No restrictions (but 19th and 20th century preferred) for papers.
Theoretical and empirical papers are welcome.
Applicants should focus on economic history.
Participants should be willing to publish their paper in our anthology.
Juergen Nautz (University of Kassel; University of Vienna) * and Maria Eugénia Mata (Universidade Nova de Lisboa) are organizing a session on the subject of “Ethnic, Religious, or Cultural Plurality and Economic Institution Building” for the 14th World Congress of the International Economic History Association to be held in Helsinki, in Summer 2006.
In preparation for this panel we plan a pre-conference. Participants are responsible for their traveling expenses, the cost for attending the conference are about 450 Euro, including 3 nights (single occupation) and all meals, and conference service, 500 Euro for 4 nights. Last time we were able to cover the most of the traveling cost of our participants. We’ll do our best that we can reimburse the participants of our pre-conference and are very hopeful that we will have success. But we can’t guarantee a reimbursement at this time, but we will have the information a half year before the pre-conference latest. For the conference in Helsinki participants have to help themselves. Deadline for paper proposals: October, 15, 2004
Deadline for paper submission: May, 1, 2005
Please submit your proposals to Juergen Nautz Juergen.firstname.lastname@example.org.
Your application should contain:
(1) an abstract of not more than 1,500 words
(2) a short CV of not more than 300 words
(3) affiliation, and address.
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THIS PROJECT:
Economic and social sets of human rights (like political and civil rights) have been primarily defined as individual rights. John Rawls for instance deals with the problem "how a society should determine what constitutes a basic set of rights and thus constitutes justice: each of us should go behind a metaphorical veil of ignorance where we determine what we think outrights should be with no knowledge of what our actual economic standing, educational level, gender, or ethnic origin would be." (Nikolas K. Gvosdev) The individual and methodological individualism are basic assumptions of Western economic theory (Neoclassical economic theory or New Institutional Economics).
History and also the experience of our days provide a number of examples that the individual doesn't ignore its group relationship. This applies to family relationships just like for religious, cultural or ethnic senses of belonging. One perhaps also can talk about a splitting between individuals with strong group identity and monadic individuals with no ties to others: If we accept that individual people are defined by their group membership, which thus differentiates them from others in society, we must take attention to the effects of this identity to the functioning and the structure of economic institutions and organizations; and of course to institutional change. In their analysis of the limits of institutional competition in the development of the European Economic and Monetary Union Daniel Kiwit and Stefan Voigt have reached the conclusion that external institutions that discriminate are frequently supported by a society's internal institutions. External institutions such as an economic order are supported by the population when their substance is in harmony with the society's internal institutions. Only then is their legitimacy and survival guaranteed.
History provides a wealth of illustrations for this theory. For instance if this argument is applied to the ethnic interests within the Habsburg empire, evidence can be found to support such a position. This is true both of the successful Czech efforts to develop their own banking system and industrial structure as well as Hungarian industrialization policies.
Economic and monetary policy and their results affect different social segments and groups of economic subjects differently and have distributional and social policy consequences. For this reason, interest groups try to influence the formulation of the economic and monetary order as well as economic, monetary and fiscal policy. In the Habsburg Monarchy this expressed itself in the competition between the political representatives of the various nationalities for mobile resources. To the extent that they possessed their own external institutions (laws, state ordinances etc.), as in the case of the Germans and Hungarians they also made use of them. Competition using external institutions was a characteristic but not the only feature of the rivalry between the Austrian and Hungarian lands. A second component, the only one available to the national minorities in the two halves of the empire, was competition using internal institutions (social mores, morality, language etc.: "Pláè koruny èeské"). This was done by criticizing real or imagined political, social and economic discrimination as well as emphasizing values such as national self-determination, protection of ethnic, cultural or linguistic identity and cohesion etc. The ethnically oriented organizations pinned their hopes in a new definition of the citizen that no longer emphasized the position of the individual as a citizen, but his role as a member of an ethnic group. In the Roman Empire Jews possessed the status of a religio licita, and as such enjoyed specific rights as Jews like the right not to work on the Sabbath. Such rights were not granted to an individual Jew but to the Jewish collective. This distinguished them for example of the Celts. The millet system of the Ottoman Empire - a further example - defined each group in the state via their religious community with the consequence that inhabitants of the same town or village had different rights and duties, dependent on their faith. Further examples of a tension relationship between group interests and central economic institutions are found also in other societies. It is therefore meaningful and productive to deal with this problem definition: "ethnic, religious or/and cultural plurality and economic institution building".
This project doesn't intend a discourse about the well-known associations question, cartels, labor unions or similar. The interaction shall rather be examined between central economic institutions and the social plurality or fragmentation, according to the definition of Arend Lejphardt. When a society is deeply divided among different ethnic groups, democratic politics that emphasize individual rights and liberties may contradict with ethnic collective demands. Thus, scholars like Lijphard claim that it is not democracy but the "type" of democratic institutions that matter in conflict management in ethnically or religious plural societies. These scholars consider political institutions a means in ameliorating violence in ethnically plural nations. Therefore, according to them, a democratic political system may be problematic unless proper political institutions are established for the accommodation of ethnic differences. They suggest consensus and decentralized (federal) type of democratic institutions as more feasible alternatives for these societies than majoritarian and centralized (unitary) democratic institutions. Democratic politics can be considered as a competition for the representation of various interests in politics, meaning rule by the "people." However, in multi-ethnic nations there might be a gap between the interests that are represented in the state and the demands that are raised by the "people" because the society is divided into different linguistic, cultural, or religious sects. When the society is sharply divided along such lines, the legitimacy of democracy may be questioned from each group's own perspective according to whether their interests and preferences are reflected in public policy. For some groups democratic governments may not have any legitimacy unless they have representation and influence over policies. As important constituents of modern politics, ethnic groups may aim at the promotion of their cultural, socioeconomic, and political goals. Although most democratic states recognize individual rights equally for each citizen regardless of his ethnic, cultural, or religious background, this does not seem to hamper the development of certain collective demands such as quotas for ethnic representation in the political system or local political autonomy. In some cases ethnic groups mobilize against the state through separatist movements claiming their own nation. Accordingly, democracy may not always ameliorate political violence in ethnically plural societies. Ethnic cleavages are said to lay the ground for conflicting issues in politics. For example, the French in Canada or the Basques in Spain are two ethnic nationalities; one was relatively poor (Quebec) and the other wealthy (Basque), that seek ultimate formal collective recognition contends that ethnically plural Western democracies face difficulties in accommodating multinationalism within a single state. The German-speaking people of the Italian Tyrol were not content with the dominant political rule.
The institutional perspective asserts that the function of democracy may become problematic in multi-ethnic societies if institutional arrangements are made without taking ethnic divisions into consideration. Arend Lijphart coined the term "consociationalism" to describe the sharing of power between segments of society joined together by a common citizenship but divided by ethnicity, language, religion, or other factors. Some rights are given, therefore, to communities rather than to individuals, resulting in over- or under-representation for individuals from some areas of society. (One long-standing example is the creation of the United States Senate. Each state gets two senators; geographic equality. Alaska, with 400,000 people, has two senators, while California, with thirty million people, also has two senators. Alaskans are over-represented in the Senate by a factor of approximately 100 compared to Californians. This exists even though in the United States we uphold the principle of one person, one vote.) A number of countries are openly and deliberately governed by the principles of "consociationalism." These include Belgium, South Africa, Zimbabwe, India, the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, Cyprus, etc.
In this project we want to discuss two fundamental questions for every economic cooperation (regularly discussed under the premise of cooperation between sovereign states): Are the advantages of the cooperation great enough in her sum to compensate for the possible disadvantages? Is the incentive to observe the agreements for every one involved great enough to ensure the cohesion of the cooperation?
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