressed toward the ultimate republican Revolution of 1923" (p. 196). Obviously one should not buy into the Republican self-narrative of a rupture with the past, yet a critical account should also be wary of teleological narratives which ignore conflicts and contingencies inherent in historical processes. Turnaoğlu recognizes this when she concurs that "Ottoman political thinking was profoundly embedded in historical, institutional, and social contexts, and in contingencies of space and time" (p. 10), yet by ignoring voices that do not fit her narrative, she erases these contingencies herself.

Chapter 8 covers the War of Independence, the emergence of concepts of national will and national sovereignty, and the "rebirth of radical republicanism" with the establishment of the new parliament in Ankara. However, the connection to Young Ottoman "radical republicanism" is suggested with merely a hint that the notion of national sovereignty was not novel (p. 206). Similarly, the concept of the fatherland is tied to Namık Kemal without much attention to the transformation of this concept in the fifty years in between (p. 216). One other curious argument Turnaoğlu puts forward here is that the Turkish concept of liberty, "like its French republican counterpart, was understood in contrast to slavery and dependence on the external power of an enemy" (p. 208). While it is true that liberty was understood as independence from a foreign yoke (a point acutely observed by Isaiah Berlin with regard to non-Western thought in his seminal 1958 essay,

“Two Concepts of Liberty”), how this connects to the French concept is a question left unanswered.

Chapter 9 brings us to the “victory of radical republicanism” over other alternatives. Here, at last, Turnaoğlu discusses the tension between “Islamic republicanism” and the “radical secular republicanism” that she says prevailed over the former. One other conceptual novelty in this chapter is “authoritarian republicanism,” which Turnaoğlu uses to describe the emergence of Mustafa Kemal as the authoritarian leader of the new republic. However, she also uses “authoritarian republicanism” interchangeably with “radical republicanism” without any justification or elaboration, thus further complicating and undermining her conceptual scheme.

On top of the implicit teleology and problematic analytical scheme, a crude form of idealism pervades this work. As noted above, Turnaoğlu claims early on that the root of the current political crisis in Turkey is “inherently intellectual,” originating “principally from ideas” rather than “facts” (p. 1). Along similar lines, she argues that Ottoman engagement with the West was driven by their dissatisfaction with indigenous theories and concepts. The main axis of the book, the clash between supposedly conflicting forms of republicanism, mostly ignores the material context of political struggles, factionalism, and competing claims to nationality among non-Muslim elements of the empire. Nor does she shy away from establishing a direct link between ideas and practices, for instance when she explains Ottoman monarchical practices via a Qur’anic verse (p. 17). Such a crude idealism also fails to account for the rapidly and drastically changing ideological orientations of Ottoman political actors in a matter of a decade (particularly between 1908 and 1920). In a non-Western context, such a crude idealism, which ignores both domestic realities and indigenous ideas, is barely discernible from culturalism, or—let’s call a spade a spade—Orientalism. Certainly, Turnaoğlu’s Orientalism diverges in important

ways from classical Orientalist accounts which answered the question of “What went wrong?” always with reference to Islam. In Maurus Reinkowski’s words, scholars like Bernard Lewis and Ami Ayalon used to present Islamic political vocabulary as “a language that has to pass from a stagnant Islamic past to the European-inspired Elysian fields of modernity.”[5] Turnaoğlu’s attitude throughout the book reproduces this image, with one major difference: while classical Orientalism condemned Ottomans for crudely imitating Europeans without living up to their standards, her approach celebrates Ottomans for their hearty embrace of the West.

Such a way of writing intellectual history reflects not only its Orientalist influences, but a Kemalist orientation toward the Ottoman past. Although the book claims to tease apart Kemalist historiography as it has been handed down for the past century, Turnaoğlu, as a self-professed Kemalist, actually desires to save Kemalism from itself by demonstrating its deep roots in a pre-Kemalist era. However, in doing this she ends up producing a narrative which is barely discernible from Kemalist intellectual historiography in its neglect of any idea that has no Western parallel. The most obvious and ironic example of such neglect is the case of the newspaper *İnkılab* mentioned above: Turnaoğlu picks up the French inscription on the left side of the banner, completely missing the fact that it is a translation of the Qur’anic verse on the right.

Besides these flaws in structure and argument, Turnaoğlu’s book suffers from numerous factual mistakes and instances of problematic source usage that seriously overshadow the original contributions her research aims to provide. For example, the word *serbestiyet* (freedom) appears more often than not in this text as “serbessiyet” (see chapter 2). Again in chapter 2, Turnaoğlu quotes a late eighteenth-century Ottoman bureaucrat using the word *yetki* (authority, power), a word which would only be coined long

after the language reforms of 1928, instituted as part of the Republican government's attempt to rid Turkish of its Arabic and Persian vocabulary (p. 43). Similarly, she quotes a Young Turk using the expression *kişisel ve toplumsal özgürlükler* (personal and social freedoms) despite the fact that none of the three words yet existed at the time he is said to have used them (p. 128). Such mistakes reveal a problematic relationship to the primary sources: she seems to lack a notion of the transformation of Ottoman language. Finally, Turnaoğlu is apparently unaware that the "March 31 Incident" took place on March 31 of the lunar Rumi calendar, which corresponds to April 13 in the Gregorian calendar, a fact that could be checked via Wikipedia (p. 123). Such anachronisms strain the book's credibility as a challenge to the existing scholarship on late Ottoman history.

My conclusion is that this book is at best a seriously misguided attempt to propose a revisionist account of the transformation of Ottoman-Turkish political thought, which crumbles and falls under the weight of the task at hand. Had Turnaoğlu forgone the overly ambitious scope and restricted her analysis to thought that can justifiably be described as republican, the resulting text would have been a shorter and perhaps more persuasive work. However, in its negligence, which casually dismisses one half of the literature as inept and completely ignores the other half, the book falls seriously below the level of scholarly quality achieved in the field of Ottoman and Turkish intellectual history.

That a book marked by such profound flaws could be published by a major academic press despite so much progress in the field also deserves some reflection. Both the number of factual mistakes and the negligence with regard to extant scholarship indicate that the book was not closely reviewed by an Ottoman or Turkish historian prior to its publication. The fact that the book was able to make it through all conceivable stages of

academic peer review points to a larger problem: the lack of communication between scholars of Ottoman-Turkish intellectual history and the broader field of political thought. It seems that much of the excellent recent scholarship on Ottoman-Turkish political thought has remained by and large confined to area studies. This points to the urgent necessity of connecting Ottoman political thought to global intellectual history by way of comparative or integrative research. One solution could be the emerging field of comparative political theory, which has been striving for some time to find ways of bridging the gap between the historiography of political thought and normative theorizing. Another possibility lies in the appropriation by students of Ottoman-Turkish history of methodological tools developed in the historiography of Western political thought, such as conceptual history and even the more strictly contextualist approach of the Cambridge school. In the absence of methodological self-awareness, however, one risks rewriting Ottoman historiography in the same flawed way that it has been done in the past, blatantly ignoring the richness of a vast corpus. Indeed, Orientalism is not merely about seeing in a certain way; it is also about not seeing.

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Notes

[1]. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), and *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962).

[2]. Particularly in recent years, there has been exemplary work drawing on a wide range of both extant and previously uncovered sources and presenting a fresh account of intellectual developments in both the early modern and modern

periods. A few notable titles include Marinos Sariyannis, *Ottoman Political Thought up to the Tanzimat: A Concise History* (Rethymno: Institute for Mediterranean Studies, 2015); Nazan Çiçek, *The Young Ottomans: Turkish Critics of the Eastern Question in the Late Nineteenth Century* (London: IB Tauris, 2010); Şükrü Hanioglu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011); Umut Uzer, *An Intellectual History of Turkish Nationalism* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2016); Doğan Gürpınar, *Ottoman/Turkish Visions of the Nation, 1869–1950* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Ethan Menchinger, *The First of the Modern Ottomans: An Intellectual History of Ahmed Vasıf* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); and Hüseyin Yılmaz, *Caliphate Redefined: The Mystical Turn in Ottoman Political Thought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018).

[3]. See Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 223-24. For more on constitutionalist trends before the nineteenth century see Hüseyin Yılmaz, “Containing Sultanic Authority: Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire before Modernity,” *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 45 (2015): 231-64.

[4]. See Sariyannis, *Ottoman Political Thought*, 127-28.

[5]. Maurus Reinkowski, “The State’s Security and the Subjects’ Prosperity: Notions of Order in Ottoman Bureaucratic Correspondence (19th Century),” in *Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power*, ed. Hakan Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 196.

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