Hope Millard Harrison. Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 345 S. EUR 39.56 (gebunden), ISBN 978-0-691-09678-0.
Reviewed by Mathilde von Buelow (School of History, University of Nottingham)
Published on H-German (November, 2006)
The Tail that Wagged the Dog
The construction of the Berlin Wall marked a crucial juncture in the Cold War. For nearly thirty years, it sealed and symbolized the ideological and physical division of Germany, Europe and the world. How did it come to the building of the Berlin Wall, and who was ultimately responsible for that decision? These are questions that scholars have sought to answer ever since August 13, 1961, when the Wall's construction first began. Constrained by a lack of access to Soviet bloc sources, Cold War traditionalists and revisionists alike have approached the Berlin Wall crisis mainly from a Western perspective.[1] They generally argue, though for different reasons, that the decision to build the Wall was dictated to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, who, in November 1958, initiated the second Berlin crisis. Only the end of the Cold War and the subsequent opening (or partial opening in the case of Russia, for instance) of previously inaccessible archives has made it possible for scholars to reassess this argument and to examine the eastern perspective on the Berlin Wall crisis.
Hope M. Harrison is one of these scholars.[2] Her fascinating monograph is one of the latest academic works to tackle the construction of the Berlin Wall. It is also the latest scholarly work to analyze the alliance relations between Moscow and East Berlin during the years leading up to the Berlin Wall crisis, focusing in particular on Khrushchev's rapport with his East German counterpart, Walter Ulbricht.[3] To get to the bottom of this important yet understudied relationship, Harrison has conducted extensive research in East German and Russian archives and has carried out interviews with former East German and Soviet officials and observers. Her lens is broad, allowing for an examination of both sides of the Soviet-East German, Khrushchev-Ulbricht relationship. Thus chapter 1 takes as its starting point the death of Stalin in March 1953 and analyzes East Berlin's reactions to Moscow's "New Course" before and after the June 1953 uprising in the GDR. The following chapter examines East German reactions to Khrushchev's "secret speech" before the twentieth congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956 urging further de-Stalinization, and to the crises in Poland and Hungary later that year. Chapters 3 and 4 then turn to the Berlin crisis itself, analyzing Soviet and East German motives, interests and strategies from 1958 until the end of 1961. In all of these chapters, Harrison addresses seven key themes: "(1) Soviet vacillations about what policy to follow regarding the GDR; (2) Ulbricht's resistance to alleviating his harsh socialist policies; (3) the East German refugee problem and conflicting views on how to resolve it; (4) East German economic difficulties and divergent views about how to handle them; (5) the precariousness of the East German regime in the face of challenges from West Germany and West Berlin; (6) Soviet policy preferences versus real policy implementation on the ground in the GDR; and (7) conflicting Soviet and East German tendencies regarding establishing legitimacy versus control in the GDR" (p. 12).
By approaching the Berlin crisis in this manner, Harrison demonstrates that Ulbricht and the East German regime played a much greater role in the decision to build the Wall than traditionally assumed, because, "[t]o a large degree, the policies carried out in the GDR and East Berlin were formulated by the East Germans, not the Soviets, and were often implemented against Soviet wishes" (p. 9). Harrison thus concludes that it "is not possible to really grasp how the Cold War evolved in Germany and why the Berlin Wall came to be built without understanding the personalities, policies, and preferences of both Ulbricht and Khrushchev" (p. 231). According to Harrison, several factors made it possible for Ulbricht to manipulate, modify or ignore the Kremlin's intentions regarding Berlin, the East German economy and the refugee problem. These include the GDR's geographic location, its distance from Moscow and its strategic as well as symbolic importance to the Kremlin. In addition, Ulbricht influenced Khrushchev by playing on the latter's personal dedication to socialism; he benefited from rivalries among the Soviet leadership and even the developing Sino-Soviet rift. "Just as Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy perceived West Berlin and West Germany as a 'superdomino,'" Harrison claims, "Khrushchev treated East Germany as a 'super-ally,' an ally of the greatest importance to Soviet security and prestige, the loss of which was to be avoided at all costs" (p. 7). East Germany's weakness thus became a strength, allowing Ulbricht--both literally and figuratively--to drive Khrushchev up the wall.
Harrison's argument is meticulously researched, lucid and compelling. It places Soviet-East German relations between 1953 and 1961 into a wider historical context, including that of the East-West struggle and the Sino-Soviet split. It engages critically with Cold War historiography and points to ongoing gaps in our knowledge. Harrison argues convincingly that studies on the Cold War cannot focus exclusively on the superpowers and security issues but must also take into account factors such as the non-great powers, personality, ideology and domestic politics. By focusing precisely on such factors, this monograph provides valuable and fresh insight into the dynamics of Moscow's alliance relations, notably with East Berlin, which appear to have been just as complex and malleable as those between the United States and its Western European allies, including Bonn. The volume therefore makes a significant contribution to our understanding not only of the Berlin Wall crisis but also of the complex nature of the relationship between strong patron-states and their weak clients. As such, Hope Harrison's study will be an indispensable tool for all scholars and students of the Cold War and of diplomacy, statecraft and crisis-management at large.
Notes
[1]. See, for instance, Honore M. Catudal, Kennedy and the Berlin Wall Crisis: A Case Study in U.S. Decision-Making (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1980); John P. S. Gearson and Kori Schake, eds., The Berlin Wall Crisis: Perspectives on Cold War Alliances (London: Palgrave, 2002); Rolf Steininger, Der Mauerbau. Die Westmächte und Adenauer in der Berlinkrise 1958-1963 (Munich: Olzog, 2001); Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
[2]. Others include Michael Lemke, Die Berlinkrise 1958 bis 1963. Interessen und Handlungsspielräume im Ost-West-Konflikt (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995); Gerhard Wettig, "Die UdSSR und die Krise um Berlin. Ultimatum 1958--Mauerbau 1961--Modus Vivendi 1971," Deutschland Archiv 34 (2001): pp. 592-613; Vladislav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962)," Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Working Paper No. 6 (May 1993).
[3]. This monograph builds on Harrison's dissertation (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1994) on the same topic, as well as a number of research papers Harrison subsequently published through the CWIHP and scholarly journals.
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Citation:
Mathilde von Buelow. Review of Harrison, Hope Millard, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961.
H-German, H-Net Reviews.
November, 2006.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=12573
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