


Richard J. Chasdi. *Serenade of Suffering: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism 1968-1993*. Oxford and New York: Lexington Books, 1999. xv + 304 pp. \$35.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7391-0057-8.



Reviewed by Frank Chartrand

Published on H-Diplo (January, 2001)

Richard Chasdi has written an original and significant text with the publication of *Serenade of Suffering: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism 1968-1993* (1999). Not original perhaps in the collection of theories and examples provided in the text, but original in his interpretation and analysis of the material. The significance of the work and timeliness is without a doubt, given the emphasis the Clinton Administration has placed on counter-terrorism, the ongoing (never ending) bloodshed in Israel, and America's favorite person to hate, Osama bin Laden, alive and well in Afghanistan.[1]

Scholarship on this subject is, to date, generally lacking in substantive and meaningful contributions. Over the last eight years and more specifically within the last two or three years, it appears everyone has an opinion and a theory that usually involves regurgitation of earlier texts with a slightly different spin on the facts. Several texts Chasdi does evaluate and include in his contribution do provide substantive insight. One problem with this area of analysis (terrorism) is the lack of information. Real or self-described experts have

readily available speeches and policies of American political leaders and now, even those of Russia (and possibly China), but we do not have detailed material from those we call terrorists.[2] Experts may pontificate and analyze for quite some time with the material available, but without greater access and evaluation of the terrorists we seek to understand, we will never have all the necessary information with which to make wise and judicious decisions. That is in itself part of the problem for policy makers; one does not simply walk up to a known terrorist and strike up a conversation. Regardless, other means are available and must be pursued.

Chasdi's text is not long although not the simplest of readings (resulting from his effort to quantify variables, causes, ideology, goals, and typologies). The text is six chapters, presented in such a format and style so as to be understood by the researcher, student, and even the policy analyst. Each chapter begins with his goals for that particular chapter and concludes with analysis and a clearly stated conclusion. The notes on each chapter vary, but one particular endnote was five

pages in length. He begins with an introduction of the subject and his objective in writing the text followed by the second chapter of definitions, politics, terrorism and typologies of terrorist groups. The third chapter becomes more difficult when he introduces explanatory variables for terrorist group behavior and begins a discussion on ideology. The fourth chapter is somewhat easier to understand as he examines several terrorist organizations/groups with a brief history on each and an evaluation of their organizational structure and ideology. The problem begins when he offers us an empirical analysis of terrorist group-type behavior in chapter 5. Using a cube graph, he charts various typologies and assigns placement on the graph to the earlier defined groups. One smaller problem with this chapter is the, in my case, need to grasp the mathematical equations Chasdi uses to lead us onward with a theoretical framework for analysis of terrorism and terrorist groups. His concluding chapter, titled Conclusion does just that: concludes with a summary of his major points from each chapter, shows how they relate to and support his objective in writing the text.

Mr. Chasdi does not have a thesis so much as an objective, in writing his text: to bring as much science as is possible to the study of and insight into the formative conditions and processes associated with Middle East terrorist groups.[3] Studies undertaken with a serious effort at empirically evaluating, isolating, and identifying the behavior, causal factors, group origins, and typologies will assist in the formulation of prudent counter-terrorist measures. Mr. Chasdi, at the heart of his extensive research and analysis, wishes to aid in, or be of assistance to, those who will develop measures that counter terrorism in the Middle East.

Presented for the reader very clearly in his first chapter are the cornerstones upon which Mr. Chasdi would like to touch, as he makes his way through the quagmire of Middle East terrorism. The first purpose is set forth clearly as an effort to

empirically study the behavior of different types of Middle East terrorist groups by isolating and identifying various types of targeting behavior and providing a description of terrorist events. Important according to Mr. Chasdi because it will permit a more in-depth understanding of what Middle East terrorism planners need to know to enact counter-terrorist measures. Secondly, to provide insight into the formative processes of terrorist groups, their splintering, and resulting demise. Groups form for particular reasons, remain cohesive for particular reasons, and splinter for still other reasons. It is important to Mr. Chasdi to investigate and analyze this information to aid in furthering his first purpose (as stated above).

One area where Mr. Chasdi makes a substantial contribution is in his effort to arrive at a definition of terrorism. According to the author, over one hundred definitions are in use by the US government and various authors devise their own definitions that only add to the number. This further supports the author's contention that so much of what has been written on terrorism is vacuous in content and worthiness. It becomes clear when the reader recognizes that with over one hundred definitions in use, it is no wonder we are unable to formulate an effective counter-terrorism policy. Further aggravating the problem is the fact that with no single definition, the likelihood that international law is ignored or violated becomes a very real possibility. The reason we are afflicted with so many definitions is simply because experts and authors begin from one point of reference in defining terrorism and end up devising a definition based upon individual case studies. The problem is evident, every case is different or potentially different, and the definitions change.

Another problem that Mr. Chasdi mentions although he does not pursue it is that of the term itself: terrorism. The term terrorism entered our lexicon in the aftermath of the French Revolution.

At that time, it was used to describe the violent oppression of the people by the state. Terror was the instrument of the state, used against its citizens. In the late 1930's, the League of Nations found that criminal acts directed at a State were terrorist acts. Mr. Chasdi points out that while we call groups such as Abu Nidal, Hamas, and others terrorist organizations, the truth is not so clear. How we define the definition determines who is and is not brought under the umbrella definition and depending on how one defines such terminology, Israel or the United States could find themselves included as a terrorist state. Indeed, that becomes one of the first and major problems with the text, defining terrorism. There are organizations and states not discussed in Mr. Chasdi's text that clearly would fall under the purview of any of the definitions of terrorism and yet, because they happen(ed) to be in favor with the United States, are not included. We supplied the Afghan Mujahdin against the Soviets and defined them as freedom fighters (the same would go for the contras) yet we label Libya and Syria as designated sponsors of terrorism by virtue of their aid to the Islamic jihad.[4]

Double standards, loose standards, and no standards are a big problem that Mr. Chasdi does try to overcome on his way to raising the level of discourse on this subject. He settles for a rather long and drawn out definition that puts us two steps ahead of where we were, but does not grapple with deeper issues revolving around the terminology usage. As Mr. Chasdi defines it, terrorism is "the threat, practice or promotion of force for political objectives" that are "designed to influence the political attitudes or policy dispositions of a third party, provided that the threat, practice or promotion of force is directed against" 1) non-combatants; 2) military personnel in non-combatant roles; 3) combatants, if the force violates international laws; or 4) governments which have not violated human rights standards equivalent to the Nuremberg findings. Finally, whatever action is taken, in some manner serves to "denigrate the

target population while strengthening the individual or group simultaneously" (p. 24).

Mr. Chasdi's definition is a beginning, but one might come away concluding that nothing within such a definition would prohibit application of such a label to the United States (Iraq) or to Israel (West Bank or Gaza). I do not suggest that such a label should be applied to either the United States or Israel, simply that the definition Mr. Chasdi proposes is broad enough so as to include either or both of the countries. Several other examples exist including the aspirin factory in Sudan or the missile attack against Afghanistan (the Taliban is however much we may disapprove, the de-facto government in Afghanistan). If the roles were reversed and Afghanistan launched missiles against the United States, our response would be clear: defend ourselves and retaliate. Attacking a country, whether we are indeed attacking the country or a selected target, is clearly an attack on that country and we would regard it as an act of war. The United States may devise all types of rationale and label its evidence secret and not open to review, but the act itself and the circumstances involved (including violations) would place question marks beside the word terrorism and US actions. That is the problem with the definition; many nations may find they fit within the definition Mr. Chasdi provides.

Another problem is contained within the subtitle: 1968 - 1993. Mr. Chasdi begins the discussion with a substantive elevation of the discourse on terrorism and for that we should be thankful. However, he selects a year, 1968 and begins his trek forward. My question/problem is: what if the root cause of many problems and issues plaguing the Middle East began in, for example: 1960 or 1965, or 1967? By selecting 1968, it is clear one must begin somewhere rather than leave an open ended debate, but to select 1968 when events in the preceding (very recent) years, potentially played an enormous role in the development and shaping of events that would define themselves

over the following thirty years. These issues and possibilities are missed by such a (seemingly) random selection of years.

In all fairness, one must begin somewhere and in Mr. Chasdi's case, his earlier work included the same period.[5] Further, as Mr. Chasdi points out, the 1967 war in the Middle East was a turning point for many individuals and gave energy and impetus to hitherto unstated arguments. Terrorism is a cyclical process as the text and evidence argues. Events transpire followed by action. The 1967 war ended in June, followed by a period leading up to 1968 when Mr. Chasdi would suggest events turned, becoming more volatile and resulting in an escalation of terrorist activity in the region. These reasons support or reinforce the author's decision to begin with 1968, yet do not, I would suggest, completely ameliorate the inherent problems caused by such a choice.[6]

One choice Mr. Chasdi does make is his interest in defining three characteristics that distinguish terrorist group-types. This discussion begins in chapter one with discussion on the subject amplified in each of the subsequent chapters. As outlined in the text, those characteristics are: ideology, goals, and recruitment patterns, and form the basic structural underpinnings of Mr. Chasdi's study. The author returns to these three discussion areas repeatedly in an effort to show a "dove-tailing" effect with each of his analyses. In returning to these three areas of analyses, Mr. Chasdi clearly suggests an empirical approach to the study of terrorism. Devise an equation, input the data, test the hypotheses, and arrive at a conclusion. That conclusion would afford, in Mr. Chasdi's opinion, policy makers and counter-terrorism analysts the opportunity to devise a prudent and rational policy (whether counter-terrorism or as is less explicit in his material, a general policy in dealing with the Middle East).

The second chapter grapples with definitions, the political development of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (as but one example), and

three basic typologies of terrorist groups. One important note that stands out immediately in the second chapter (and has only recently been recognized by the United States and other governments) is the inadequacy of conventional military forces to combat terrorism. Further, that until very recently (and one might argue quite effectively is still the case) there was a scarcity of counter-terrorism analysts. Less interest or emphasis was placed on these issues by the American government resulting in a failure of US policy on issues ranging from how to conduct policy with regard to various Islamic countries, respond to conditions in the Middle East, or the ability to recognize the fruits of our inept policies.[7]

What may strike the reader when reviewing Mr. Chasdi's examples of American policy is how much our actions resemble those of the comedic Keystone Cops or Abbott and Costello Meet the Ayatollah. President Reagan's preemptive retaliation policy led to the Central Intelligence Agency farming out their dirty tricks in Lebanon, to third-party operatives (p. 20). These operatives detonated an explosive device outside the home of a listed terrorist leader. The operation was uncovered with almost preordained results (these results are as Mr. Chasdi points out, illustrative of how inept and bumbling our policy becomes in practice): the United States loses the moral high ground by resorting to such devious and unscrupulous acts and there is recognition among Middle Eastern (and perhaps world) people, that the United States is so incompetent that it requires others to do its dirty work and then, not effectively. Mr. Clinton's attack on Sudan and the subsequent errant missiles that did not make it into Afghanistan are further illustrations of actions that are perceived by people in that region as examples of American immorality and incompetence.[8]

It is within the second chapter that the author delves into the quagmire of definitions of terrorism [9] before finally settling on: "the threat, practice or promotion of force for political objectives"

that are "designed to influence the political attitudes or policy dispositions of a third party, provided that the threat, practice or promotion of force is directed against" 1) non-combatants; 2) military personnel in non-combatant roles; 3) combatants, if the force violates international laws; or 4) governments which have not violated human rights standards equivalent to the Nuremberg findings. In addition to the problems highlighted above with regard to this definition, it does not consider interests or outside events that may result in *emeute*. One simply needs to find an example that does not fit the definition or one that would be included under the definition as an act of terrorism to recognize the quandary. Further, that peripheral factors may mitigate the linkage between an act of purported terrorism and a group or individual. This is one of the more serious problems I have with Mr. Chasdi's overall methodology: events, life, actions, cause, and effect cannot always be placed into scientific equations to pop out solutions. It may work some of the time and produce benefits, but by quantifying and qualifying people and actions, it becomes easier to marginalize the cause. That marginalization of the grievances of many in the Middle East against the United States and several of their respective governments is part of the problem. The problem with marginalizing those individuals and groups is that you take away their voice and their options. At some point, remaining inactive or taking violent action becomes blurred, with the results reported as terrorism.[10]

Setting aside the critique of squeezing human action into mathematical equations, the author does contribute to a greater understanding of the dynamics of Middle East terrorism. He concludes the second chapter with his typological analysis of the types of terrorist groups. Mr. Chasdi ponders the question of why terrorism begins and wrestles with the issues of typological quantification and the flaws that reduce the actions or reactions of individuals or groups to lesser or higher import with no meaningful distinctions. He recognizes

the need for any analytical form to consider changes that occur in the region or sphere, to modify and be malleable to revision. To that end, Mr. Chasdi offers several typological approaches: instrumental (type of terrorist activity undertaken), psychological (think Freud, Jung, Maslow), and aim (the purpose approach, the political commitment or ideology). It is clear to the author that analysts need to pay particular attention to theoretical considerations such as categorical studies (including ideology, goals, and recruitment patterns) rather than concentrating on a single methodology of analysis.

In his third chapter, Mr. Chasdi lays out explanatory variables for terrorist group behavior and the role of ideology in behavioral acts. The author chooses various criteria for his analysis: target selection (either civilian or governmental), lethal or non-lethal, group size, group age, location of attacks (Israel, the Middle East region, Europe, or elsewhere), political events (actions by one or more governments that may generate terrorist responses), and finally, a brief highlight of the prevailing ideology in the region. Into that analysis of variables, the author introduces the idea of charismatic leadership (or lack of) and its impact upon group activity.

It is important to note that regardless of whether one agrees or accepts the scientific equation model for reviewing terrorist activity, each of the author's above stated variables have some relevance (even if one discounts the author's scientific methodology) and require further research. Mr. Chasdi points out that the available literature on terrorism that describes explanatory variables is "highly fragmented . with no clear starting point" nor does the abundance of material attempt "to streamline or integrate discussion" (p. 77).

In his fourth chapter, the author presents an explanation and discussion on the reasons behind formation of various terrorist groups (Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Jihad, Amal, Hezbollah, Al-

Fatah, PLO, Abu Nidal, Islamic Jihad, and several Jewish groups – for the most part are the majority of groups considered). This is an interesting chapter for those individuals interested in brief synopses of selected groups and the reasons for their formation. Economic, religious, ethnicity, and ideology are the prime factors surrounding each of the groups presented for analysis. Mr. Chasdi includes the issue of charismatic leadership into each group-type to further complicate the analysis. Ultimately, through his research Mr. Chasdi suggests that enough information on the sources and origins of certain groups in the Middle East has been collected that clearly demonstrate the gaps in knowledge that require yet further research. This is also a continuum in the text: we know this and as a result, of knowing, we have learned we don't know enough to make any definitive statements, and we need to do further research. The factors analyzed in chapter four do suggest to Mr. Chasdi, that economics plays a large role in the formation of terrorist groups (as in marginalized and poor). He diminishes the importance of the role played by the British when they relegated control to the Jews thereby marginalizing the Arabs in the area.[11] The British actions were of marginal importance in terms of terrorist group formation while economic conditions were of greater importance.

It is worth noting that Mr. Chasdi's presentation of various selected terrorist groups fails to include many other groups that could potentially have a counter-balancing effect on his analysis. He does not mention groups that have been and are perhaps still, supported by the US or European countries. In so doing, Mr. Chasdi may be isolating the international implications of the various groups and their connections while selecting groups that are regionally based. This methodology will produce skewed results, primarily showing groups as regional. There are far more variables and factors at work in the Middle East than Mr. Chasdi's empirical method recognizes.

Further, the rather obscured references to Israeli terrorist groups and the invocation of Rabbi Kahane as an example minimizes the role-played by Israeli terrorist groups by invoking a prime example of a disturbed individual who was wanted neither in the United States nor in Israel.[12] Israeli activity is one area that should be further researched as materials written to date sorely lack substance and focus resulting in obfuscation of issues and minimizing Israeli terrorist activity.

The fifth chapter involves the cube graph with several variables listed on each axis. Ideology, charismatic leadership (or not), recruitment efforts, group size, group age, location of acts, political events, and goals. Targeting is the variable (which I suppose could be replaced with each of the other factors to view an alternative schematic), either government or civilian. His findings would indicate that most attacks between 1978 - 1993, were against civilians, occurring in a cyclical pattern, committed by Ethnocentric groups against Israel, with minimal death (50 or less individuals injured or killed are the standards for minimal).

The major concern with regard to targeting is a concern with governmental versus non-governmental (civilian). It is generally recognized and accepted that the intelligence agencies recruit individuals (who may well be civilians) to carry out intelligence or other deeds abroad. How does one determine who is and is not a government functionary? It is clear when you have physical structures pasted with flags or symbols of the United States, but when one analyzes data and suggests civilian targets are preferred over governmental functionaries, it does raise a question. Could any of the incidents (Mr. Chasdi suggests 75% of the 973 incidents between 1978 - 1993 were against civilians), highlighted in the chapter, be more than that which they may appear to be on first glance? The answer quite simply is yes. Therefore, reliance on data that distinguishes between governmental and non-governmental targets exclu-

sively, or to any significant degree blurs the issue. This type of blurring of issues reinforces and aids in the marginalizing of group-types by labeling groups based on faulty data. Do these questions negate the usefulness or importance of Mr. Chasdi's research? No, but they do highlight the need for further research.

The final chapter in the text wraps together all previous chapters with analysis and a summary focusing on the dynamics of the political context and the effects of those dynamics within terrorist groups on political and social events. Mr. Chasdi concludes with suggestions for policy consideration based upon his empirical analysis. Using the typologies devised, Mr. Chasdi hopes to categorize terrorist groups in an effort to generate and test hypotheses about their behavior.

In offering suggestions or counter-terrorist advice, Mr. Chasdi uses a chart, again, to show the possibilities of short term, medium range goals, and long term. Each goal is related to tactical planning, positive strategic, or negative strategic variables. From counter-terrorist assassination (negative strategic/short term), protracted contact with groups (tactical/long term), promotion of democracy (positive strategic/long term), contacting prisoner families (tactical/medium term) to several other options offered. These options (offered by Mr. Chasdi in the various chapters) are valuable opportunities for policy analysts to consider something new in their approach to countering Middle East terrorism specifically and more generally, United States/Middle East policy.

Mr. Chasdi's text is a welcome addition and well worth reading and considering. More importantly, it is incumbent upon policy makers to ponder his evaluation and conclusions based upon his research. Without serious review of American failures, greater cultural understanding and respect for the Islamic world, the United States will continue to lose valuable opportunities to repair the breach between the United States and the Islamic world. We do not need to accept nor toler-

ate belligerent behavior by individuals or nations, but the United States must resist imposing itself into areas it has little understanding of and even less respect from, or we will continue down the path of violence and aggression in the Middle East and within our borders.

Notes:

[1]. The timeliness of this subject matter is, as I mentioned above, without question. Our policy toward those we deem as terrorists has been a faade behind which is no coherent or rational policy. One would think with 'specialists' in Washington that someone would grasp an understanding of the miserable failure of US policy in the Middle East. Through blunder, misstep, lack of understanding of cultures and religions, the US has taken itself out of the running to make positive and effective changes in the Middle East. Reckless action on the part of several US administrations have now placed the United States at a point where 'catastrophic terrorism poses an eminent threat to America 's future' (Ashton Carter's article *Catastrophic Terrorism* in *Foreign Affairs* , (Nov 1998). One might discount Mr. Carter, but there are others. The Pentagon and FBI have both publicly stated that it is a matter of when not if, a terrorist attack is launched on US soil. In May 2000, on NBC's *Meet the Press* Defense Secretary William Cohen stated, "an attack on American soil . is not only possible, but probable." NEST (Nuclear Emergency Search Team) issued the same warning in August 1997 (AP Newswires, 8/21/97), when the question became not a matter of 'if' but 'when' a terrorist nuclear device is detonated on United States soil. The first step is a coherent policy that involves understanding the characters and issues. This requires a far greater understanding of the situation and cultures than we have been afforded thus far by those individuals charged with the task of devising reasonable, rational, and appropriate policy. Mr. Chasdi's contributions, while not directed at the cultural ignorance we are replete with and have been for a very long

time, but he takes a first step toward explanation and analysis of the topic.

[2]. Chasdi utilizes work done by several individuals who have provided substantive work in this area and related areas. The author suggests that what has been written thus far on the subject matter is "vacuous" from an empirical standpoint. Albert Reiss and Jeffrey Roth were editors of a text, *Understanding and Preventing Violence* (1993), in which they suggested intervention to reduce the chance of further violence in conflict areas: Intervention through economic, medical, or financial assistance. In so doing, such aid would deflate the tension in the region or area. Edward F. Mickolous has written several texts and articles that contributed vastly (given his first text was written in the mid 1970' s) to the area of terrorism. Bard E. O'Neill wrote one of the earliest texts on Palestinian resistance and the typologies of the movement. One source Mr. Chasdi does not use, yet has contributed to the field, Stephen Sloan of the University of Oklahoma. He has contributed to, and written several texts on the general subject of terrorism and policy.

[3]. Unlike a text whose thesis argues or defends or suggests a certain perspective, Chasdi simply presents his evidence, includes the theories of those who have written previously on the subject, offers on occasion his opinion of what works better, but does not root through the theories and suggest one as being better or superior to another. This goes to his objective on bringing more science to the study of terrorism. Science is not a field that is typically associated with the same fervent desire as the social sciences to argue and discount theories in favor of a better theory. Rarely (and I do not recall any) does Chasdi comment negatively or critically on other theories.

[4]. Response to this position will include the actions of the Islamic jihad versus the actions of the contras or Mujahdin. Respectfully I would submit it depends entirely on your perspective and that is a serious issue we need to consider

when attempting to understand terrorist activity in the Middle East.

[5]. Mr. Chasdi's 1995 dissertation at Purdue University, *The Dynamics of Middle East Terrorism, 1968-1993: A Functional Typology of Terrorist Group-types* clearly functioned as the cornerstone upon which he developed materials for this book and included the years 1968 through 1993.

[6]. Beginning at a random point in time creates serious problems with all further analysis of the issues. Understandably, and I have tried to show an understanding and appreciation as to the possible reasons underlying the choice of the years selected, one must begin some where in a review of materials. In this particular instance, due to the issues involved and the current environment of blame and counter-blame for acts committed (historical background), to have included perhaps one further chapter dealing with the pre-1968 events and groups would have resolved this issue for all intents and purposes. Finally, it must be stated that Mr. Chasdi does delve into pre-1968 discussion with regard to selected terrorist groups. He discusses in chapter four some of the pre-1968 history of the groups selected.

[7]. Despite his best intentions and faith in those empowered to understand events transpiring in Iran, President Carter's policy toward Iran could not be viewed as anything but an inept failure. In many respects, we brought upon ourselves the crisis of 1979, in Iran. The evidence was there for everyone to see quite clearly had analysts understood the Islamic faith and Iranian culture. Mr. Carter was led down the path and the results were for all intents and purposes, ordained by our failed policy. Mr. Reagan's policy toward Iran and Iraq was not very different and in some respects aided in the creation of a power vacuum in the Middle East. One could also argue that because of those early Reagan policies, Iraq became the military giant it did become and the resulting problems in Kuwait were the consequence. Under

President Bush, our policy toward Iraq did not reflect any indication that analysts understood the culture or existing system any better into the 1990's than in the 1980's. Mr. Clinton's policies toward various countries in the Middle East were equally reckless demonstrating quite clearly that policy analysts remain under-equipped to provide competent information on the region. On the actions by President's Carter and Reagan please see James Bill's *The Shah, The Ayatollah and the US* (1988); Amir Taheri's *Nest of Spies: America's Journey to Disaster in Iran* (1988); David Menashri's *Iran: A Decade of War and Revolution* (1990); Gary Sick's *All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran* (1985); R.K. Ramazani's *Iran's Revolution* (1990). There are many other texts on this subject as these are but a fraction of what is available and the above listing is not exclusive of still other pertinent scholarship on the subject.

[8]. Mr. Chasdi discusses the Reagan preemptive retaliation effort and Mr. Clinton's Sudanese actions on page 20.

[9]. The author arrives at his definition after extensive review of many other proposed definitions from: the US State Department, Louis Rene Beres, Emmerich de Vattel, Alberico Gentili, as well as implicit through UN treaties which he discusses at length in his notes on pages 43-48.

[10]. This does not impute legitimacy to the grievances and claims of all individuals or groups opposed to their respective government, Israel, or American policy. Rather the explanation applies to some of those who choose violence. They believe that they are impotent to change a bad policy (as they define such) and when ignored and marginalized, find no alternative, but violence. This is equally true when their opposition efforts are met with violence by a government. Over a period of time, they are no longer willing to tolerate either the marginalizing or violence against them.

[11]. On page 24, Chasdi explains that "compounding the manner even more were middle term explanatory factors, such as British offers of devolution to Arab and Jewish Palestinians that were accepted in a full-blown way by many Jewish officials and rejected outright by Arab Palestinian officials."

[12] See pages 119 - 121 for more information regarding Kahane and Kach.

Copyright (c) 2001 by H-Net, all rights reserved. This work may be copied for non-profit educational use if proper credit is given to the author and the list. For other permission, please contact H-Net@H-Net.MSU.EDU.

If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at
<https://networks.h-net.org/h-diplo>

Citation: Frank Chartrand. Review of Chasdi, Richard J. *Serenade of Suffering: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism 1968-1993*. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. January, 2001.

URL: <https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=4830>



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No
Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.